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An auditor assesses the risk that financial accounts, offered to him (her) for certification 
of the truth and fairness, contain a material error.  He (she) may rely on this 
assessment by reducing his (her) substantive audit effort when the risk is deemed to be 
low.  So it is reasonable to expect that this risk assessment is consistent with the 
outcome of his audit in terms of the size of the error found and in terms of estimates of 
the real risk that can be based on this error.  By engaging in the research reported in 
this thesis (in 1996) I tried to fill a gap in the knowledge on this issue.  Many persons 
and organisations have contributed to its realisation.  I am very grateful to all of them. 
 
In the first place I mention the ‘Algemene Rekenkamer’, the Netherlands Court of Audit 
(NCA), I had the pleasure to work for from 1986 until 2005.  These nineteen years I 
spent as a statistical consultant, in a context where there is place for questions, 
curiosity, amazement.  This not only because of the scepticism which, maybe, is a 
necessary condition for a proper execution of the task of a court of audit, but also 
because of interest in improving the audit profession.  So I was given the opportunity to 
engage in my research, not only by being given the time, but also by numerous 
discussions with my colleagues, almost without exception highly interested. 
 
In the second place I mention the Limperg Instituut (LI), which gave me an appointment 
for a day a week from 1996 through 2004.  In this time I did the research, reported it to 
the organisations which participated by giving access to their data and started to write 
this thesis. 
 
In the third place I mention the organisations which were willing to give me the 
necessary data.  Without their disinterested cooperation, this research would have been 
impossible.  Our agreement on anonymity forbids mentioning names, also of people in 
these organisations who have greatly contributed to the ideas in this thesis. 
 
I mention the Steering Group Statistical Audit, in which the many discussions on the 
use of sampling and the validity of risk assessment were a great stimulus to start and 
continue this research. 
 
I mention the “Kenniskring Steekproeven” (the ‘Statistical Auditors of the Round Table’), 
a peer group of auditors from governmental audit organisations, interested in the 
application of statistical sampling in auditing.  They bore my imperfect knowledge of 
accounting and auditing, my still confronting them with my questions and half bred 
ideas regarding (improvement of) risk assessment and stimulated me to continue my 
research, by always showing their interest and stressing the relevance of my questions. 
 
I mention with pleasure and gratitude the many discussions with Henk Kuenen, Berrie 
Zielman, Martin Dees, Jurrie Vos, Marion van Dam, Nur Acardag and many other 
colleagues of the NCA, with Fred Drieënhuizen, Chris Hibbitt and Marcelle Weisfelt of 
the LI, with Paul van Batenburg of Deloitte and Touche, who spent many hours 
discussing with me the (im)possibilities of validating risks and other topics in statistical 
auditing, with Martien van Zuijlen of the Radboud University, who has such a gentle 
way in getting people to clarify their problem, with Hein Kloosterman, Niek de Jager, 
Ruud Veenstra, Lucas Hoogduin, Jacques de Swart, members of the steering group 
and also partners in some subprojects, with Roelof Helmers (CWI), who also spent 
much time with me in exploring possible relations in my risk indicators data set and with 
Hans Moors, who gave feed back on the statistical parts of the manuscript.   
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I thank Jack Franklin for being so kind to read the whole manuscript and correct the 
English where necessary. (It was never meant to conceal the fact that I am not a native 
speaker). 
 
I thank the members of the reading committee for spending their time in reading my 
manuscript and providing me with valuable comments; these certainly led to 
improvement of my thesis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
In the audit risk approach, the assessment of the occurrence risk is crucial.  This thesis 
intends to validate this assessment with the observed error rate and related criteria.  
The motivation for this goal is given ( section 1.1) followed by an introduction into the 
audit risk model, which is the context for risk assessment (section 1.2).  This 
introduction includes a closer look at the concept of audit risk (1.2.6). 
1.1  Quest for the real risk 
 
Common audit practice uses risk analysis (assessment1 of the risk of not discovering an 
error of a material size, the “audit risk"2) in two ways: (1) it guides the auditor in the 
choice of his/her audit objects (in this thesis: "the primary allocation"), (2) when the risk 
is assessed to be low, risk analysis may replace a part of the substantive tests of details 
or other substantive procedures (in this thesis: "the secondary allocation") and 
sometimes even all of these tests.  This practice is part of the so-called “audit risk 
approach”.  I first met it as a statistical consultant at the Netherlands Court of Audit 
(starting 1986).  It is still observed to be common practice in a statement of the Panel 
on Audit Effectiveness in POB (2000, p.33): "The major reason for the auditor’s risk 
assessment activities is to provide a basis for determining the nature, timing and extent 
of substantive tests to be performed to provide a reasonable assurance the auditor 
needs about the reliability of the assertions that are embedded in the financial 
statements." 
 
As a formalisation of this approach, the audit departments of the Dutch ministries base 
the extent of substantive testing on a table which gives the reliability still to be 
generated by an audit sample, with IR, ICR and RAR as arguments (see HCDAD, 
1997).  All departments (may) use this table, regardless the specific qualities of their 
risk assessment.  The uniformity in the use of the tables can only be justified when the 
audit approaches and the risk assessments of all users of these tables are also uniform.  
Partly this uniformity is realised, because all departments use the same handbook, 
maintain professional exchange and share education.  But in many cases differences 
are visible without much effort.  And, also with risks assessed in accordance with 
professional standards, there is no guarantee that an assessment “low” by one auditor 
represents the same risk as the same assessment by another one. The same or even 
more severe lack of guarantee applies to assessments compared between 
departments.   
This lack of uniformity is confirmed in the report of the Panel of Audit Effectiveness 
(POB 2000, p 34, 37) which reports large variability in sizes of samples designed by 
different members, even of the same audit department of an audit firm, who come to the 
same formal risk assessment. 
 
These observations led to questions like: 
• Is the audit risk approach (formalized as the audit risk model,(ARM, see among 
many others: POB, 2000 (pp 175-179), NIVRA, 1989, Arens & Loebbecke, 1997 
(pp 257-264),  ISA 200 par. 16) justified, insofar it allows the auditor to replace 
                                                          
1 "Assessment" is a term which is part of natural language; it is that "primitive" that the IAASB 
Handbook 2004 does not think it necessary to define it.  Because of the central role it plays in 
this thesis, we still give a description of it in the glossary. 
2 Italicized words refer to concepts that are defined in the glossary. 
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substantive tests of details, or other substantive procedures, by the information 
from risk analysis? 
• Is this practice validated in some way or another?   
• Has the above mentioned table of the governmental audit departments in the 
Netherlands been validated? 
 
An answer to these questions should come either from earlier empirical research, or 
from research by the audit organisation itself.  Our chapter 3 will show that research 
fails to give a satisfactory answer.  Moreover the audit organisations I discussed these 
questions with did not try to do the necessary empirical research, so I decided to start 
my own empirical research, from a question that can be seen as generic for these 
validation/ justification questions:  
 
Generic question 
"Does risk assessment by an auditor represent the ‘real risk’ of a material error?".  
 
But because of difficulties concerning a concept like "real risk" I decided to investigate 
something more simple: "Is there a satisfactory relation between risk assessment on 
the one hand and error rate, and some measures derived from it, on the other?".  This 
is the basic research question and it will be leading for the investigations and further be 
elaborated in this thesis.  The basic question is formulated as follows: 
 
Basic research question: 
“Is there a satisfactory relation of the assessed risk with the error rate as found in an 
audit, or with other measures, derived from it, that may be seen as an indicator for the 
risk of a material error?”.  
 
I wanted to deal with this question with real life data as a source, so I decided to 
perform a field study, with ‘real risk assessments’ and with ‘real error rates’.  Chapter 5 
will explain this in more detail. 
 
1.2  The audit risk model in auditing 
 
The aim of auditing is to give an opinion on the quality of a financial statement (see 
among many others: ISA 200, par. 2).  In principle, this opinion is of the form: "My 
opinion is that the annual accounts do not contain an error of material size, except for 
an acceptable risk that my opinion may be false because of not having detected a 
material misstatement ".  
 
In this opinion "material misstatement" or "material error" means a misstatement of a 
size as to influence the economic decisions of users of the annual accounts (see e.g. 
Handbook IAASB 2004, p.141).  In practice the choice of a level of materiality is 
governed by conventions, which are the result of experience, negotiations of users and 
auditors and public opinion.  In Dutch governmental administrations, a level of 1% of the 
account size is usually considered ‘material’, with private companies 5% of the profit is 
not unusual.  The risk of giving a false opinion is called the audit risk (AR, see ISA 400 
par 3); in general a maximum for the audit risk of 5% is deemed to be acceptable.  
 
In order to deal with the audit risk, the so-called "audit risk model" is in use. The crux of 
this model is twofold:  
1. it decomposes the audit risk into two components: the occurrence risk and the 
detection risk; 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 3
2. it is hoped and assumed that the assessment of the occurrence risk provides so 
much assurance as to the absence of a material error, that the total cost of the 
audit (the detection activities included) will be less than the costs of an audit 
purely based on detection activities (see again POB 2000, p.33). 
.  
The two components of the decomposition of the audit risk can be introduced as 
follows: 
For the first component the leading question is: “What is (prior to the audit), the risk of 
the existence of a material misstatement or error in the accounts?” The auditor will 
try to assess this occurrence risk, OR.   
For the second component the leading question is: “What is the risk of not detecting a 
material misstatement, although it is in the accounts?” The auditor will try to control 
this detection risk, DR, by a proper planning of the audit.  
Both OR and DR are decomposed in their turn: OR in the inherent risk and the control 
risk (see 1.2.1), DR in the risk of analytical review and the sampling risk (see 1.2.2). 
Clearly the audit risk will be a function of the occurrence risk and the detection risk.  In 
this thesis the assessment of the occurrence risk will be the object of validation.  We will 
go deeper into its assessment. 
 
1.2.1 The occurrence risk 
 
In assessing the occurrence risk (OR) the auditor will decompose the factors to be 
assessed into two types: (1) those regarding the inherent risk and (2) those regarding 
the internal control risk or control risk.  He will see OR as a function of the inherent risk 
(IR) and the control risk (CR): 
   OR= f(IR,CR). 
 
ISA 400 (par. 4) gives the next definition for inherent risk:  
 
Definition of inherent risk: 
“Inherent risk” is the susceptibility of an account balance or class of transactions to 
misstatement that could be material, individually or when aggregated with 
misstatements in other balances or classes, assuming that there are no related internal 
controls. 
 
Essentially, the inherent risk regards the risk of a material error due to factors that 
cannot be, or are not controlled by the business and administrative processes.  It can 
be seen as the risk originating from the context, like environment, type of activity of the 
business, etc..  ISA 400 (par. 12) states factors on which the inherent risk is dependent, 
some of them being: 
• the integrity of management 
• managements experience and knowledge 
• changes in management 
• pressure on employees 
• the nature of the business 
 
Many of the business and administrative processes are designed to control the risks 
given with the context. The control risk regards the risk due to the fact that these 
business and administrative processes cannot control every possible mistake or 
misstatement.  The leading question in assessing this risk is: will the business 
processes, in particular the administrative processes and related controls, prevent 
material errors?  And if not, will these controls detect and correct them?  The quality of 
these processes determines the internal control risk, ICR, or (synonymously) control 
risk, CR, defined as ISA 400 (par. 5) does:   
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Definition of control risk: 
“Control risk” is the risk that a misstatement, that could occur in an account balance or 
class of transactions and that could be material individually or when aggregated with 
misstatements in other balances or classes, will not be prevented or detected and 
corrected on a timely basis by the accounting and internal control systems. 
 
ISA 400 summarises components of the ‘control environment’ (par 8)  and goes into the 
question how the auditor can get an “understanding of the business” and how control 
risk can be assessed by means of tests of control.  We mention: 
• verification that a transaction has been authorised 
• inquiries about and observation of internal controls which leave no audit trail 
• reperformance of internal controls, for example reconciliation of bank accounts 
(par 30) 
 
The auditor investigates the processes and related controls as to their design and their 
existence as well as to their operation; their operation is assessed by means of tests of 
control.  From these assessments and analyses the auditor assesses the control risk 
(CR).  Together with the inherent risk (IR) it forms the occurrence risk (OR).  So OR can 
be seen as a function of inherent and control risk.   
 
This function is sometimes viewed as just a function, without further specifications, and 
otherwise as the multiplication of IR and CR, (see also 1.2.5).  Many auditors do not 
separately consider IR and CR, because in their assessment some factors can both be 
accounted for in IR and in CR (see e.g. Touw & Hoogduin (2002), pp. 13,14).   
 
This thesis focuses on the occurrence risk, because of the practice just mentioned, and 
because the combined inherent risk and control risk are the risks an auditor has to deal 
with in his planning and execution of the audit.  This occurrence risk is taken as a fact 
for the auditor, once he starts his detection activities, by means of substantive 
procedures. 
 
Definition of substantive proecedures 
“Substantive procedures” are concerned with amounts, aimed at obtaining audit 
evidence to detect material misstatements in the financial statements, (see ISA 530, 
par.17).   
 
The decomposition of the audit risk can be depicted as in figure 1.1.  The 
decomposition of the detection risk will be discussed in 1.2.2. 
 
Figure 1.1: Decomposition of the audit risk 
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Our discussion of the audit risk enables us to formulate the generic question in section 
1.1 more precisely as: 
 
Does the occurrence risk, as assessed by the auditor represent the ‘real risk’ of a 
material error?3 
 
1.2.2 The detection risk 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the decomposition of the audit risk in occurrence risk and detection 
risk.  In this subsection we discuss the detection risk. 
 
Definition of detection risk: 
“Detection risk” is the risk that substantive procedures will not detect a misstatement 
that exists in an account balance or class of transactions and that could be material, 
individually or when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes. (see 
ISA 400 par 6).   
 
The detection risk is broken down into the "risk of analytical review" (RAR) and the 
"sampling risk" (SR): 
DR=f(RAR,SR). 
 
Definition of risk of analytical review: 
The “risk of analytical review” (RAR) is the risk that analytical procedures will not result 
in the detection of a misstatement that exists in an account balance or class of 
transactions that could be material, individually or when aggregated with misstatements 
in other balances or classes (see ISA 520 par. 10-15, where only reliance on analytical 
procedures is discussed). 4 
 
Analytical procedures play a role both in the planning phase and in the completion 
phase of the audit, as we will see in the next subsection.  If possible the auditor also 
decides on the risk of not detecting a material error by way of a (statistical) sample, 
more comprehensively defined as:  
 
Definition of sampling risk 
“Sampling risk” (SR) arises from the possibility that the auditor’s conclusion, based on a 
sample, may be different from the conclusion reached if the entire population were 
subjected to the same audit procedure.” (see ISA 530 par. 7).  
 
Sampling risk plays a role in the planning and in the completion stage, as we will also 
see in the next subsection.   
 
 
                                                          
3 For an error found, the auditor will investigate its kind, cause and consequences.  This may 
also lead to the conclusion that the error regards fraud.  So our research will also apply to the 
risk regarding fraud.  Sometimes an investigation is aimed specifically at discovering fraud and 
then extra tools are used. 
Our research regards the regular audits, which allows conclusions as to predictability of fraud, 
but does not apply to these extra tools. 
 
4 It is a remarkable that neither ISA nor SAS explicitly define the risk of analytical review, where 
at the same time it has an explicit place in HCDAD (1997) and in handbooks of various big firms.  
And it has a place in the practice of auditing. 
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1.2.3 Planning of the audit 
 
Having assessed the occurrence risk, as discussed, by observing and making an 
analysis of the business, its context and its (administrative) processes, the auditor can 
start to plan the audit.  In this planning stage, his knowledge of the inherent risks and 
the quality of the administrative procedures and internal controls will play a key role in 
allocating the audit resources, the primary allocation, as we introduced it in section 1.1 
(figure 1.2, arrow 1a).   
 
In accordance with ISA 520 (par. 2, 7) the auditor will apply analytical procedures, to 
get a better view where other audit procedures should be applied.  So next to the 
assessment of OR, analytical procedures play a role in the primary allocation of audit 
resources (figure 1.2, arrow 1b).  They also play a role in the testing and completion 
stage of the audit and at other stages where analytical review is more effective or 
efficient than tests of details (arrow 2b).  Both the analytical activities in the planning 
and in the testing and completion stage imply the "risk of analytical review"5.   
 
Once the primary allocation has been decided upon - the audit objects, the parts of the 
annual accounts and their context that will be subjected to the ongoing audit have been 
determined - a set of detection activities is planned for these parts.  These detection 
activities will consist of substantive procedures: substantive testing (also tests of detail, 
arrow 2a) and/ or analytical review (arrow 2b).  A minimum of substantive procedures is 
always required (see ISA 330, par 49).  Dependent on the nature of and the extent to 
which these procedures are performed, the auditor runs a detection risk (DR), the 
combination of sampling risk (SR) and risk of analytical review (RAR).  As a rule, he 
plans the substantive procedures to an extent as resulting in an audit risk of at most the 
maximum that he (and his auditee and society) is prepared to accept (mostly 5%).  This 
makes the planned maximum for the detection risk dependent on OR.  To complete the 
picture, the audit activities lead to an audit opinion, with a planned maximum for the 
audit risk (AR).  In summary: this audit risk is controlled by the assessed occurrence 
risk, the planned risk of analytical review and the planned sampling risk (figure 1.2, 
arrows 3a, 3b, 3c).   
 
As a rule there are many observations and findings that are worthwhile to be reported to 
management, also when these do not directly influence the audit opinion.  These 
findings may result from every audit activity and lead to the so-called "management 
letter" (arrows 4a, 4b, 4c), in which these findings are reported and management is 
given some advice where necessary or useful in the opinion of the auditor.  As far as 
business process analysis (BPA) is performed, this will certainly contribute to this 
management letter (arrow 4d).  BPA may also affect the assessment of OR (arrow 5).  
BPA will be discussed in subsection 1.2.7.  Figure 1.2 depicts the relations we just 
discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 With this decomposition of DR, there is an inconsistency in the audit risk model: RAR is seen 
as component of DR, but to the extent that analytic review plays a role in the audit planning, the 
associated risk is not defined.  In this thesis RAR will not play a role, because it is not a part of 
OR. 
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Figure 1.2: Audit planning in accordance with the audit risk model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the points discussed above we should make the following remarks. 
 
Remark 1: The audit opinion rests on three types of activities. 
In the discussion above this was already mentioned.  But it is interesting enough to 
stress it in an explicit remark. The activities, also depicted in figure 1.2, are: (1) 
substantive testing or other substantive procedures, (2) analytical review and (3) the 
outcome of risk analysis itself: the assessment of the occurrence risk. 
 
Remark 2: Substantive procedures give the most direct evidence. 
Substantive testing and some forms of analytical review, give the most direct evidence 
as to the truth and fairness of the account under audit. Individual book-values are tested 
for their correctness.  The aggregate of errors found in the tests gives an estimate of 
the size of the total error in the audited account (arrow 3c).  In principle, the level of risk 
associated with the audit opinion is largely determined by the size of the sample that is 
taken from the account.  In many cases this sample is selected on a random basis, 
allowing sound statistical inference on the error rate.  This inference as a rule, is done 
by giving a point estimate (most likely error, MLE), together with a confidence upper 
limit (upper error limit UEL) at a confidence level that corresponds to the desired "level 
of assurance".  "Assurance", also “audit assurance” is the complement of audit risk: 
when, for instance, the audit risk equals 10%, the audit assurance equals 90%. When 
substantive tests are the only basis for the audit opinion, statistical laws exactly produce 
the level of audit assurance, or equivalently audit risk, associated with the audit opinion, 
provided the tests were selected on a statistical basis.  The secondary allocation 
especially determines the size of the audit samples.  
 
Remark 3:  Sampling risk is used in the planning and in the evaluation. 
In the planning stage the sample is planned at a size such that a maximum for this SR  
(‘the 5%’) will not be exceeded, when the actual error is equal to the materiality.  Once 
the sample has been audited, the likelihood can be calculated that the real error in the 
population (= the account under audit) may exceed the materiality, given the error found 
in the sample.  This likelihood is also seen as the sampling risk.  This post hoc SR may 
be both larger and smaller than the planned (allowed) maximum.  When it does not 
exceed the this maximum, the sample results allow an unqualified opinion.  In this 
thesis this post hoc SR plays an important role as a validation criterion (see Ch. 2) 
 
Remark 4: The occurrence risk is the responsibility of the auditee, the detection risk is 
the responsibility of the auditor. 
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This distinction offers another way to think of the occurrence risk and the detection risk.  
It should be kept in mind, however, that the assessment of the occurrence risk is the 
responsibility of the auditor. 
 
Remark 5: For this thesis assessed risk and error are the relevant outcomes. 
For this thesis the relevant outcomes of the audit activities are the assessed OR and 
the assessed error in the annual accounts on which assessment the audit opinion will 
be based. Not all activities of figure 1.2 are aimed at these two outcomes; they serve to 
give context to our analyses of the error rate in its relation to risk assessment. 
 
1.2.4 Risk analysis replacing substantive testing 
 
In the logic of the ARM, risk analysis is supposed to yield information on the quality of 
the annual accounts.  It leads to a practice where exact formal probabilities are 
calculated, partly based on the judgmental assessments of risk analysis. And as a 
consequence, the model assumes that the extent of the substantive testing 
(synonymous with ‘substantive tests of details’) may be decreased if the occurrence risk 
is assessed at "low" or "medium".  In the start of this section (1.2) we mentioned that 
this assumption can be seen as one of the main reasons for risk analysis (see for 
instance POB 2000, p.33, JWG 2000, p36, 42, NIVRA 1989).   
 
This combination of judgments and exact statistics is very common in Bayesian 
statistics.  There the prior distribution plays a role parallel to that of the occurrence risk 
in auditing: both methodologies provide a way to quantify the degree of belief the 
auditor has that a material error will be absent.  In the field of statistics, there are doubts 
on the validity of such prior information especially when modelled by a prior distribution. 
These discussions regard two aspects: is there really information that applies to the 
probability that is to be calculated, and is it possible to transform the information into the 
probability in such a way that the calculus gives a valid result. (see e.g.: Lee 1997, pp. 
ix,x,xi,  Box & Tiao 1992, p 12,  Novick & Jackson 1974, pp 145,146, Sennetti 1995, 
Johnstone 1995, Loebbecke 1995).  To circumvent these doubts, in Bayesian statistics 
a so-called ‘non-informative’ or ‘reference prior’ is often chosen.  Such a prior 
distribution expresses the beliefs of someone who, a priori, had no strong beliefs about 
the parameter in study, and therefore is such that the posterior distribution is almost 
fully dependent on the likelihood of the sample result (See Lee 1997, p.45)   
 
The position of auditing in these discussions is relatively favourable: risk analysis 
provides much prior information that applies to the situation under audit and that also 
relates to some probability; obviously the ARM is built on this information.  So if there 
are fields where Bayesian statistics is applicable, auditing surely belongs to these fields.  
Nevertheless, in the audit context too the transformation of information into a probability 
is difficult and questionable.  In that respect it has similar difficulties as application of the 
ARM.  But where there is such an abundance of prior information, it is worthwhile to 
investigate the validity of this transformation, and not to take refuge into non-informative 
priors.  This latter approach would boil down to not taking prior information into 
consideration at all, for the level of assurance associated with the audit opinion.   
 
In this thesis we will not elaborate on the Bayesian approach as such.  We will only 
make use of the approach when we calculate the sampling risk (see remark 3 above 
and chapter 4, where we will complete this introduction on Bayesian statistics to a 
minimum, needed for this thesis; see also the glossary).  And our most important 
suggestion for improvement of the use of risk assessment includes the use of Bayesian 
statistics (see chapter 10). 
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1.2.5 The audit risk model 
 
Our discussion of the audit process and the place of risk analysis leads to the complete 
audit risk model (ARM). It appears in two forms.  
1. The first form is that of a multiplication : AR = IR x CR x DR (see a.o. SAS 47, 
Arens and Loebbecke 1997, p. 257, NIVRA 1989), 
or with the detection risk broken down: AR = IR x CR x RAR x SR  (see a.o. 
HCDAD 1997).  
The ARM in this form is assumed to be multiplicative. This assumption has 
caused extensive discussions because the independence of the various risks, 
which is a necessary condition for this model to be valid, can be questioned (see 
for instance Broeze et al, 1991, Schilder 1991). 
2. This discussion has led to a second form for the ARM: AR = f (IR, CR, RAR, SR). 
This form is chosen merely to imply that the auditor is aware of the fact that a 
precise functional form for the audit risk and its alleged determinants is difficult to 
find (or easily criticized) but that this does not alter the fact that there is a relation 
between these risks.  
The second form also formalizes a frequently used argument in the discussion on the 
merits of the multiplicative form: the ARM is just a heuristic model, without claims on 
precise mathematical properties. 
 
The table mentioned in section 1.1, used by Dutch governmental audit departments, is 
based on the second form.  It gives a level of confidence still to be generated by the 
audit sample, with IR, CR and RAR as arguments (see the handbook HCDAD 1997 
325.38).  The assigned confidence level, in combination with the assessed IR, ICR and 
RAR is supposed to establish an audit risk of at most 5%.  The table is not based on a 
multiplicative model, because the combination of IR=’low’ with ICR=’high’ assigns a 
confidence level different from the combination ICR=’low’ with IR=’high’.  For many 
more combinations the assignment is not commutative, as it would be in a multiplicative 
model. 
 
1.2.6 Audit risk as a property of the distribution of possible error rates 
 
So far we have treated audit risk as a function of other risks.  Now we wonder in an 
exploratory way how the meaning of audit risk could be formalised as a property of the 
distribution of possible errors, before we will analyse possibilities for validating the 
occurrence risk in chapter 2.  
 
We realize that risk and error rate are related, but that “risk” is more than error rate: it 
also includes materiality and probability.  We see this in figure 1.3.  This figure depicts 
the possible error rates in an annual account along the abscissa, the "error rate-axis".  
The curve depicts the likelihood of all these possible error rates: the higher the curve 
above an error rate, the more likely this error rate and the error rates close to it.  
Obviously, this likelihood can be a product both of risk analysis and of sample results.  
The area under the curve between two possible error rates depicts the likelihood of 
these error rates. For instance the area under the curve to the right of the vertical line 
depicts the likelihood of the possible error rates to the right of this line.  If the position of 
this line represents the level of materiality, the shaded area represents the likelihood of 
a material error.  So the shaded area depicts the audit risk, in case an auditor would 
give an unqualified opinion on the annual accounts to which this picture applies, without 
doing further auditing.  In a more formal sense, audit risk can be seen as the likelihood 
of errors of a material size (when an unqualified opinion is given).  We will extend this 
view in chapter 2. 
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Figure 1.3: materiality and audit risk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.7 Business process analysis  
 
By the end of the nineties of the last century an evolution in the application of the audit 
risk approach resulted in an approach in which the whole of business processes and 
the context of the business were analysed as to the possibilities and risks of (not) 
obtaining the objectives of the business.  This way of dealing with a business, its 
continuity and prospects, its accounts and their audit, is known as "business risk 
analysis", "business risk approach" (see JWG 2000 pp. 3,5), "business risk audit model" 
(Ellifsen et. al. 2001) or "business process analysis" (see Van Leeuwen & Wallage 
2002).  Business process analysis (BPA) is meant to get an image of a business’ 
strategic position, the quality of the business’ products and processes and of the 
administrative processes in particular.  This all is meant to assess the strategic 
situation, and get an image of the business itself.   
 
BPA is also meant to be relevant for the audit of the business’ annual accounts: it is 
even expected that BPA gives a better view of the occurrence risk than the ARM, 
because the auditor not only has an image of the accounting process and its related 
controls, but also of all other business processes and in the way they interact with the 
accounting process. (see e.g. Van Leeuwen & Wallage 2002, JWG 2000 p 33).   
 
In 1998 several international accounting and auditing organisations installed a "Joint 
Working Group" which was to investigate recent developments in audit methodology, in 
particular the extent to which BPA was in use with audit firms and governmental audit 
organisations.  This Joint Working Group (JWG 2000, p.10) has the same expectation 
as to the effectiveness and efficiency of BPA as have Van Leeuwen and Wallage, 
especially for issues concerning accounting estimates, going concern and management 
fraud.  The Joint Working Group mentions nine reasons for adopting the business risk 
approach (JWG 2000 pp. 35-37), among which audit effectiveness, audit efficiency, 
control of engagement risk (the risks for an auditor due to engagement in an audit) and 
client service. 
 
In this thesis we focus on the audit risk model, because the data we have all were 
produced in the context of the audit risk model. Therefore henceforth business process 
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analysis will not be paid attention to. Only in chapter 10 we will discuss the question to 
which extent our findings are relevant for those who use business process analysis. 
 
1.3  Aim of the study 
 
The aim of this study is, to make some steps in the quest for the ‘real risk’, mentioned in 
section 1.1, finding evidence whether substantive testing may be replaced by risk 
assessment as it is done in practice, and if so, under which conditions this will work.  As 
risk assessment plays such as central role in auditing, the answer may have practical 
implications.   
 
A necessary condition for this practice of replacement to be justified is a positive 
answer to the basic research question in this study: 
“Is there a satisfactory relation of the assessed occurrence risk with the error rate as 
found in an audit, or with other measures, derived from it, that may be seen as an 
indicator for the risk of a material error?”  
So we can formulate the aim as follows: 
 
The aim of the study is to get insight into the relationship between risk 
assessment and error rate, in order to get an answer to the question whether risk 
assessment can be used as a replacement for substantive testing. 
 
1.4  Participating organizations 
 
In chapter 5 we will go deeper into the design of the study, but an essential feature of it 
should be stressed now: without the willing participation of many organizations, this 
study would have been impossible.  We agreed to report our findings in a way that they 
cannot be associated with one of the participants in the study.  This is the reason that 
we only mention them in this chapter in a form of disguise and only will refer to them in 
the chapters 6 through 9 again in the same way as to prevent recognition.  
 
The participating audit organisations were:  
1. A national court of audit from one of the countries of the European Union  
2. The audit departments of eight Ministries of the Dutch government 
3. Two private audit firms (of the ‘big five’) in the Netherlands,  
 
Data were collected regarding audits on annual accounts from 1995 through 2001. 
1.5  Structure of the thesis 
 
In order to answer the basic question, we have structured this thesis as follows. 
1. This introduction gives the motivation and basic question of this thesis.  Also a short 
introduction on the audit risk model and basic definitions are given. 
2. The second chapter will treat the basic question as the problem of validity of risk 
assessment with regard to four validation criteria: 
1. the error rate 
2. the ‘audit position’ 
3. the sampling risk 
4. the conditional distribution of the error rate. 
Each criterion will be discussed as to their quality as a validation criterion. 
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3. The third chapter will give a review of relevant literature.  It will speculate on the 
possibilities of humans to assess risks, in which speculations the work of Tversky and 
Kahneman will serve as a guide.  Next to that it will report findings related to our basic 
question; the picture that results is neither a cause for optimism nor for pessimism. 
4. The fourth chapter will justify the use of the beta distribution as a probability law for 
the sampling risk.  We need this justification, because in our study we had to calculate 
sampling risks on the basis of limited information.  It appears that the beta distribution is 
a model in which this information is sufficient for the required calculations. 
5. The fifth chapter will deal with the design of this study.  It will justify our choice for a 
field study. 
6. The sixth chapter will give validation results for the audit risk model for eight audit 
organisations, both private and governmental. Private and governmental organisations 
show no clear differences. At the same time, the results vary strongly over 
organisations and therefore ask for more evidence that risk assessment has the 
required validity. This evidence is sought in the chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
7. The seventh chapter will give research results on an approach that is based on 
decomposition of the assessment of the occurrence risk.  Unfortunately this way of 
decomposition did not improve validity. 
8. The eighth chapter will give the results of a replication of the validation of the 
assessment of the occurrence risk as it was done in the framework of the audit risk 
model.  Four governmental organisations will be investigated.  In this part of the study 
risk assessment only shows very weak correlations with the error rate or other 
validation criteria. 
9. The ninth chapter will give the results of a study of the quality of tests of controls and 
errors of the previous year as a validation of risk assessment.  It does so by 
investigating their predictive power for the error rate.  As for the occurrence of errors, 
tests of controls appear to be predictive, but as for the size of errors no predictive 
quality is found. 
10. The tenth chapter will discuss the results of this study.  It will end with a suggestion 
to continually validate risk assessment and next to that also base the size of a statistical 
sample on the distribution of the error rate conditional on the assessed risk.  
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Chapter 2: Validation of Risks 
 
 
Risk or probability - the ‘real risk’ - can only be observed by the varying amounts or 
numbers, resulting from processes, governed by this risk or probability.  Our intuition 
tells that the error rate is such a number, but what is its quality as a validation criterion 
for the assessment of OR; how close does it come to the ‘real risk’?  Via a metaphor of 
rain, rivers and dykes, representing processes resulting in heights of water in a river 
(parallel with error rate), flooded dikes (excess of materiality) we try to justify the four 
validation criteria for the assessed risk and we get more insight in the ‘real risk’. 
2.1  Introduction: rain and risks 
 
We start this chapter with a short story on excessive rainfall, with high risks of a flood as 
a consequence, not only depending on the rainfall, but also on the water stowing 
capacity of the German and Dutch rivers and forelands.  This story offers a metaphor 
for the introduction of the inherent risk and the internal control risk.  We elaborate this 
metaphor in section 2.2, with ideas for validation criteria for risk analysis as a result.  
We go deeper into these validation criteria in section 2.3.  In section 2.4 we will take 
quite a different point of view on validation, by wondering whether tests of control can 
serve as a validation for risk assessment. 
 
The story on excessive rainfall is about risk management in an extreme form, because 
the possible consequences of mismanagement are tremendous.  In such a context, not 
only the metaphor as to risk management is interesting, but the question how to 
validate the assessed risks is even more fascinating, especially in the context of this 
thesis.   
 
In the daily "Trouw" of Saturday December 11th 2004, an article "Niet ophogen die 
dijken, maar verleggen” (“Do not raise those dikes, move them”) discussed the 
necessity of increasing the height of the dikes along the rivers in the Dutch estuary.  
This ‘raising’ was thought necessary after the near crises of 1993 and 1995. In 1993 the 
waterflow was of an extraordinary volume, causing an extremely high water level.  In 
1995 it was even higher, which made the authorities decide to evacuate many tens of 
thousands of people from areas next to the rivers Waal and Maas.  The authorities 
thought this evacuation necessary, because the threat of a flood was thought to be very 
high.  These water levels were the consequence of extremely long and intensive 
rainfall, causing a flow of water of unknown volume. 
 
The article discussed the plans to create areas that could serve as a reservoir for the 
surplus of water streaming down the river in case its level would be so high as to cause 
too large a risk of flooding areas that – different from the forelands - are not prepared to 
suffer a flood.  This reservoir would be planned to be given up to the river water, by 
deliberately opening flood channels from the rivers into these reservoirs, thereby 
keeping the water level under a critical level.  Even so, there are villages in these so 
called "mega-bathtubs" and, to save them from being flooded, they would be protected 
by a ring-dike with a height of 6 meters.  
 
Activists opposing these plans, argue that the worst case scenario, assuming that 
18.000 cubic meters of water (per second) could stream into the Netherlands at Lobith, 
is too pessimistic.  In Germany the dikes are being moved instead of raised, giving 
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more room for the water in the German forelands.  Therefore a scenario in which 
16.500 cubic meters per second stream into the Netherlands is more realistic as a worst 
case scenario.  When a policy is chosen in the Netherlands, similar to that of the 
Germans, with the motto: “give room to the river”, the building of ring-dikes around 
villages and towns can be avoided.  
 
So far for the short story 
2.2  Risk of a flood: how to validate? 
 
In this section we elaborate the "high water metaphor", by observing some typical traits 
in the story regarding risks and their control and by observing how assessments of 
critical probabilities are validated in the real situation to which in this story applies. 
 
2.2.1 Risks 
 
The first observation is that we are talking of “risks of a flood".  We are talking about 
risks, a (small) chance of an event happening.  We are talking of risk and not merely of 
chance or probability, because the consequences of the event happening are very 
serious: the impact of a flood will be tremendous.  This is the reason why in the 
literature (see for instance Keeney and Raiffa, 1976, French,1988) risk is often treated 
as an expected loss: the risk of an action associated with losing €100,000 when the 
probability of losing it is one percent, is equal to €1000.  So risk is associated with 
probabilities of an event and with (negative) consequences of that event. 
 
In a second meaning risk merely is a probability or a chance of some (negative) event 
happening, for instance "the risk that it will rain tomorrow".  Here the possible loss is not 
included in the concept, so a "high risk" of something happening, is "high" regardless of 
what is at stake, except for the fact that the concept of risk is used because negative 
events are involved.  
 
The concept of risk in the audit risk model has the second meaning: it stands for "the 
risk of not detecting a material error in an annual account" if indeed there is one in it.  
“Risk” in practice is handled as a probability and it only refers to an expected loss as far 
as the event possibly happening regards something undesirable: the existence of a 
material error.  This risk is also referred to as 'the risk of the auditor', and thus has the 
meaning of the probability of overlooking a material error.  And although the 
consequences of such an event may be very large, these consequences are not 
included in the regular way auditors deal with this risk in the audit risk model.  (See 
Klijnsmit et al., 2003). 
 
Only recently proposals appear as to include expected loss in an adapted audit risk 
model.  This especially so, in the light of the risks that audit firms appear to run of even 
going bankrupt, when they are involved in accounting scandals like that with Enron, 
WorldCom and Ahold (see again Klijnsmit et. al., 2003, Mollema, 2003, 2004).  Whether 
these suggestions will be acted upon or not, confusion as to the meaning of risks lies in 
wait.  
 
In this thesis we will adopt the meaning as it is used in auditing: risk is the probability of 
overlooking a material error.  This is the logical consequence of the aim of this thesis: to 
validate the risk which the auditor assesses in his risk analysis.  
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2.2.2 Context 
 
The second observation in the "high water metaphor", is that there are risks in a 
context:  
• the way the landscape is formed, environmental conditions like the presence of 
forests and other conditions affecting its water retaining or absorbing capacity  
• short-term and mid-term weather conditions like: will it rain or not, will it rain day 
after day or with larger intervals   
• the question whether the melting water from the glaciers will grow, due to the 
rise of temperature of the atmosphere.   
The whole of these (and other) risks due to conditions is analysed and aggregated into 
the probability formulated in the next question: “What is the probability of a period of 
such intensive rainfall that the flow of water will (almost) exceed the stowing capacity of 
the river?” This contextual risk (or probability) in the context of this “risk of a flood” 
cannot be influenced, which is a reason to treat it as context.  
This does not mean that human actions do not affect these risks: the ruining of the 
woods, the canalization of the rivers and many other human actions, all affect the water 
retaining, absorbing and stowage capacity. Next to that, global warming affects the 
climate, rainfall and melting of the glaciers.  
 
Risk analysis in auditing also deals with risks of the context: things that are not 
controllable with the given accounting methods, like competition with other 
organisations, nature of the organisation, nature of the product, attitude of the 
personnel, robustness of production methods, etc..  We have seen in 1.2.1, that these 
are called ‘inherent risk’. 
 
2.2.3 Control 
 
The third observation is that there are also attempts to control the risks of a flood, as 
they result from the risks of the context or from the "environmental risk".   
One way of controlling the risks is by keeping the probability of a flood under control:  
- dikes are raised (if necessary relatively instantaneously by means of sandbags),  
- flood-control dams are built and once built, opened (and closed) when necessary, 
- ships are urged to lower their speed or are prohibited to sail.  
It can be argued that the probability of a flood is also controlled by adopting a proper 
organisation, for instance, with a proper separation of duties like: ship owners should 
not be made responsible for the closure of a waterway.  
 
A second way to control the risks of a flood is to reduce the damage that may be the 
consequence of a flood. In the estuary there are not many possibilities to do so.  Near 
the former Zuiderzee houses on the isle of Marken were built on posts. To a certain 
extent the situation with forelands is a way of damage-control: the forelands are used in 
a way as to only suffer to a minimal extent from being flooded.  This use sometimes 
extends to the building of houses in the forelands on posts (or on a similar construction) 
or on a mound.  The plans mentioned in section 2.1 to create bathtubs, also aim at 
damage control.  
 
Risk analysis in auditing also deals with risks (of a material error) that can be controlled. 
More precisely: the risks are controlled (or hoped to be controlled) by a proper 
organisation of the administrative processes and more in general by a proper 
organisation of the business processes.  Risk analysis assesses the extent to which 
these controls will be, or may have been successful.  Next to this in auditing the 
probability is kept under control of not seeing an error that could occur due to the 
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imperfect control of the causes for an error.  This is realised by applying substantive 
procedures to a sufficient extent.  
 
Damage control can also be found in auditing.  Some errors (for instance ‘just some 
mistake in a VAT-calculation causing an error of €100, -’) are deemed to be less serious 
than others (for instance some fraudulent appropriation of money, causing an error of 
€100,-). ‘Damage control’ consists of adapting the level of materiality to the kind of 
error. For serious errors, for instance errors that could have a significant political 
impact, a very low level of materiality is adopted.  Of course it must be hoped and it 
may be expected that the organisation itself also deals with ‘damage control’.  
 
2.2.4 Materiality 
 
A fourth observation reveals the key issue of it all: flood relates to a critical level of the 
water.  Thus, a flood of the forelands is not critical; an auditor might say that flood of the 
forelands is ‘not material’; it is an ‘error’ which does not influence decisions as to the 
use of land on the land side of the winter-dike.  But once the level of the river gets too 
high, there will be a flood: the water will go over the winter-dike and flood the hinterland.  
A water level that is equal to the height of this dike is "material".  This is like the critical 
"level of an error": this is called material when it is higher than the level of materiality.  In 
our metaphor ‘flood’ stands for the ‘necessity of a qualified opinion’. So the similarity 
can be extended: a higher dike means a smaller probability of flood of the hinterland; a 
higher level of materiality means a smaller probability of the necessity of a qualified 
opinion.   
 
There is a basic dissimilarity included in this part of the metaphor: a higher dike means 
more expenses and more safety, whereas a higher materiality means less expenses 
and less safety, because a less intensive audit is needed to realise an audit risk that is 
acceptable.  Of course users of the financial statements may consider such a higher 
level of materiality undesirable 
 
So far the observations make explicit how the "high water metaphor" provides an image 
of the accounting and audit process, in particular regarding the concepts of risk 
analysis.  We now wonder whether the metaphor can be extended to the validation of 
risk assessment.  To this end we continue with two observations, the first in 2.2.5 and 
the second in 2.2.6. 
 
2.2.5 Water authorities and validation 
 
The first of these continuing observations results from an extension of the high water 
metaphor.  The extension regards the so-called “Waterschappen”, Dutch for “Water 
authorities”.  The following can be said about "Water authorities".  
 
In the Netherlands we have authorities that are responsible for the safety of the land 
against floods.  This is embedded in an age-old tradition. In the last decades their 
responsibilities have been extended to the quality of the water in - what in the 
Netherlands are called - the "bosom", or the "bosom waters", the system of canals and 
lakes, ditches, brooks, streams, channels, trenches and rivers and any other sort of 
condition in the landscape that can hold and store water.  The "bosom-water" is of 
paramount importance in the Netherlands in dealing with precipitation for many 
purposes: keeping it in times of shortage of water and when precipitation is too 
abundant, guiding it as quickly as possible to places where it will do no harm: the 
IJsselmeer, or even better the North Sea.  
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The authorities that deal with this water management have the legal duty to build and 
maintain dikes that safeguard the land against floods. Therefore, among many other 
things, they have to establish the height of dikes that is necessary to be safe against 
floods.  Until 1995, this especially was thought to be a very relevant problem for the 
parts of the Netherlands which are in direct, open connection with the North Sea.  Since 
1995 we know that also upstream this is an important problem.  
 
These "Waterschappen" aim at a rate of security, which is such that with a very high 
probability no floods will take place. The norm is that only with the exception of - on the 
average – say once in 1000 years a flood might take place.  In order to be able to 
comply with this demand the "Waterschappen" need a fair estimate of the probability of 
this event, so of the probability of the water flooding over a dike of a certain height.  
Therefore they analyse all water heights during the last decades or hundreds of years.  
These heights form a distribution to which some probability model can be fitted.  This 
model can be transformed into another model, which can be assumed to be valid for a 
period of 1000 years.  The upper-tail probability in this distribution of the dike height  -  
the probability that a water height will exceed the height of the dike  -  is the probability 
which is needed (see Groeneboom (1992), Wijbenga et al (1993), who take once in 
1250 years).  It may be seen as the validation of the assumed "once in 1000 years".  
 
This approach will turn out to be applicable to our validation problem: we could 
subdivide our cases after the assessed risk, so that we get four subclasses: one for risk 
‘very low’, one for ‘low’, one for ‘medium’ and one for ‘high’.  For each class we form the 
distribution of all observed error rates, the empirical distribution and we look for a 
theoretical distribution that fits this.  For the materiality in a specific case we can 
calculate the probability that an error rate in this theoretical distribution might exceed 
this level of materiality.  This upper-tail probability corresponds to the assessed 
occurrence risk.  It will vary with the location of the theoretical distribution and its 
dispersion.  For low risks, the location of the distribution may be expected in the region 
of smaller error rates, for higher risks in the region of higher error rates.  When at the 
same time the dispersion is approximately equal for the various levels, or increases for 
the higher levels of occurrence risk, it can be said that a shift in the location of the 
theoretical distributions to the higher error rates should correspond to higher 
assessments of the occurrence risk, in case of a valid assessment. 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the idea of how a theoretical distribution, fitted at the 
empirical distribution, may look for an assessed occurrence risk OR at ‘low’ and how it 
may look for OR=’high’.  The shaded areas depict the probability that an error may 
exceed the materiality. It is obvious that the two figures are based on an assumption of 
valid risk assessment. 
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Figure 2.1: empirical risk for OR=’low’               Figure 2.2: empirical risk for OR=’high’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.6 Weather forecasts and validation6 
 
The second of these continuing observations regards the way weather forecasts are 
validated.  
 
In weather forecasting the weather is seen as a process, the outcome of which is the 
particular weather at a certain moment, or day.  This process is modelled in a very 
precise way by means of relevant physical laws, such as the law of Boyle-Gay Lussac, 
the law of Buys Ballot, laws of thermodynamics, etc.. The model is fully deterministic 
and meteorologists have succeeded in making it of a high quality.  This can be deduced 
among other things from the fact that its predictive power is largely enhanced by 
feeding it with data of a resolution of a measurement in every 20 by 20 km instead of in 
every 50 by 50 km.  These measurements are done worldwide and the weather 
predicted also is worldwide.  A deviation of the ‘real weather’ from the predicted 
weather is attributed to measurement imprecision.   
 
In order to deal with the more or less random character of the weather, small (random) 
disturbances are entered into the model, every disturbance possibly leading to some 
other (type of) weather, provided disturbances are chosen that are not deadened in and 
by the local circumstances.  These disturbances can be seen as representing the 
possible imprecision of measurement.  Part of the professionalism of the meteorologists 
is to choose the appropriate disturbances at the appropriate places.  In this way, in 
practice 50 different "weathers" are calculated: for every 20 by 20 km (once) or 50 by 
50 km (49 times) point on earth the expected temperature, air pressure, precipitation, 
wind direction and speed etc are calculated.  What reality can not do: letting 50 different 
results at the same time come from one process, is realised by the model.  From these 
50 different results probabilities can be deduced.  If for instance in 10 of the 50 
"weathers" the amount of precipitation exceeds 10 mm, the probability of at least 10 
mm of precipitation is assessed to be 1/5. 
 
This methodology of weather forecasting is known as the "Ensemble Prediction 
System”, EPS (see Floor, 2002) and a validation study, using the approach outlined 
above, can be found in Kok (2001).  Validation of the probabilities in the EPS is very 
straightforward, because the way a probability is assessed in the forecast is very close 
                                                          
6 I owe a great deal to Mr Robert Mureau of the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 
(KNMI), who introduced me to the Ensemble Prediction System (EPS) of weather forecasting 
and the way probabilities are calibrated in this methodology. 
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to the (Laplace) definition of probability: the rate of relevant events in the set of all 
possible events (see Hogg and Craig, 1970, p11).  Actually, validation of the assessed 
probability in the precipitation example above is done by looking at the relative 
frequency of precipitation of at least 10 mm in all the "weathers" in which this event was 
forecasted with the same probability of 20%.  Every other probability can be validated in 
a similar way.  
 
It is evident that well validated weather forecasts are of paramount importance in 
situations like the crises sketched in section 2.1.  Here, the decision to evacuate people 
or not, heavily depended (among other things) on weather forecasts for the short-term: 
the precipitation to be expected in the first couple of days, the expected wind direction 
and force. 
 
2.2.6.1 Risk assessment as a mental sensitivity analysis 
Now, just like the weather, the administrative processes only produce one reality.  But, 
unfortunately, in auditing the administrative processes are hard to simulate.  For this to 
work, some algorithm would be necessary in which for varying values of the 
determinants of the error rate the resulting error rate would be calculated.  Evidently, 
determinants in this case are the properties of the environment, the context of the 
business, the relevant controls and other properties of the administrative organisation.  
So far such algorithms do not exist (to our knowledge).  But this will not prevent the 
auditor doing some mental, professional, guessing of the form of "what-if …": what if all 
separations of duties work perfectly?, what if the separations of duties work just a little 
less perfectly?, what if access control in the EDP system is poorly organised?, etc..  
These questions will form a kind of mental sensitivity analysis, with an eye on the error 
rate in the account under audit that results from the administrative process.   
 
The result of these what-if questions can be imagined to be a set of possible error rates 
in the account under audit. Each error rate will be associated with its own likelihood.  
There will be a most likely error (not to be mixed up with the MLE, the statistical 
estimate of the error in the account, to be discussed in 2.2.6.2, 3rd point) error rates 
close to this will also have a relatively high likelihood and there will be less likely error 
rates.  In general the expected likelihood will decrease with the distance of the 
associated possible error from the most likely error.  The portion exceeding the level of 
materiality of these possible error rates and their accumulated likelihood represents the 
occurrence risk, OR.  The auditor will associate risky processes with expectations of 
relatively high errors and thus, dependent on the level of materiality, with a high OR.  
And for lower assessments of the risk he will have the lower levels of possible error in 
mind and therefore the lower levels of OR.  This view on risk assessment can be 
depicted in a figure almost the same as the figures 2.1 and 2.2. The only difference 
would be that the p-axis is not based on the empirically found error rates in a set of 
similar accounts, but represents the p’s (error rates) that are deemed to be possible 
according to the risk assessment in one account under audit. The shaded area in the 
pictures represents the occurrence risk.  We could say, in Bayesian terms: the figures 
represent the prior distribution of p (formally: f(p)) that follows from the risk assessment 
by the auditor. 
 
2.2.6.2 Four possible ways of validating the assessment of OR 
This mental image of risk assessment offers a perspective on four possible ways of 
validating the assessment of OR.  
 
For the first two ways we observe that the impossibility of letting one process produce 
several outcomes (the strict parallel with the EPS), can be circumvented:  
(1) by clustering processes that were assessed to have the same occurrence risk.  
The distribution of errors found in cases with OR=’low’ should tend to show 
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smaller errors, especially for the same level of materiality, than the cases with 
OR=’medium’ and even stronger for the cases with OR=’high’. This validation is 
parallel to that at the end of the previous subsection.  By fitting a probability 
model to this empirical distribution (as is done in Groeneboom, 1993) the 
empirical distribution is smoothed and calculations can be made easier; also 
some probability can be given to values larger than the largest observed, which 
in a probabilistic sense must be deemed to be realistic. (Compare this to 
modelling observed lengths in a sample of inhabitants of a country by means of 
a normal distribution; in this distribution there will always be a positive 
probability of lengths larger than the largest observed). 
This results in a first validation criterion: the location of the conditional empirical 
distribution of error rates 
(2) by observing that in the Bayesian approach a probability model on possible 
values for p (the error rate in the population), given the data (D) (in one audit 
case) is given by  
                                            f(p|D) = (f(D|p)f(p))/f(D)    (1) 
So the probability of a value of p (formally: the probability density function of p) 
depends on the likelihood of the data, given this value for p (f(D|p) and on the 
prior distribution of p (f(p))7.  When we take f(p) to be non-informative, f(p|D) 
virtually only depends on the data in the case we analyse.  This means that risk 
assessment can be validated by the information from one case, by calculating 
the posterior distribution of p, given the data D and with a non-informative prior. 
In this posterior the probability of the values for p larger than materiality is the 
risk of a material error (given the data). We again can refer to figures 2.1 and 
2.2, where now the curves represent the posterior density of p, given the data 
(from one case) and where consequently the shaded areas represent the risk of 
a material error, now given these data.  In formula this shaded area gives: 
                                              P(p>M|D)     (2) 
Actually, when a non-informative prior is being used, (2) gives the sampling risk, 
when D are collected by means of a sample. 
This results in a second validation criterion: the sampling risk 
 
(3) For the third way we observe that in the line of reasoning of this subsection 
processes of high quality will coincide with no or only small error(s), so the error in the 
account itself is a good indicator of the quality of the administrative processes.  In 
practice we will not know this error, but we have an estimate, resulting from substantive 
testing possibly completed with other substantive procedures.  In the practice of 
auditing this estimate often is called the most likely error (MLE).  Note that this is a 
statistic, resulting from classical statistical procedures, so basically different from the 
result of the ‘mental sensitivity analysis’ discussed in 2.2.6.1, which also lead to a ‘most 
likely error’. 
This results in a third validation criterion: the most likely error, MLE 
 
(4) For the fourth way we look again at the weather forecasting metaphor. We observe 
that often a weather forecast has the form of: "tomorrow it will rain" or "tomorrow it will 
not rain". The most simple validation of this forecast is to establish whether it rained 
next day.  The event of rain can also be used to validate the probability forecast, 
because it may be expected that days with rain are preceded by weather forecasts with 
a higher probability of rain than days where it did not rain.  The logical parallel of this 
simple validation is to validate the occurrence risk (OR) with the actual occurrence of a 
material error.  It may be expected that in cases with a low OR excess of materiality will 
occur less frequently than in cases with a high OR.  In this thesis, as a rule only results 
                                                          
7 The denominator, f(D) is constant for all possible p’s; it only serves as a scaling factor, leading 
to a correct summing up of the probabilities to 1. 
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on sub-accounts of the annual accounts were used, so we will not be in the position to 
make use of the actual audit opinion.  But a similar validation criterion can be found in 
what we will call the "audit position".  With ‘audit position’ we mean the place of the 
most likely error estimated from the audit relative to the materiality level.  This ‘position’ 
is unqualified or “OK” if the most likely error is smaller than the materiality.  
This results in a fourth possible validation criterion: the ‘audit position’. 
 
2.2.7 “Real risk” revisited 
 
Our discussion in 2.2.6 gives a possibility to be more precise about the concept of “real 
risk” as we used it in the generic question for this study in section 1.1.  In auditing, the 
risk of a material error is associated with the annual accounts.  But this gives definition 
problems:  
• for the possibility of a material error in given annual accounts, in classical 
statistics the concept of probability, is not defined, because in this approach the 
given accounts either contain a material error, or they do not.  Probability (and 
consequently: risk) only gets a meaning when some random selection is in 
operation, of which the outcome has to be predicted.  But once the accounts are 
there (possibly errors included), there is no random process influencing 
existence or size of the error.  So from the viewpoint of classical statistics, the 
concept of risk does not apply; 
• in Bayesian statistics, it is possible to define a prior distribution on the error rate 
and let the upper tail probability of materiality in this distribution be the 
occurrence risk; we discussed this possibility in 2.2.6.  But classical statisticians 
have a serious objection against this approach: they stress that a form of 
random selection is needed, or else the concept of probability makes no sense.  
And in the prior distribution this randomness is missing.  Moreover, prior 
distributions often express a subjective opinion, causing the same situation to 
give rise to different priors, for varying subjects. 
 
Some reconciliation of both approaches is possible by making explicit that the 
distribution of possible error rates is directly linked to the administrative processes and 
the controls included.  The auditor then does not assess the probability that the annual 
accounts contain a material error, but assesses the probabilities associated with the 
possible outcomes (error rates) of the underlying administrative processes.  This 
assessment produces a legitimate probability distribution in the classical approach.  
And then classical and Bayesian approach are consistent; the Bayesian may say that 
the prior he wants to establish refers to the possible error rates and their associated 
probabilities to be produced by the process.   
 
This distribution in principle does not differ from classical ones like the distribution to be 
expected when throwing a dice ten times and establish the distribution of the sum of the 
outcomes for each 10 outcomes. 
 
It leads to the conclusion that ‘real risk’,  
• in case of the occurrence risk, is the risk that the administrative processes 
produce annual accounts with a material error,  
• in case of the audit risk, is the risk that a material error is overlooked, as a result 
of occurrence risk and detection risk. 
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2.3  Validation criteria 
 
In this thesis the four entities introduced in 2.2.6 will serve as validation criteria.  We 
summarise them in a different order as follows: 
1. The error rate or most likely error; 
2. The ‘audit position’ of the error rate; 
3. The P(p>M|D),  the sampling risk; 
4. The distribution of the error rates conditional on the risk assessment 
We will give them a closer examination.  
 
2.3.1 The error rate8 
 
In section 2.2.6 we concluded that the error rate in the annual accounts is an indicator 
of the quality of the administrative processes that produced these accounts.  We also 
argued that there is a random part in the outcome of these processes and therefore the 
possible error rates in the account under audit may vary although the quality of the 
process is constant. But in practice this variation will be very small, because of the large 
number of transactions. So the error rate in the account almost perfectly indicates the 
quality of the process.  
 
In most situations we will not know the real error rate in the annual accounts or sub-
account we are auditing (if we would, we would not run an audit risk).  We only have 
estimates at our disposal, based on some substantive procedures, resulting in, in 
auditors’ terms, the most likely error, MLE.  In cases where the audit risk is assessed at 
low, the MLE may be expected to be low.  In cases where the audit risk is assessed to 
be high, the MLE may be expected to be high.  So in general a valid risk assessment 
will lead to positive correlation between assessed risk and error rate.  But two aspects 
still have to be taken into consideration.   
 
The first one is that an error rate of some size will indicate more audit risk when the 
level of materiality is smaller. So only at a constant level of materiality the same error 
rate will correspond to the same risk to be assessed. The correspondence between 
error rate and assessed risk may be expected to be stronger at a constant level of 
materiality.   
 
The second aspect regards something similar with regard to the sample size.  This 
aspect is relevant in cases where a sample is used to estimate the error in the sub-
account, which will be the normal situation in practice.  In such situations the same 
distance between error rate and materiality indicates more audit risk when the sample 
size is small than when the sample size is large. Because, with a large sample size, 
there is more reliability in the statement that materiality will not be exceeded in the sub-
account than in cases where the sample size is small.  So the correspondence between 
error rate and risk assessment holds at its strongest within subgroups of cases with the 
same level of materiality and sample size.  
 
In this study we did not get enough data to make the corresponding subdivisions in 
which to establish the relation between error rate and assessed risk. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8  In this thesis ‘error rate’ represents the relative size of the error, so size of error divided by size 
of account.  When we mean the occurrence of errors, regardless their size, we will use 
‘occurrence’ or ‘fraction of’ or in some other way let the context make it clear. 
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2.3.2 The ‘audit position’. 
 
We discussed the possibility to validate the assessment of the occurrence risk with the 
rate of annual accounts in which the estimated misstatement is larger than the level of 
materiality, found from a set of annual accounts produced by administrative procedures 
which were assessed to have the same OR.   
 
By validating risk assessment directly for cases with the same occurrence risk, we 
could ask the question whether similar administrative processes lead to a similar 
assessment of the occurrence risk.  But in this study we will not have enough cases to 
give an answer to that question, because there are many more kinds of administrative 
processes than there are levels of assessment (at most four).  In the end this is no 
problem for our validation because, as for this "similarity", it may be assumed that, even 
if in practice businesses and types of processes may differ considerably with regard to 
their procedures, risk assessment answers as precisely as possible the question to 
which extent the inherent and control risks are covered by the set of controls. So in this 
study only the level of the assessed risk is relevant for the similarity, which means that 
in principle procedures with the same assessment of OR can be seen as "similar". 
 
If the error rate for the complete annual accounts is larger than materiality, the audit 
opinion will be qualified.  In 2.2.6, for sub-accounts we introduced the “audit position”, 
the definition of which can be made more precise as follows: 
 
Definition of ‘audit position’: 
The ‘audit position’ of the error rate is its position relative to the materiality; it is “not 
OK”, if it is equal to or larger than materiality; it is “OK” if the error rate is smaller than 
materiality.   
 
In practice three or four levels of inherent -, or control risk, or of the occurrence risk are 
in use: “very low”, “low”, “medium”, “high”.  Now each of these risk levels could be 
validated by looking at the observed rate of “not OK positions" at that level.  It would be 
hard to decide on an exact rate that should correspond to this level, because this could 
at its best only be given by agreement.  But it may be expected that with an occurrence 
risk assessed at low there will be relatively much “OK positions” for the error rate in the 
corresponding set of sub-accounts, whereas with an occurrence risk assessed at high 
there will be more “not OK positions”.  So a valid risk assessment will lead to a positive 
correlation between assessed risk and the rate of “not OK positions” (the higher the 
assessed risk the more “not OK positions”). 
 
It should be noticed that taking the error rate as decisive for the ‘audit position’ will 
mean that in this study we will use the most likely error (MLE), as estimated by the 
auditor, as a criterion for the ‘audit position’ being “OK” or not.  In practice often the 
upper error limit (UEL) will be used as the criterion for the decision on the audit opinion, 
in order to realize enough reliability with regard to this audit opinion.  This UEL is a 
stricter criterion (for the audit opinion) than the MLE (for the ‘audit position’); there will 
be more qualified opinions than “not OK positions”.  But it does not mean that the ‘audit 
position’ of the MLE cannot be used as a validation criterion. 
 
2.3.3 The sampling risk 
 
In 2.2.6 we concluded that P(p>M|D) is a natural indicator for the quality of the 
administrative processes that produce the account under audit.  This probability can be 
expressed with greater precision as P(p>M|MLE), the probability that the error rate p in 
the population will exceed materiality, given the actual estimate of this real error.  
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In chapter 4 we will show how to calculate the this probability: P(p>M|MLE),               (1) 
 
This use of the sampling risk is further justified, because it solves the two problems we 
mentioned in 2.3.1 (dependence on materiality and dependence on sample size), 
regarding the use of the error rate as a validation criterion.  Because when we use the 
sampling risk, sample size and distance between estimated error and materiality, are 
taken into account.  So the error rate as a validation criterion is in a sense corrected for 
its distance to the materiality and the size of the sample in which it is observed. 
 
For a second further justification we refer to our discussion in 2.2.6 that the occurrence 
risk can be seen as the probability of all error rates which are higher than materiality 
and that it is this probability that we estimate with probability (2) in 2.2.6.2. 
 
The sampling risk has one major drawback: it is dependent on the sample size, and one 
major positive property: it is calculable in a single case.  In this single case, the level of 
materiality co-determines the validation.  In our data analysis we will compensate for 
the drawback by also using a standardised SR, by imputing constant sample sizes. We 
will explain how, when we do the analysis. 
 
A second consideration regards the dependency of the sample size on OR: the auditor 
plans the detection risk dependent on the assessed occurrence risk.  This results in 
allowing a relatively high DR (and consequently a relatively small sample size), when 
OR is assessed at ‘low’ and also planning a relatively low DR (and consequently a 
relatively large sample size) when OR is assessed at ‘high’.  But considering that in 
practice the errors may vary only in a small range, a sample with small size will tend to 
result in a relatively high SR and a sample with a large size will tend to result in a low 
SR.  This consideration results in an expectation that low OR coincides with high SR 
(given the sample results) and high OR coincides with low SR (also given the sample 
results), so a negative correlation is to be expected, according to this logic.  Now, the 
logic is far from absolute: it is not necessary that low (high) OR always coincides with a 
small (large) sample size and the error rate may grow with the assessed OR.  But the 
dependency of SR on the sample size certainly is a disturbing factor.  It is an extra 
reason for using SR with a uniform sample size, as discussed at the end of the previous 
paragraph.  We also will calculate the correlation between sample size and OR.  When 
this appears to be small, use of SR as a validation criterion remains appropriate. 
 
Because SR has the dimension of a risk (a probability) and because it is based on all 
relevant variables: error, materiality and sample size, it may be expected to be the best 
validation criterion.  The caveat we have to make for the dependency of the sample size 
on OR, makes the standardised SR (with the sample size standardised) also a 
candidate for the best validation criterion. 
 
2.3.4 The empirical distribution of the error rate 
 
In section 2.2.5, we introduced the empirical distribution of the error rate and the 
possibility to fit a theoretical distribution to it.  The location of this distribution can be 
used as a validation criterion for the assessment of the occurrence risk.   
 
For a given assessment of the occurrence risk, say "low", the error rates can be 
collected from all audits where the occurrence risk was assessed at "low".  These error 
rates (the water heights) form a distribution in which the probability that the error 
exceeds some level of materiality (the height of the dike) is the occurrence risk that 
should be associated with the assessment of "low" at the given level of materiality.  
When the assessment is valid, this upper-tail probability may be expected to be small, 
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due to relatively many small error rates.  The upper-tail probability of the materiality 
increases with an upward shift of the distribution.  So for cases with assessment 
“medium” or “high” we may expect a shift of the distribution to the higher values of the 
error rate.   
 
The empirical distribution has one major drawback: it cannot be calculated in a single 
case and related to this: it cannot fully take into account that a single risk assessment is 
dependent on the level of materiality.  This would ask for an analysis of the empirical 
distribution for each distinct level of materiality and so for many more cases than 
available in our study.  Next to this limitation, it has at least two positive properties: it is 
(relatively) independent of the sample sizes and, related to that, it gives a relatively 
easy possibility for calibration of the assessment of OR.  Our research will not go as far 
as calibration of the assessed risks, but it is worthwhile to indicate the possibility, which 
we will do in the next subsection 
 
2.3.5 Validation and calibration 
 
In short, ‘validation’ of a variable can be seen as answering the question: “Does this 
variable, given the way it is measured, measure or indicate what it is intended to 
measure or indicate?”  Yet another question is: “Does this variable, given the way it is 
measured, give the right value for what it is to measure?”.   This latter question refers to 
‘calibration’.  For risk assessment validation asks for measures that vary with the 
assessed risk (when this assessment is valid), but these measures need not give the 
‘right’ value for the risk to be assessed.  Would we wish to calibrate risk assessment, it 
would ask for some unambiguous quantification of the assessed risk  The error rate 
does not have the dimension of a risk, the sampling risk is dependent on the sample 
size and the ‘audit position’ in principle could serve as standard, but it is crude: it either 
is ‘OK’ or ‘not OK’.  
But one could form the empirical distribution of error rates from a set of audits, grouping 
them after level of materiality and assessed OR.  Validating risk assessment by means 
of the upper-tail probability for each of the groups, in the empirical distribution as done 
above, is not only fit for validating but also for calibrating the assessed risks.  It directly 
gives an upper-tail probability that can be connected to the assessed level of OR.  In 
this thesis the distribution of the error rates will be modelled by the beta distribution; this 
distribution is appropriate, as the error rates form outcomes between 0 and 1 (0 and 1 
included) and the beta distribution is very flexible: it can take forms from symmetrical to 
highly asymmetrical .   
 
It is clear that the suggested way of calibration asks for a large number of case per 
group.  In our research we did not have enough cases and therefore we do not try to 
calibrate the assessment of OR. 
 
2.4  Validation by tests of control? 
 
So far we have discussed four possible criteria for validation of risk assessment.  They 
are all related to the error rate.  In this section we introduce quite a different perspective 
on this validation, which is implicitly taken on many occasions of risk analyses in 
practice.  It is the perspective in which tests of control are implicitly seen as a means for 
validation.  This follows from what is stated in ISA 200 paragraph 21: "When the 
auditors assessment of the risk of material misstatement includes an expectation of the 
operating effectiveness of controls, the auditor performs tests of controls to support the 
risk assessment."  It also follows from similar prescriptions in HCDAD (1997) and other 
manuals, which have as a result that reduction in the extent of substantive testing only 
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is allowed when the risk assessment on which this reduction is based, is supported by 
tests of control.  However, neither ISA 200, nor ISA 400 (par. 24-34), nor HCDAD 
(1997) make explicit how tests of control add to (or validate) the quality of risk 
assessment.  
 
We will not directly try to make the contribution of tests of control more explicit, but we 
will test a necessary condition for that contribution to be valid.  We will investigate 
whether tests of controls have predictive power for the error rate, should they serve as 
support for an assessment of control risk at less than "high".  This condition is 
necessary because supporting information that does not predict the error rate to a 
certain extent, cannot serve as a replacement for direct substantive testing.  And 
consequently it can not serve as a support for risk assessment as far as it is used as a 
replacement for direct substantive testing. 
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Chapter 3: Audit Opinion: Judgment under Uncertainty 
 
 
Much research is done into the quality of risk assessment.  The classical paradigm for 
this research is that developed by Tversky and Kahneman.  Many of our references 
regard research in the tradition of this paradigm.  They investigate a variety of ways in 
which information can be presented and how mental processes deal with it.  Other 
references use relative quality criteria like consistency.  We will give all references a 
treatment in their own right, in trying to find answers to questions raised by risk analysis 
on an audit object.   
Only a few studies validate the assessed risk on the error rate (or some variable based 
on it).  Where in our research this is a key criterion, we had to construct a bridge 
between the available literature and our aim to validate OR on the error rate (or related 
variables).  This aim is decomposed into four questions that will be leading for our 
research. 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Issuing an audit opinion is being engaged in judgment under uncertainty.  Judgment 
under uncertainty is the label under which Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1971, 
1974, 1981, see also Kahneman 2003) did their pioneering research in the 70’s of the 
last century into the question how human beings deal with uncertain or incomplete 
information on which they have to base a decision.  In this research they focused on the 
heuristics people use to deal with this incomplete or uncertain information.  By 
"heuristics" they mean a rule or a set of rules that govern the way information is 
processed by the human mind.  Every day examples of these heuristics can be found in 
sayings like "one swallow does not make a summer", or "things are never as bad as 
they look", or "the better is the enemy of the good"9.  These are all heuristics, or 
heuristic principles, which give guidance to the human mind when deciding on a course 
of action or when giving predictions, based on incomplete or uncertain information. 
Many of the things Tversky and Kahneman found apply to the judgment that leads to an 
audit opinion, especially when risk analysis contributes to this judgment.   
 
We will continue this section with a short overview of the four articles mentioned above, 
illustrated with examples from auditing and some other fields.  In section 3.2 we will 
speculate on the question how the heuristics discussed in the first section might occur 
in auditing.  In the 3rd section we will discuss the validity of the audit risk model. In the 
4th section we will discuss relevant literature dealing with heuristics and related 
approaches in audit research.  In the 5th section we will discuss the results of our survey 
of literature.  In the 6th we will connect our research questions to these rsults.  We 
conclude with a table in which the results of the articles discussed is summarised. 
 
3.1.1 The Law of Small Numbers 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (T&K, 1971) state that people believe in the “Iaw of small 
numbers”.  This "law" entails that people regard a random sample from a population 
highly representative of this population, almost irrespective of the size of the sample.  
They overlook the fact that especially samples of small size are relatively likely to 
display atypical pictures of the population they are drawn from.  This means that the law 
                                                          
.9 See Wagenaar (1977) for a more elaborate account on the way sayings and proverbs serve 
as daily life heuristics when people deal with incomplete or uncertain information. 
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of small numbers causes people to come to biased conclusions about the population, 
with a relatively large probability.  One of the causes for this bias is the idea that 
randomness compensates for outliers.  People believe that if in a random draw an 
extreme value would be selected, the randomness will take care of compensation in 
one of the next draws.  But randomness has no memory.  It is not difficult to point at 
instances in daily practice of auditing, where auditors implicitly or maybe even explicitly 
capitalise on this law of small numbers.  An example illustrates this. 
 
 
Example 
An auditor draws a random MU-sample (a sample of monetary units) of size 30 from an 
account in which 2% of the monetary units is in error.  He finds no errors in his sample.  
Using this as the only information on this account, he concludes that the account will be 
error-free or at least well below his materiality level of 1%. 
By doing this he disregards the fact that his decision procedure has a probability of 55% 
to find no errors.  This probability was calculated with the help of the binomial law; it is 
the probability to find 0 errors in a sample of size 30, when the probability of ‘success’, 
p=.02. 
 
In fact auditors capitalise on the "Law of Small Numbers" every time they decide to 
base their audit opinion on the results of a small sample, especially when they base 
their opinion on the point estimate, the most likely error, and not on some confidence 
upper limit for the estimation. 
 
3.1.2 Heuristics and Biases 
 
In their article in Science (idem 1974) T&K describe three heuristics: 
(1) the representativeness heuristic, (2) the availability heuristic and (3) the adjustment 
and anchoring heuristic. 
 
3.1.2.1 The representativeness heuristic  
The representativeness heuristic can be seen as a generalisation of the belief in the law 
of small numbers.  With it, T&K mean the phenomenon that people classify an object A 
as belonging to a class B, solely on the basis of the description of A and the extent to 
which it is representative of class B. In other words, A is classified as belonging to class 
B when it is typical of class B. T&K show that with this heuristic various biases are 
associated:  
• the classification is insensitive to prior probabilities,  
• it is insensitive to sample size 
• it is insensitive to predictability 
• it misjudges regression effects. 
Overlooking prior probabilities, for instance, results in even probabilities when a non-
informative description of a person is given as an indication of an answer to the 
question whether he is a farmer or a solicitor.  In experiments the probability of the 
person to be a farmer is assessed at approximately 50 percent, even though the 
occurrence of farmers is much higher than of solicitors.  So it would be more logical to 
assess the probability much higher than 50 percent.   
In auditing this bias would occur when an auditor decides to give an unqualified opinion, 
based on a small sample, in an account of which previous audits indicate a high 
probability of a material error. This (hypothetical) course of action also suffers from the 
next insensitivity. 
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Insensitivity to sample size means that a point estimate derived from a small sample 
leads a person to the same conclusion as the same point estimate derived from a large 
sample.  This is another way of stating the law of small numbers. 
 
Insensitivity to predictability means that predictions of for instance the future value of 
stock or the demand for a commodity are based on a description of the company 
involved, without taking into consideration whether this description is really informative 
for what has to be predicted.  So when a description of the company is very favourable, 
a high profit will be predicted, even if the properties that are described, are not relevant 
for the profit.  
In auditing, this bias may occur when risk analysis is done on irrelevant properties. To 
speculate a little on (hopefully) a caricature: the financial director is looking very honest, 
most of the accounting staff are wearing ties, building and working environment are 
very well organised and brand new. 
 
Misjudging regression effects is due to taking an extreme performance as 
representative.  This causes a prediction being too high in most cases, because in 
general it is hard to perform the next time at the same level, or higher, when the last 
time was at the top of your ability.  This effect is mirrored in the case of extremely bad 
performances: these will lead to predictions that are too low. 
In auditing, this bias may occur when last year the auditee performed very badly. This 
surely will influence the assessment of risk for this year, regardless of present year’s 
observations. (An effect that on other grounds can be deemed to be favourable). 
 
3.1.2.2 The availability heuristic  
The availability heuristic makes people assess the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event dependent on the ease with which instances of occurrences 
come into mind.   
Biases are associated with the following conditions: 
• the retrievability of instances 
• the effectiveness of a search set 
• the imaginability of instances 
• the illusory correlation effect. 
 
The retrievability bias, for instance, occurs because famous persons are more easily 
remembered than less prominent persons, or larger line items have higher attention 
value than smaller line items.  Selection bias due to this "retrievability by size of item" is 
shown by Hall et. al. (2001), who let subjects select items from an account, as random 
as possible.  So not only judgment but also non-judgment can cause biases. 
 
By a search set T&K mean a set of mental rules, or heuristics, that enables a person to 
retrieve information from his memory.  ‘Always be vigilant with lowly educated staff’, 
‘always be vigilant with quantitative outcomes’ may be such mental rules (implicitly 
guiding ideas), as part of a search set.  Such a set may influence the choice of an audit 
object or influence the way information stored in memory, is processed. 
 
Imaginability plays an important role in the evaluation of probabilities in real-life 
situations.  The risk of engaging in some project often has to be assessed beforehand 
and then not only experience, but also imagination plays a role in coming at 
contingencies that may disturb the project.  When this imagination is vivid, the risk may 
be overestimated because the likelihood of the contingency is much less than the 
vividness of the imagination. 
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The availability heuristic also provides a natural explanation for the illusory correlation 
effect.  It occurs when two events occur simultaneously; human mind then assumes 
they are associated, correlated, or even related by some causality, even if there is no 
association at all.  On future occasions, when one of the two events happens the 
heuristic makes the observator assume that the other will occur also.  In the 
Netherlands an every day example of this "illusory correlation effect" is the remark often 
made in a company when a conversation suddenly falls silent: "The Vicar passes".  The 
implicit assumption in this remark (meant as a joke) is that the company has reasons to 
keep quiet when a vicar is near, because of a bad conscience. (As a matter of fact it 
must be admitted that no formal record is known of instances where these two events 
co-occurred). 
 
3.1.2.3 The anchoring and adjustment heuristic  
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic regards the phenomenon that in many 
situations people make estimates by starting from an initial value, the anchor, that is 
adjusted to yield the final answer.  Insufficient adjustment is synonymous with the 
anchoring effect.  One of the instances in which it will occur is in incomplete 
computations, such as in solving the well-known ‘joint birthday problem’.  This goes as 
follows: 
 
Joint birthday problem: 
 “Give an estimate of the probability that of 23 people together at some party two 
or more have their birthday on the same date”.  
 
Most people intuitively assess this probability much smaller than the actual 50%. This is 
because they start with some small probability like ‘1 or 2 divided by 365’ as an anchor 
and fail to adjust sufficiently for the numerous combinations in which the event for which 
the probability is to be estimated can occur. 
 
Also adjustment biases appear in the evaluation of conjunctive, disjunctive and simple 
events.  A conjunctive event is an event that, by definition, happens if (and only if) all of 
a set of composing sub-events happen simultaneously (are in conjunction); it is 
analogous to a series connection. A disjunctive event is an event that, by definition, 
happens if at least one of a set of composing sub-events happens; it is analogous to a 
parallel connection. A simple event is not structured as a combination of sub-events.  
Compared to a simple event, people tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive 
events and to underestimate the probability of disjunctive events (which also happens in 
the birthday problem described above).  T&K mention examples in which the equivalent 
formulations of a problem as a conjunctive or a disjunctive event had this impact on the 
assessment of the associated probability. 
 
3.1.3 Framing 
 
In their article in Science T&K (1981) introduce the concept of framing and the effects it 
has on decisions.  Framing refers to the way a problem is stated. In daily language a 
message may be that the glass is half-empty, or that the glass is half-full.  It is everyday 
experience that this difference in ‘framing’ of the same information, often causes 
differences in appreciation, or action.  
 
By way of an example, T&K give the consequences of two programmes that have to 
cope with the threat of an outbreak of an unusual disease.  The consequences were the 
same, but framed in a different way. They also give a sketch of an experiment in which 
these descriptions were given to experimental subjects that were asked to choose 
between the programmes.  The following example (from T&K, 1981) summarises their 
experiment. 
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Example 
Problem 1: Imagine that the U.S. are preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asean disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.  Two alternative 
programmes to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the exact 
scientific estimates of the consequences of the programmes are as follows: 
If programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved  
If programme B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.  
Which of the two programmes would you favour? 
In an experiment this problem was administered to 152 people; the majority 
choice, 72% in this problem was risk averse and chose the option in which 200 
people were saved: the prospect of certainly saving 200 lives is more attractive 
than a risky prospect of equal expected value, that is a one in three chance of 
saving 600 lives, chosen by the other 28%  
 
Problem 2: The story about the disease is the same as in problem 1. 
If programme C is adopted 400 people will die.  
if programme D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.  
In the same experiment this problem was administered to 155 other people; the 
majority choice was now risk taking: the certain death of 400 people , chosen by 
22%, is less acceptable than the two in three chance that 600 will die, chosen by 
78%.  
 
T&K state that in general choice problems involving gains lead to risk averse choices 
and problems involving losses lead to risk taking choices as is illustrated in the "Asean 
disease" example. 
 
Remark 
Framing is different from the three heuristics in section 3.1.2: the heuristics can directly 
be seen as a kind of "mental aid" to solve a problem of information processing.  
Framing is a phenomenon that is inevitable any time information is presented, because 
it is impossible to present information without a frame.  Still, as the example in this 
section shows, framing can cause biases.  And it is also known from literature (Emby, 
1994, Johnson et al, 1994) that the way a problem is stated heavily influences its 
solution or even its solvability. An example can also be derived from the birthday 
problem.  That could also have been presented as the question: "Give an estimate of 
the probability that neither of those present at the party have their anniversary on the 
same date".  Then the estimate might have been much better.  So there are good 
reasons to subsume framing under the concept of heuristics, and deal with the 
corresponding biases.   
 
3.1.4 Accessibility, System 1 or System 2 Judgment, the Affect Heuristic, 
Prototype or Extensional Attributes 
 
In his Nobel lecture on December 8, 2002 Kahneman reviews the work of Tversky and 
Kahneman and that of Kahneman and others.  By distinguishing two modes of thought, 
in a "Two System View" for cognition he consolidates the theoretical framework for the 
heuristics approach. "System 1" is the system of intuition and "system 2" is the system 
of reasoning.  In his lecture he adds a key concept to the theory of heuristics and 
biases: the concept of "accessibility".  He shows that representativeness, availability, 
and anchoring can be explained by the role the "accessibility" of key features plays in 
the object to be judged. 
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In his lecture he gives a more precise definition of a heuristic by calling it attribute 
substitution and defining it as follows: "A judgment is said to be mediated by a heuristic 
when the individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by 
substituting a related heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind".  This 
definition does not apply to anchoring effects because here the key mental mechanism 
consists of temporarily raising accessibility of a particular value of the target attribute, 
relative to other values of the same attribute. 
In his lecture he adds the "Affect Heuristic" to the basic heuristics in judgment. In 
principle this heuristic explicitly models the influence of affections on judgment.  It deals 
with the extent to which thoughts from system 2 can be corrective for biases for which 
the judgments from system 1 are susceptible. 
He discusses prototype and extensional attributes; prototype attributes being the 
average of these attributes for a class and extensional attributes being the specific extra 
of a member of the class for the prototypical attributes of the class.  Because of their 
high accessibility the prototype attributes are the natural candidates for the role of 
heuristic attributes. 
 
Much of the literature we discuss in this thesis rests on the "classic heuristics" and the 
framing concept.  It adds the possibility of corrections from system 2, for instance by 
looking at the role of experience and of structuring a task.  It seems to us that the idea 
of accessibility does not give a new opening for research.  But the affect heuristic might 
give interesting new openings: it needs no argument that affections inevitably play a 
role in assessments. 
 
3.2  Heuristics, biases and validity in risk assessment in 
auditing 
 
Tversky and Kahneman show that many possible biases lie in wait when people deal 
with incomplete or uncertain information, at least partly due to the heuristics they use, 
or that are at work on a subconscious level.  If risk assessment by auditors is also 
subject to these biases, then it can only fail, except for the very improbable event that 
the biases nullify each other.  So the question whether we may expect these biases and 
if they really occur, is very relevant.  Otherwise, if the biases would appear not to be 
very influential, the question still remains whether risk assessment by auditors is valid in 
the sense meant in this thesis. 
In general, the heuristics that cause the biases are not directly visible when they 
operate.  As stated above, they operate in a human mind and can be deduced from the 
effects that can be observed, when people deal with incomplete or uncertain 
information.  So when looking for the effects of heuristics and corresponding biases we 
have to wonder where, in what type of information context, the heuristics will operate.  
We will do this in the next analysis.  It will lead to some expectations, that will be 
evaluated in our overview of previous research in section 3.4 and be concluded upon in 
section 3.5. 
We have to warn in advance that this analysis, the expectations emerging from it and 
the evidence we find in literature, do not simply give a justification for our leading 
research questions.  In section 3.6 we will bridge the gap between our findings from 
literature and these questions. 
 
3.2.1 Biases in auditing due to the representativeness heuristic 
 
Biases due to the representativeness heuristic are very likely to occur.  In the first place 
in a context that is relevant as the normal follow up of risk analysis: forming an audit 
opinion based on a sample of tests. In general, the size of test samples is small, and 
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even if other sources of information are taken into consideration when coming to an 
audit judgment, the weight that will be given to the results of a test sample will be 
relatively large in general, because with an eye on the truth and fairness of the 
accounts in general it is deemed to give the strongest information.   
Expectation A: Small samples tend to be taken as (too) representative of the 
population. 
 
On the other hand it can be argued, that auditors make an almost exhaustive use of 
their prior information on the accounts under audit.  This is paramount in the basic 
assumption of the audit methodology: the audited account is true and fair, the ‘only 
thing’ an auditor has to do is to gather sufficient evidence to substantiate that.  For 
instance the Leerboek Accountantscontrole 4/5 (p. 7) states (translated from the Dutch): 
“ The purpose of the audit of the annual accounts (..) is (..) confirming the truth and 
fairness of these accounts with a view of their use in societal intercourse” (see 
Leerboek, 2003).  On the majority of occasions this assumption is true, and therefore it 
is justified not to reject this assumption on the basis of only little counter information, but 
only to reject it when there is sufficient counter information.  
Expectation B: The representativeness heuristic in auditing does not lead to 
disregarding prior probabilities of truth and fairness of an account.  
 
Even an over-weighting of prior probabilities can be expected, also due to a less 
justifiable practice in which the assumption of a true and fair account causes auditors to 
neutralise information that indicates an unfair or untrue account.  For instance by 
declaring an error found as totally incidental, and therefore leaving it out of the 
extrapolation.  Seen from a purely statistical point of view, this practice violates the 
assumption of randomness that underlies statistical inference (because the 
randomness is made conditional on the absence of a certain type of error), but maybe a 
kind of reasoning can be conceived that neutralises this objection.  However, in this 
light Burgstahler & Jiambalvo (1986) do exactly the opposite: they show why that 
conditional randomness is fatal for a sound inference and thus raise serious objections 
against this practice.  These objections have lately been convincingly confirmed by 
Hendriks et. al. (2005).  But this practice still lasts, with a danger of an unjustified 
unqualified opinion. 
Expectation C: An over-weighting of prior probabilities can be expected. 
 
The three expectations formulated so far are contradictory to a certain extent.  We 
believe that their effects more or less keep each other in balance, so the net effect will 
depend on the circumstances; see also the discussion after expectation E.  
 
Bias due to representativeness can also occur due to (lack of) predictability. T&K (1974) 
define this as the phenomenon that a prediction is made solely on the substantive 
content of the information, but regardless of the strength of the same information. With 
valuation of stocks or with an assessment of the continuity of a business it would mean 
that the same assessment would be given, more or less regardless of the strength and 
quality of the information on which the assessment is based.  For instance, the 
information could be that the saleability of goods is high; the strength of the arguments 
that substantiate this information can be of varying quality.  It is not very likely that the 
experienced auditor lets himself be led astray by a lack of predictability. 
Expectation D The representativeness heuristic will show no bias due to lack of 
predictability. 
 
Bias due to misconceptions of regression effects could occur if current values are 
predicted from past values.  An extremely high profit of last year could lead to such a 
regression effect.  It is also plausible that the assessment of IR and CR will show a 
regression effect on the assessments of the previous year.  This is because an auditor 
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will look at the assessments of last year and wonder how stable the audit context has 
been during the year and, dependent on the stability, he will closely relate the 
assessment of this year to that of last year.  In particular this mechanism plays a role 
when, last year, the administrative processes were found to be of insufficient quality; 
the audit department urges the accounting department to improve these processes, 
which they do.  The audit department observes the improvements, but still as a matter 
of precaution assesses the control risk at "high".  So knowingly the auditor weighs the 
results of last year too heavy. This boils down to 
Expectation E: Regression effects in risk assessment will be found. 
 
Bias due to sample size and bias due to prior information might occur simultaneously. 
In a case where they have opposite directions, the resulting effect may be a correct 
assessment.  In case they have the same direction, which is the case when the 
occurrence risk is assessed as low and the small test sample shows no or only tiny 
errors, the auditor may have a too positive assessment.  It needs no argument that this 
bias is more likely to occur when sample size is smaller as a consequence of a 
favourable risk assessment. 
 
3.2.2 Biases in auditing due to the availability heuristic 
 
The availability heuristic will almost surely be present in the way auditors come to 
conclusions on the basis of the vast amount of information that they have of their audit 
object.  The first thing that comes to mind is that the retrievability of the most recent 
information will be larger than that of older information.  In the literature of audit 
research therefore the availability heuristic is relevant under the label of "recency 
effects".  It also may mean that there is an effect on the conclusions due to the order in 
which the information is presented or gathered.  
Expectation F: Bias due to the availability heuristic will be there in the form of 
recency effects or order effects. 
 
 A more speculative effect may be due to the imaginability of possible or plausible 
combinations of events in the administrative processes that are the object of risk 
analysis.  Two contradictory arguments are relevant with regard to this heuristic.  The 
first is that auditors are educated to be keen on error generating conditions, so it may 
be expected that a possible bias will not be too large, or even absent. The second is 
that error generating conditions will evolve or deliberately be changed, due to which 
imagination falls short and such a condition can be overlooked. Therefore a risk may be 
assessed too low.  Imagination may lead to an endless sequence of possible conditions 
in which the availability heuristic may lead to biases; we conclude that it is a relevant 
heuristic for research with respect to fraud.  But this means that in regular research on 
auditing the problem hardly will be addressed. 
 
Bias due to the effectiveness of a search set seems unlikely. A search set is the 
combination of knowledge and information about the audit object, or more general the 
object of searching, combined with the heuristics used. In general a search set is 
interpreted as being a mindset: a set of relevant knowledge and heuristics in the 
person’s mind.  But in the auditor’s case this mindset will be controlled to a very large 
extent by the methodology of auditing itself.  And if, as a consequence, the search set is 
interpreted as the audit methodology, this leads to questions outside of the scope of 
heuristics and biases. 
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3.2.3 Biases in auditing due to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
 
The adjustment and anchoring heuristic may be very relevant in the aggregation that an 
auditor has to make, based on all the risk factors he has detected in the administrative 
processes and their context.  It will be hard for him to make a distinction between 
inherent risk and internal control risk and where to situate certain risk factors.  He will 
have to be aware of the dependency between certain factors.  It will make a difference 
whether he sees the aggregation as conjunctive or disjunctive events, whether he starts 
with very low probabilities, etc.  A problem in dealing with this heuristic will be that the 
possible risk causes are numerous, and their interrelations and dependencies are often 
very hard to explore. Moreover, much of the assessment of the risk due to these factors 
occurs in the head of the auditor, so that it is not even clear which risk factors (including 
their relationships) the auditor deals with.  They can only be deduced, to a certain 
extent, from the results of his assessment. 
 
In principle the same considerations apply to the decomposition of the possible 
misstatement and corresponding opinion by looking at the assertion level, albeit that the 
assertions in general are well-defined (see also the discussion in 3.3.3).  Assertions like 
accuracy, ownership, completeness, etc. are basic to the audit opinion on the truth and 
fairness of the account.  Opinions on the assertion level have to be aggregated in order 
to come to an opinion on the account level.  This aggregation will be subject to the 
mechanisms and problems discussed above. Lea et al (1992) give a very interesting 
discussion on the aggregation of risk assessment at the assertion level into an 
assessment at the account level, which confirms the existence of aggregation 
problems. 
 
So there is complexity in assessing risks on at least two dimensions.  Table 3.1 gives 
an outline. 
 
Table 3.1: Complexity as assertions by risk factors 
assertion → 
risk factor↓ 
completeness ownership .. assertion m 
Complexity sub-assessment (1,1) ……. .. sub-assessment (1,m) 
professionalism ……. ……. .. …… 
………. ……. ……. .. …… 
risk factor n sub-assessment (n,1) ……. .. sub-assessment (n,m) 
 
The risk factor "complexity" for instance may be representing the expectation that more 
complex organisations are more susceptible to material errors; the risk factor 
"professionalism" may be representing the expectation that more professional 
personnel reduces the susceptibility to material errors. On each of these factors and for 
each of the assertions the auditor has to assess its influence on the risk of a material 
error, the occurrence risk.  This means that the assessment task as a whole will ask for 
n times m sub-assessments.  
 
In principle every sub-assessment is of the form: "does this risk factor apply to this 
assertion and if so, to what extent does it cause risks?".  Subsequently these nxm sub-
assessments will be aggregated.  Anchoring with undue adjustments lies in wait. 
So the relevance of this heuristic is without question, but the way it operates is very 
hard to predict.  
Expectation G: The anchoring heuristic will show effects but its direction is 
dependent on the specific situation; in particular it will show effects when 
disjunctive or conjunctive events are involved,. 
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3.2.4 Biases in auditing due to framing. 
 
In our introduction of the concept of framing we already observed that framing is 
inevitable anytime you present information.  So in the context of auditing the question is 
not whether framing will have influence on the judgment and assessment of the auditor, 
but how.  Effects of framing already can be observed when the basic task of auditing is 
considered.  For many auditors their mission is to confirm that the annual accounts as 
issued by management are true and fair, because otherwise they would not have 
issued these statements (see: Leerboek  2003, p.7).  For other auditors their mission is 
to come to a conclusion regarding the question whether the possible errors found in the 
annual accounts are not so large that they prohibit an unqualified opinion.  In principle 
these two views are equivalent, but in practice they may lead to different actions and 
therefore to different outcomes.  Many other examples of possible framing effects could 
be given, they all lead to 
Expectation H: Framing effects will be found in auditing. 
 
3.2.5 Conclusions as to heuristics and biases in risk assessment 
 
The previous discussion of the relevance of heuristics and biases as stated by Tversky  
& Kahneman inevitably leads to the conclusion that they are very relevant for risk 
assessment by auditors, and even for the way they come to an audit opinion.  Of course 
this has been recognized so far by many researchers, and results of their investigations 
will be discussed in section 3.4.  The expectations as stated above will serve as a guide 
in interpreting the literature, without claiming completeness of all the relevant literature 
for a specific expectation.  This means that neither denial nor confirmation of an 
expectation should be seen as a "proof", but at its best as a certain tendency. 
 
At the same time an interesting question will remain unanswered, namely: “Is the 
absence of biases as discussed in this chapter sufficient for a valid assessment of risks, 
as meant in chapter 2?”  When trying to answer this question, it must be observed that 
the first step in risk assessment will be the assessment of the risk associated with 
primitive events or conditions in the administrative processes.  It is very unlikely that 
each of these primitive events can be assessed at the "right" risk.  For instance, it will 
be hard to assess the risk associated with the quality of a set of application controls or 
of a set of user controls.  In the first place it is very hard to separate them from the other 
controls and the environmental controls and even if this is possible the task remains to 
assess the associated risk.  And only then the aggregation of these risks to an overall 
risk of the existence of a material error in the accounts can take place, with the 
accompanying possibilities of biases. 
 
The conclusion can only be that validation on the criteria of chapter 2: 
the ‘audit position’ of the error rate, 
the error rate, 
the sampling risk and 
the distribution of the error rates conditional on the risk assessment, 
remains necessary.  Literature on research with this orientation will also be discussed in 
the current chapter. 
 
3.3  The validity of the audit risk model 
 
So far we have discussed the validity of risk assessment from a general point of view 
and with a specific view on the possibility that biases in risk assessment might occur.  
We have seen biases conceived in literature and their existence confirmed (bias will 
Chapter 3: Audit Opinion: Judgment under Uncertainty 
  37
specifically and more thoroughly be examined in section 3.4 for audit situations), but the 
question is still unanswered whether this implies a lack of validity with respect to our 
validation criteria.  This validity still might be found.  But even if our study would show 
this validity, invalidity of the ARM as a model could prevent its application to be valid.  It 
could, for instance, be that OR is assessed via IR and ICR, without taking into 
consideration their dependency.  Therefore it is relevant to look at the quality of the 
model itself.  We will do this from three perspectives: 
1  the event structure of the model; 
2  the statistical validity of the model; 
3  the level at which risk is assessed. 
 
3.3.1 The event structure of the ARM. 
 
Four events are distinguished in the ARM (see Panel 2000 p.164; SAS No. 47): 
• the coming into being and existence of a material error if the related controls in 
the business processes would not work; the inherent risk (IR) is the risk of this 
event happening; 
• the failure of the related controls in the administrative processes to prevent or 
detect and correct a material error on a timely basis; the control risk (CR) is the 
risk of this event happening; 
• the failure of analytical review by the auditor to detect a material error; the risk of 
analytical review (RAR) is the risk of this event happening; 
• the failure to detect a material error in a sample of tests of detail; the sampling 
risk (SR) is the risk of this event happening. 
The precise definitions of these risks are given in section 1.4. 
Table 3.2 shows the context of business and administrative processes, in particular its 
controls and the actions the auditor can take in the form of analytical review and 
substantive tests of detail. It also shows the resulting events and the related risks, as far 
as relevant in the ARM.  It is clear that the four resulting events: that of the possible 
existence of a material error, are distinguished because of their distinct places in the 
business, accounting, and auditing processes. 
 
Table 3.2: Actions, events and the risk in the ARM. 
Action of audit 
object 
Action of 
auditor 
Event Action of 
auditor 
Assessed risk 
Business 
processes 
 Creation of 
material error? 
Assessment 
of quality of 
processes 
and 
environment 
Inherent risk, IR 
Set of controls  Not preventing or 
detecting and 
correcting 
material error 
Assessment 
of quality of 
controls 
Control risk, CR 
Annual accounts Analytical 
review 
Not detecting a 
material error 
Assessment 
of quality of 
analytical 
review 
Risk of analytical 
review, RAR 
Annual accounts Tests of detail Not detecting a 
material error 
Assessment 
of quality of 
tests of detail 
Sampling risk, 
SR 
   Combining 
the four risks 
Audit risk, AR 
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The problem with the events as defined above, is that the causes of the first and the 
second instance of the possible existence of a material error and therefore IR and CR, 
are very hard to separate. This is caused by the fact that many controls, such as 
separation of duties, authorisations, competence level of employees, etc. are also part 
of, or help determine, the business processes, which cannot be imagined to work 
without these controls.  So it is almost impossible to assess inherent risk apart from the 
control risk.  Waller (1993) points at the preventive qualities of the internal controls.  
They precede the coming into being of errors and therefore directly influence the IR, but 
they cannot be modelled in the ARM.  And where to model the competence level of 
employees: is that preventive (IR), just part of the context in which the business 
processes operate (IR), or detective (CR).  Ambiguities in this respect are likely to 
cause inconsistent assessments of the IR and CR (see again Waller 1993). 
 
In this thesis we circumvent this problem of separability by validating the occurrence 
risk, the combination of inherent and control risk.  This is also justified with a view on 
the statistical validity of the ARM (as a result of the lack of separability), as we will 
explain in the next subsection. 
 
3.3.2 The statistical validity of the ARM 
 
In the ARM the four composing risks are multiplied, which implies that they are 
assumed to be independent in the statistical sense.  This means that irrespective of the 
assessed IR, the CR is assessed.  But the fuzzy event structure as explained above 
already causes dependencies between IR and CR, as does a possible anchoring effect: 
if the inherent risk IR is assessed as "high" this may cause an upward tendency in the 
assessment of the control risk CR (Waller 1993).  But also the opposite effect may 
happen: an as "high" assessed IR, may cause the auditor to start from the idea that the 
internal control will be strong and subsequently assess the CR as "low" (idem). 
The dependencies are circumvented when IR and CR are aggregated into a new risk: 
the occurrence risk (OR, again Waller 1993, HCDAD 1997. Kinney, 1992) or when the 
ARM is changed into:    AR = f (IR, CR, RAR, SR).  
It is obvious that OR = f (IR, CR) is included in the previous expression. 
 
In the Netherlands the statistical validity of the ARM was extensively discussed in the 
end of the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s of last century (see, among others: Ten 
Wolde (1989), Veenstra & Van Batenburg (1990), Schilder (1991), Broeze et. al. (1991), 
Lammerts van Bueren (1991), Hoogewoning (1991)). 
 
It is obvious that as long as the statistical validity is questionable, valid assessment of 
OR, or of IR and CR, are only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for a valid 
application of the Audit Risk Model.  Here "valid" has a broader meaning than it has in 
the research in this thesis.  A valid model refers to an application of the ARM that leads 
to the correct size of substantive testing and other substantive procedures, given the 
assessed occurrence risk.  The size is correct when the reliability of the audit opinion 
has the "nominal level".  "Nominal level" is the level of reliability that was aimed at by 
the audit design; it is the level of reliability, or complementary the risk, at which the size 
of substantive testing is calculated.  In a valid model, this nominal level will be equal to 
the actual reliability. 
 
The validity investigated in this thesis, only refers to valid assessment of the occurrence 
risk.  In principle this does not suffer from the statistical invalidity of the audit risk model, 
unless the occurrence risk were calculated from the assessments of IR and CR by 
multiplying them.  Then this would be incorporated in our data on OR, because we 
asked our respondents for their OR assessment.  But in the discussion we had with our 
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respondents they all reported their assessment of OR to be based on a judgmental 
combination of IR and CR. 
 
3.3.3 The level at which risk is assessed. 
 
In general two levels are in use at which some component of audit risk can be 
assessed: (1) the assertion level, (2) the account level.  At the assertion level 
"assertions" like completeness (have all transactions been recorded) or existence (does 
an asset exist) or accuracy (is the recorded amount correct) are the object of risk 
assessment: the risk is assessed that some material error might occur in this assertion.  
An assertion can also be seen as an aspect of the truth and fairness of the account.  So 
the assertion level does not imply a subdivision of the account in smaller sub-accounts, 
but a subdivision of the quality of the account in aspects.  Assertions are also labelled 
as "audit objectives": an audit activity can have the objective of assessing the 
completeness of a sub-account, or of the existence of a debtor, etc.  Related to such an 
audit objective or assertion is an opinion on that assertion.  It is clear that the risk at the 
account level is some aggregate of the risks at the level of the assertions. Figure 1 
sketches the relevant relations.   
 
Figure 3.1 Relation between assertions and quality of account 
Error! 
 
 
When the auditor can give a positive opinion on the assertions and if the aggregate of 
the errors in the assertions does not exceed the level of materiality for the account, the 
auditor can give an unqualified opinion of the account.   
 
The aggregation of the evidence found with respect to the assertions, both with respect 
to the size of the error, and with respect to the associated risk, should be done in a very 
systematic way (see Srinindi & Vasarhelyi 1986, Lea et al, 1992).  In practice no formal 
calculus to execute this aggregation is used and there are only poor heuristics in use to 
achieve such an aggregation, like: “take the risk associated with the most important 
assertion”. (See again Srinindi & Vasarhelyi 1986 and HCDAD  1997).  In 3.2.3 we 
discussed that risk assessment at the account level will be composed in principle of risk 
assessments at the level of the assertions, which means that the absence of valid 
aggregation rules is a serious problem for the assessment at the account level.  At best 
an auditor will resort to letting himself be led by heuristics dealt with earlier in this 
chapter, but this will mean that he will also be subject to the corresponding biases.  This 
will also mean that it is highly probable that risk assessment at the assertion level will 
show greater validity than risk assessment at the account level (see Waller 1993). 
 
In the above discussion, one simplification has been allowed which might complicate 
the relation between assessments at the assertion level and assessments at the 
account level.  In the discussion we took the level of materiality at the assertion level for 
granted.  Maybe this implies that, for every assertion, the same level of materiality will 
be adopted, say, equal to the level of materiality for the whole account.  But this is far 
 
Assertion 2 
Truth and fairness of 
account 
Assertion 1 
Assertion k 
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from self-evident: when for instance, the truth and fairness of the account depends on 
three assertions, and errors on these assertions are additive when aggregation to the 
level of the account takes place, in principle one-third of the materiality level for the 
account could be material for the assertion level.  Many variations on this complication 
can be imagined and they might cause the expectation to fail that risk assessment at 
the assertion level may be more valid than risk assessment at the account level as 
expected by Waller (1993). 
 
When we realise that risk assessment at the account level is almost inevitably 
aggregated from assessments at the assertion level (implicitly or explicitly) it is clear 
that there are more problems with the ARM than those of heuristics and biases in 
judgment under uncertainty. 
 
3.3.4 Conclusions as to the validity of the ARM 
 
This very short account on the validity of the ARM serves to show that a valid risk 
assessment is necessary, but not sufficient for a correct application of the ARM.  
Especially when IR and CR are assessed separately, a valid assessment still can lead 
to incorrect results due to weaknesses in the ARM.  In this study this is taken as a 
limitation on the subject.  Our point of departure is that the first thing to be sure of is a 
correct assessment of the risks and only when that is accomplished, does improvement 
of the audit risk model make sense. This means that we choose a course of action that 
is different from, for instance, Mollema (2003, 2004), who aims at improving the model 
without making a problem of the validity of risk assessment.  Our looking at the validity 
of IR and CR at the account level also means that we do not consider problems of 
aggregation, neither from assessments on risk factors nor from assessments on 
assertions.  Only in chapter 7, where we deal with risk indicators, we will meet the 
problem of aggregation, but there it is not our object of study. 
 
3.4  Relevant literature 
 
We have chosen the work of Tversky and Kahneman (T&K) as a framework for our 
study of the literature on risk assessment.  T&K give a very interesting frame for 
understanding what happens in risk assessment.  As a consequence many studies on 
risk assessment can be described within this framework.  Moreover many studies 
explicitly refer to the T&K concepts.  So for an overview of research into risk 
assessment the T&K paradigm offers opportunities to come to a well-fitting 
categorisation. 
 
At the same time not all relevant literature can be subsumed under this framework.  So 
in this subsection we will extend our search beyond the T & K-framework.  Before we 
give an account of the relevant literature, we notice two contingencies with our research 
problem. 
 
Firstly we observe that complexity of information may cause the same heuristics 
to operate as discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2.  This is because complexity can 
be a source of uncertainty or incompleteness in or of the information.  Information 
can be so complex that relevant interrelations, interactions and effects are beyond 
the information processing capacity of the human mind and/or even beyond the 
possibilities of more formal modelling.  Complexity possibly causes effects of 
information to be subject to order effects and consequently availability effects, 
anchoring, etc.  This observation results in the conclusion that literature on the 
processing of complex information will also be relevant for this thesis.  
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Secondly we recall our discussion in section 2.4: the assumption that system 
tests (tests of control) have a predictive value for the error rate or the rate of 
misstatements.  In our study we will check this assumption, and therefore 
literature on the relation between tests of control and/or compliance testing on the 
one hand and the error rate on the other is relevant too. 
 
We will order our overview of literature as follows: 
3.4.1 Studies that are directly related to the heuristics and biases paradigm 
3.4.2 Studies that investigate consistency of risk assessment with some criterion 
3.4.3 Studies that deal in some sense or another with the complexity of the object 
of risk assessment 
3.4.4 Studies that investigate the value of system tests for validation of risk 
assessment.   
 
3.4.1 Studies on the heuristics and biases paradigm 
 
3.4.1.1 Framing 
Johnson et. al. (1991) and Emby (1994) investigate the effect of 'framing' on the 
assessments of an auditor.  As stated in section 3.1.3 'framing' refers to the fact that 
information is always given within a point of view or frame of reference.  This frame is 
somehow given to, or adopted by, the one who performs the assessment.  In audit 
research the dependent variable may be the quality of some business, or the audit 
effort to be given by the auditor.  Bias towards the frame of reference as an effect of 
framing is shown in both studies, but experience or extra information may counteract 
this bias.  
Johnson et al (1991) state that management creates a possibly misleading frame by 
issuing financial statements that suggest a growth firm, when in fact a fraud is hidden in 
the statements.  Auditors, experts and novices were provided with extra information 
about this firm in which a fraud case is hidden.  Indeed it appeared that the idea of 
growth firm serves as a frame for further investigation.  But Johnson et al found that 
subjects with sufficient knowledge about the industry were able to change the growth 
frame into a fraud frame and consequently detect the fraud.  This was independent of 
experience as an auditor as such. 
In a second experiment subjects were provided with a case with a financial 
misstatement.  Expert auditors appeared to be able to look through this frame induced 
by the financial misstatement and detect it.  Novices did not succeed in that task.  In 
this second experiment knowledge of the industry did not seem to have influence on the 
success with respect to the task 
The effect of framing was shown; it was also shown that expertise, be it as an auditor or 
as an expert in the industry can cope with this framing effect. 
A brief comment is also due: the phenomenon that Johnson et al investigate and label 
as "framing" may also be seen as "anchoring".  The experimental subjects show a 
tendency to cling to a given starting picture. 
 
Emby (1994) presented the same assessment problem in two frames.  In the first, 
subjects were asked to assess the risks in an internal control system given in a brief 
description, in the second, subjects were asked to find the strengths in the same 
internal control system with the same brief description.  In a third, control, group the 
same information was given but without framing questions.  All groups were asked to 
decide on the level of substantive testing that they would plan in the given conditions.  
Emby found no significant differences in the planned levels between the three groups. 
The three groups were provided with more information in a sequential way or in a 
simultaneous way, giving a three by two design with the frame factor.  Now Emby found 
a significant difference in chosen level of substantive testing between the risks group 
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provided with sequential information and the strength group, provided with the 
simultaneous information.  It means he found an interaction between framing and 
recency effects. 
 
Intermediate conclusions as to framing 
Framing appears to have influence on the auditors assessment.  Expectation H is 
confirmed. 
 
3.4.1.2 Anchoring and adjustment 
O’ Donnell & Schultz (2005), Wilks (2002), Butler (1986), Joyce & Biddle (1981a), Krug 
Nelson (1995), Smith & Kida (1991) and Tan (1995), (among others) investigated the 
effect of 'anchoring and adjustment', or of phenomena that we deem to be very similar 
to anchoring.  As stated in 3.1.2.3, 'anchoring' is the heuristic which reduces complexity 
by taking a starting picture ('anchor') as the picture to be 'adjusted' to comply with (new) 
information. The dependent variable is the assessed risk or probability.   
 
O’Donnell & Schultz (2005) investigate the ‘halo-effect’, for the first time described by 
Thorndike (1920).  The halo-effect is the mechanism that a favourable (or unfavourable) 
judgment of an object on some attribute is likely to lead again to a favourable (or 
unfavourable) judgment on some other attribute.  O’D & S find this halo-effect: when 
auditors assess the account-level risk: they tend to adjust this to the strategic risk as it 
is assessed in the business process analysis.  The strategic risk apparently serves as 
an anchor for the account level risk. 
 
Wilks (2002) investigates the effect on the tendency to agree with supervisors’ views of 
a subordinate who is aware of these views.  This would be caused by distorting 
evidence or by evaluating evidence in a way consistent with the supervisors views.  In 
an experiment Wilks finds that auditors who learn the partners’ views before evaluating 
the evidence, evaluate evidence and make going-concern judgments more consistently 
with the partners’ views, compared to auditors who learn the partners views after the 
evaluation phase. 
A brief comment is at its place: Wilks’ findings can be seen as a matter of anchoring of 
a judgment; obviously compliance to desirable behaviour may also give an explanation 
of his findings. 
 
Butler (1986) gave the result of an audit sample to his experimental subjects and asked 
them to assess the audit risk (AR), given this sample result.  In the presentation of the 
results of the audit sample Butler manipulated the information on the allowed audit risk.  
Clearly this allowed AR is irrelevant for the actual AR, but Butler expected this extra 
information to work as an anchor.  His experiment confirms this expectation. 
 
Joyce & Biddle (1981a) introduced an anchor in their experiment by manipulating the 
starting question. In the first experimental condition they asked their experimental 
subjects: what is your estimate of the number of fraudulent businesses, is it more than 
10 per 1000 and how much more?  In the second experimental condition they asked 
their experimental subjects whether their estimate was more than 200 per 1000 and 
how much more or maybe less?  This manipulation caused significant differences in the 
given answers by the two experimental groups.   
In a second experiment they found that the sequence in which information with respect 
to the internal control was given also led to anchoring effects: experimental subjects 
provided with prior information, followed by negative adjustments chose a higher level 
of audit effort than experimental subjects provided with the same information (prior and 
adjustments) at once.  Auditors with more experience (experience varies between 0 and 
27 years) showed less bias by the anchoring effect. 
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Again a brief comment is worthy of note: the phenomenon that Joyce & Biddle 
investigate in their experiment and label as “anchoring” may also be seen as “recency”.  
Seen as “anchoring”, the experimental subjects over-adjust in the sequential 
presentation, which is inconsistent with the anchoring and adjustment ideas.  The 
recency heuristic directly explains the experimental effect. 
 
Joyce & Biddle (1981a) also investigated possible differences in assessments of 
probabilities which result from a combination of primitive probabilities in the case of 
conjunctive and disjunctive events.  In their experiment the primitive probabilities were 
known to the experimental subjects; the same assessment problem was presented in a 
conjunctive (condition 1) and a disjunctive (condition 2) mode.  Joyce & Biddle did not 
find differences between the two conditions in the assessed risk. 
 
Smith & Kida (1991) showed anchoring effects when risks are combined in a 
conjunctive or a disjunctive presentation of a problem.  They found that risks are 
overestimated with a conjunctive presentation and underestimated with a disjunctive 
presentation of the combined event.  They explained this effect from the assumption 
that the probabilities associated with the primitive events serve as an anchor when the 
probability of the combined event is estimated.  (Remember the “birthday problem”: it 
was presented in 3.1.2.3 as a disjunctive event, the relevant probability is 
underestimated). 
 
Krug Nelson (1995) found that adjustment into a posterior probability of a given prior 
probability of a material misstatement, based on the given results of an audit sample, 
may be insufficient.  The prior probability appeared to serve as an anchor. 
 
Tan (1995) investigated the effects of repeat engagements: is there more “consistency” 
in the assessment in repeat engagements compared to new engagements?  By 
“consistency” is meant a lack of variability in the aspects that are deemed to be relevant 
for risk assessment.  Tan found such consistency effects, which also can be called 
anchoring effects.  He also investigated the possibilities of mitigating that consistency 
effect by staff rotation or by inducing review awareness.  He showed that this 
awareness, raised by an expected review, leads to more vigilance and therefore 
attention for inconsistent findings.  Also, job rotation leads to more attention for 
inconsistent findings.  In addition, a panel of audit partners found the decision process 
under the rotation and review awareness conditions to be more appropriate. 
 
Intermediate conclusions as to anchoring 
There is a strong tendency for an anchor to prevail in the final assessment; 
expectation G is confirmed.  
 
3.4.1.3 Representativeness 
Bar-Hillel (1979), Joyce & Biddle (1981b), Nelson (1995) and Smith & Kida (1991) 
(among others) explored the effect of ‘representativeness’.  As stated in 3.1.2.1, 
‘representativeness’ is the heuristic which reduces complexity by taking given 
information as representative for the population, irrespective of relevant base rates, 
sample size, or quality of the information.  The bias due to this heuristic was found by 
Nelson (1995), Joyce & Biddle (1981b) and Bar-Hillel, (1979) both where it regards not 
taking into account the sample size, and where it regards neglecting a base rate in 
which a phenomenon occurs.  Smith & Kida (1991) found that the bias is smaller with 
more experienced auditors and with more realistic cases, administered to the 
experimental subjects. 
 
The studies of Burgstahler et al (2000)  and Messier et al (2001) are not explicitly 
related to a heuristic as discussed; but their findings clearly relate to the 
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representativeness heuristic.  They show that people let themselves lead by this implicit 
principle which causes bias in their assessment.  
 
Messier et al (2001) found that the use of a recent AICPA ‘Audit Sampling guide’ leads 
to sample sizes well below what would be necessary had a statistical sampling 
approach been used.  Their study might even mean that use of this Sampling Guide 
guides in the direction of under-auditing.  They are concerned that greater assurance is 
inferred than is jusitified by the sample (had it been statistical).  We add to their 
conclusion that the representativeness heuristic gives a perfect explanation for the 
effect they found; see also expectation A (3.2.1). 
 
Burgstahler et al (2000) found that auditors tend to underestimate the effect of both 
projected error and uncertainty when evaluating the aggregate error and the need for 
adjustments to financial statements.  They even misjudge the meaning of an upper 
error bound (statistically derived) exceeding the materiality.  So there is a basic 
inconsistency with the laws of probability.  Especially their results with respect to the 
upper error bound, can be explained by the representativeness heuristic. 
Burgstahler et al present a critical review of the existing research literature of expertise 
in auditing.  The review is organised around two approaches: the behavioural and the 
cognitive approach.  Results from studies using the behavioural approach indicate that 
expert auditors do not behave differently from novice auditors.  Results from studies 
using the cognitive approach are more encouraging.  They indicate that there may be 
knowledge differences between experts and novice auditors and that these differences 
might lead expert auditors to use decision processes that differ from those used by 
novice auditors.   
 
Intermediate conclusions as to representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic shows clear effects, both as to disregard of 
sample size (see expectation A; confirmed) and as to not taking into account the 
base rate (see expectation B, not confirmed and C, confirmed).  Expectation D & 
E were not dealt with. 
 
3.4.1.4 Availability 
In 3.1.2.2 we stated that the availability heuristic makes people assess the frequency of 
a class or the probability of an event dependent on the ease with which instances of 
occurrences come to mind.  It is investigated by (among others) Ashton & Kennedy 
(2002), Hall et al (2001) and Cushing & Ahlawat (1996).  
 
Ashton & Kennedy (2002) show recency effects in going concern judgments.  When this 
judgment is based on a so-called ‘step by step procedure’ (form a judgment after the 
first information item and revise this after each new information item), a bias towards 
the most recent information is shown, compared to a judgment given only once, when 
all information has been processed, the ‘end of sequence procedure’.  Moreover, A&K 
show that proper self-review eliminates the recency effects.  
 
Hall et al (2001): investigated whether doubling the sample size mitigates the selection 
bias in haphazard sampling that is (or may be) caused by ‘call properties’ of units, as 
size or isolation (the larger and/or more isolated are more likely to be selected).  So 
they studied whether bias caused by the availability heuristic can be mitigated by 
increasing, doubling the sample size.  They found that the bias clearly exists (some 
30% over-representation), and also that the doubling hardly has any effect on the bias.  
 
Cushing & Ahlawat (1996) found that recency effects, a form of availability effects (see 
3 2.2), disappear when the auditor is asked to document the evidence he bases his 
opinion on.  
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Intermediate conclusions as to availability 
The availability heuristic shows clear effects; which in some cases can be 
circumvented by proper documentation or self review (expectation F only partly 
confirmed) 
 
Intermediate conclusion of 3.4.1: heuristics and biases 
 
An intermediate conclusion of this sub-section can be drawn as: the heuristics 
conceived and investigated by Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974, 1981) are fruitful 
paradigms for investigating many aspects of risk assessment by auditors.  In general, 
ample evidence is found for their existence, especially because the corresponding 
biases are found in many experiments.  An encouraging finding for the professionalism 
of auditors is that on several occasions experience as an auditor appears to help to 
prevent biases.  In various experiments probabilities or risks of a quantitative nature 
were used; in these cases formally speaking risk assessment also was validated.  But 
the question whether an auditor is able to derive valid risks from his assessments of 
real-life administrative processes, has not been addressed. 
 
3.4.2 Studies on consistency of risk assessment with some criterion 
 
We organise the studies in 4 sub-subsections: consistency (1) with audit design, (2) 
with other subjects (consensus), (3) with error rate or another indicator of the assessed 
risk, and (4) with size of errors. 
 
3.4.2.1 Consistency with audit design. 
Basu & Wright (1997), Dusenbury et. al.(1996), Mock & Wright (1995), Joyce, E. (1976), 
Gaumnitz et al (1982), Srinindi & Vasarhelyi (1986), Houston et al. (1999), and Elder & 
Allen (2003) (among others) deal with consistency of risk assessment with audit design. 
 
Basu & Wright (1997) performed an experiment in which eight control-environment 
factors ((1) management philosophy and operating style; (2) organisational structure; 
(3) audit committee; (4) methods of assigning authority and responsibility; (5) 
management control methods; (6) internal auditing; (7) personnel policies and 
procedures; (8) external influences see SAS 55), contained in the US professional 
auditing standards, were manipulated as either positive or negative for three different 
client sizes.  Also the consistency of an auditor’s control risk assessment with the 
formulation of the preliminary audit strategy was investigated.  It was shown that 
auditors do not place equal emphasis on the eight factors.  However the reliance placed 
on these factors is not significantly different across clients of different size.  A significant 
impact of risk assessment on the planned audit strategy was found.   
An interesting feature of this study is that it is one of the rare studies on separate risk 
factors.  We saw already that the complexity of the assessment task of an auditor is 
caused among other things by the necessity to aggregate risk assessments on 
separate assertions into one risk assessment on the account level.  This article deals 
with the complexity on another dimension: it studies factors in which the causes of risk 
itself can be decomposed.  The introduction of the risk factors by Basu & Wright 
expands the complexity that is already caused by the distinction between assertion and 
account level.  We discussed this complexity in 3.2.3 in figure 1. 
 
Dusenbury et. al.(1996) investigated the consistency, by way of an experiment, of three 
ways of assessing IR, CR and APR (analytical procedures risk) to come at an allowed 
TDR (test of details risk), namely by way of the (classical) ARM, by way of a firms 
model and by way of a belief based model.  The latter uses Dempsters rule to combine 
beliefs and bases the degree of belief on the quality of the information.  It appears that 
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the belief based assessment is the most conservative, then that of the audit firms and 
then the ARM.  It is claimed that this order is dependent on the type of material. This 
means that the order could be the other way round, with some other type of material. 
 
Interesting quote  
The consensus of the extant research is that this specification of the (SAS) model is 
deficient. First the target audit risk selected ex ante is generally less than the actual 
audit risk achieved ex post, when the target risk is used to determine the allowed tests 
of details risk (..) audit plans based on this model may not be as conservative as they 
should be.”   
end of quote  
 
It will appear in our research that the same lack of success in keeping audit risk under 
the desired level, occurs rather frequently (we will call this ‘ineffective audit’).  This 
study indicates that there is no consistency over assessment methods and no 
consistency of risk assessment with audit plans. 
 
Mock & Wright (1995) replicated their extensive previous archival study of evidential 
planning by audit teams (Mock & Wright, 1993).  Data were gathered on risk 
assessments and evidential plans in the accounts receivable area from the working 
papers of 76 randomly selected clients in two industries. 
Corroborating prior archival studies, the results did not indicate a strong statistical 
association between changes in assessed risks and audit plans.  Programmes were 
found to change little over time with many tests done across a broad array of 
engagements.  In addition, risk assessments were not found to differ significantly 
between the two industries.  Moreover the planned extent of testing was positively 
related with the number of prior errors and there was some evidence that programme 
plans were related to risks at the assertion level.  In general there was a lack of 
sensitivity of audit programmes to risks.  
 
Joyce., E. (1976) notes that “One of the difficulties involved in studying the validity of 
auditors’ judgments, is the absence of a suitable criterion by which to distinguish correct 
from incorrect judgments”. The solution we found for this problem in chapter 2 implicitly 
confirms Joyce’s remark: we only can validate judgments in a statistical way, by looking 
at the quality of a set of judgments.  In principle, chance can never be studied in single 
cases.  At best the error rate, or rather the sampling risk can be seen as a single case 
indicator.  But in this thesis, these are also used in analyses of correlations, so for 
multiple cases.  
As a result of his review of the literature on this subject, Joyce states that individual 
auditors’ judgments usually show a high variation across auditors.  The only exception 
Joyce found is in Ashton (1974); he asked his subjects to rate the strength of the 
internal controls.  Subjects in other studies made judgments about the amount of audit 
work to perform.  To the extent that different firms have different internal procedures, 
continuing education programmes, etc., agreement among auditors within firms would 
be expected to exceed agreement among auditors between firms.  This expectation 
was confirmed with the exception of one firm. 
 
Gaumnitz et al (1982) found that auditors achieve consensus in their assessment of the 
internal control strength and the audit program planning tasks.  An explicit, quantified 
assessment of the internal control was asked.  This may be the difference with Joyce’s 
(1976) study where internal control was not assessed that explicitly.  In Joyce’s studies 
planned audit work expresses the assessment.  Possibly as a consequence Gaumnitz 
et al also find consistency in the inverse relationship between the internal control 
assessment and the audit program planning tasks. 
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Srinindi & Vasarhelyi (1986) attempt to reconcile the apparently discrepant research 
findings of Gaumnitz et al (1982) and Joyce (1976) by dividing the process of risk 
assessment into three different stages: 
1)identification, 2) evaluation, and 3) interpretation. 
The third stage, where auditors decide on substantive tests based on their perception of 
the internal control strength, was analysed in descriptive terms.  A high degree of 
consensus between auditors was found in substantive test planning decisions when 
numbers were provided representing the system reliability.  At the same time, large 
divergence was observed when only component reliability values were provided in the 
form of a number.  Therefore, the experimental results indicate that auditors will 
disagree on how to aggregate audit evidence but, once one aggregation rule is 
established, high consensus will follow.  With these findings Srinindi & Vasarhelyi 
reconcile the above-mentioned, seemingly discrepant findings: variance in risk 
assessments might very well be due to varying aggregation rules.  Their findings 
therefore also lend credibility to the need and desirability of using internal control 
reliability decision aids, that provide a consistent algorithm to aggregate the component 
reliabilities.   
It can be concluded that the consistency question is more complex than at first sight.  
Assessed risk and substantive test planning decisions are shown to be consistent when 
an assessment for the system is given in numbers, without need for aggregation from 
components.  But when aggregation of risks (in numbers!) from components is needed, 
this is done in a very diverging way by different auditors and this leads to inconsistent 
substantive test planning decisions over auditors.  So the study offers another example 
of the problems with risk assessment when it regards larger or complex entities, where 
implicit or explicit aggregation of risks or probabilities has to take place.  
Moreover, in practice, the assessment of the quality of internal control still has to be 
transformed into a quantitative assessment.  In this transformation there also is a 
variability between auditors and cases, which, as S&V show, may very well be enlarged 
in the combination of assessments on components. 
 
Houston et al. (1999) identify conditions under which the audit risk model does, and 
does not, describe audit-planning (investment and pricing) decisions.  In an experiment, 
audit partners and managers examined one of two cases where a material 
misstatement was discovered. In one case the misstatement was a possibly material 
error, in the other case the misstatement regarded an overt irregularity: the inventory 
system was inconsistent with GAAP.  The auditor assessed the elements of the audit 
risk model and assessed the business risk.  Based on his assessments he provided 
recommendations for the audit investment and fee.  When the likelihood of an error was 
high (according to the assessment of the experimental subject), the audit risk model 
performed better than the expected business risk (see also 2.2.1) in the explanation of 
the audit investment. Moreover the client was not charged a (business-) risk premium. 
When the likelihood of an irregularity was high (again, according to the assessment of 
the experimental subject), the expected business risk performed better than the audit 
risk model in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee the (hypothetical) 
client was charged, contained a (business-) risk premium.  These results (n=17 in each 
condition) suggest that the ability of the audit risk model to describe auditor behaviour 
and the inclination of auditors to charge a risk premium depend upon the nature of the 
risks present in the audit.  In the presence of errors, the audit risk model adequately 
described audit planning decisions; in the presence of irregularities it did not. 
 
Elder & Allen (2003) examine changes in risk assessment and sample size decisions 
between 1994 and 1999.  They found a tendency for greater reliance on controls in the 
later period and lower assessments of IR.  Firms that used larger sample sizes in the 
first period show a tendency for smaller sample sizes in the later period.  They find a 
significant relationship between the inherent risk assessment and the sample size 
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decisions; this relation was stronger in the first period and not significant for all firms.  
The relation they found between control risk assessment and the sample size is much 
weaker. 
 
Intermediate conclusions as to consistency with audit planning 
Once there is a result in the form of an occurrence risk (or inherent risk or control 
risk), the decisions with respect to audit planning are consistent with this 
assessment, possibly conditional on the type of error the auditor expects.  But as 
soon as some aggregation of partial assessments, or an assessment of risk 
associated with the observed quality of an administrative process is involved, 
consistency with audit planning tends to fail. 
 
3.4.2.2 Consistency with other auditors (consensus) 
Another type of consistency is agreement between auditors on risk assessment. Stone 
& Dilla (1994), Amer et al (1994), Trotman & Wood (1991), Reimers et al. (1993) and 
Davis et al. (2000) (among others) study this type of consistency/consensus.  As in the 
previous section, in some studies not only the consensus is investigated but also its 
consequences for audit design. 
 
Stone & Dilla (1994) investigated the influence of experience of auditors on their risk 
assessment, next to the effects of the representation of this assessment.  They 
expected experienced auditors to have developed more complex and complete 
classifications of “domain stimuli” (signs and signals from the audit object, possibly 
indicating a relevant feature for the audit opinion) than have novices.  They state that a 
response classification in numbers allows for more precision than a linguistic 
classification.  Therefore they expected experienced auditors to show a gain in 
consensus in a classification of risk when this classification is in numbers rather than in 
words.  This gain in consensus was expected to be absent when the same judgment 
task was given to inexperienced auditors.  In addition, they expected more variation in 
risk judgment with experienced auditors, due to the unique professional experiences 
that they have.  In contrast, they expected judgment of inexperienced auditors to have 
more dependency on their education and therefore show less variability; or, in other 
words, more consensus.  These subjects lack the specialised knowledge to improve 
their judgments when using numbers.  In two experiments their expectations were 
confirmed. 
This study is inconsistent with Srinindi & Vasarhelyi (1986), who found: consensus in 
risk assessment or classification is weak or absent, when there is too much complexity 
in the task (see end 3.4.2.1).  
The two studies to be discussed below find possibly conflicting results. 
 
Reimers et al. (1993) noticed that the Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) nos. 39, 
47, 55 suggest that the assessed control risk has a direct effect on the amount of 
substantive testing required in the audit.  They found that numerical risk assessments 
differ from linguistic assessments in two ways.  First, the assessments of those 
responding numerically were significantly lower than of those responding with linguistic 
categories.  Second, there was a consistently higher level of agreement among those 
who responded in linguistic categories.  Unfortunately Reimers et al. did not include 
experience as a variable; therefore it is not clear whether these findings really conflict 
with those of Stone & Dilla (1994). 
Quote: ‘As in most audit judgements there is no way to determine correct control risk 
assessments.’ End quote 
We hope to disprove the quoted statement to a certain extent in this thesis.  At the 
same time it gives a justification for our way to validate OR in our research. 
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The study of Amer et al (1994) adds to this possible lack of consistency: it shows that 
the interpretation of probability phrases differs substantially between auditors and also 
that auditors are not aware of these differences.  So the same object of risk assessment 
leads to substantially differing assessments by auditors.  Moreover it shows that most of 
the risk assessments are not valid, which raises the suspicion that the few valid 
assessments in their experiments are only a matter of chance.  
 
Trotman & Wood (1991) conducted a statistical meta-analysis on 17 studies into the 
consensus regarding the assessment of internal control risk and regarding the decision 
as to the size of the substantive audit effort.  With both variables they found a 
reasonable (approx. .60) and significant (p<.05) correlation.  So, according to this meta-
analysis, decisions of auditors as to the use of substantive audit resources are 
consistent with their assessment of risk.  
 
Davis et al. (2000) examined the relation between consensus (estimates coincide to a 
high degree) and accuracy (estimates are close to the quantity to be assessed), using 
an error frequency estimation task for which the auditor’s overall accuracy is known to 
be low to moderate.  They used real life cases in which the error rates were known.  
They also examined the extent to which experience had influence on the strength of the 
relation between consensus and accuracy for the three industries they examined: 
manufacturing, natural resources and banking.  Accuracy appeared to be positively 
related to consensus for all auditors in manufacturing and for auditors with more than 
12 (36) months of experience in natural resources (banking).  For banking and natural 
resources, evidence was provided that auditors with little experience in these industries 
use a heuristic consistent with manufacturing error frequencies as an ‘educated guess’ 
for the specialized industries’ error frequencies. This heuristic leads to consensus 
among auditors, but results in low accuracy.  More research is needed. 
 
Intermediate conclusions as to consensus 
Consensus on risk assessment between auditors on the same object appears not 
to be stable; it is dependent on experience and representation of the assessment 
object. Consensus is no guarantee for accuracy. 
 
3.4.2.3 Consistency with error 
In this thesis the most interesting consistency is that of risk assessment with the error 
rate or another indicator of the assessed risk.  Only a few studies deal with this 
consistency in one way or another.  Many studies regard the occurrence (also 
frequency) of error and not its size. 
 
To a certain extent the study of Davis et al (2000), discussed at the end of 3.4.2.2, can 
be seen as investigating the auditors’ ability to assess risk, although it is not directly 
aimed at the relation between risk assessment and error.  Still the findings of Davis et al 
are very interesting for risk assessment, because they show that auditors can give 
reasonable estimates of the occurrence of errors to be expected.  And it almost speaks 
for itself that this is directly relevant for risk assessment. 
 
Roberts & Wedemeyer (1988) did not directly investigate the characteristics of risk 
assessment.  But they did investigate relations that are very similar to the question of 
this thesis. 
In their introduction they note that “Accurate prediction of the distributional 
characteristics of errors in financial statements is of critical concern to the practicing 
auditor. These characteristics directly determine the auditors allocation of effort and, 
eventually, evaluation of the implications of the results of that effort”.  They describe the 
role of risk assessment, without needing that concept, because they translate it into the 
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distributional properties of the error in the audit object (see the parallel with our 
discussion in 2.2.4 and 2.3.5). 
They found six general attributes that can be used to predict whether an audit 
engagement is likely to have a significant amount of monetary error: 
1.  the control environment; 
2.  employee integrity; 
3.  financial strength, particularly liquidity; 
4.  complexity, particularly unusual transactions; 
5.  regulation of accounting and reporting practices by agencies other than SEC; and 
6.  existence of material internal control weaknesses. 
R&W claim that at least four of these six attributes could be interpreted as features of 
the control environment as defined in the proposed AICPA Statement on Auditing 
Standards, “The Auditors Responsibility for Assessing Control Risk.”  They state: “The 
complexity and variability of expression used by auditors in describing such 
characteristics as a quality of internal control, management competence, etc, suggests 
that future empirical work will continue to require the collection and analysis of a large 
number of possible explanatory variables which may be interrelated.” 
 
Waller’s (1993) first interest was not in the association between the rate of 
misstatements and an auditor’s risk assessment, but in the question whether risk 
assessment on the level of assertions (see 3.3.3 figure 1) will lead to improvement for 
the total risk assessment: that on the level of an account.  He states conditions10 under 
which assertion oriented risk assessment might lead to improvement of the total risk 
assessment: (1) varying rate of misstatements over assertions for an account; 
otherwise there would be no gain in effectiveness from extending the decomposition of 
risk to the assertion level (2) varying risk assessments by an auditor, over assertions for 
an account; otherwise the assessments would be informationally redundant (3) positive 
association between the rate of misstatements and an auditor’s risk assessment; 
otherwise auditors’ ability to perform the task would be in doubt. 
Waller tested four propositions: 
1. There is an association between auditors’ IR and CR assessments 
2. The rate of detected misstatements varies over assertions, after controlling for 
DR 
3. Auditors’ IR and CR assessments vary over assertions for an account 
4. There is a positive association between auditors’ IR assessments and the rate 
of detected misstatements, after controlling for CR and DR. 
In 215 real audit cases, at the assertion level no confirmation was found of the first 
proposition; almost all 15 Kendall correlation coefficients that are used in the data 
analysis were close to zero.  The correlations increased to approximately .20 when the 
cases with CR = “high” were left out of the analysis.  So there was a moderate 
indication that IR and CR are positively related in the cases where the auditor relies to 
some extent on the controls.  This is consistent with the expectation that weak controls 
produce error prone conditions and inconsistent with the expectation that a high IR will 
be compensated by strong controls. 
The rate of detected misstatements appeared to vary significantly over assertions, for 
instance for trade accounts payable “completeness” had a rate of 0.115 and 
“ownership” had a rate of 0.024.  Comparable differences were found with inventory 
and with trade accounts receivable.  The differences were all highly significant.  
Controlling for the detection risk, did not make much difference, because the detection 
risks only varied between 0.04 and 0.11. 
The risk assessments over assertions were found to vary only minimally. 
                                                          
10 It is remarkable that Waller does not mention that (less) complexity of the assessment task as 
possibly leading to improvement. 
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A positive association was found between IR and the rate of detected misstatements, 
approximately 0.10 (Kendall’s correlation) when the three most important assertions 
were combined; all significant at less than a half percent and for each of these “most 
important combinations” fully consistent. 
 
Asare & Davidson (1995), Kreutzfeldt & Wallace (1990), Wallace & Kreutzfeldt (1993) 
and Wright (1994) investigated consistency of risk assessment with the size of errors. 
 
Asare & Davidson (1995) gave a small scale review of studies into risk assessment as 
a predictor for the error.  In three of the studies in their review a positive correlation was 
found between either contextual or control risk factors and the error found, but there 
was no explicit risk assessment.  In two of these studies the correlation was negligible.  
A & D performed an own study into the influence of the strength of controls on the error 
expectation of auditors.  They found that strong control procedures lead to predictions 
of smaller errors.  Obviously this finding relates to consistency in risk assessment and 
not to the relation between controls and errors as such, because the study did not 
extend to real errors. 
 
Kreutzfeldt & Wallace (1990) tested  a total of 75 operational variables for control 
structure elements by correlating these variables to total error rates and errors at the 
account level.  With respect to total error interrelationships, over one half of the 
measures tied to the control environments were significantly related to the incidence of 
error.   
Seventy percent of the accounting system measures and hundred percent of the control 
procedures at an aggregate level were strongly associated with error. 
Certain contextual and control dimensions of the company did not relate to errors.  
Specifically public versus private status, the extent to which management is dominated 
by one or a few individuals, the existence of significant equity or debt offerings, and 
safeguarding of investments did not have a demonstrable association with error. 
The implications for practice of public accounting are that auditors can measure the 
effectiveness of control structure of variables in a manner which appears to track in 
proportion with errors.  In other words, clients judged to have more effective controls 
are observed to have fewer or less severe errors.  K&W give the advice to consider 
inherent risk and context jointly with control structure as they evaluate control risk. 
The correlations for occurrence of errors (with control structure) and for size of errors 
(with control structure) they found, could differ to a substantial extent. 
 
Wallace & Kreutzfeldt (1993) investigated the influence that 5 factors have on the error 
rate, in 1506 files of completed audits. (1) Management competency, (2) management 
integrity, (3) company’s financial condition, (4) management controls and (5) detailed 
controls, all appear to have a significant positive relation with the error rate found.  
 
Wright (1994) examined the incidence, impact, direction and cause of detected 
misstatements as related to the assessed strength of internal controls. 
Data on detected errors were gathered from a random, cross-sectional sample of 186 
audit engagements.  Auditors reported detailed information on 731 detected errors.  
The results indicated that as assessed internal controls weakened, the frequency of 
errors increased and errors were more likely to have an effect on income.  Errors were 
more likely to reflect understatement of assets and liabilities when controls deteriorated, 
while, when controls were strong, assets and liabilities were more frequently overstated.  
Further, the causes of errors reflect a greater frequency of “the routine” errors as 
controls deteriorate, although cut-off errors were relatively common across all control 
settings.  These results suggest different audit strategies are appropriate in response to 
variations in controls. 
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Intermediate conclusions with regard to consistency with error rate.  
The studies reveal relationship of varying strength between risk assessment and 
audit opinion and also between risk assessment on specific risk factors and the 
occurrence or size of errors.  (Note that the second relationship does not 
necessarily imply a relation between risk assessment and error rate)  
 
Discussion 
The weak correlation found by Waller between IR and CR, is hard to interpret.  The 
question is whether “in reality”, when the IR is high, the controls also “in reality” tend to 
be of relatively less quality.  Or that the correlation is caused by some anchoring 
mechanism in the assessment itself of the auditor. 
Varying rate of misstatements over assertions, found by Waller, combined with hardly 
varying risk assessments over assertions, indicate a possible improvement of risk 
assessment.  This improvement would entail a valid combination rule of risks assessed 
over assertions into a risk assessment on the level of the account. (see also Amer et al, 
1994 and Srinindi & Vasarhelyi, 1986). 
Waller and Wallace & Kreuzfeld aim at a relation with the occurrence of errors. This 
relation does not necessarily imply a relation with size of error (Kreuzfeld & Wallace, 
19990). 
 
Intermediate conclusion of 3.4.2: consistency 
 
Consistency of risk assessment with audit planning, or with that of other auditors, or 
with the error rate found in the corresponding account, tends to be susceptible to 
influences, such that consistency can not be relied upon as a stable feature of risk 
analysis. 
 
3.4.3 Studies on complexity of the object of risk assessment. 
 
Abdolmohammadi &  Wright(1987), Tan et al (2002), Van Kuijck (1999), Colbert (1988), 
Colbert (1989), Bell & Carcello (2000) and Buckless (1989) (among others) deal with 
complexity. 
 
Abdolmohammadi &  Wright(1987) investigated the effects of experience on decision 
making in auditing.  They provided evidence that the experience effect is significant 
when task complexity is explicitly considered.  They reported the results of a series of 
experiments examining structured, semi-structured, and unstructured tasks where 
subjects are pooled into two groups: “experienced” (those having reached the staff level 
where the required monitor skills are developed) and “inexperienced” (lower staff levels 
or auditing students).  Responses to a separate study of 88 partners and managers 
were used to independently establish the appropriate staff level for each task and 
complexity.  Significant decision differences were found between the experimental 
groups on each task.  A & W state that these results suggest that auditing students or 
less experienced junior auditors are questionable surrogates for CPA’s in complex audit 
decision settings.   
 
Tan et al (2002) investigated the impact of accountability (degree of responsibility for 
the outcome of the audit) and knowledge (“of necessary substantive and compliance 
tests (…) of double entries and financial statement errors”) on the performance of an 
auditor with varying task complexity.  They find that for auditors working with high 
accountability and low knowledge and also for those with low accountability and high 
knowledge, the performance for increasing task complexity decreases. For auditors with 
high accountability and high knowledge the performance stays at the same (high) level 
and for those with low accountability and low knowledge at the same (low) level, when 
task complexity increases.  
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Van Kuijck (1999) investigated judgment performance related to experience, education 
and complexity.  His key findings were: 
• Judgment performance in terms of the effectiveness of subjects with a university 
education is better than that of subjects lacking such education.  The non-
university group made significantly more errors in interpreting accounting 
records as compared to the other group. 
• The university group used significantly more time than the non-university group, 
but, corrected for errors found, there was no difference in efficiency. 
• More experienced auditors did not perform better than auditors who were 
inexperienced. 
• More experienced auditors used more time for their judgments task. 
• Task structuring influenced the effectiveness as well as efficiency: both 
improved under the structured task as compared to the unstructured task.  
Moreover, there was a tendency that the difference between the routine and 
complex audits decreased.  However, there was no indication that the subjects 
learned under the structured task. 
• Attention was paid to difference in performance of auditors with different 
educational backgrounds: auditors with a university education under the 
structured instruction did not perform better than the other auditors.  However, 
these results were based on only five observations. 
Van Kuijck investigated a judgment task which is not really aimed at assessing risks.  
Still the results are interesting, because his judgmental tasks refer to complex situations 
and so are similar to our risk assessments tasks. 
 
Colbert (1988) examined four inherent risk factors in inventory: (1) rate of turnover of 
the controller, (2) financing pressure, (3) the complexity of overhead in inventory, and 
(4) the quality of the personnel responsible for the inventory calculation.  Sixty-five 
practising auditors were included in her study.  The results suggest that although all 
four inherent risk factors were important to auditors, quality of personnel was the most 
significant in determining the assessed risk.   
 
Colbert (1989) conducted a literature study in an attempt to integrate the findings within 
various areas on the influence of experience on the quality of judgments.  She 
concluded that in the more structured assessment tasks experience does not show a 
positive relationship to consensus.  But in more complex or relatively unstructured 
tasks, experience makes a difference in the judgments: the judgments improve.  
The findings from studies in internal control support the hypothesis that experience may 
be vital for complex or unstructured decisions, but not significant for relatively simple or 
structured judgments.  This is consistent with her other finding that, although often in 
research it is important to classify subjects by experience levels, used years of 
experience or rank within the firm as surrogate measures for expertise are not 
appropriate: juniors may be better able to observe inventory than partners, possibly due 
to their recent experience and detailed instructions from seniors.  In other words, 
experience and expertise are not the same. 
 
Bell & Carcello (2000) did not directly refer to experience of the auditor or complexity of 
the assessment task.  But they did investigate the effect of decomposing the complex 
assessment task by looking at the determinants for the detection of fraud.  In that study 
they refer to SAS No 82, which makes the auditor responsible for the detection of fraud. 
Their study used a sample of 77 fraud engagements and 305 non-fraud engagements.  
In a logistic regression analysis they found six significant risk factors and one 
interaction term: (1) weak internal control environment, (2) rapid company growth, (3) 
inadequate or inconsistent relative profitability, (4) management places undue 
Chapter 3: Audit Opinion: Judgment under Uncertainty 
  54
emphasis on meeting earnings objectives, (5) management lied to the auditors or was 
overly evasive, (6) the ownership status (public vs private) of the entity and (7) an 
interaction term between a weak control environment and an aggressive management 
attitude toward financial reporting.  Their logistic model was significantly more accurate 
than practicing auditors in assessing the risk for the 77 fraud observations.  There was 
not a significant difference between model assessments and those of the practicing 
auditors for the sample of non-fraud cases. 
 
Buckless (1989) aims at providing information on what factors are involved in the 
assessment of audit risk and to provide insight into the manner auditors assess audit 
risk. He conducted two interrelated experiments.   
The first experiment was concerned with determining the relative influence of various 
risk cues on auditors’ risk assessments.  In this experiment, audit managers were given 
a list of risk cues and asked to indicate the relative influence of these cues on their risk 
assessments.  The audit managers were assigned to one of two groups.  One group 
evaluated the risk cues with respect to a specific account.  The other group evaluated 
the risk cues with respect to a specific audit objective. 
The second experiment was concerned with modelling auditor’s subjective 
assessments of audit risk and examining the effect of the judgment task on auditor’s 
risk assessments.  In this experiment, audit managers were asked to evaluate the audit 
risk of several audit cases.  
The case profiles presented varied by manipulations of risk components.  The 
manipulations were selected based on the first experiment.  Again, audit managers 
evaluated the audit cases either with respect to a specific account or with respect to a 
specific audit objective.  The experiment employed a 2 x 2  mixed factorial design. 
Buckless found four major points.   
• First, audit risk assessments are differentially affected by risk cues.   
• Second, auditors combine the risk components in an additive fashion and achieve 
lower audit risk than suggested by the audit risk model exhibited in the authoritative 
literature.  
• Further, auditors’ risk assessments are affected by the judgment task.   
• Finally, consensus is higher for risk assessments made with respect to audit 
objectives (assertions, see 3.3.3) as compared to risk assessments made with 
respect to accounts. 
 
The second bullet above refers to inadequate aggregation. Aggregation was extensively 
discussed by Lea et al (1992). 
 
Both Bell & Carcello (2000) and Buckless (1989) deal with complexity by studying the 
role of various risk factors or determinants of risk assessment. This view is explicitly 
taken by the studies that are dealt with in the next sub-section. 
 
Intermediate conclusions of 3.4.3: complexity.  
 
Complexity is investigated with respect to experience and some other attributes.  
‘Experience’ appears to have influence on the quality of the assessment task, but not in 
a straightforward way.  Actually sometimes ‘expertise’ is the better concept to deal with 
what an auditor learns in practice and by maintaining his education.  Experienced 
auditors are better in dealing with complex situations than novice auditors.  But 
decomposing a complex situation into risk factors and combining them, like Bell & 
Carcello (2000), in a logistic regression performs better than even experienced auditors 
do.  And accountability moderates the relation between knowledge and complexity. 
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3.4.4 Studies on tests of control as predictor for misstatements.   
 
In this is subsection we deal with studies that investigate the relation between tests of 
control and the error rate.  As stated in section 2.4, predictive power of the tests of 
control for the error rate is a necessary condition for these tests to serve as 
underpinning of risk assessment.  Roberts & Wedemeyer (1988), Bell et al. (1998), 
Blokdijk (2001, 2004), Koning (2002), Blokdijk (2002) and Van Leeuwen & Wallage 
(2002) deal with this question. 
 
At least four of the determinants (1, 2, 4 and 6, see 3.4.2.3) mentioned by Roberts & 
Wedemeyer (1988) that appear to have predictive value for the error rate can be 
assessed by means of tests of control.  Therefore it may be expected that tests of 
control have predictive value for the error rate. 
 
Bell et al. (1998) examined the differential impact of computerisation on common 
attributes of audit differences.  Consistent with prior studies, this study indicated that the 
majority of audit differences (misstatements) arose due to incorrect computations, 
differences in management and auditor judgment, faulty initial identification and 
processing of transactions, and overworked accounting personnel.  Likewise, audit 
differences related to control attributes were usually associated with inadequately 
skilled personnel, improper or inadequate independent verifications, or improper 
documents and records; audit differences were readily associated with inadequate 
controls over assets or records.  This study reports additional findings that incorrect 
manual computations, the recording of exchange documents, incorrect application of 
internal controls, and inadequate internal controls were more likely to be sources of 
problems when information systems are computerised than when they are not.  Finally, 
very few of the audit differences in this study were associated in any way with failures in 
the computerised system.  What the study does show is that if errors occur in 
computerised systems, manual processing and human errors are the most likely to be 
the cause of the errors.  And, consistent with what they found in prior studies, this could 
be generalised into a proposition that the operation of the system is a greater cause of 
errors than its design. 
 
Blokdijk (2001, 2004) concluded in a logical analysis that the systems approach, with 
tests of control as a major part (ISA 400) cannot give definitive evidence on the quality 
of the annual accounts and is therefore insufficient as a basis for an audit opinion.  This 
means that substantive tests will always be necessary. 
 
Koning (2002) challenged Blokdijk’s views: systems assessment, especially by 
performing tests of control, is a necessary part of risk analysis.  Koning gives 
arguments and refers to the report of among others the Panel (2000) to come to his 
conclusion that the assessment of the internal controls gives the expected information 
regarding the quality of the annual accounts.  
 
In reaction Blokdijk (2002) states that the Panel (2000) does not show the effectiveness 
of tests of control where it regards the truth and fairness of the accounts.  It would be 
better to make the tests of control part of the guiding activities for an audit, similar to the 
use of analytical procedures.  In a postscript, Koning states that especially in an 
automated environment it can be very effective with regard to the truth and fairness of 
the accounts to test the proper operation of controls. 
 
Van Leeuwen & Wallage (2002) give an introduction into the business process analysis.  
It extends the usual risk assessments in the audit risk model to the assessments 
derived from analysis of the business processes and the context in which the business 
is operating.  It claims that the extension implies more assurance with regard to the 
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audit opinion.  It associates the proper design and operation of the internal controls with 
a low occurrence risk (p 87). 
 
Intermediate conclusions of 3.4.4: validating power of tests of control. 
 
Only a few studies are included in this sub-section.  They indicate predictive power of 
systems characteristics for misstatements, but far from exclude human errors as a 
cause for failures.  The cited Dutch discussion on the value of tests of control as 
sufficient evidence on the quality of the annual accounts, adds to the relevance of 
investigating the predictive power of the operation of the system of controls for the 
existence and size of errors, as performed in this thesis.  
 
3.5  Discussion  
 
Not all expectations given in section 3.2 are covered by the literature discussed in this 
chapter.  The expectations with regard to representativeness were neither clearly 
confirmed, nor rejected, when overweighting of sample results or of prior probabilities 
was concerned.  Predictability or regression effects were not studied in the given 
literature.  The expectations with respect to the availability and anchoring heuristic were 
confirmed.  So the presented studies reveal a lot about the heuristics and biases in the 
assessment of auditors.  In general, the studies show that this paradigm is a fruitful one.  
In most cases the heuristics appear to be active.  But, encouraging for the profession, 
proper training or experience can mitigate the related biases.  And experience often is 
sufficient as that proper training, although care must be taken for the possibility that the 
experience is only of value when it also implies expertise with respect to the audit task.  
Expertise is then to be seen both from the viewpoint of auditing and from knowledge of 
the kind of organisation or industry whose accounts are audited. 
 
Direct validation of risk assessment in practical situations forms only a minority in all the 
studies we discussed11 (see: Waller, 1994, Asare & Davidson, 1995, Kreuzfeldt & 
Wallace, 1990, Wallace & Kreuzfeldt, 1993, Wright, 1994, Bell & Carcello, 2000)  The 
studies mentioned in the heuristics and biases paradigm do not use real-life situations 
in order to validate the assessed the risks on the real incidence or size of errors.  The 
same applies to the other types of study.  This is not compensated by the fact that in 
many of the studies some quantitative risk or probability is specified which has to be 
assessed in some way or another by the experimental subjects.  For such a 
compensation it would have to be sure that the primitive risk assessment tasks on 
primitive events, however defined, will be done in a valid way.  And even if this were the 
case, hardly any literature is found on this topic.  Moreover, what numerical value is 
associated with a ‘high risk’, 10 %, 20 %, 40% or even more?  Concern for the answer 
to this question is directly implied by the conclusion of 3.4.2.1. 
 
So we can extend our conclusion that the heuristics and biases paradigm is interesting, 
with the conclusion that research based on it does not give conclusive information on 
the validity of risk assessment in practice.  Similar conclusions can be drawn on the 
consistency studies: our review shows very interesting things on the conditions under 
which consistency in the assessments will be seen and/or will indicate more quality of 
risk assessment.  Also in these cases, however, no validation is performed on the error 
rate or on an estimated audit risk, except for a couple of studies.   
 
                                                          
11  Maybe our strategy of selecting studies is the cause for this: include the articles with titles that 
refer to risk assessment.  But it is not very probable that from a body of literature with a 
reasonable portion of this “validation-type” of studies, only so few studies would be found.   
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So here is a gap to be filled.  In this thesis this work will be started. 
 
Various studies go into the distinction between risk assessment on the assertion level 
and risk assessment on the account level.  They suggest that risk assessment at the 
assertion level has more quality than risk assessment on the account level, but as 
Kinney (1992) notes: the ARM fails to reflect the risk of joint misstatements in two or 
more assertions.  And although Srinidi & Vasarhelyi (1985) give suggestions to solve 
this problem of aggregation, in practice they are not followed, at least in our own 
experience in governmental audit practice and in the practice of some private audit 
firms. 
 
The complexity of the assessment task is dealt with in several ways.  One way is to try 
and find determinants of the error rate in a direct sense, thereby circumventing the 
problem of risk assessment.  Still for these determinants a major assessment is often 
necessary.  The other way is to try and find determinants for risk assessment.  In both 
types of this research these determinants are found.  In other words: they show that it 
helps to decompose the assessment task in an assessment task on smaller scaled 
problems. 
 
The studies on consistency of risk assessment and audit design are the most consistent 
in showing a positive relationship.  Of course, the practitioner that operates in 
accordance with the auditing standards, should be expected to show this consistency in 
his assessments and choices in audit design. 
 
3.6  How to get insight in the ‘real risk’ 
 
We have made it our aim (probably with approval of Reimers et al, 1993) to get insight 
in the ‘real risk’ of a material error, more precisely, how far this can be assessed by the 
auditor by means of risk analysis according to the ARM.  We have found many studies 
on the quality of risk assessment, but only some in real life situations, with the error rate 
or related measure as a criterion (see 3.4.2.3).  We summarise:  
• consensus appeared not to have consistent positive influence on the accuracy 
of an error estimate (Davis et al, 2000),  
• attributes of the control environment appeared to have predictive qualities for 
the error rate (Roberts & Wedemeyer, 1988; they suggest research into a large 
number of explanatory variables),  
• a Kendall correlation of .10 is found between IR and the rate of detected 
misstatements (Waller, 1993) 
• some weak relation between contextual or control risk factors was established 
by Asare & Davidson (1995); they did not investigate risk assessment as such 
• operational variables regarding the controls structure were found to have strong 
correlations with the error rate (Kreuzfeldt & Wallace, 1990) 
• both factors of inherent risk and of control risk have a positive correlation with 
the error rate (Wallace & Kreuzfeldt, 1993) 
• strength of internal controls and incidence and impact of errors  are positively 
related (Wright 1994) 
Studies in this summary sometimes show a clear correlation, between risk factors and 
error rate, sometimes a weak correlation, between IR and rate of misstatements.  We 
have to realise that investigating risk factors is something different from investigating 
risk assessment.  Moreover the rate of misstatements (relative number of misstated 
transactions) is different from their size.  So there are two reasons for completing the 
quoted research by investigating the validity of risk assessment with respect to the error 
rate (as relative number of monetary units) and related measures: 
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• can we extend the positive correlation for IR and rate of misstatements as 
Waller found, into one for OR and error rate? 
• do the high correlations between risk factors and the error rate hold, when 
instead of risk factors, risk assessment is taken as the predictor. 
 
Taking into consideration what we found in chapter 2 with respect to appropriate 
validation criteria, the following question emerges from this overview and discussion, 
and will be taken as leading question for our research:  
1.  Has the assessed risk by an auditor, predictive value for the error rate or an 
empirical estimate of the audit risk, such as the sampling risk? 
Naturally, we are interested in factors that influence the strength of the relation 
formulated in this question.  This is to say that we are looking for moderator variables, 
as in the next question. 
2.  Can we find moderator variables, influencing the strength of the relation meant in the 
previous question? 
 
There is a striking difference in the strength of the relations found by Waller and most of 
the references investigating separate risk factors.  This may be explained by a 
difference in complexity: the risk assessment task is complex compared to the 
assessment of one factor.  In this chapter we have seen that in more complex 
situations, heuristics like anchoring, availability and representativeness are more likely 
to lead to corresponding biases.  Several authors (Colbert, 1989, Bell & Carcello, 2000, 
Buckless, 1989, Abdolmohammadi & Wright, 1987) actually showed that complexity has 
influence, and also that it sometimes can be dealt with, a) by making assessments at 
the assertion level (for instance Waller, 1993, Buckless, 1989), b) by excluding 
judgment as far as possible: logistic regression on directly measurable risk factors 
performs better than judgment of auditors (Bell & Carcello, 2000), c) by decomposing 
the assessment needed into part- assessments (Roberts & Wedemeyer, 1988, Wallace 
& Kreutzfeldt, 1993). 
 
In this study we investigated the possibility to improve risk assessment by 
decomposition of the assessment task into a set of subtasks, each of which would be 
less complicated. Each subtask consisted of giving an assessment regarding the risk of 
a material error on a ‘risk indicator’. The question then is: 
 
3.  Can risk assessment be improved by decomposing the task into risk components or 
risk indicators? 
 
We had two related reasons for aiming at the tests of control (which we will call ‘system 
tests’ in chapter 9):  
(1) these are necessary as an underpinning of risk analysis, when an assessment ‘low’ 
is to lead to a decrease in the extent of substantive testing (ISA 200, par.21, HCDAD 
1997) and  
(2) we concluded (section 2.4) that reduction of the extent of substantive testing can 
only be justified if tests of control have predictive power for the error rate.   
So we decided to investigate a fourth question, a decision with an extra justification 
from the discussion cited in 3.4.4: 
 
4.  Are tests of control fit for underpinning risk assessment? 
 
Including this fourth question was also caused by a very practical reason: we were 
granted access to a large set of data giving an opportunity to answer this question. 
 
By concentrating on these questions, our research aims at validating risk assessment 
directly on the error rate or an estimate of the audit risk, thereby circumventing the 
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possibility that a risk assessment which is fully consistent, consensual and not suffering 
from ‘Tversky and Kahneman bias’, might still miss the “real risk”, because the 
assessment of the risks associated with the primitive events in the administrative 
process happened to be biased, the possibility that was discussed in section 3.5. 
 
In chapter 5 we will discuss the research design in which we tried to find answers to 
these questions. 
 
To conclude this chapter we give a table with a summary in keywords of the things we 
found in the cited studies. 
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Table 3.3: An overview of the findings in literature. 
 
Authors Framing effect 
found? 
Anchoring 
effect found? 
Recency or 
availability 
effect found? 
Represen-
tativeness 
effect found? 
Positive 
experience 
effect ? 
Johnson et al (1991) yes, 1) yes 2)   Yes/no 3) 
Emby (1994) Yes, but only in 
interaction with 
recency 
 Yes, but only 
in interaction 
with framing 
  
O’Donnel & Schultz 
(2005)  
 yes    
Wilks (2002)  yes    
Butler (1986)  Yes 4)    
Joyce & Biddle 
(1981a) 
 Yes 5) Yes caused by 
order 
 Yes: more 
experience => 
less anchoring 
Krug Nelson (1995)  Yes    
Smith & Kida (1991)  Yes: 
disjunctive, 
conjunctive 
   
Tan (1995)  Yes  2)  
(consistency) 
   
Bar Hillel (1979)    Yes  
Joyce & Biddle 
(1981b) 
   Yes  
Krug Nelson (1995)    Yes  
 
Smith & Kida (1991)    Yes Yes 
Messier et al (2001)    Yes  
Burgstahler et al 2000)    Yes No and yes 
Ashton & Kennedy 
(2002) 
  yes, but 
disappears by 
self-review 
  
Hall et al (2001)   yes   
Cushing & Ahlawat 
1996) 
  Yes, but 
disappears by 
documenting 
  
1. in case of fraud: independent of auditor experience, dependent of knowledge of 
business 
2. anchoring in the form of consistency: this is a tendency to consider the same 
aspects in repeat engagements 
3. knowledge of the industry caused better performance in discovering fraud; 
experience as an auditor did not; experience as an auditor caused better 
performance to detect financial misstatement 
framing effects were less with greater expertise, either as an auditor, or as 
expert in the business 
4. on anchor: allowed audit risk 
5. on plain anchor; no difference  conjunctive / disjunctive 
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Table 3.3 (continued): An overview of the findings in literature  
 
Authors Is audit design 
consistent with  risk 
assessment? 
consensus with 
respect to risk 
assessment? 
Risk assessment 
consistent with error 
rate? 
Positive 
experience  
effect? 
Basu & Wright (1997) Yes    
Dusenbury et al (1996) No at the account 
level, yes at the 
assertion level 
   
Mock & Wright (1995) no    
Joyce (1976)  No but        1)   
Gaumnitz et al (1982) Yes 2) Yes             2)   
Srinindi & Vasarhelyi 
(1986) 
No No/yes        3)   
Houston et al (1999) Yes, conditionally  Yes, varying for errors 
or irregularities 
 
 
 
 
Elder & Allen (2003) yes    
Stone & Dilla (1994)  Yes             4)  Yes         4) 
Reimers et al (1993)  yes / no       5)   
Amer et al (1994)  No   
Trotman & Wood (1991) Yes                 6) Yes             6)   
Davis et al (2000)  Consensus(=> 
accuracy)     7) 
 Yes       7) 
Roberts & Wedemeyer 
(1988) 
  Yes       8)  
Waller (1993)   Yes, moderately  9)  
 
 
1. there is consensus between auditors of the same firm, much more than between 
those of distinct firm. 
2. possibly because a quantified assessment of the strength of internal controls is 
asked for (where the planned work served as the assessment of this strength in 
Joyce 1976) 
3. dependent on aggregation rule and primitive assessment 
4. when risk classification is in numbers and subjects are experienced auditors; 
else no consensus 
5. high consensus when risk categories are linguistic; much lower consensus when 
the categories are numerical 
6. based on a meta analysis of 17 studies 
7. the relation “consensus => accuracy” has varying strength over types of 
industry. Experience appears to have a positive influence on the strength of the 
relation between consensus and accuracy 
8. this consistency regards the relation of six ‘general attributes and the error rate; 
somewhat different from proper risk assessment, but similar enough as to be of 
interest for this thesis 
9. Waller rather investigates the relation of risk assessment and the audit opinion 
resulting from the audit 
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Table 3.3 (continued): An overview of the findings in literature 
 
Authors Consistency with 
others: consensus 
Consistency 
with error 
rate 
Complexity Experience 
Asare & Davidson 1995  Yes, but not 
stable 
  
Wallace & Kreutzfeldt 
1993 
 Yes        1)   
Wright 1994  Yes, but not 
consistent 
  
Abdolmohammadi & 
Wright 1987 
  Yes Yes, depen-
dent on com-
plexity      2) 
 
Tan et al 2002   yes yes, dependent 
on knowledge 
Van Kuijck 1990   Yes           3)  
Colbert 1988   Yes           4)  
Colbert 1989   Yes           2) Yes, depen-
dent on com-
plexity       2) 
Bell & Carcello 2000   Can be 
circumvented by 
decomposition 
 
Buckless 1989 High on assertion 
level ; low on account 
level 
 Leads to 
inconsistent 
combination rules 
 
 
1. 5 factors (overlap of 3 with Roberts & Wedemeyer, 1998) appear to have a 
significant positive relation with the error rate 
2. experience makes a difference in complex situations; not in relatively 
uncomplicated situations 
3. experience, education and task complexity/ structuring affect assessment 
4. but quality of personnel had more influence on the assessment of IR 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Sampling Risk 
  63
Chapter 4: The Sampling Risk12 
 
 
One of our validation criteria is the sampling risk.  We calculated this risk as a 
probability in the beta-distribution.  In this chapter we show (in a technical way) that 
this approach has good properties.  A by-product of this chapter is a method for 
calculation of the upper error limit that is much simpler than the usual Stringerbound, 
with an extra advantage that it gives the sampling risk and is less conservative. 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will introduce a method for calculating the sampling risk, when we 
only have the sample size and the estimated error rate at our disposal.  In this section 
it is made plausible that this method may lead to useful results, in the second section a 
simulation study is designed to substantiate this plausibility.  In section 4.3 we give 
results of this simulation and section 4.4 discusses their generalisability. 
  
In chapter 2, 2.2.6 we came to the conclusion that the sampling risk P(p>M|D) is the 
generic measure for the occurrence risk. This expression is to be read as "the 
probability (P) that the error rate p, associated with the quality of the administrative 
process, exceeds the level of materiality M, given the data (D)”.     
 
Now the problem is which probability law applies to this sampling risk. In 2.2.6 we saw 
that P(p>M|D) is calculated with the help of  
f(p|D)=(f(D|p)f(p))/f(D)     (1).  
In this formula f(D|p), the likelihood, will be dependent on the sampling design.  In 
auditing the so-called “monetary unit sampling (MUS)” is the most widely used.  In 
MUS the distinct monetary units (MU’s, e.g. dollars, guilders, euros) are seen as the 
unit of sampling.  So the population from which the sample is taken is the collection of 
all booked MU’s.  Every single MU is selected with the same probability (1/N, when 
there are N MU’s).  The question is whether this MU is in error or not. 
 
In the case of the "all or nothing approach" - "the my euro right or wrong approach" – 
every “book-value” (an entry in the account containing the value of the transaction to 
which the book-value corresponds) is subdivided in the MU’s that are correct and 
those that are not.  The selected MU is in error when it comes from the part of the 
corresponding book-value that was in error.  In this approach for every MU it is defined 
whether it is in error or not.  Say that totalled over the whole account a fraction of p is 
in error.  Now when a sample of n MU’s is selected with replacement, k, the number of 
MU’s in error in the sample, will have a binomial distribution with parameters (n,p).  
The hypergeometric (for sampling without replacement), or the Poisson distribution 
(when p is small and n is large) can also be used.  In the evaluation of the sampling 
risk, the so called beta distribution also plays a role, as we soon will see. 
 
The fraction MU’s of a book-value that is in error is called the ‘taint’ or ‘tainting’ 
symbolized by T.  When an approach with taintings is used, or when only the most 
likely error (MLE) and the sample size are available, as in most cases in the study, the 
probability law is unknown.  The aim of this chapter is to investigate a possible 
probability model for this situation.  We start with a heuristic argument to show where 
                                                          
12 This chapter gives a justification of the way we calculated the sampling risk in chapters 6 and 
8.  These chapters can be read without having read chapter 4. 
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the idea for the solution comes from. 
 
The hypergeometric, the binomial and the Poisson distribution all apply to integer 
valued outcomes.  But the outcomes of most of the cases that are in the study are not 
given in the number of errors found in the audit (sample), but as an estimate of the 
error rate in the population.  And at its best, only by exception, this estimate can be 
converted into an integer number of errors in the sample of the relevant case, which 
would be a necessary condition for the applicability of one of the three probability laws.  
 
This means that we have to find another probability law in order to evaluate the 
sampling risk that is given with the outcome in the cases that were in the study.  We 
will give an intuitive argument that the beta distribution is fit for this purpose. 
 
The beta distribution has the following density: 
 
 f(p)= (1/ B(a,b))pa-1(1-p)b-1; 0<=p<=1; a,b>0 
 
In this density, B(a,b) is the beta function, a factor dependent on a and b, which 
causes the probability for all p’s ( ( )∫ −− −1
0
11 )1(),(/1 dpppbaB ba )  to be equal to 1.  
 A well-known theorem in Bayesian statistics states the following (see Lee, 1997): 
 
Property 4.1: 
Let p (0<=p<=1) have a beta prior distribution with parameters a1 and b1.  Let k have a 
binomial distribution with parameters n and p.  Then if k= k0 successes (errors) are 
found in a sample from this distribution, the posterior distribution for p is also beta, with 
parameters a2 = a1+k0, b2 = b1+(n-k0). 
 
This property implies that the beta distribution is similar to the binomial distribution; in 
Bayesian statistics the distributions are called conjugate.  For our purposes the beta 
distribution has a convenient property: it uses broken (or rather real valued) 
parameters, a and b. These parameters play a role which is similar to the number of 
successes (a has this role) and the sample size (a+b has this role) in the binomial 
distribution.   
We observe that in property 4.1 k0 is integer valued, but a2 and b2 are real valued.  The 
binomial law has no meaning for a broken k0, but the beta posterior (and also the beta 
prior) is defined for every value of a and b (both > 0), so also for every broken or real 
value.  Now a value for a2 of for instance 2,3 in the posterior beta distribution can result 
from a1 = 2 and k0 = 0,3 (if this value for k were possible).  But it can also result from a1 
= 1,3 and k0 = 1.  So, for the beta distribution it does not matter whether k is integer 
valued or not.   
We can also observe that the beta distribution is continuous in a and b, which means 
that it also takes on values for all a and b between the integer values and so, in a 
sense, gives a way for interpolation between these values.  This leads to the idea that 
it makes sense to model the sampling risk with the beta distribution as follows. 
 
Beta-model 
Let r be the rate of error in a sample of size n, let M be the level of materiality, let p be 
the error rate in the account under audit and let B be the beta distribution with 
parameters a = 1+r*n, b = 1+ (n-r*n), then modelling with B of the probability that p is 
larger than M gives a good approximation to the real probabilities. 
 
In the beta-model r*n takes the place of k in property 1.  The specified beta distribution 
can be seen as the posterior distribution for p, as the result of a uniform prior 
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(beta(1,1)) and a likelihood for r, which is not known, but is similar to the binomial 
distribution.  Therefore this distribution will be referred to as the ‘beta posterior’.  The 
beta-model has some properties that add to its plausibility. 
 
The first one regards the mode of the posterior distribution, formulated in property 4.2. 
 
Property 4.2: 
The mode of a beta distribution with parameters a and b is equal to (a -1)/(a + b-2). 
 
For the beta distribution of the beta-model this means that its mode is equal to 
r*n/(r*n+(1-r)n) = r.  This is consistent with the most likely error, the estimate for the 
rate of errors in the population, which is also r.  It also gives an extra justification for 
the model 
 
The second consequence regards the fact that for the binomial case the distribution of 
the beta-model is the same as the one in property 1. 
 
Now these two consequences are far from a mathematical proof of the beta-model.  In 
fact, a proof of this beta-model is impossible, because a fit of practical data to a 
mathematical model never can be proven; it can only be shown.  But we may hope that 
a mathematical form can be found for data modelled in a plausible way (such as the 
binomial model for sampling with replacement), combined with a prior beta distribution. 
We did not succeed in finding such a model with related proof.   
 
Therefore we started a sub-project with Dr Karma Dajani, lecturer at the Department of 
Mathematics at the University of Utrecht and Bianca Snel, a student in mathematics at 
the same University.  In this project we conducted a simulation study and tried to find a 
mathematical expression for the posterior distribution if we assumed a beta prior for p, 
the error rate in the population.  The remainder of this chapter will give a summary of 
the results, which are fully reported in Snel (2002). 
 
4.2  The design of the simulation. 
 
The distribution of the error is not known and the way the sample was taken varies 
over cases.  Therefore it was convenient to investigate (and therefore generate) 
distributions of errors (in the form of taints) that generally are assumed to be valid 
models of real error distributions.  These models have the form of a mixture of two 
distributions. In addition we also investigated an unmixed model for the distribution of 
the taints.  It was done both in a classical and in a Bayesian setting. 
In the sequel we will use a third property of the beta distribution. 
 
Property 4.3: 
The expectation of a beta distribution with parameters a and b is equal to a/(a+b). 
 
For the simulation, populations of book-values were generated.  In the book-values 
errors were inserted, based on a variety of distributions.  From these tainted book-
values a sample was taken in which the relevant statistic: the average taint as the point 
estimate for p and a confidence limit was calculated and given the outcome of the 
statistic two values were determined: 
1.  that for the probability of the parameter exceeding some critical value (the 
materiality), given a prior distribution and the value of the statistic; 
2.  based on the sampling distribution, that for an upper confidence bound, which was 
compared to the standard Stringer bound. 
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To be more precise, the following steps were taken in the simulation study. 
 
1. Three times N accounts ACi  (i=1,…,N) were generated, each consisting of A book-
values.  In the study N was mostly taken 100000, and A was taken 10000.  The size of 
the book-values was taken from the exponential distribution with average equal to 1.  
 
2. In each account ACi (i=1,..,N) errors (taints) were inserted, such that the error rate pi 
(the rate of MU’s in error) in account ACi is equal to i/N, so pi=i/N.  This was done in 
three different ways, one way per N accounts, labelled as the beta likelihood, Mix1 and 
Mix2, as follows: 
2.1 taints were inserted distributed according to the beta likelihood with parameters 
(p/(1-p),1); as a consequence of property 4.3 this distribution has the expectation of 
      (p/(1-p))/(p/(1-p)+1)=p  13 
2.2 taints were inserted distributed according to a mixture of two distributions, g and h 
as follows: 
 f(Ti|p) = q.g(Ti|p)+(1-q)h(Ti|p).  
Here  
Ti is the variable representing the values Tim (m=1,…,A) for the taints in the i’th 
account ACi;  
g is the density of the beta distribution with parameters (bp/(q-p), b); (b will be 
varied to render two sets of mixtures Mix1 and Mix2)   
h(Ti|p) = 1 for Ti = 0 and h(Ti|p) = 0 otherwise; 
q is the fraction of book-values with non-zero taints. 
This mixture implies the taints in the book-values to be distributed as follows: with 
probability 1-q they take on the value 0; with probability q they take on the value of the 
specified beta distribution g.   
Note that the distributions of 2.1 and 2.2 apply to T, the fraction of MU’s in error in a 
book-value, whereas the beta prior and the beta posterior in this simulation apply to p, 
the fraction of MU’s in error in the total account. 
As a consequence of property 3 the beta distribution g has an expectation 
   E(g) = (bp/(q-p))/(bp/(q-p)+b)=p/q.  
So the mixture f(Ti|p) has expectation: 
E f(Ti|p) = q.p/q+(1-q).0=p. 
In the simulation in this mixture the next values were taken for q and b: q= 0.05,  
q=0.10,  q=0.15; b=1 (Mix 1), same values for q and b=0.5 (Mix 2). Taking b=0.5 
causes the beta-distribution to have more mass close to 0 than the distribution with 
b=1 (see also 4.4.2, 3rd point);  
2.1 and 2.2 have as consequence that for one round in the simulation effectively 
300,000 accounts were generated (the beta likelihood, Mix 1 and Mix 2, each with an 
error rate of p, which of course varied per 3 accounts and for the Mixes had q as a 
maximum. The combination of values for b and q implies 6 rounds of simulation.  
 
3. From each ACi a sample Si of n book-values was taken, with a probability 
proportional to the size of the book-values (PPS sampling). (done for 3 times N 
accounts ACi) 
 
4. In each selected sample Si the average Ťi of the taints Tim was calculated : 
Ťi=ΣmTim/n.  This was done for the 3 types of distributions described in 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
5. Each Ťi is associated with the pi of the account ACi from which the sample Si was 
                                                          
13 We hoped to find a mathematical expression for the distribution of the average taint in a 
sample from this distribution, but we did not succeed.  As a second best approach we 
investigated the properties of this distribution by including it in our simulation study.  
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taken  (for 3 times N accounts ACi). 
 
6. The Ťi are ordered with respect to their size and subdivided in classes Ck 
(k=1,..,1000) of size 100, by grouping every 100 successive values; so C1 consists of 
the 100 smallest Ť, C2 of the next 100 smallest Ť of the 99,900 remaining Ť, and so on. 
 
7. In each Ck the statistic P(p>M| Ť) is calculated, for a level of materiality M.  This 
expression can be read as: "the probability that the error rate in the population is larger 
than the level of materiality, given the average taint in the sample."  This "probability" is 
not a real probability, but an estimate of the relevant chance, simply calculated by 
counting the number of pi in class Ck that exceed M and dividing it by 100.  It is done 
for the 3 types of distributions mentioned in 2, above. Also for each Ťi  this "probability" 
is calculated by means of the beta posterior distribution as it was formulated in the 
beta-model of the previous section. 
 
Remark: On the average the Ti  in a class Ck do not differ more than 1/1000, so that 
the variability of the Ťi in a class Ck is negligible compared to the random variation that 
will be present in the associated pi. 
 
8.  In each Ck for each of the 3 distributions (Mix 1, Mix 2 and the beta likelihood for T) 
and also for the beta posterior upper confidence bounds UB, with a level of confidence 
of 1-β, are calculated in the following way: 
UB is the value for which P(p>UB| Ť)= β, making UB the 1-β quantile of the pi's that 
are connected to the Ťi in class Ck.  In the expression P(p>UB| Ť)= β the median of the 
Ťi in class Ck is taken for Ť. Now this UB is not an upper confidence bound in the 
classical statistical sense.  But its value is very close to that of an upper confidence 
bound in the classical sense (see for instance Novick and Jackson (1974, pp120,121).  
The relevant probability in classical statistics attaches to the method by which the 
confidence interval was derived (and is called ‘confidence level’), in Bayesian statistics 
it attaches to the particular interval (0, UB) found.  
Next to these UB's, also the Stringer bound, SB, is calculated for a confidence level of 
1- β.  This is done on the basis of the actual taints found in the simulated samples from 
the Mix1 distribution, in the following way.  
For each of the samples in class Ck the taints are known; the SB is calculated from 
them. This gives 100 SB’s in every Ck.  
These 100 SB’s are averaged and this average is used as the Stringer bound 
associated with the average of Ť in the class Ck. 
 
In the end the simulation produces 1000 classes Ck (k=1,...,1000) and associated with 
each Ck: 
100 values for Ťi, 
100 values for pi, 
4 values for P(p>M| Ť), estimated for the two mixture distributions and the beta 
likelihood for T and calculated for the beta posterior, 
4 values for an upper confidence bound UB for the same 4 distributions, at a 
confidence level of 1-β, plus, for the sake of comparison a Stringer bound SB for the 
same confidence level 1-β. 
 
Now in simulations β was taken 5%, the materiality M was also taken 5%, the sample 
size n was taken 50.  In some simulation rounds,  the simulation was only done for the 
most relevant possible values for pi: those up to 10% or 15%, depending on the value 
chosen for q, thereby reducing the time needed for a round.  The relevant numbers 
N=100000 and A=10000 could then be reduced up to N=10000 and A=1000, varying 
over the rounds. 
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Just to remember, the simulation study is meant to establish the validity of the beta 
posterior distribution as a model to calculate the sampling risks that are associated 
with the cases in the study. When the probabilities calculated in step 7 are equal to or 
very close to that computed with the beta posterior, the validity is confirmed.  Because 
the estimated probabilities for the beta likelihood and the two mixes are a (close) 
estimate of the relevant probability in these distributions, so they can serve as a 
calibration for the corresponding result with the beta posterior in the same situation.  
So to the extent that the 3 distributions we used cover the distributions that an auditor 
meets in practice, the probabilities calculated in step 7 are sufficient to establish the 
validity of the beta posterior.   
 
However, we thought it useful to also look at this validity from a different perspective, 
namely from that of the confidence bound.  With the Stringer bound we have a kind of 
benchmark for confidence bounds in auditing, so when we compare the Stringer bound 
with the upper confidence bounds calculated in step 8, we have another means of 
validating the beta posterior distribution. 
 
4.3  The validity of the beta posterior. 
 
In this section will show the results of our simulation study.  In this study the standard 
level of materiality M = 5% was adopted.  Variations were implemented in the mixture 
distribution: 95%, 90% and 85% were adopted as the rate of error-free MU’s (1-q) in 
the population ACi. 
 
We show results, given by means of two graphs in figures 4.1 and 4.2, that are typical 
for the outcomes.  In this round the following parameter values for the simulation were 
adopted:  N=100000  A = 10000  (figure 4.1) N=10000  A = 1000  (figure 4.2) n = 50  M 
= .05       q = .1,   prior distribution for p ~beta (1,1) (both figures) 
The abscissa in the figures represents T 
 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.2  
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the probabilities for p of exceeding M, are very close to each 
other on almost the whole range of the mean taintings found.  Only for values close to 
zero the upper-tail probabilities diverge. The probabilities calculated for the beta 
posterior, the solid line, show what can be expected: when very small taints are found, 
the probability of exceeding M is not getting too close to zero.  From the regular audit 
samples for instance of size 50, we know that when the real error rate in the audit 
object equals 5%, the probability of finding zero errors is 8%.  This is reflected in figure 
4.2: here the beta posterior shows an upper-tail probability for M of about 11%.  The 
difference with the 8% binomial probability is partly explained by the fact that the 
smallest mean taint for which the upper-tail probability of M is calculated in the 
simulation study, is somewhat larger than zero.  
We had to find an explanation for the fact that the three distributions that were 
simulated show much smaller values for these upper-tail probabilities.  We had a 
suspicion that it might result from a fallacy in the simulation: if for small values of p the 
taints generated would show insufficient variability, then the upper-tail probability of M 
would become too small.  Some small extra simulations confirmed our suspicion.  
These extra simulations also showed that this lack of variability only influences the 
outcomes for mean taints very close to zero, because for the larger values of Ť the 
pi|Ť, the values of p, given the mean taint Ť have an appropriate spread around M.  
This also explains why for the larger values of the mean taint the upper-tail 
probabilities are a little smaller than those of the beta posterior. 
The extra simulations also showed that the lack of spread is only small; though large 
enough to mitigate the upper-tail probability of M, small enough to hardly influence the 
95% quantile of p|Ť, which quantile is the 95% UB (upper confidence bound, upper 
error limit in auditors’ language) that result from the simulations. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the Stringer bound (SB) and upper error limits calculated as 
The dotted and striped 
line staying closest to 
the taint axis,  represents 
both Mix1 and Mix2; 
due to black and white 
printing the distinction 
with the dotted and 
striped line of the beta 
likelihood is only very 
small 
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explained in section 4.1. As can be seen, for mean taints up to 7 percent, the solid line 
of the beta posterior distribution lies between the Stringer bound (which appears to be 
more conservative) and the upper error limits that result from the beta likelihood and 
the two mixed beta distributions.  For the assumed distributions of the taints, these 
upper error limits may be assumed to give a valid confidence bound for p given Ť.  
Figure 4.2 only shows the part of the graph that is informative for our beta-model, for 
our beta-model applies to values of Ť that virtually all are smaller than 10% and mostly 
much smaller or zero.  Moreover figure 4.1 shows that for values of Ť larger than ca 
10% the upper-tail probabilities all are getting (much) larger than 0.45, which will be 
the lower boundary of the largest class for the sampling risk in the classification we will 
use in our data analysis in chapters 6, 7, 8. 
 
Discussion of the results shown in figure 4.1 and figure 4.2. 
The results in figure 4.1 and 4.2 are almost completely consistent, with regard to the 
quality of the beta posterior distribution as it was expected when adopting the beta-
model:  
• the upper-tail probabilities of M appear to be very close to that of the beta 
posterior on almost the whole domain of the mean taints; if there is difference 
the beta posterior is somewhat larger; 
• the upper error limits (upper bounds, UB’s) of figure 4.2 show a consistent 
picture: the beta posterior UB is a little larger than the UB’s from the two 
mixture distributions and the beta likelihood. As the UB’s from these three 
distributions may be assumed to be correct for these distributions (this was the 
way they were derived in the simulation), the beta posterior UB appears to be 
somewhat conservative. 
• Moreover at the most relevant range, that of average taints smaller than ca 5%, 
the beta posterior bound is sharper (less conservative) than the Stringer bound. 
This makes the beta posterior bound a good candidate for replacing the 
Stringer bound 
Only the upper-tail probabilities for mean taints very close to zero are a little puzzling, 
but as explained above these results have been explained by extra simulations, which 
support the validity of the results. 
It can be concluded that the beta posterior gives probabilities that are valid for the 
distributions that were assumed in this round of the simulation study. 
 
So far we discussed the results for mean taints not greater than 7%.  These are the 
results that would be relevant in case of a real evaluation of audit results and forming 
of audit opinion as long as the chosen level of materiality does not exceed 7%. 
 
The way the probabilities behave for mean taints larger than 10 percent, in practical 
situations is not very relevant.  This also applies to the interpretation of the results 
given in figure 4.2.  Here we see that the beta posterior bound just grows with the 
mean taint.  This is a direct consequence of this upper error limit just being calculated 
on the basis of the beta-model: in the simulation the beta posterior bound is just 
calculated for a mean taint, regardless of its possible existence. 
 
The two mixes show an upper error limit that grows with the mean taints, up to a level 
that is equal to the value of q, which is 0.1 in this round of simulation.  This is 
necessary of course, because p's larger than 0.1 are impossible with these 
specifications. 
 
The simulations were also done for mixture rates of 5% and 15%, and for a level of 
materiality equal to 2.5%.  The results were very similar to the ones discussed above.  
It means that for relevant levels of materiality and for relevant mixture rates of errors in 
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the transactions of an account, the beta posterior is an appropriate model to evaluate 
the probabilities associated with the outcomes of the samples in our study. 
4.4 Conclusion and Generalisation 
 
4.4.1 Conclusion 
 
For error distributions in accounts like the ones simulated in the current simulation 
study, the beta posterior upper error limit is better than the Stringer bound: it is a little 
more conservative than bounds that may be assumed to be valid, and sharper than the 
Stringer bound.   
 
In this study we will use the probabilities that are calculated with the help of the beta 
posterior distribution in various kinds of correlation studies some of which with a 
classification of the sampling risk.  Here the absolute value is less important than the 
relative value.  It can be concluded that the beta posterior is fit as a model for the 
calculation of these sampling risks.   
 
4.4.2 Generalisation 
 
A few remarks can be made on the generalisability of the results to practical situations. 
1. The use of the beta posterior as formulated in the beta-model, is only dependent on 
a proper estimation of the error rate in the population and the sample size.  This 
estimation must be done in accordance with the sample design.  But given the 
estimate of the error rate, the beta-posterior is not dependent on the sample design 
that made this estimation possible. 
2.  In the simulation study an exponential distribution was used for the size of the book-
values.  The skewness of such a distribution is like that of many accounting 
populations (see for instance Willemsen, 1996). In PPS-sampling the size of the book-
values affects the outcome. Especially when the account contains items of an 
extremely large size, the results might be influenced.  But in auditing practice these 
extremely large book-values are isolated and audited separately from the rest of the 
account.  And then for the rest of the account it is more likely that something like the 
exponential distribution applies.  But we did not investigate the properties of the beta 
posterior in the light of other distributions for the size of the book-values. 
3.  In practice distributions of taints occur that show a point mass in 1.  The simulation 
studies of for instance Van et. al. (1996) show that this can strongly affect the results 
for probabilities associated with values of Stringer bound or other relevant statistics.  
See also Tamura et. al. (1989).  In our study we tried to simulate this reality to a certain 
extent by also using the value .5 for the b-parameter of the beta distribution as this 
causes this distribution to have a large mass close to 1. (But this is not the same as a 
point mass in 1). 
 
4.4.3 A welcome side effect 
 
The simulation study gives a strong indication that the beta posterior is a better 
evaluation instrument than that provided by the Stringer bound.  It has three 
advantages over this bound: 
1. The computations are much simpler 
2. Our study shows that it is less conservative than the Stringer bound (at the 
same time having sufficient reliability.) 
3. Relevant probabilities, like the upper tail probability, can easily be calculated, 
while probabilities for the Stringer bound, given a value for this bound, cannot 
be calculated directly. 
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So, provided that the validity of the beta-model can be given a firmer empirical basis 
than provided by our study, we have given perspective on a convenient evaluation 
method for substantive test.  A simulation study that varies on the distribution of the 
size of the book-values and also introduces point masses for taints in 1 can give this 
firmer basis. 
 
Our result can also be seen as a confirmation of the quality of the Stringer bound 
(including its conservatism). 
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Chapter 5: Design of the Research 
 
 
Our research was initiated because of a need to learn more about the ‘real risk’.  
Therefore we collected real life data concerning real life risks in a first study.  The 
outcome of this study and availability of new real life data determined the content of a 
second and a third study. Their design is also discussed in this chapter. 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In the introduction of this chapter, we explain why we have chosen for a field study, in 
our quest for the ‘real risk’.  In section 5.2 we formulate research questions that 
represent steps on this quest, in 5.3 we give an overview of the three field studies we 
performed, in 5.5 we stress the anonymity of our respondents and in 5.6 we discuss the 
generalisability of our findings. 
 
In section 1.1 we introduced the generic question of his thesis, whether the risk as 
assessed by the auditor on audit objects in his practice, represents the ‘real risk’ of a 
material error.  For finding an answer to this question, two ways of action were 
considered: 
1.  an experimental approach, in which cases with a pre-specified risk would be 
administered to experimental subjects, and in which interesting variables could be 
investigated on their effect on the risk assessment by the subjects; 
2.  a field study (archival study), in which in principle on real audit objects two 
measurements would be performed: the level of risk as assessed by the auditor and 
one or more indicators of the ‘real risk’ associated with the annual accounts of the audit 
object. In this field study the source of the data would have to be the audit files of an 
audit case, because it is on these that an auditor bases his opinion and in which the 
exact outcomes of the audit process are given. 
 
There were several reasons for choosing the second option.   
The first, main and decisive reason was that in our opinion it is almost impossible to 
construct the "right cases".  Such a "right case" should: 
• entail a pre-specified level of risk; 
• not give cues in the description of these cases as to the level of risk aimed at by 
the researcher; 
• entail certainty as to the effects on the error rate (and as a consequence on the 
audit risk) of the included risk factors.   
 
For to realise the third bullet for instance, it would be necessary to know of the effect of 
each risk factor.  But the effect of such a factor is dependent on many other factors in a 
way that almost absolutely inhibits the construction of a "natural case".  In other words, 
we did not see how to include cues pertaining to the ‘real risk’ in an audit object, at least 
satisfying the following properties: 
• like in practice, they may not be that overt and they may not be that sure to have a 
bearing on the generation and/ or detection of errors; 
• like in practice, they sometimes only can be observed by being present in the 
organisation; in other words, messy desks, chaotic archives, wavering 
communication can be described, but could be interpreted differently on direct 
observations; 
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• like in practice, they sometimes only can be discovered by talking to people 
responsible for the processes; the considerations of the previous bullet apply: a 
phenomenon being described or being directly observed may make a difference in 
interpretation. 
 
In other words, we did not see how to include risk cues, without giving away too much 
information on their bearing on the audit risk in the case description.  And we also did 
not see how to provide for the many ways in which risk factors can interact in creating 
and/ or hiding an error. Our discussion in chapter 3 on the complexity of risk 
assessment gave a more elaborate analysis of this complexity.  This complexity also 
implies that it is very hard to judge whether a risk assessment by an experimental 
subject as based on the cues in the experimental case, be it low or high, is correct.  
Both low and high might be justified.  For instance because experimental subjects may 
give a varying interpretation to that cue, due to their varying experience in similar cases.  
This may lead to different assessments which still are consistent with the given 
description. 
 
A second and also decisive reason was that an experiment would not completely solve 
the question whether auditors in practice are able to give the right assessments of the 
audit risk, in particular the occurrence risk (OR).  Obviously this second reason is 
related to the first, but it also stands on its own, for instance because in an experiment 
only a limited number of factors can be varied. 
 
A third reason to choose a field study was given in 3.2.5: there it was argued that as far 
as heuristics and biases are included a purely experimental study would not answer the 
question whether the auditor can assess the ‘real risk’.   
 
A fourth reason is given by Van Kuijck (1999) who aims at confirming findings from 
experimental studies in a quasi-experimental approach.  He refers to authors who doubt 
the value of experimental studies because they have the suspicion that subjects act 
differently in experimental situations as compared to real-life situations.  This suspicion 
is fully justified, since it refers to the equivalent of the well-known Hawthorne effect, 
which was discovered in 1928 (see Babbie, 1994 p. 236; Cook and Campbell, 1979, pp 
39,60,66 and others). 
 
All these considerations result in the conclusion that the generic question given in 
section 1.1 can not be answered by an experimental approach.  So we chose an 
(archival) field study approach, which is consistent with the framework of Bonner (1999, 
p. 389).  Bonner also mentions external validity as an advantage of archival studies, but 
with her, we realize that, by not adopting an experimental approach, causality is harder 
to find.   
 
Next to the counter indications for an experimental study, two positive reasons for a 
field study can be stated. 
1. The first reason is that a field study can answer the basic question "does it 
work?"  without having to justify the experimental conditions.  It measures "real 
life" by directly measuring the auditors risk assessment and the corresponding 
errors.  Every property, seen or unseen, is included in the object on which the 
auditor has to assess the risk.  Moreover, when audit files are the basis for the 
measurement of the auditor’s assessment, there is no measurement error, 
because the assessments filed are also the ones that were the basis for the 
audit design, in which the audit risk aimed at is included.  
2. A second reason is that a field study still offers the opportunity to look for factors 
that influence the quality of risk assessment, like properties of the auditor, 
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properties of the audit object, properties of the audit environment.  In the next 
section we will go into further detail. 
 
5.2  Research questions 
 
In section 1.1 we stated the following generic question:  
“Does risk assessment by an auditor represent the ‘real risk’ of a material error?”.  
Due to the widespread use of risk analysis, we designed this study with the basic 
expectation in mind that risk assessment by auditors will certainly have some predictive 
value for the error rate (and its possible materiality) in the annual accounts.  With this 
prior attitude towards risk assessment, we developed the key question in four 
directions: 
1. the first direction regarded the relation between risk assessment and the four 
criteria developed in chapter 2; 
2. the second direction regarded an exploration of possible moderator variables: 
variables that influence the strength of the relationship between risk assessment 
and the criterion variables; 
3. the third direction was an attempt to improve risk assessment by decomposing 
the overall assessment into assessments of risk indicators; 
4. the fourth direction regarded the predictive qualities of system tests14 for the 
error rate in account. 
 
We will present the resulting research questions in 5.2.2 through 5.2.5.  But first, we will 
discuss the level of analysis that applies to our study. 
 
5.2.1 Two levels of analysis: the organisation and the pooled organisations 
  
Clearly the research questions regard the capability of the individual auditor in risk 
assessment.  However, most of our data are derived from only one assessment per 
individual auditor.  Therefore we had to pool our data to the level of the organisation 
(the auditor belongs to) and analyse them per organisation.  This means that our 
pronouncements rather apply to the organisation than to the individual auditor.  But as 
the organisation is made up by individual auditors we could say as well: "they apply to 
the auditors of the organisation".  Moreover, it refers to the necessity for individual 
auditors in the organisation to assess their risks in such a way that the organisations 
uniform guidelines on the extent of substantive testing, given a risk assessment, result 
in an audit of sufficient size.  It can be stated that the validity we will test at the 
organisational level is necessary for the use of such uniform tables and thus gives a 
sufficient reason for taking the organisational level as level of analysis. 
 
These considerations lead to the choice of the organisational level as the most natural 
level for pooling.  The same considerations also lead to the conclusion that one 
assessment per responding auditor is sufficient.  
 
Where relevant we will also pool the data at the level of pooled organisations.  Pooling 
makes sense, because many organisations base their audits on the same handbook, all 
auditors are subject to the same international auditing guidelines and standards, and 
the key question: “Does the auditor assess the ‘real’ occurrence risk?” is the same for 
all auditors/ organisations, regardless the underlying methodology.  The advantage of 
                                                          
14 "System tests" in this thesis is synonymous to "tests of controls", or "compliance tests".  The 
term "system tests" is widely in use in the Netherlands and the research reported in chapter 9 is 
based on the Dutch practice, which makes the use of the term "system tests" natural. 
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such a higher pooling level is that our sample size increases and therefore the power of 
the statistical tests or the possibility to include (more) predictors in regression analyses.  
But the relevance is limited by the possibility that there is much variability between 
organisations: it could result in significant correlations for the pooled organisations 
(validity in general with respect to some criterion), but insignificant correlations per 
organisation (so no validity with respect to the same criterion for an organisation).  
Where the interesting question with regard to validity is at the organisation level, we 
have to be careful with the results for the pooled organisations.  Moreover searching for 
causes is complicated with varying organisations and associated cultures and 
experience. 
 
5.2.2 The relation with the criterion variables. 
 
As argued in 2.3.2, a valid risk assessment may be expected to correlate positively with 
the position of the error rate in the audited account relative to the level of materiality.  
The first research question directly derives from this expectation: 
 
Research question 1: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the position 
of the error in a sample relative to the materiality? 
 
As argued in 2.3.1, a valid risk assessment may be expected to correlate positively with 
the error rate itself in the audited account.  The second research question directly 
derives from this expectation: 
 
Research question 2a: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the error 
rate in the audited account? 
Research question 2b: To which degree does this correlation vary over organisations? 
 
As argued in 2.3.3, a valid risk assessment may be expected to correlate positively with 
the sampling risk (SR) associated with the outcome in the audit sample, except for the 
possible influence towards a negative value for the correlation between SR and OR due 
to the dependency of sample design and OR, coming from the lower sample sizes and 
therefore higher SR, when OR gets a lower assessment.  This dependency will lead to 
a positive correlation between OR and sample size. 
 
In preview of the analyses in chapter 6 we observe that the correlation between OR and 
sample size is only .101, which mitigates the dependency of the correlation on the 
sample design.  We also recall that the standardised sampling risk, based on the same 
sample size in all cases, does not suffer from this problem.  So we can derive the third 
research question directly from the expectation of a positive correlation: 
 
Research question 3: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the sampling 
risk (SR)? 
 
As argued in 2.3.4, a valid risk assessment will show varying distributions of the error 
rate for different assessed levels of risk.  The fourth research question directly derives 
from this expectation: 
 
Research question 4: To which degree will the distribution of the error rate vary with the 
level of assessed risk? 
 
As explained in 2.3.1, the occurrence risk not only depends on the error rate, but also 
on the level of materiality: the higher the materiality, the smaller the occurrence risk, 
given an observed error rate.  For groups of accounts with the same level of materiality, 
the relation between error rate and the occurrence risk only depends on the error rate.  
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In such groups and with valid risk assessment, the correlation of error rate and risk 
assessment will increase, compared to that in the whole set of accounts.  This leads to 
the fifth research question:  
 
Research question 5: To which degree will the correlation between error rate and risk 
assessment increase when calculated for groups of accounts with the same level of 
materiality compared to the correlation for the whole group of accounts? 
 
In chapter 2 (2.3.3) we argued that in principle the (possibly standardised) sampling risk 
SR, given the error rate found, may be the best validation criterion for the occurrence 
risk (OR).  For valid risk assessment it therefore can be expected that the relation 
between OR and SR will be stronger than that between OR and the ‘audit position’ or 
between OR and the error rate. This leads to the sixth research question:  
 
Research question 6: To which degree will the occurrence risk (OR) show a relation 
with the sampling risk, which is stronger than that between OR and the ‘audit position’, 
or OR and the error rate? 
 
5.2.3 Moderator variables 
 
In chapter 3 various variables that improve or might improve risk assessment were 
discussed, among others: experience as an auditor and knowledge of the type of 
business the audit object belongs to.  Literature (among others: Abdolmohammadi & 
Wright, 1987, Colbert, 1989,  Stone & Dilla, 1994,  Davis et al, 2000), showed that 
better assessments may be expected from a more experienced auditor and from one 
having more knowledge of the type of business.  In the same references, implicitly 
complexity of the audit object 15, was shown to negatively influence the quality of risk 
assessment.  For more complex audit objects, less valid assessments may be 
expected.   
These references and associated expectations imply that the corresponding variables 
are potential moderator variables for the relations that are of interest to us.   
 
We did not take size as a possible moderator, because we found no literature to have a 
basis for its moderating effect.  Moreover results on its (possible) moderating effect are 
hard to interpret: size of an account (the total number of monetary units), may have 
both a positive and a negative influence on the quality of risk assessment.  Positive 
because with a larger size errors of a certain percentage get larger and therefore more 
care is taken not to miss them (which is also mirrored in a level of materiality of a lower 
percentage).  The influence may be negative, because larger may mean more 
complexity, making risk assessment more difficult.  It also may be indifferent for size, 
because it is not the size in MU’s that determines the difficulty of performing a risk 
analysis, but the ‘size’ (say in number of and relations between controls) and related 
complexity of the system of controls.  So, whatever the outcome of an analysis, there is 
always a justification for it; ‘size’ as a moderator is not informative, if no other variables 
can be included in the analysis. 
 
We introduce the following research questions with respect to moderator variables. 
 
With growing complexity organizations are harder to evaluate in terms of assessed risk; 
the auditor will be aware of that and put the effort for the assessment at a relatively high 
level, in order to overcome the complexities.  This might compensate for the complexity, 
                                                          
15 Variables like ‘complexity of the audit object’ and ‘experience’ have to be defined and 
operationalised to make them measurable; we will do this in chapter 6, when we report the 
findings as to these research questions. 
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were it not that human mind has great difficulties in combining assessments (see for 
instance Burgstahler et al, 2000 ).  So in the end the complexity may be expected to 
reduce the level of validity.  This leads to the 7th research question: 
  
Research question 7: To which degree will the validity of risk assessment decrease with 
the complexity of the audit object? 
 
With more effort an assessment in general may be expected to improve. This leads to 
the 8th research question:  
 
Research question 8: To which degree will the level of validation increase with the effort 
put in the assessment of OR? 
 
As a consequence of Abdolmohammadi & Wright (1987), Bell & Carcello (2000), Davis 
et al (2000), Stone & Dilla (1994), Burgstahler et al (2000), Smith & Kida (1991), Joyce 
& Biddle (1981a), Johnson et al (1991), (see chapter 3 (3.4.2.2 and 3.4.3)), it is 
interesting to look at experience as potential moderator variable.  In many cases we 
know whether the audit regarded a first or a repeated engagement.  This stands for less 
or more experience with the business and to a lesser extent for experience as an 
auditor.  Because our data do not distinguish between these two types of experience, 
the differential influence (indicated by some of the studies in chapter 3) of experience in 
the business and as an auditor, can not be confirmed by our analysis .  Still it is 
worthwhile to add research question 9: 
 
Research question 9: To which degree will the level of validation increase with the 
experience of the auditor with the business? 
 
The following considerations regard a potential moderator variable that is only nominal 
by nature.  Still it is interesting to look whether it has influence, even if the direction of 
the influence cannot be predicted.  
 
An auditor attains a certain level of experience in risk assessment in interaction with his 
or her direct colleagues. The firm’s or department’s manual will formulate an 
assessment strategy which in its turn, in conjunction with the exchange with colleagues 
in the organization, will cause assessments by varying auditors within organizations to 
be interchangeable and therefore to be at a relatively stable level of validity.  The 
question is whether this level is also stable over organizations. There are reasons to 
believe that this will only be the case to a more modest extent; we mention the 
following:   
• there is lack of professional exchange,  
• audit manuals are secret outside companies,  
• the audit manual plays a central role in auditing,  
• over- or under-assessments are not made public.  
 
These (and possibly even more) reasons will not cause risk assessment to be totally 
different over organisations, because all organizations are subject to international 
guidelines on auditing and auditors in general share education; moreover there is some 
exchange for instance by way of published research.  These considerations lead to the 
10th research question:  
 
Research question 10: To which degree will the level of validity vary over 
organizations?  
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The possibility that there is also variation in validity between individual auditors within 
one organization cannot be tested in this study, because only one audit per respondent 
was collected.   
 
5.2.4 Decomposition of risk assessment 
 
In chapter 3 the complexity of the assessment task was stressed.  In more complex 
situations, heuristics like anchoring, availability and representativeness are more likely 
to lead to corresponding biases.  Several authors (Colbert, 1989, Bell & Carcello, 2000, 
Buckless, 1989, Abdolmohammadi & Wright, 1987) actually showed that complexity has 
influence, and also that it sometimes can be dealt with, a) by making assessments at 
the assertion level (for instance Waller, 1993, Buckless, 1989), b) by excluding 
judgment as far as possible: logistic regression on directly measurable risk factors 
performs better than judgment of auditors (Bell & Carcello, 2000), c) by decomposing 
the assessment needed into part- assessments (Roberts & Wedemeyer, 1988, Wallace 
& Kreutzfeldt, 1993). 
 
In this study the possibility to improve risk assessment by decomposition of the 
assessment task also has been investigated.  The idea was to decompose the 
assessment task into a set of subtasks, each of which would be less complicated. Each 
subtask consisted of giving an assessment on a ‘risk indicator’.  
  
Definition of risk indicator 
A risk indicator is an aspect of the audit object or its context, that is expected to affect 
the risk that the administrative process will produce annual accounts with a material 
error.   
 
In appendix 1 (the questionnaire) we explain how we came to the set of indicators, that 
was used in the questionnaire. 
 
Indicators imply judgment. 
The respondent was asked to give his judgment with respect to each indicator as to the 
question whether the audit object would have less or more risk of a material error or 
would be risk-neutral.  This question often will produce the same answer as the 
question of the quality with respect to that indicator.  But by including judgment in the 
indicator with regard to the effect on the risk of a material error, an assessment is 
explicitly asked.  This allows for judgments of the auditor that, although the quality may 
be poor, the resulting risk still may be low in the specific situation.  It means that one of 
the central properties of judgment is included in the way we use risk indicators: it is 
more than just looking at the parts and it allows intuition or professional judgment. 
 
This approach also is consistent with a goal of our study: to look whether assessment 
improves when the situation gets less complicated (section 3.6,  3rd question).  For that 
we have to measure risk assessment at two levels: at the level of the usual audit risk 
model next to the level of the risk indicators. 
 
Decomposition of risk assessment asks for the aggregation of the assessments per 
0indicator.  In principle we chose for aggregation by way of regression analysis.  By 
using this technique, it would be possible to find which indicators are most important in 
risk assessment.  Also variation in these models over organisations could be found.  
And, not the least, the explaining power of the risk indicators can be compared to that of 
classical risk assessment.  We chose for the error rate as the dependent variable, 
because it appeared that classical risk assessment correlated strongest with this 
validation criterion. 
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Construct validity of the risk indicators 
In the course of the study the opportunity was taken to involve the participating auditors 
in controlling the construct validity of the risk indicators.  When we introduced our study 
to a participating organisation, we discussed the questionnaire, in particular the risk 
indicators, with our contact persons.  In this discussion the view of the auditors on five 
desirable qualities (mentioned in appendix 1) was especially asked for.  As a rule, only 
minor changes resulted from these discussions; in one case one indicator was added, 
in another one was deleted.  In the end this did not play a role in our findings, because 
we used a set that applied to all organisations, as will be made clear in chapter 7. 
 
Next to the analysis of correlations between and of regression of the risk indicators on 
the occurrence risk, this check on consistency can be seen as a triangulation on the 
construct validity of the risk indicators (see Babbie, 1995). 
 
Research questions concerning risk indicators 
The above can be summarised in six research questions: 
The first three derive from the question whether the risk indicators are consistent with 
the classical audit risk model. 
 
Research question 11: Are the bivariate relations between risk indicators and the 
occurrence risk in the expected direction and of sufficient strength? 
 
Research question 12: Can the occurrence risk be predicted from the risk indicators by 
way of a regression model? 
 
Research question 13: Can the risk indicators be seen as an appropriate representation 
of the view auditors have on audit risk assessment? 
 
The next three derive from the question whether the predictability of the error rate can 
be improved by the use of risk indicators.  This question can be decomposed as 
follows. 
 
Research question 14:  Are the bivariate relations between the risk indicators and the 
error rate in the expected direction and of sufficient strength? 
 
Research question 15:  Can the error rate be predicted from the risk indicators by way 
of a regression model? 
 
Research question 16:  Is the explaining power of the risk indicators larger than that of 
the classical risk assessment?  
 
5.2.5 System tests as predictors of errors 
 
In section 2.4 we argued that the use of system tests to underpin risk assessment when 
it is used as a replacement of direct substantive testing, implies a question as to the 
validity of system tests.  We also mentioned that we would test that necessary condition 
for system tests to be valid as underpinning of risk assessment.   
 
System testing serves to establish the proper operation of the system of controls; risk 
analysis serves to assess the quality of the system of controls, combined with 
assessment of the influence of the context in which this system operates on the risk of a 
material error, in order to assess the occurrence risk.  Related to the difference in goal, 
there are three essential differences between risk assessment and system testing: (a) 
the level of assessment, (b) the extent to which judgment plays a role and (c) the extent 
to which the design and the operation play a role. 
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a. The level of assessment 
Risk assessment has the annual accounts (or a sub-account) as its object and 
assesses the risk (of a material error) at the level of this (sub)account.  When 
investigating its validity, only a measure at the level of the (sub)account is relevant.  
System tests, by definition, have the individual transactions as their object.  So 
investigating their validity should be done at the level of a transaction.  The most logical 
criterion for validity of a system test then will be the error in the transaction, as stated in 
section 2.4.  This means that we need dual purpose tests to validate system tests. A 
dual purpose test is a test on an individual transaction in which the operation of the 
controls (the administrative system) is checked (also called compliance testing, see e.g. 
Arens & Loebbecke, 1997) and in which also the correctness of the book-value (the 
monetary value for which the transaction has been booked) is investigated (also called 
substantive testing, see idem).  The logical expectation in such a dual purpose test is: 
the better the system has operated, the more probable a zero error or a small sized 
error. 
 
b. The role of judgment 
In risk assessment, judgment plays a prominent role: the auditor forms an image of the 
administrative processes, analyses them on weaknesses, looks for the controls that 
should neutralise these weaknesses, wonders how well they are designed to meet 
them, gets an impression of the qualities of the personnel, tries to get an impression of 
how well the procedures are followed etc etc.  In system testing, judgment is far less 
important and observation is the key activity: it is observed, how well the procedures 
are maintained in an individual transaction.  This observation is done on cues, directly 
related to the procedures, such as the signatures of employees that correspond to 
separation of duties.   
 
c. The extent to which the design and operation play a role. 
In risk assessment both the design and the operation of the administrative procedures 
are assessed, with emphasis on the design, as outlined in the previous point.  The 
operation is also paid attention to, but only in so far as the "existence" (as is said in the 
Dutch auditing practice, see: Leerboek, 2003) is concerned.  “Existence” is established 
by ‘walk-through’ tests: with one or a few transactions every relevant part of the 
administrative procedures is tested.  When this test is positive, the administrative 
organisation "exists": it has been shown that the designed controls "exist" and can do 
their work (see for instance: Leerboek 2003, Arens & Loebbecke, 1997, ISA 400 
par.15).  But establishing that the controls continually operate in a proper way, asks for 
a lot more system tests; system testing is meant to meet this necessity. 
 
So in system testing the controls are tested on their correct and continual operation, 
given their design; this is done by testing the controls in a sample of transactions of 
appropriate size.  In principle, when poorly designed administrative procedures operate 
well, this could lead to excellent outcomes of the system testing.  So system testing on 
its own is not a sufficient indication for the quality of the administrative procedures.  But 
note that when an auditor establishes the controls to be poorly designed, he will not 
choose to do extensive system testing, because that does not add to the assurance 
regarding the absence of a material error. 
 
These differences between system testing and risk assessment leave unaffected that 
they both aim at assessing the quality of the administrative processes that produce the 
annual accounts.  In this ‘one-two’ system testing plays the role of underpinning the risk 
assessment, by showing the strength of the operation.  We could also say that it 
completes risk analysis, by showing whether the procedures operate properly, given 
their design.  When system testing confirms the assessment of "low risk", the auditor 
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may decrease his substantive testing; consequently substantive tests are replaced by 
system tests.  It is a widespread practice to do so.  We may conclude that this decrease 
asks for two necessary conditions to be met: proper design and proper operation of the 
controls. 
 
Replacing substantive tests by system tests implies that, just as to risk assessment in 
general, also to system testing qualities are attributed as to having predictive power for 
the error rate.  So if system testing would appear not to be a predictor of the error rate, 
risk assessment cannot be expected to work.  It follows that the predictive qualities of 
system testing are worth to be investigated.  The 17th research question applies to this. 
 
Research question 17:  To what extent are system tests predictive for the error rate and 
valid in that sense?  
 
For the study into this validity of system testing, we again chose the option of a field 
study, because we could be provided with the results of many thousands of dual 
purpose tests. See section 5.3 
 
5.3  Three field studies 
 
Our research consisted of three field studies. 
 
Five audit departments of Dutch ministries, two private audit firms and one audit office 
of a European country participated in the first study (see chapters 6 and 7).  They 
were asked to give information on audits from 1996 or 1997, by way of filling out a 
questionnaire (see appendix 1), which contained questions for an audit object related 
to: 
• global factors that determine the initial risk assessment 
• risk assessment in the classical sense, IR and ICR explicitly combined into the 
occurrence risk OR; 
• assessments on 23 risk indicators; 
• the errors found in the audit object; 
• some background variables (type, size in monetary units, etc.), which might be 
moderator variables. 
It was explicitly asked to answer the questions with the audit files as a basis.  The 
auditor who did the audit was asked to give the information, all coordinated by our 
contact person in the organisation. 
At the public audit organisations the audit objects regarded either a part of the direct 
expenses of the related ministries or of the expenses of some agency.  At the private 
organisations mostly accounts receivable or stocks were the audit object. 
 
In the second study (see chapter 8) four audit departments of Dutch ministries 
participated.  The aim of the study was to check the findings in the first as to the 
unstable relation between occurrence risk and error rate.  We collected the data 
ourselves, by examining the audit files, concerning 2001, in these audit departments 
for: 
• risk assessment in the classical sense: IR and ICR; 
• the error rate; 
• background variables. 
When these data were not in the files, some effort was made to retrieve them, but none 
to reconstruct them. 
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The third study (see chapter 9) was only possible because we were provided by a 
Dutch ministry with more than 30,000 records containing data on the dual purpose tests 
over five years (1995-1999).  The aim of this study was to check the predictive qualities 
of a system test for the error rate in the corresponding transaction.   
 
The first study was optimistic about the relation between error rate and risk 
assessment, especially in the possibilities of decomposition of risk assessment into risk 
indicators.  But among many other things, it found an unstable relation between risk 
assessment and error rate. The second was meant to replicate the first study especially 
with an eye on the unstable relation between classical risk assessment and error rate 
(and hopefully find more stable results).  The third was meant to find a way out of the 
unsatisfactory findings of the first two studies, by trying to find a confirmation of the 
relation between system tests and error rate.  If this relation would be found, this would 
mean that at least the part of risk assessment in which system tests underpin risk 
assessment, would be valid. 
 
Only the first study was planned at the start of this project, the second and third were 
entered into on the basis of the findings of the first and second study. 
 
5.4  Anonymity 
 
An arrangement was made with the cooperating organisations, where we promised to 
process their information and publish the results in anonymity. 
 
5.5  Generalisability 
 
The key question of this project is "does risk assessment work; does it indicate the real 
risk".  This question can be asked at various levels: 
• at the level of the auditor; 
• at the level of an auditors’ organisation; 
• at the level of organisations in general. 
Relevant questions as to this working are: 
• does it depend on type of clients’ organisation; 
• does it depend on some moderator variables. 
 
Findings in the studies reported in his thesis do not apply to the level of the auditor: for 
that purpose it would have been necessary to have repeated measurements of risk 
assessments per auditor.   
 
Findings in the studies do apply to each separate auditors’ organisation.  In principle the 
risk assessments that were the basis for this study may be supposed to be 
representative for risk assessments in general by auditors of the organization, although 
no random procedure for selection of auditors and/or audit objects was used.  But there 
was no selection of the respondents on their (alleged) risk assessment capabilities. 
Decisive for their cooperation was whether they dealt with audit objects aimed at and 
that, especially with the private firms, they were willing to spend their costly time on it.  
But there are restrictions as to this applicability: the sample of audit cases from each 
organisation was selected by the organisation itself and there was a criterion for 
selection that only accounts in which some error was to be expected were wanted.  As 
a matter of fact there are good reasons to assume that the organisation did not select 
cases as to get a positive relation between risk assessment and error rate, because the 
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organizations did not keep a systematic record of this relation.  Moreover, they would 
have had a difficult job to select with that purpose, especially with respect to the risk 
indicators, because there are so many risk indicators on which the relationship is 
dependent.  So the findings will be generalisable to the same type of audit object.  The 
findings will also provide for a significant indication of the existence of the relations 
studied: if they do exist, it is hardly imaginable that we will not find them in a sample of 
so many cases.  It is also plausible that the findings will apply to some extent to other 
types of sub-accounts within the same organisation.  When, for instance, a class of 
accounts receivable is assessed at a low risk and still a material error is found, this 
increases the probability that the same might occur in another type of sub-account.  
Apparently in such a case, the quality of risk assessment in this audit organisation 
allows such an unexpected match.  Note that also a correct assessment ‘low risk’ does 
not exclude the existence of a material error. 
 
Findings in the study will also apply to other auditors’ organisations, because the 
participants in this research were not selected with an eye on their risk assessment 
qualities (had they been known).  There are also restrictions to this applicability, as the 
sample of organisations neither is random.  But it can be argued that the participating 
organisations act under the same audit rules and regulations, guidelines, international 
standards, professional education as the ones that did not participate.  These 
conditions will tend to cause a certain degree of uniformity in risk assessment over 
organisations.  If these conditions would not work at all, not only would the 
generalisability of our findings to a larger set of organisations be problematic, but also 
the applicability and working of regulations, guidelines and standards.  And moreover, 
the psychological mechanisms that are discussed in chapter 3 equally apply to every 
human being. 
 
As far as generalisation is aimed for, we could say that there is an implicit population to 
which the results apply: that of similar accounts, auditors and organisations, and that it 
is highly improbable that this population is empty.  But in fact in this project 
generalisability was not to the main goal.  The way of reasoning was rather the other 
way round: if in general risk assessment works, it will also work in the participating 
organisations, especially if they are not selected for their qualities in assessment.  So if 
it works, some signs of it must be found.  Reversing this argument means that when no 
relevant signs are found it only can be concluded that there is something wrong with 
risk assessment.   
 
We can also state this as follows: the generalisability is to the validity of the audit risk 
model as such, and not to the whole population of organisations using it (see for 
instance: Yin, 2003, p.10).  But in such a statement we still have to be aware that 
‘generalisation to a theory’ as Yin calls it, only makes sense when a population exists in 
which the theory really can be shown to work. So our ‘existence of an implicit 
population’ and Yin’s ‘generalisation to a theory’ may be equivalent. 
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Chapter 6: Classical Risk Assessment at eight 
Institutions. 
 
 
Four relatively complete actions in three studies were taken in our research into the 
‘real risk’: (1) validation of the classical assessment of OR, (2) an attempt to improve 
classical assessment of OR by decomposition of the assessment over risk indicators 
(1st and 2nd action formed the first study), (3) a replication of the validation of classical 
assessment of OR (in the second study) and (4) investigation of the predictive power of 
system tests for the error rate (in the third study).  Varying validity of classical risk 
assessment per organisation (1st action) and problematic results with risk indicators (2nd 
action) led to the choice for the replication (3rd action).   
In this chapter we report the results of the 1st action. 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The leading question of this chapter is how well an auditor’s assessment of the 
occurrence risk (OR) will perform at each of the four validation criteria used in the study:  
In the sections 6.2 through 6.5 we will investigate this quality, firstly for the pooled 
organisations and secondly at the level of distinct organisations.  By investigating 
possible moderator variables in 6.6, we will answer the remaining research questions of 
the eleven that are dealt with in this chapter. We will give a discussion of the findings for 
every single research question and end with an overall conclusion and discussion in 
section 6.7 and a summary of our findings in section 6.8. 
 
The four validation criteria were introduced in chapter 2 where, in section 2.3, we 
chose: 
• the "audit position", the position of the error rate relative to the materiality,  
• the error rate, as estimated by the auditor  
• the sampling risk  
• the conditional distribution of error rates.   
All criteria are related to the error rate, which relationship we can recapitulate in the 
following table 
 
Table 6.1: The four validation criteria 
Validation 
criterion      → 
‘audit 
position’ 
Error 
rate 
Sampling risk Distribution 
Relation to error 
rate(s) → 
Is error rate 
larger than 
materiality? 
Error 
rate 
itself 
What is the risk that the 
real error rate exceeds 
materiality, given the 
error rate found? 
What is the 
distribution of the 
error rates for distinct 
levels of OR? 
 
The findings regard our research in the first study.  In this study we collected the data 
concerning annual accounts from 1996 or 1997, by way of a questionnaire in which the 
respondent was asked to give the values of the assessed risks, the error rates found 
and other variables, by retrieving them from the audit files.  With every organisation, the 
questionnaire was discussed in advance, with the contact person and some of the 
(other) respondents. The data regarded among other things: 
• the occurrence risk (question 3.3), for which he probably had to transform the 
assessment of IR and ICR (in the audit files) into OR.   
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• the error (q 4.3); because of the various possible forms in which the error could 
have been filed, we gave the respondent various ways to give the error: as an 
amount or as the sum of taintings; in our data processing we calculated the 
estimated error rate from these data dependent on the sample design as: the 
average tainting (in case of monetary unit sampling), or the estimated amount of 
error divided by the size of the financial statement (in case of line item 
sampling), or simply the amount of error found, without extrapolating it, also 
divided by the size of the financial statement; (in case of judgmental sampling).  
When the sampling was judgmental, we always checked how it actually had 
been performed, in order to apply the right estimation procedure,  
• the size of the financial statement (in monetary units) (q 1.2),  
• the materiality (q 2), which could be given as an amount or as a percentage of 
the size (or both),  
• the size of the sample and the number of line items in error (q 4.3).   
• the potential moderator variables as introduced in 5.2.3 (effort, experience,(q. 
3.3),, complexity, (one of the risk indicators))  
• the risk indicators (q 3.1).   
(For the questionnaire, see appendix 1). 
 
In all, as mentioned in chapter 5, eight organizations participated in this first study of our 
research: a national court of audit from one of the EU-countries, five audit departments 
of Dutch ministries and two private audit firms, also in the Netherlands.  With each 
organisation the questionnaire was discussed with a contact person and with 
participating auditors.  One of the leading questions was whether the questionnaire 
represented the way an audit was done by the organisation.  Sometimes this led to 
minor adaptations of the questionnaire, but not to an extent that it changed the 
substance.  The questionnaires were distributed and collected by our contact person in 
the organisation.  The organisations were explicitly asked to fill out the questionnaire 
with data from or based on the actual audit files.  
 
On average, about 20 cases per organisation were collected.  Data of the three 
organisations with the smallest number of cases together, only consisted of 13 cases.  
Because in these organisations the same handbook (that of governmental audit 
organisations) was in use and because the audit objects of these organisations were 
very similar (in numbers of transactions, in size and kind of transactions, subject to 
relatively similar regulations) we pooled the data into one unit of analysis which we will 
be referred to as ‘the triplet’.  For the analysis this triplet was treated as a distinct 
organisation.  So 8 organisations formed 6 units of analysis: 5 organisations and one 
“triplet”.  Whenever there were questions concerning data, direct contact between 
researcher and respondent solved these.  
 
The data regarded the annual accounts of 1996 or 1997 
 
All data were analysed at the level of the (6) units of analysis.  We will refer to this level 
as to the “level of the distinct organisations”, thereby disregarding that one of these 
‘organisations’ is a triplet.  The data of all eight organisations were also pooled and 
subjected to similar analyses as at the level of the organisations.  So actually, the 
pooled organizations formed a seventh unit of analysis.  We refer to 5.2.1 for a 
justification of these levels of analysis. 
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6.2  Risk assessment and ‘audit position’ 
 
6.2.1 Definition of ‘audit position’ 
 
In 2.3.2, we defined ‘‘audit position’’ as follows: 
 
Definition of ‘audit position’: 
The ‘audit position’ of the error rate is its position relative to the materiality; in our study 
it is labelled 'not OK', if it is larger than materiality; it is labelled ‘OK’ if the error rate is 
smaller than materiality.   
 
In our analysis, we defined a corresponding variable ‘audit position’ which takes the 
value 0 (not OK) when the MLE (most likely error) is larger than materiality and the 
value 1 (OK) when the MLE is smaller than materiality.  We refer to this latter position 
as ‘unqualified’, because of the clear analogy to the audit opinion in case of the 
complete annual accounts.  
 
We recall our remark at the end of 2.3.2 where we stated that the ‘audit position’ may 
be OK (‘unqualified’) because the most likely error (MLE) is smaller than materiality, 
where in the same case the audit opinion would have to be qualified, because the upper 
error limit (UEL) is larger than materiality.  In fact, if the MLE would be taken as 
sufficient for an unqualified opinion the reliability of that opinion could be only 
approximately 50%.  This, because roughly the most likely error has 50% chance to be 
smaller than the real error, if in fact the real error just exceeds materiality.  So when a 
most likely error just below the level of materiality would actually lead to an unqualified 
opinion, this only would have this same reliability of approximately 50% (instead of the 
standard 95%, aimed for in the audit practice).  If we would define ‘audit position = OK’ 
with a rule that implies a larger reliability, more ‘not OK positions’ would result (in the 
same situations), because then only most likely errors which are sufficiently smaller 
than the level of materiality, would result in an ‘OK position’. 
 
In our third validation criterion: the sampling risk, this dependency on materiality and the 
corresponding reliability is accounted for. 
 
6.2.2 Results for the pooled organisations  
 
In case of a valid risk assessment, it may be expected that the relative number of cases 
in which ‘audit position = OK’ decreases with increasing OR.  The following cross 
tabulation shows the quality of the assessment of OR in this respect. It is illustrated with 
a bar diagram in figure 6.1.  As can be seen, two (of nine) ‘not OK positions’ are found 
at OR=very low and also two at OR=low.  Moreover, the rate of ‘not OK positions’ 
decreases up to OR= medium, where an increase should be expected (see the row 
percentages).  Only at OR=high the picture is more in line with the logical expectation. 
The chi square statistic had a very significant (p<.005) value of 20; but this does not 
imply the expected relation.  This, because the chi square statistic only accounts for 
deviations from the expected cell frequencies; these deviations can be such that they 
point in the expected direction in one row but in the opposite direction in the other.  For 
chi square the deviations count, not their direction. 
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Table 6.2: Occurrence risk by ‘audit position’ for the pooled organisations 
‘audit position’→ 
Occurrence risk↓ 
Not OK OK Row totals
2 7 9 Very low 
22.2% 77.8% 100% 
2 33 35 Low 
5.7% 94.3% 100% 
3 54 57 Medium 
5.3% 94.7% 100% 
7 9 16 High 
43.8% 56.3% 100% 
14 103 117 Column totals 
12.0% 88.0% 100% 
 
Figure 6.1: ‘audit position’ by occurrence risk for the pooled organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cross tabulation shows a relation that certainly is not strong, but the relatively many 
‘not-OK’ for OR=’high’ indicate the possibility of a (weak) relation in the expected 
direction.  We further investigate this by calculating two correlation coefficients: the 
Kendall rank correlation and the point-biserial (PB) correlation between OR and ‘audit 
position’.  We should expect a negative correlation: with a change from ‘audit 
position’=0 (‘not OK’)  to ‘audit position’=1 (‘OK’) the occurrence risk should change 
from relatively high to relatively low.  The result is shown in table 6.3, last line.  It turns 
out that both the K-correlation and the PB-correlation indicate a relatively weak relation 
in the expected direction; neither is significant at the 5% level. 
 
6.2.3 Results for the distinct organisations 
 
We applied the same analyses to the distinct organisations.  The following table (6.3) 
gives the results of the K- and the PB-correlation of the OR with the row%% for the 
‘audit position’. 
 
Table 6.3: K- and PB-correlations  ‘audit position’ x OR by organisation 
Organisation K-correlation  p-value16 PB-correlation p-value n 
1 -.35 .27 -.37 .27 13 
2 -.014 .97 .15 .50 22 
4 .085 .70 .057 .81 20 
                                                          
16 A ‘p-value’ of an outcome of a statistic is the probability that this statistic might be equal to or 
larger than this outcome, given some null-hypothesis.  When the p-value is small, the outcome 
can or will not be attributed to chance. 
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Organisation K-correlation  p-value16 PB-correlation p-value n 
5 -.29 .29 -.29 .20 21 
6 .082 .69 .097 .65 24 
8 -.69 .00 -.69 .00 17 
Pooled -.18 .13 -.18 .06 117 
 
The results shown in table 6.3 are not very satisfactory, with an exception for 
organisation 8. Only the correlations for this organisation are significant at the 5% level 
(p-value<5%).  But taken over all organisations, only 6 out of 12 correlations (K- and PB 
correlations pooled) are negative, the expected direction, so there is no systematic 
direction of the correlation over the organisations.  Moreover, none of the other 
organisations shows a significant correlation.   
 
For organisation 8 a closer look at the data (table 6.4) reveals that the relation between 
OR and ‘audit position’, as found, is strong: all 5 ‘not OK- positions’ occurred for the 8 
cases with OR=’high’; all 9 OR=’medium’–cases had ‘OK-positions’.  This relation was 
significant at the .007 level  (Fishers exact test for a cross tabulation) and fully 
consistent with the correlations in table 6.3.  
 
Table 6.4: ‘audit position’ by OR for organization 8 
‘audit position’→ 
Occurrence risk↓
Not OK OK Row totals
Medium 0 9 9 
high 5 3 8 
Column totals 5 12 17 
 
Conclusion research question 1: validity with respect to ‘audit position’ 
Assessment of OR only shows insignificant correlation with the variable ‘audit position’ 
for the pooled organisations; only one organization shows a significant correlation. 
 
Conclusion research question 10: varying validity with respect to ‘audit position’ 
There is considerable variation in the correlation between ‘audit position’ and OR; it is 
significant for one organization (8). 
 
Discussion 
As can be seen from table 6.2 there are only 14 cases in total, in which ‘audit 
position=not OK’ .  This means that there is only a limited variation in the ‘audit position’ 
and that therefore the correlation between the variables ‘audit position’ and OR is very 
sensitive to only small changes in the number of ‘audit position=not OK’ on some level 
of OR.  
6.3  Risk assessment and error rate 
 
In chapter 2, we concluded that the error rate in itself is an indicator for the level of risk 
associated with the administrative process that produced the account under audit.  
Therefore it makes sense to use the error rate as a validation criterion for an auditor's 
risk assessment.  In principle a correlation coefficient is fit for investigating the relation 
between risk assessment and error rate.  But there are two complications: 
1. The variable ‘OR’ is of an ordinal level, the variable ‘error rate’ is of a ratio level; 
therefore the Pearson product moment correlation in principle is not fit and so the 
Kendall or another rank correlation should be used.  We will use both because, 
especially with larger sample sizes, the Kendall correlation and the Pearson 
correlation tend to show p-values close to each other.  This is a consequence of 
the 91% power-efficiency of the K(endall)-correlation (see Siegel & 
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Castellan,1988, p. 254).  When both correlations show similar p-values, that of 
Pearson can be seen as valid, and it makes sense to use the associated 
explained variance as an extra indicator of the strength of the relationship. 
2. The variable ‘error rate’ is not normally distributed and may show serious outliers.  
This may cause significance tests to be invalid.  Therefore we will examine the 
scatterplot of error rate by occurrence risk, as to the existence of outliers. It will 
indicate outliers that have to be skipped from the analysis.  When the K-
correlation is the basis for inference, this problem does not apply. 
 
It should be noted that even these considerations regarding the data may fail to meet 
the probably pathological properties of auditing data.  Willemsen (1996) shows that the 
estimated extreme value index (see Leadbetter et al, 1983) of real life auditing data 
comes very close to boundaries where even the central limit theorem no longer applies.  
In the very limited number of studies that investigate the statistical properties of auditing 
data (see for instance Tamura at all, 1989) these properties are also recognised, but 
not to the extent found by Willemsen. 
 
The conclusion of this discussion must be that only the Kendall correlation leads to valid 
statistical tests, where the Pearson correlation only may help interpret the data when 
the values of both are similar. 
 
6.3.1 Results for the pooled organisations. 
 
We start with a scatterplot of the error rate by the occurrence risk. Figure 6.2 shows the 
results. 
 
Figure 6.2: Error rate by occurrence risk for the pooled organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scatterplot shows one evident outlier in the right upper corner.  It also shows a high  
density of error rates close to 0.  This can be made more visible in a scatterplot with a 
scale for the error rate which is adapted to its actual distribution.  This is shown in the 
next figure where the error rate is treated as an ordinal variable. 
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Figure 6.3: Error rate by occurrence risk for the pooled organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the pooled data the Pearson and the Kendall correlation showed the following 
values: 
P-correlation = .43 (p-value two-tailed: .00; n = 119) 
K-correlation = .40 (p-value two-tailed: .00; n = 119) 
Skipping the outliers mentioned above hardly changed the P-correlation.  The 
correlation is satisfactory and highly significant, the corresponding explained variance of 
18% (the square of .43) can be seen as moderate. 
 
The fact that the occurrence risk OR only has four classes may inhibit a stronger 
correlation coefficient, because of the many ties this will cause.  Therefore we also 
compared the means of the error rate per class of OR and calculated the association 
measure eta.  This resulted in the following table. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Means of error rate by OR for the pooled organisations. 
OR Mean of error rate N Std. Deviation 
Very low .0073 9 .017 
Low .0033 35 .0090 
Medium .010 58 .016 
High .072 17 .077 
Total .017 119 .039 
 
The following association measures were calculated. 
 
Table 6.6: Association measures error rate x OR for the pooled organisations 
 R R squared Eta Eta squared 
Error rate by OR .427** .183 .590 .348 
** significant at the .01 level 
 
The means of the error rate in the 4 OR-classes turn out to be significantly different (p-
value is 0) and the eta is .590; the explained variance -eta squared- is 35%.  This is 
much better than the 18% variance explained by the P-correlation (R in table 6.6).  But 
this improvement mainly is a consequence of the nonlinearity that eta allows.  
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Figure 6.4 shows the results graphically. 
 
Figure 6.4: Means of error rate by occurrence risk for the pooled organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We see that with increasing OR, the mean of the error rate at first very slightly 
decreases and that from OR=medium to OR=high the differences increase drastically.  
We applied Tamhane’s multiple comparisons test, which assumes unequal variances, 
to do pairwise comparisons of the means at the various levels of the occurrence risk.  
This resulted in table 6.7, which shows that the test shows one significant difference at 
the 5% level: that of OR = 3 and OR = 4.   
 
Table 6.7: Pairwise differences for the means of the error rate, by OR. 
Difference for Difference of means Standard error p-value 
OR = 1 OR = 2 .0040 .012 .98 
OR = 2 OR = 3 -.0068 .0068 .059 
OR = 3 OR = 4 -.062 .0087 .027 
 
We can conclude that the fact that eta is considerably larger than the P-correlation 
shows that the relation between the error rate and OR, lacks the linearity to be 
expected; it even lacks monotony.  Where standard audit procedures allow less effort in 
substantive testing when OR is assessed at a lower value, this monotony is assumed.  
We could say that OR assessment is seen as a part of the assurance which is given in 
the audit opinion.  This being so, implies that the lack of monotony must cause a 
problem: the audit opinion for OR=’very low’ might lack sufficient reliability. As a matter 
of fact it is hard to be precise on this possibility, because the tables and the audit effort 
they indicate are not calibrated.  When we analyse the OR assessments in relation to 
the sampling risk, more can be said about it (see 6.4.2 discussion of ‘ ineffectiveness’). 
 
6.3.2 Results for the distinct organisations. 
 
Just as we did for the pooled data, we plotted OR against the error rate and computed 
the correlations OR by error rate for the distinct organisations (with the three smallest 
combined into the triplet of size 13).  All scatterplots showed more or less extreme 
outliers.  We show the most interesting scatterplot, that of organization 4, which is 
associated with a moderately positive P-correlation and a moderately negative K-
correlation.  The results are given in figure 6.5 (for organisation 4) and in table 6.8 (for 
all organisations). 
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Figure 6.5: Scatterplot of error rate by OR for organization 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scatterplot shows how the data point at OR=high causes the inversion of the sign 
from the K- to the P-correlation (table 6.8).  For the P-correlation this value will have a 
relatively large positive influence on the correlation coefficient.  But for the rank 
correlation, its size is far less important; the relatively many small values of the error 
rate for OR = medium will result in the negative rank correlation. 
 
Table 6.8: Correlations error rate x OR by organization 
Organisation P-correlation K-correlation n 
1 .39 .30 13 
2 .28 .22 22 
4 .12 -.11 21 
5 .52* .55* 21 
6 -.01 .16 25 
8 .72** .51* 17 
** significant at the .01 level  * significant at the .05 level 
 
It can be seen that:  
• almost all correlations are positive and two of the P-, together with two of the K-
correlations are significant at the 5% level (one even at the 1% level); 
• the differences between the P-correlation and the K-correlation are more 
substantial in some cases (see organisation 4, 6); this was already shown to be 
due to outliers, (figure 6.5); 
• there is a substantial variation in the correlation over the organizations; most 
correlations are positive, but one P-correlation (organisation 6) and one K-
correlation (organisation 4) are negative.  
 
Intermediate conclusion research question 2: validity with respect to error rate 
We can conclude that the overall picture shows a varying validity with respect to the 
error rate:  
• the overall correlation (.427, table 6.6) is satisfactory 
• four organisations show a positive correlation,  
• only two (5 and 8) have a significant correlation,  
• but organisations 4 and 6 show negative correlations.   
So, even if this result would be interpreted as a moderate indication that the 
assessment of OR is valid with respect to the error rate, the substantial variability over 
organisations weakens this overall picture.  Because, the variation over organisations 
implies that an auditor of a random organisation cannot be sure that in his organisation 
very low low medium high
occurrence risk
0,00
0,01
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,05
er
ro
r r
at
e
?
?
? ?
? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Chapter 6: Classical Risk Assessment at eight Institutions 
 94
risk assessment is valid.  He will have to check this empirically.  In this checking he will 
also have to investigate the monotony of the relation of OR and error rate. 
We must conclude that: 
 
An organisation, or department, or branch will have to assess independently of others 
whether this validity of its risk assessment is sufficient. 
 
6.3.3 Controlling for materiality 
 
So far we did not take the fact into consideration that the error rate has shortcomings as 
a validation criterion for the occurrence risk.  We discussed this in 2.3.1, where we 
stated that we should control for the level of materiality and for the size of the audit 
sample.  This, because the same error represents a greater risk with lower (stricter) 
materiality and with smaller sample size.  So, when risk assessment is valid,  for audit 
objects where the same level of materiality was chosen, the relation between risk 
assessment and error rate may be expected to be stronger than for the undivided 
organisations (see research question 5), because with constant materiality the size of 
the error rate has a direct bearing on the risk of a material error.   
For the moment we disregard a similar effect of the sample size. 
 
These considerations lead to the hypothesis implicit in research question 5: ‘The 
correlation between error rate and risk assessment will be larger in groups of cases with 
the same materiality than in the set of all cases’.  To test this hypothesis the level of 
materiality was categorized into 3 categories with boundaries 3% and 6%. For the 
cases in each of these categories the correlation was computed.  Table 6.9 shows the 
results. 
 
Table 6.9: P-correlation of OR x error rate for classes of materiality 
Level of materiality OR x error rate size sub-sample
materiality<3% .282 74 
3%<=materiality<6% .252 14 
6%<=materiality .516 29 
total .427 117 
The table only shows an increase of the correlation at the highest levels of materiality; 
the increase has a p-value of .30, so is far from significant.  In the two other classes, for 
88 of the 117 cases (2 less than 119 because of missing values), the correlation 
decreases.  This indicates that risk assessment is done with disregard of the level of 
materiality.  
 
The introduction to this subsection implies that we should do a similar analysis for levels 
of the sample size.  We choose to do this by transforming our data into the sampling 
risk (in the next section), which takes the sample size into account.  
 
Conclusion research question 5: controlling for materiality increases correlations? 
Contrary to the expectation for valid assessment of OR, the correlation of error rate and 
OR does not increase when controlled for levels of materiality.  
 
Conclusion research question 2: validity with respect to error rate 
Risk assessment and error rate correlate to a satisfactory degree, but the lack of 
monotony in the relation may cause problems. 
 
Conclusion research question 10: varying validity with respect to error rate 
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The strength of the correlation varies too much over organizations as to justify the 
assumption that irrespective of organisation the same score on risk assessment implies 
the same extent of substantive testing. 
 
Discussion 
Eighteen percent of the variance in the error rate is explained when assuming a linear 
relation with OR, moreover the correlation is significant at the .0005 level.  A 
satisfactory result.  But care has to be taken for the nonlinearity, even non-monotony, 
that appears to be in the relation.  The variation over organizations of the degree to 
which error rate and OR correlate, should have consequences for the way risk 
assessment is used in establishing the reliability of the auditor’s opinion. 
 
6.4  Risk assessment and sampling risk 
 
6.4.1 Definition of sampling risk 
 
In 1.2.4 we defined the sampling risk as: 
“Sampling risk arises from the possibility that the auditor’s conclusion, based on a 
sample, may be different from the conclusion reached if the entire population 
were subjected to the same audit procedure.” (the sampling risk, SR, see ISA 530 
par. 7)”.  
In the audit methodology especially the risk of overlooking a material error is 
considered.  This risk not only consists of the sampling risk (often referred to as the 
‘beta risk’), but also of the risk of analytical review and other non-sampling risks, like 
measurement errors (failing to see an error in a sampled transaction).  Our validation 
criterion is based on the error as it was found in the sample.  In chapter 4 we formulated 
a model which gave the possibility to calculate this sampling risk by way of a beta 
distribution.  In our study we implemented this calculation by calculating the variable 
ESTRISK1, which gave the sampling risk SR as the upper-tail probability of the 
materiality in the appropriate beta distribution.  For this distribution the most likely error 
was used as the mode; together with the sample size of the corresponding case the a- 
and b-parameter were assessed (see chapter 4 for the exact calculations).  For some of 
the cases the most likely error was based on a judgmental sample.  In such cases the 
auditor cannot give a statistical estimate of the error, but still there will be a sampling 
error.  We calculated the associated sampling risk in the same way as for the statistical 
samples, so as to include the uncertainty about the estimate, due to all the non-
sampled transactions, even if they were deemed to contain no error (almost surely).   
 
The variable ESTRISK1 was classified into a variable POSTRIS1.  So POSTRIS1 is a 
classification of the sampling risk ESTRISK1.  The categories are as shown in table 
6.10.  
 
Table 6.10: Categories of sampling risk 
category for sampling risk boundaries 
1: very low SR < .05 
2: low .05 <= SR  < .15 
3: medium .15 <= SR  <.45 
4: high SR >=.45 
 
The boundaries were chosen on the basis of a "statistical intuition"; we could not find 
real criteria for what should be "low", "medium", etc.  Only the choice of 5 percent for 
the category "very low" is justified by the widespread use of this value for the 
significance level (the standard of at most 5% for the audit risk derives from the same 
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convention).  Besides, a convenient consequence of the choice of these boundaries is 
that all classes of POSTRIS1 contain a satisfactory number of cases. 
 
For an impression of how this categorisation works, we give a listing of some cases in 
table 6.11 in which the most likely error, the sample size, the level of materiality, the 
estimated sampling risk (ESTRISK1), and the category of sampling risk (POSTRIS1) 
are shown. 
 
Table 6.11: Some values related to (category of) SR 
MLE sample size materiality ESTRISK1 
(sampling risk, SR) 
POSTRIS1 
(category of SR) 
 ,049500 46 ,037 ,80 4 
 ,000000 59 ,10 ,00 1 
 ,000000 58 ,123 ,00 1 
 ,002980 113 ,0275 ,08 2 
 ,001667 80 ,0083 ,57 4 
 ,001580 63 ,01 ,57 4 
 ,000000 187 ,008 ,22 3 
 ,000008 30 ,006 ,83 4 
 
Table 6.11 illustrates that the sampling risk naturally depends not only on the MLE, but 
also on sample size and materiality.  So it meets the considerations in 6.3.3.  In chapter 
two we argued that conceptually it is the most appropriate validation criterion.  But its 
inclusion of the sample size also causes problems:  errors of size 0, or very small 
errors, still can be associated with large sampling risks when the corresponding sample 
size is small.  We will circumvent these problems by also creating the variable 
ESTRISK2, in the same way as ESTRISK1, but now by taking a constant sample size 
of 100 in the calculations.  We will call this the "standardised sampling risk". 
 
In the remainder of this section we will give the distribution of ESTRISK1 for categories 
of the occurrence risk, in the form of a scatterplot and also the correlation of occurrence 
risk, ESTRISK1 and ESTRISK2.  Next we will give a cross tabulation and a graph of the 
occurrence risk against POSTRIS1.  We will do this for the pooled organisations and 
also give results for the distinct organisations. 
 
6.4.2 Results for the pooled organisations. 
 
We start our analysis by creating a scatterplot for the sampling risk (ESTRISK1) against 
the occurrence risk (figure 6.6).  The scatterplot shows a distribution of the sampling 
risks for all levels of occurrence risk which is considerably more homogeneous than in 
the case of the distribution of the error rates.  As a consequence correlation analysis 
has more validity.  Moreover, the picture shows that the distributions of the sampling 
risk at the levels of occurrence risk are relatively similar, so we should not expect a 
strong correlation. 
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Figure 6.6: Sampling risk by occurrence risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.12 gives these correlations.  In this table, we also give the correlation of the 
standardised sampling risk (with sample size set at 100, ESTRISK2) with the 
occurrence risk.  We give both the P- and the K-correlation 
 
Table 6.12: Pearson and Kendall correlations of occurrence risk x sampling risk 
(ESTRISK1) and standardised sampling risk (ESTRISK2) 
Organi 
sation 
P-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
n P-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
n 
all -.179 -.179* 93 .05 0 117 
*significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)   
 
The varying number of cases (n) for which these correlations could be calculated are a 
consequence of missing values for the sample size.  This problem was not met in the 
case of the standardised sampling risk because here we imputed a standard sample 
size of 100, also in the cases where the real sample size was unknown. 
 
The table shows negative correlations, even to a significant extent in the case of the 
sampling risk itself and virtually 0 for the standardised sampling risk.  For a good 
interpretation of these correlations we have to take the correlation between OR and 
sample size into account.  This appears to be .101 (p-value .33).  In 5.2.1 we argued 
that we might expect this correlation to be positive and that this positive correlation 
gives the correlation between sampling risk and OR a tendency to be negative.  A 
correlation of .101 shows that in our study this tendency is only weak.  This is confirmed 
by the correlations for ESTRISK2. 
 
We also analyse the relation of a categorised sampling risk (cf. table 6.10) with the 
occurrence risk by way of a cross tabulation.  This will give insight in lack of efficiency 
and lack of effectiveness, as can be caused by over- or under-assessment of the 
occurrence risk.  Table 6.13 gives this tabulation.  
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Table 6.13: Cross tabulation of occurrence risk by categories of sampling risk 
Sampling risk in 
categories→ 
Occurrence risk↓ 
Very low Low Medium High Row total 
Very low   3  (33%) 6  (67%) 9   (100%) 
Low 3   (13%) 1   (4%) 8  (35%) 11 (48%) 23 (100%) 
Medium 14 (30%) 11 (23%) 10 (21%) 12 (26%) 47 (100%) 
High 4   (29%) 1   (7%) 2  (14%) 7   (50%) 14  (100%) 
Column total 21 (23%) 13 (14%) 23 (25%) 36 (39%) 93  (100%) 
 
The cross tabulation indicates a negative relationship between occurrence risk and 
sampling risk.  For a positive relationship the row percentages for an occurrence risk 
"very low" or "low" should show a decreasing trend, whilst the actual trend is increasing. 
For OR= "very low" the cells with values "very low" or "low" for the sampling risk in 
categories are even empty (while they should be the most filled).  This is compensated 
more or less by some increasing trend in the row percentages for an occurrence risk 
"high".  The fact that the Pearson Chi-square and the likelihood ratio test both are 
significant does not add to the relation looked for.  The conclusion is that the negative 
correlations as given in table 6.12 are confirmed. 
 
Ineffectiveness and inefficiency 
A perfect relation between the sampling risk in categories (POSTRIS1) and the 
occurrence risk cannot be expected: even if it would exist it would be dependent on the 
choice of class boundaries for POSTRIS1.  If it would exist, the table would only show 
zeros in the off-diagonal cells.  So all positive counts in the off-diagonal cells indicate a 
less perfect relationship.  More specifically: those in the above-diagonal triangle of the 
table correspond to cases where the actual sampling risk is higher than expected given 
the occurrence risk.  Audits in these cases are designed based on an OR that should 
have been larger, which implies an audit of insufficient extent.  So here a serious 
problem is detected: the audits have too large a probability to be ineffective.  When we 
count all off-diagonal cases, there would be 40 cases with a threat of ineffectiveness.  
When, to account for the dependence on the classification of SR, we count cases at 
more distance from the diagonal there still remain (6+11+3=)20 cases, with a serious 
threat of ineffectiveness.  A similar logic leads to the conclusion that 35 cases suffer 
from a threat of inefficiency, from which (4+14+1=)19 suffer a serious threat. 
 
Remark: Ineffectiveness worse than inefficiency 
From the viewpoint of validity ineffectiveness and inefficiency are of the same 
importance.  But from the viewpoint of quality of the audit opinion, it must be stressed 
that ineffectiveness is a greater danger than inefficiency.  Ineffectiveness may lead to 
an audit effort that is not sufficient and therefore to not detecting a material error, so to 
an audit opinion that lacks sufficient reliability.  Inefficiency ‘only’ leads to an audit effort 
that is larger than necessary, so to an opinion that is safer than required. 
 
The fact that no cases were found with the value ‘(very) low’ for the sampling risk in 
categories when OR= ‘very low’, might be due to small sample sizes.  This can be 
checked with the standardised sampling risk, classified in the same way, where a 
uniform sample size of 100 was used in the calculation of the sampling risk.  Table 6.14 
gives the results. 
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Table 6.14: Categories of standardised sampling risk by occurrence risk 
Standardised sampling 
risk in categories→ 
Occurrence risk↓ 
Very low Low Medium High Row total 
Very low 1 1 3 4 9 
Low 7 3 19 6 35 
Medium 15 6 20 16 57 
High 5 0 2 9 16 
Column total 28 10 44 35 117 
 
The relation tends to be more in the direction as may be expected for a valid risk 
assessment.  But at all levels of occurrence risk, deviations from this expectation occur. 
It can be seen, for instance, that only two cases appear for the two lowest classes of 
the sampling risk, and that the highest classes of  the sampling risk still form a majority 
for OR=”very low”. In this way for every level of OR, there are deviations. So the 
correlation of virtually 0 as given in table 6.11 is confirmed in this analysis. 
 
Ineffectiveness and inefficiency 
The same logic as with the sampling risk (in table 6.13) gives us insight in 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency.  We count 49 cases with a threat of ineffectiveness (in 
the above-diagonal triangle of table 6.14).  When, to account for the dependence on the 
classification of SR, we only count cases at more distance from the diagonal there still 
remain (6+4+3=)13 cases, with a serious threat of ineffectiveness.  A similar logic leads 
to the conclusion that 35 cases suffer from a threat of inefficiency, from which 
(5+15+0=)20 suffer a serious threat. 
 
Conclusion research question 3: validity with respect to sampling risk  
Risk assessment with respect to the sampling risk shows no validity for the pooled 
organisations; there is hardly any correlation between OR and SR.  
 
Conclusion research question 6: OR strongest relation with SR as a criterion? 
The answer to this question is evident: for the pooled organisations, the relation 
between error rate and OR was positive; between ‘audit position’ and OR the 
correlation was close to 0; a relation between SR and OR is negative or absent.  The 
answer to this question is the opposite of what is expected for a valid risk assessment.  
 
6.4.3 Results for the distinct organisations. 
 
We did the same analyses for the distinct organisations, as we did for their combination. 
So firstly we calculated all P(earson)- and K(endall)-correlations for the six 
organisations that were our units of analysis.  Table 6.15 shows the results. The 
differences in n for ESTRISK1 and ESTRISK2 are again caused by missing values for 
the size of the audit sample.  So for instance in organisation 5 only in 4 cases the size 
of the audit sample was given, whereas in 21 cases an estimate of the error rate was 
available. 
 
Table 6.15: Sampling risk (ESTRISK1) x OR and   
                  standardised sampling risk (ESTRISK2) x OR,            by organization 
Organis
ation 
P-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
n P-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
n 
1 .104 -.09 12 .03 -.16 13 
2 -.455* -.342 21 -.05 -.102 22 
4 -.165 -.114 15 -.251 -.162 20 
5 .636 .548 4 .527* .414* 21 
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Organis
ation 
P-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK1 
n P-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
K-correlation 
ESTRISK2 
n 
6 -.385 -.299 24 -.141 -.110 24 
8 .756** .485* 17 .772** .507* 17 
all -.179 -.179* 93 .05 0 117 
** significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)   *significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)   
 
Table 6.15 shows two organisations with a satisfactory correlation between OR and 
sampling risk. First of all organisation 8, where the correlations for both the sampling 
risk and the standardised sampling risk are significant; in the second place organisation 
5, where the sampling risk shows high correlations, but which are not significant due to 
the small number (of 4) on which they are based. The standardised sampling risk is 
based on all 21 error rates that were available for organization 5.  As this shows 
significant correlations with OR, organisation 5 can be deemed to have a satisfactory 
correlation.  The change in magnitude of the correlations ESTRISK1, ESTRISK2, with 
OR, for organization 2 is remarkable: it changes from -.455 (and significant at the 5% 
level) to -.05.  This is due to the sample sizes and materiality levels involved in this 
organization: there are relatively many cases with a relatively high level of materiality 
and correspondingly a relatively low sample size.  With the constant sample size of 100 
for ESTRISK2, the sampling risk for these cases decreases sharply.  Obviously, this 
has a bearing on the size of the correlation coefficient. 
 
We present scatterplots of the sampling risk by levels of the occurrence risk (ESTRISK1 
by OR) for two organisations: again for organisation 4 and also for organisation 8. The 
latter to get some confirmation of the high correlations.  Figure 6.7 gives the results.  
 
The weak negative correlation for organisation 4 is confirmed: it does not depend on 
one outlier.  The same applies to the scatterplot for organisation 8: this shows that the 
positive relation is not dependent on a single outlier.  The quality of the correlation 
coefficients is also confirmed by the relatively small differences between the P- and the 
K- correlations. 
 
Figure 6.7: Sampling risk by occurrence risk for  
organisation 4     and organization 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cross tabulation were also produced; table 6.16 gives the results for organisation 4 
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Table 6.16: Occurrence risk by categories of sampling risk for organisation 4                               
sampling risk in 
categories→ 
Occurrence risk↓ 
Very 
low 
Low Medium High Row 
total 
Very low 0 0 0 1 1 
Low 1 0 2 2 5 
Medium 0 2 3 4 9 
High 0 0 0 0 0 
Column total 1 2 5 7 15 
 
This analysis shows that for all levels of OR, where this can be concluded, the count of 
the classified sampling risk (POSTRIS1) increases for the higher scores of POSTRIS1. 
When the distribution of POSTRIS1 is approximately the same for the various levels of 
OR, the correlation cannot be far from 0. It is also remarkable that the only case for 
OR=’very low’ has the highest class of the sampling risk (with an audit sample size of 
80); which certainly accounts for a part of the negative sign of the correlation. But figure 
6.7 shows that the influence is only modest.  The shaded areas in table 6.16 represent 
the (2+1=)3 cases with a serious threat of ineffectiveness and the 0 cases with the 
same for inefficiency. 
 
Conclusion research question 3: validity with respect to sampling risk  
Risk assessment with respect to the sampling risk SR shows validity for the distinct 
organisations for only two organisations (8 and 5). For the rest of the organisations  
validity is absent. 
 
Conclusion research question 6: OR strongest relation with SR as a criterion? 
For most organisations, a relation between SR and OR is either negative (with the 
unstandardised SR), or absent (with the standardised SR).  So for most organisations 
the answer is negative.  Only with organisations 5 and 8 the correlations of the 
sampling risk with OR are larger than that of the error rate with OR.  But the difference 
is minimal. 
 
Discussion on validity with respect to sampling risk. 
We expected the validity with respect to the criterion variable ‘sampling risk’ to be 
stronger than with respect to the error rate, because the error rate has not the 
dimension of a risk, whereas the sampling risk does.  But contrary to this expectation 
(for a valid risk assessment and in our study the correlation between sample size and 
OR being small), the validity with respect to the criterion sampling risk is virtually 
absent, with a majority of the correlations being negative where they should be positive.  
Only for two organizations (5 and 8), the correlations are satisfactory. 
 
These findings suggest that an auditor’s risk assessment applies more to the 
assessment of the error to be expected, than to the risk that the error might exceed the 
level of materiality.  This conclusion is interesting to test in a next round in this research. 
 
If this conclusion would hold in subsequent studies, it opens an interesting perspective 
on how to deal with risk assessment.  Auditors could be asked to assess the most 
probable error in the audit population and also the less probable errors, up to the 
improbable and even impossible, ones.  These assessments add up to a kind of 
distribution on the possible error rates and the probability in this distribution of error 
rates larger than materiality may be seen as the assessment of the occurrence risk, the 
risk of an unjustified unqualified opinion prior to the substantive part of the audit.  We 
will recur to this discussion in chapter 10. 
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6.5  Risk assessment and conditional distribution of error rates 
 
As stated in chapter 2, the distribution of the error rates, conditional on the assessed 
risk, can also be used as a validation criterion for risk assessment.  In this section we 
show the results of this analysis only for the pooled organisations, because for the 
distinct organisations there are not enough data.  We will give a scatterplot of the error 
rates for the four levels of OR and also the parameters of the beta distributions that can 
be fitted on the pooled data and on the data per level of assessed risk. 
 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 showed scatterplots of the error rates per level of the occurrence 
risk (OR).  Because of the high density of datapoints near the OR-axis we needed a 
figure in which the error rate is treated as an ordinal variable (figure 6.3). But 
interpretation of the purely graphical representation is difficult. The only thing that 
seems to be clear is that the error rates tend to increase with the change to the level 
‘high’ for OR: then error rates larger than 5% occur, where errors of this size are absent 
at the other levels of OR.  The slight increase in error rates for the level ‘medium’ of OR 
is harder to take as an indication for an increasing tendency when changing from level 
‘low’ to level ‘medium’.  Of course we are supported in this interpretation by the 
information of section 6.3, where we found that there is a positive correlation between 
the error rate and the occurrence risk.  It also appeared that the means of the error rate 
per level of OR at first decrease (‘very low’-> ‘low’) and next considerably increase.  
 
To gain further insight than with these graphical representations, we will fit a beta 
distribution to the empirical distribution of the error rates.  A beta distribution may be 
appropriate because it is defined for values between 0 and 1 (0, 1 included) and it is fit 
for modelling a large variety of distributions: from symmetric to highly asymmetric and 
from a very low to a very high dispersion (see for instance Novick & Jackson 1974). We 
will show that a symmetric distribution like the normal, does not fit at all.  Once a (beta) 
distribution is fitted, differences in these distributions for the four levels of OR may 
become clearer, and as a consequence the degree to which these distributions indicate 
validity of the assessment of OR.  
 
Before we try to fit a beta distribution on the data, it may be useful recall our discussion 
in 2.2.5 and 2.2.6, to note that the distribution of the 120 error rates, as they were found 
per case of an audit, is something different from the distribution of the possible error 
rates in a single audit case.  The first, the distribution of errors per case, tells something 
about the probabilities that apply to a random selection from the set of the 120 audit 
cases in the research.  It could also be used as a distribution for the probability of an 
error of a certain size, that applies for random selection from a set of annual accounts 
similar to the 120 audit cases.  The second, the distribution of errors in a single audit 
case,  applies to the distribution of the possible error rates in a single account under 
audit.  In 2.2.7 we saw that this distribution can be seen as a property of the 
administrative processes, which directly relates to the ‘real risk’.  Prior to the 
substantive procedures, this risk is the occurrence risk.  In 2.3.3 we saw that the 
sampling risk (also a single case outcome) can be seen as a direct indicator for this. 
 
The fact that we model both distributions with the beta distribution does not take away 
this difference in meaning.  
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6.5.1 Results for the pooled organisations 
 
We constructed a PP-plot17 of the distribution of the error rates, for a beta distribution, 
and calculated the best fitting parameters, both for the total of error rates and for the 
error rates per level of the occurrence risk.  We show the PP-plot for the pooled 
organizations and undivided for level of OR in figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8: PP-plot of the error rates for the beta distribution 
 
From figure 6.8 it can be 
seen that where some 35% 
of the observed error rates 
is smaller than the error rate 
corresponding to the first dot 
above the X-axis, in the 
fitted beta distribution values 
smaller than this observed 
value would have a 
probability of some 15%.  
So here the fitted 
distribution and the actual 
distribution do not fit.  But  
the fit improves and is good for the values that are larger than the 45 percent smallest 
observed error rates 
 
The poor fit for the lower cumulative probabilities is due to the 35% of the error rates 
equal to 0, where in a theoretical beta distribution none of any possible values has a 
probability larger than zero.  The parameters of the fitted beta distribution turn out to be: 
a=.164 b=9.77. 
This means that the mean of this distribution is (a/a+b=) .164/9.934=.0165.  The 
difference with the actual mean of all error rates (.0167) is due to rounding precision: 
the fitted distribution is derived by the method of moments. 
 
We further investigate the fit of the beta distribution by applying it to the non-zero errors 
and by also applying the normal distribution as a possible fitting distribution to the same 
non-zero errors. The results are shown in figure 6.9.  The fit of the beta distribution has 
considerably improved.  Now, for the lower cumulative frequencies, the expected 
frequencies are higher but the deviation is much less than for the error rates with the 
zeros included.  The normal PP-plot clearly shows that the observed cumulative 
frequencies are far from symmetrical. 
 
Figure 6.9: PP-plot non-zero errors for beta distribution and for normal distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 In a PP-plot the observed cumulative frequencies are plotted against the expected cumulative 
probabilities, as can be calculated from the model to which the data are fitted.  
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When we apply the same analysis to the error rate for the four levels of the occurrence risk (see 
also figure 6.2 for a scatterplot), the PP-plots roughly show the same fit of the beta distribution and 
the same evident lack of fit of the normal distribution.  So again the beta distribution seems 
appropriate as a fitting distribution, but with some limitations for the lowest level of OR, as will be 
discussed next.  
 
Table 6.17: Beta distributions for the errors by occurrence risk 
Occurrence risk→ 
(Beta-) distribution↓ 
very low low Medium high all 
N 9 35 58 17 120* 
a-parameter .186 .127 .388 .729 .164 
b-parameter 25.34 38.71 38.18 9.40 9.77 
mean  .00735 .00327 .0102 .0776 .0165 
*in one case a score for OR was missing. 
 
The means of the fitted distributions are equal to the means of the empirical distribution, 
as given in table 6.5, because of the fitting method.  As shown in table 6.18, the relative 
rate of errors equal to 0 is high for the lower levels of OR.  The rate clearly decreases 
with increasing OR.  So one difference between the error distributions at the various 
levels of the occurrence risk is evident.  But the fit of the beta distribution for the error 
rates larger than zero is influenced to a large extent by the zeros.  Therefore we also 
fitted the distributions for the nonzero errors, for the levels ‘low’ and higher of the 
occurrence risk.  For the level "very low" there are only three nonzero error rates, so 
fitting makes no sense.  The results are shown in table 6.18. 
 
Table 6.18: Relative rates of  0 and beta distributions for the non-zero errors by 
occurrence risk 
Occurrence risk→ 
(Beta-) distribution↓ 
very low low medium high all 
#(greater than 0) 3 14 47 14 78 
a-parameter  .378 .527 1.086 .280 
b-parameter  46.057 41.944 11.35 10.699 
mean non zeros .0219 .00815 .0124 .0874 
 
.0255 
#(equal to 0) 6 21 11 3 42 
rate of 0 (%) .67 .60 .19 .18 .35 
weighted mean .0073 .00326 .0101 .0720 .0166 
 
The monotonously decreasing relative rate of 0-errors,  compared to the non-monotony 
of the relation of OR with the weighted means, may be seen as an indication that risk 
assessment has more predictive power for the existence of an error than for its size .   
 
Just as with the fit of all cases, the fit of the beta distribution for the nonzero errors is 
much better than that with the zero-errors included.  Figure 6.10 shows the fit by way of 
two PP-plots for the cases of OR=’medium’. 
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Figure 6.10: PP-plot for OR=’medium’  for all error rates and for the non-zero errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It can be concluded that the conditional distributions shift in the expected direction for 
growing occurrence risk, taking into consideration both: 
• the apparent predictive power for the existence of errors,  
• the considerable difference in shape of the distributions, expressed by the 
decreasing b-parameter and the increasing means in table 6.18. 
 
6.5.2 Results for the distinct organisations 
 
There were not enough cases to perform this analysis on the level of the distinct 
organisations: it asks for an analysis at the 4 distinct levels of OR2, for 6 units of 
analysis. So on the average we would only have 120/24=5 cases to base the 
distributional analysis on.  Therefore, we do not succeed in doing this analysis per 
organisation. 
 
Conclusion research question 4: validity with respect to conditional distribution  
Risk assessment with respect to the conditional distributions shows a satisfactory 
validity. 
 
Discussion on validity with respect to conditional distribution. 
In our discussion on research question 3 we speculated that the risk assessment of an 
auditor might sooner predict the size of the error to be expected in the audit object, than 
the actual risk of this error exceeding the level of materiality (the occurrence risk).  The 
analysis with regard to the conditional distributions is consistent with this speculation: 
the analysis regards the distributions of the errors found, regardless the materiality that 
applied to the corresponding risk analysis.  And still the conditional distributions show a 
satisfactory relation with the assessed risks.  They extend our findings by showing that 
the predictive power of OR is best visible with the existence of an error, even stronger 
than with the size. 
 
A promising perspective with regard to the conditional distributions is that they give the 
possibility to use purely statistical data (the error rates in a relevant set of financial 
accounts) in combination with risk assessment.  We will go deeper into this possibility in 
the discussion at the end of this thesis in chapter 10  
 
6.6  Moderator variables?  
 
The strength of the relation between risk assessment and our validation criteria is found 
to be moderate, but with considerable variability over the criteria and over the 
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organisations.  The strongest relations are found with the error rate and its empirical 
distribution as validation criterion, the weaker ones with the sampling risk.  But also with 
the error rate as criterion, there is much variability: for some organisations the 
correlation is even virtually 0.  It would be reassuring when the relevant relations would 
appear to be ‘inflatable’ by the use of convenient and interesting variables.  So the 
question is: can we find moderator variables? 
 
Potential moderator variables were already introduced in chapter 5, and formulated in 
research questions; we summarise: 
• The complexity of the audit object, because with more complex objects, assessment 
is more complicated and therefore less valid risk assessment may be expected (see 
research question 7). 
• The effort, put in the assessment, because with more effort, better assessment may 
be expected (see research question 8). 
• The experience with the audited organisation: second or subsequent engagements 
might lead to more valid assessments than first engagements (see research 
question 9), 
• The audit organisation itself, because the way in which risk assessment is dealt with 
will vary over organisations, which can lead to varying validity of risk assessment 
(see research question 10). 
 
In section 6.3 we already found that indeed, seen from the level of ‘all organisations’, 
the organisation strongly acts as a moderator variable (see for instance table 6.3).  In 
the next subsections we will investigate the other potential moderators mentioned 
above.  For the sake of brevity, we will only do this with the error rate as the criterion 
variable.  
 
6.6.1 The influence of complexity 
 
We did not plan to measure complexity of the audit object.  Therefore no direct 
measurement of this variable is included.  But with one of the risk indicators, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter, the respondents were asked to give their opinion on 
the influence of complexity of the organisation on the occurrence risk.  “Do you deem 
the complexity of the organisation to increase, decrease, or leave unaffected the risk of 
a material error?” was the question the respondent had to answer.  This variable can be 
viewed as a proxy for complexity, because ‘higher risk due to complexity’ may be 
expected to coincide with ‘more complexity’ (in the opinion of the auditor).  The fact that 
judgment on complexity is contaminated with judgment on the influence on risk, has to 
be kept in mind when interpreting the analysis with this proxy.  Scores on this indicator 
could be given in three categories: risk decreasing (least complex), risk neutral or risk 
increasing (most complex).   
 
Using this proxy as a classification variable, table 6.19 shows the results for the 
relevant correlations.  The most complex organizations show the highest correlation for 
OR and the error rate, which is against the expectation underlying research question 7.  
Consistent with this expectation is the increase of the correlation with further decreasing 
complexity.  When we take into consideration that there are only 14 cases in the class 
of most complexity, we could say that the expectation is at its best only weakly 
confirmed.  But the differences found are far from significant: the largest, that between 
.546 and .363 has a p-value of .13 (computed by means of Fishers z-transformed P-
correlations). So we must conclude that we find no difference. 
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Table 6.19: P-correlations over 3 classes of complexity 
Complexity OR x error rate n p-value difference me-le 
most .616(*) 14  
medium .363 65 
least .546(**) 40 .13 
** significant at the level of 0.01  * significant at the level of 0.05 
 
Conclusion research question 7: is complexity a moderator? 
The validity of risk assessment does not improve with decreasing complexity of the 
audit object.  Research question 7 cannot be answered positively. 
 
6.6.2 The influence of the effort 
 
The effort was measured by way of a variable which stated the number of days spent in 
risk assessment. This variable was categorized in four approximately even numbered 
categories, as shown in table 6.20 
 
Table 6.20: Categories of effort in assessment. 
Category Boundaries 
1 effort at most 1.5 days 
2 effort more than 1.5 days and at most 2.5 days 
3 effort more than 2.5 days and at most 13 days 
4 effort more than 13 days 
With this categorization, the correlation between effort and the error rate behaved as 
shown in table 6.21.  This table shows that the correlation is at its best when the effort 
category = 2 and almost equal for the effort category = 1 or 4. This pattern is 
inconsistent with the expectation underlying research question 8, which is that the 
correlation will increase with increasing effort.  It is worthwhile to note that the 
differences for classes 1 and 2 (p-value 2%) and for classes 4 and 2 (p-value 1%) are 
significant at the 5 % level.  But this does not confirm our expectation: more effort 
coincides with higher correlations. 
 
Table 6.21: P-correlations over 4 classes of effort 
Effort category OR x error rate n 
Unknown .333 8 
1 .254 26 
2 .703(**) 30 
3 .479(*) 25 
4 .214 30 
** significant at the level of 0.01    * significant at the level of 0.05 
 
Could there be an optimal effort? 
Table 6.21 suggests that there might be an optimal effort.  But, only when there is a 
convincing logic that implies the existence of such an optimum, it is justified to conclude 
accordingly.  Looking for such a logic, we can imagine that, with increasing numbers of 
days spent, the load of information to be processed is growing at a rate as to cause 
errors in the information processing, causing a negative influence on the quality of the 
assessment that is larger than the positive effect of the extra information.  But we think 
this ‘logic’ highly improbable, given the competence of auditors to deal with information 
streams of such sizes.  We could not imagine other possible ‘logics’. 
 
Conclusion research question 8: is effort a moderator? 
The validity of risk assessment does not improve with increasing effort spent in this 
activity.  Research question 8 cannot be answered positively. 
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6.6.3 The influence of experience 
 
As stated in the beginning of this section, we will investigate whether experience with 
the audit object positively influences the validity of risk assessment.  In the available 
cases only 8 cases regard a first engagement.  This makes it hard to make a proper 
comparison to the rest of the cases, because in so few a cases a relatively extreme 
outcome can easily happen.  This should be kept in mind when seeing the results of 
table 6.23.  But the fact that the 8 cases of a first engagement show a higher instead of 
a lower correlation between OR and error rate, surely is contradictory to the expectation 
that experience with the audit object improves risk assessment.  (The difference of the 
correlations has a p-value of .10 (Fishers z-transformation)). 
 
Table 6.23: P-correlations over 2 classes of experience 
Experience OR x error rate n p-value difference 
first engagement .827(*) 8 
second and subsequent engagement .530(**) 76 .10 
** significant at the level of 0.01    * significant at the level of 0.05 
 
Conclusion research question 9: is experience a moderator? 
The validity of risk assessment does not improve with increasing experience with the 
audit object.  Research question 9 cannot be answered positively. 
 
Discussion on potential moderator variables. 
None of the variables that we thought to be potential moderators turns out to be one, 
except ‘organisation’.  In the introduction of the relevant research questions (7 through 
9) we already discussed reasons for a potential moderating effect.  Are there more 
reasons for ‘organisation’ to be an exception, besides the reasons of (separate) 
cultures, mentioned in 5.2.3?  We can speculate on possibilities like: differences in audit 
methodology, education, experience, audit objects.  But our data do not provide for the 
possibility of testing these speculations.  Research into organisation-related 
determinants of validity of risk assessment may nevertheless give relevant insight in 
possibilities to improve risk assessment. 
6.7  Summary, Discussion and Conclusions  
 
6.7.1 Summary 
 
The outcomes of the analyses of this chapter are, to a certain extent, positive; namely: 
 
(1) The correlations of the occurrence risk (OR) and the error rate on the average are 
positive and statistically significant.   
(2) Also the distributions of the error rates for the various levels of OR shift into a 
direction that indicates valid risk assessment.   
 
But there are also serious problems namely: 
(1) We have used four variables as a criterion in this study and three of them show that 
validity suffers from problems.  On one hand, the pooled data lead to the conclusion 
that risk assessment has explaining power for the criterion variables ‘audit position’ and 
‘error rate’ (and its distribution).  On the other hand, this relation is not stable: for some 
organisations it is strong and significant; but for others the relation is virtually absent. So 
we must conclude that there is too much variability over organisations. Without 
validating its own risk assessment, an organisation cannot be sure that this assessment 
is valid. 
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(2) Validity on the criterion ‘sampling risk’ is absent, also for its standardised form.  Risk 
assessment shows no relation with, what can be seen as, the best (see 2.3.3) of the 
four validation criteria.  
(3) Only the relation of the occurrence risk with the distributions of the error rate, 
conditional on the OR, shows no inconsistencies, but here we had insufficient data to 
investigate the relation at the level of the organisations. 
 
6.7.2 Discussion 
 
We discuss our findings in the form of some considerations with respect to the 
problems just stated. 
 
The first consideration regards the variability in risk assessment between organisations; 
it was already discussed in 5.2.1.  Here we must conclude that the evident variability 
between organisations causes the results of the analyses at the level of the pooled 
organisations not necessarily to hold for every distinct organisation. The outcome at this 
level could be interpreted as: “Auditors’ assessments of the occurrence risk are valid 
with respect to the error rate”, but not necessarily for every organisation. 
 
A second consideration is that the anomalies might have to do with bias in the sample: 
only error prone cases have been collected.  And maybe, in this type of audits, the 
assessment of risk is of lower quality than in ‘error averse’ cases.  But, from the point of 
view of professionalism, you might expect better quality in error prone accounts.  And 
even if bias in the sampling indeed prohibits full generalisation, the study still 
generalises to the implicit population of ‘error prone’ populations.  
 
The limited possibility of generalisation was already discussed in the design chapter 
(chapter 5).  We observed that the implicit population consists of error prone ‘private 
accounts’ and of a majority of the public accounts.  This already means quite a 
population to be generalised to.  Still a more general type of generalisation can be 
made: if the assessments of risks were valid, findings like in this study would (and 
should) not occur. 
 
A third consideration is that the data could be of low quality.  But all data have been 
checked and the nature of the data is quite simple; they could directly be got from the 
audit files, which makes erroneous answers quite unlikely.  So the findings of this study 
are likely to be valid.  With a view on the studies mentioned in 3.4.2.3, it still is not wise 
to take the conclusions simply for granted: it appears that outcomes of validation 
studies may vary, so before far-reaching conclusions are drawn from this study, it is 
better to replicate it in similar archival studies.  In the mean time, where risk 
assessment can be invalid, it will be necessary not to rely on only this assessment, but 
to always do a significant piece of substantive work. 
 
A fourth consideration regards the relatively loose way in which the risks are defined. 
That makes it hard to decide on how to validate risk assessment, or rather, unclear 
what has to be validated.  Where validity is necessary, it is worthwhile to improve the 
possibilities of validation by defining more precisely the concept of occurrence risk.  
Now it specifies some risk of a material error, but that is all.  It does not give any more 
information on what the auditor knows (or is able to assess) about the error rate in the 
audit population.  Therefore neither of the four criteria used in this study is self-evident 
as validation criterion, although validity on these criteria still should be seen as a 
necessary condition for application of tables that transform risk assessment into audit 
effort. 
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A fifth consideration regards the finding that the relation between OR and error rate is 
relatively strong, both in the correlations and in the conditional distributions.  It looks like 
risk assessment is best in trying to predict the size of the possible error.  Even if this is 
something different from assessing a risk, it can be of use: assessing a ‘most likely 
error’, combined with assessments of less likely errors also can lead to risk 
assessment.  We will discuss this to a fuller extent in the concluding chapter (10). 
 
A sixth consideration regards an inconsistency between the practice of risk assessment 
and a basic assumption in the audit methodology.  Audit  methodology has an almost 
axiomatic assumption that the audit object will not contain a material error.  And that 
therefore all the auditor has to do is to show that this is true.  The only thing is that with 
a higher risk, assessed in risk assessment, he has to do more than at a lower level of 
risk.  This in order to have sufficient assurance for his unqualified opinion.  But at the 
same time risk assessment can very well produce a risk level of high.  A naive person 
could think that this can not go together with the basic assumption of ‘no material error’ 
but it is audit practice that it does.  It can only mean that risk levels of high still are 
maybe not larger than 10 or 20 percent.  Speculating on their actual value does not 
make much sense; assessing this value by the analysis of the conditional distribution of 
the error rates, as indicated in this chapter, is much better.  (Note that this still has to be 
completed by including the level of materiality). 
 
6.7.3.Conclusion 
 
These considerations lead to a (repeated) warning for the assessment practice: Do not 
build on your assessments unless you know that they are valid. In order to know this it 
will be necessary in many cases that validation be organised.  In most audit practices 
this is not customary.  
 
6.7.4 What next? 
 
In chapter 5 we already stated that part of this study took a basic quality of risk 
assessment as a point of departure, which justified a plan to search for improvement of 
risk assessment.  This basic quality seems to be present, be it with limitations, so a 
study in possibilities for improvement can take that basis.  The improvement we try to 
establish will rest on the idea of decomposition of the assessment task.  We will report 
findings on this idea in the next chapter. 
 
It also seems appropriate to do something with the limitations.  We should be alarmed 
by the unpredictability of the quality of risk assessment per organisation.  We talk of 
“unpredictability”, because when we would randomly draw one of the organisations that 
were in our study, we are not able to say beforehand if its risk assessment is valid or 
not, due to the considerable variability in the relation of risk assessment and the 
validation criteria.  We may hope that decomposition of risk assessment will improve on 
this situation, but it seemed worthwhile to do a replication of the study of this chapter, in 
order to get a firmer basis for classical risk assessment.  We did such a replication; in 
chapter 8 we will report our findings. 
 
In many of the cases included in this part of our research, underpinning of the 
assessment of OR by system testing will have taken place.  We could wonder why this 
did not lead to a more stable relation between our validation criteria and the occurrence 
risk.  We did not collect separate data on system testing in these cases; therefore we 
cannot analyse its influence on the validity.  So the question remains if consistent 
incorporation of system testing, as prescribed in many situations in risk analysis based 
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audits, improves the quality of the assessment of the occurrence risk.  A study related 
to this question will be reported in chapter 9.  
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6.8  Summary of findings research questions 1 through 10 
 
The next table gives an overview of the findings reported in this chapter. 
 
Table 6.24: Overview of the findings in chapter 6 
Research question Result 
1: To which degree will risk assessment (OR) 
correlate with the position of the error in a sample 
relative to the materiality? 
Assessment of OR only shows insignificant 
correlations with the variable ‘audit position’; it is 
not valid with respect to this variable (section 6.2).
2: To which degree will risk assessment correlate 
with the error rate in the audited account, for the 
pooled organisations? 
Risk assessment and error rate correlate to a 
satisfactory degree, but the lack of monotony in 
the relation may cause problems (section 6.3). 
3: To which degree will risk assessment (OR) 
correlate with the sampling risk (SR), for the 
pooled organisations? 
There is hardly any correlation between OR and 
SR. (section 6.4)  
 
4: To which degree will the distribution of the error 
rate vary with the level of assessed risk, for the 
pooled organisations? 
The distribution of the error rate, conditional on 
the assessed level of risk, varies with risk 
assessment in the expected direction (6.5.1) 
5: To which degree will the correlation between 
error rate and risk assessment increase when 
calculated for groups of accounts with the same 
level of materiality compared to the correlation for 
the whole group of accounts? 
Contrary to the expectation, the correlation of 
error rate and OR does not increase when 
controlled for levels of materiality.  (6.3.3) 
 
6: To which degree will the occurrence risk (OR) 
show a relation with the sampling risk, which is 
stronger than that between OR and the ‘audit 
position’, or OR and the error rate? 
For the pooled organisations: The answer to this 
question is negative or rather: the opposite of 
what is expected.  
For the distinct organisations: The answer to this 
question is negative or rather: in most cases the 
opposite of what is expected (and implied in the 
question). Only in two cases (with two 
organisations) the relation is as expected in a 
valid assessment. (section 6.4) 
7: To which degree will the validity of risk 
assessment decrease with increasing complexity 
of the audit object? 
The validity of risk assessment hardly improves 
with decreasing complexity of the audit 
object.(6.6.1) 
8: To which degree will the level of validation 
increase with the effort put in the assessment of 
OR? 
The validity of risk assessment does not improve 
with increasing effort spent in this activity. (6.6.2) 
 
 
9: To which degree will the level of validation 
increase with the experience of the auditor with 
the business ? 
The validity of risk assessment does not improve 
with increasing experience with the audit object. 
(6.6.3) 
 
10: To which degree will the level of validation 
vary over organizations?  
Validity with respect to ‘audit position’ varies 
considerably over organizations; it is significant for 
one organisation (section 6.2) 
The correlation between error rate and occurrence 
risk varies considerably over organisations 
(section 6.3). 
The correlation of SR and OR varies even 
stronger over the organisations than that of OR 
and error rate. (section 6.4). 
The distributional analysis was not done for 
distinct organisations, for shortage of cases. 
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Chapter 7: Risk Assessment by way of Risk Indicators. 
 
 
Four relatively complete actions in three studies were taken in our research into the 
‘real risk’: (1) validation of the classical assessment of OR, (2) an attempt to improve 
classical assessment of OR by decomposition of the assessment over risk indicators 
(1st and 2nd action formed the first study), (3) a replication of the validation of classical 
assessment of OR in the second study and (4) investigation of the predictive power of 
system tests for the error rate in the third study.  Varying validity of classical risk 
assessment per organisation (1st action) and problematic results with risk indicators (2nd 
action) led to the choice for the replication (3rd action).  
In this chapter we report the results of the 2nd action;. 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter 6 we investigated the quality of classical risk assessment, in particular the 
assessment of occurrence risk.  We found that the assessment of occurrence risk has 
positive qualities, but also some tricky anomalies.  We also concluded that the plan of 
chapter 5 to look for improvement of risk assessment by way of decomposition seems 
useful, given the problems we met concerning risk assessment.  We recall our 
conclusions of chapter 3 that decomposition of risk assessment may be expected to 
lead to improvement of the assessment and our introduction in chapter 5 of a 
decomposition of risk assessment by way of risk indicators. 
 
In this chapter we will deal with the quality of risk assessment based on these indicators 
and consequently the possibilities they give for improvement, for the same 
organisations as in chapter 6.  We will do this by answering research questions 11 
through 16.  Section 7.2 deals with research questions 11, 12 and 13, concerning the 
relation between risk indicators and classical risk assessment and other aspects of their 
consistency.  Section 7.3 deals with research questions 14, 15 and 16, concerning the 
predictability of the error rate (7.3.1, 7.3.2).  We also investigate the relations of 
transformed indicators with the error rate (7.3.3 and 7.3.4) and of the original indicators 
with a transformed error rate (7.3.5).  In section 7.4 we discuss our findings and come 
to conclusions.  In section 7.5 a table gives a summary of our results.   
 
The data for this chapter were collected with the same questionnaire (see appendix 1), 
for the same organisations as in chapter 6.  There was some variation over 
organisations in the indicators used; in this chapter we use the 19 indicators present in 
all questionnaires. 
 
7.2  Risk indicators and the audit risk model 
 
One of the desirable aspects of the risk indicators, is their consistency with the audit 
risk model (ARM).  Risk indicators are hoped to improve risk assessment because the 
task to assess the occurrence risk (OR) is decomposed but, when the aspects 
represented by the risk indicators lead to assessments that are not related to the 
assessment of OR, acceptance of the indicators is only possible at the cost of rejecting 
the ARM.  But the validity of this model has not been disproved so far.  On the contrary: 
the findings of the previous chapter partially support its validity and, moreover, our 
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study of literature in chapter 3, shows that often risk assessment according to the ARM 
has desirable qualities such as sensitivity for experience and expertise and a relation 
with error rate (occurrence, size , or both).  These observations are good reasons to 
aim at consistency with the ARM.  (But still, a more consistent and stronger relation 
between risk assessment and error rate may be hoped to be achieved with the risk 
indicators, as a solution of the problems we also mentioned in chapters 3 and 6.) 
 
We will investigate the consistency of the risk indicators and the OR by analysing their 
bivariate relations (7.2.1) and regressing OR on the risk indicators (7.2.2).  In 7.2.3. we 
report outcomes of other checks on the consistency.  
 
 
7.2.1 Bivariate relations of risk indicators and occurrence risk 
 
The first thing to be expected in consistent relations are the bivariate correlations to be 
in the expected direction and of sufficient magnitude.  We investigated these bivariate 
relations producing Kendall rank-correlations (K-correlations) between the occurrence 
risk and risk indicators and by producing cross tabulations. 
 
Table 7.1 shows the K-correlations.  The expected sign of the correlation is negative, 
because with OR a higher risk is represented by a higher score, whereas with the risk 
indicators a higher quality of the AO/IC is represented by a higher score, which in turn 
represents a lower risk. 
 
Table 7.1: K-correlations risk indicator x occurrence risk for the pooled organisations 
(n=119)  
risk indicator K-correlation 
Risk indicator x OR
p-
value 
errors previous audits -.307** .0 
changes controls since last audit .118 .152 
quality documentation admin procedures .043 .6 
separation duties EDP -.286** .001 
 
segregation of duties other -.048 .561 
strength system of controls -.334** .0 
access to EDP systems -.234** .005 
access other systems and assets -.160 .06 
 
operation other segregations of duties -.089 .289 
are processes routine? -.196* .017 
pressure for high-performance? -.171* .04 
structural changes in organisation? -.206* .012 
auditability of applicable regulations -.010 .907 
existence of audit trail -.032 .698 
nature of organisation -.216** .009 
   
attitude of management -.171* .037 
expertise of personnel -.220** .008 
attitude of personnel -.081 .323 
complexity of organisation -.016 .848 
* significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)              ** significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
On the average the correlations between OR and the risk indicators are not high.  But 
with consistency between OR and risk indicators, the bivariate relations cannot be 
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expected to be too strong, because variation on a risk indicator will only partially 
influence the occurrence risk.  This because other aspects may be stable or even vary 
in a direction as to stabilise the occurrence risk or even let it vary in another direction.  
Still, 10 are significant (p-value <.05) or highly significant (p-value <.01) and only 2 out 
of 19 have the “wrong” sign.  We applied  the sign-test: it gives a lower-tail probability 
for the event (2 ‘–’signs in 19) of only .04%.  We conclude a clear tendency for 
consistency of the risk indicators with the assessment of OR.  
 
In order to check the nature of the relation for a relatively high and a relatively low K-
correlation, the corresponding cross tabulations will be given; firstly for the strongest 
relation. 
Table 7.2: Occurrence risk by strength of system of controls 
controls→ 
occurrence risk↓ 
-1 0 1 row total 
very low 2 2 5 9 
low 1 13 21 35 
medium 7 38 13 58 
high 4 11 2 17 
column total 14 64 41 119 
 
Table 7.2 shows the expected relation: in the two lowest classes of OR the high 
‘strength of controls’ are in a majority, and they are in a minority in the ‘high’ class of 
OR, where in OR ‘medium’ the risk neutral’ class of ‘strength of controls’ forms a big 
majority.  (Note that every cell in the cross tabulation is occupied even if this tabulation 
regards the strongest relation; this causes a scatterplot to give no insight in the 
relation.)   
 
The next table represents one of the weakest relations, that of ‘quality of documentation 
of administrative procedures’. 
 
Table 7.3: Occurrence risk by quality documentation admin procedures 
documentation →  
occurrence risk ↓ 
-1 0 1 row total 
very low 2 3 4 9 
low 7 16 12 35 
medium 11 24 23 58 
high 2 8 7 17 
column total 22 51 46 119 
 
Now for every class of the occurrence risk the distribution of the risk indicator is similar, 
which is fully consistent with a K-correlation of virtually zero. 
 
We also show the bivariate relations for two distinct organisations: organisations 8 and 
4.  We chose these organisations because in the next subsection they will show to have 
the largest (8) respectively the smallest (4) explained variance in the occurrence risk, 
when we try to explain this by multiple risk indicators.  Table 7.4 shows the results.  For 
the sake of comparison we add the correlations for all organisations. 
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Table 7.4: K-correlations: risk indicator x occurrence risk for organisations 8 (n=17) and 
4 (n=21) 
risk indicator K-correlation 
org. 8 
K-correlation 
pooled organisations 
K-correlation 
org. 4 
errors previous audits -.339 -.307** -.164 
changes since last audit .070 .118 .242 
quality documentation .479* .043 .124 
segregation of duties EDP* -.630** -.286** -.434* 
    
segregation of duties other .039 -.048 -.267 
strength system of controls .387 -.334** -.273 
access to edp systems* -.373 -.234** -.436* 
access other systems and assets -.310 -.160 -.302 
operation other segregations of 
duties 
-.635** -.089 -.166 
routine processing? -.032 -.196* .044 
pressure for high performance? -.350 -.171* .131 
structural changes? -.354 -.206* .144 
auditability of law, regulations .160 -.01 .027 
existence audittrail .149 -.032 .187 
    
nature of organisation .145 -.216** .302 
attitude management -.462 -.171* .070 
expertise personnel -.580* -.220** .279 
attitude personnel -.074 -.081 .153 
complexity of organisation -.267 -.016 .259 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)     **  Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
 
As can be seen, two of the correlations for organisation 8 are significant at the 1% level, 
two are significant at the 5% level, five are smaller (in absolute value) than those of the 
pooled organisations, so larger (absolute) values than those for the pooled 
organisations are a rule.  Next to that, 7 correlations appear to be positive, the 
unexpected sign, when the occurrence risk and the risk indicators are assumed to be 
consistent.  Even if none of the positive correlations is significant, this considerably 
reduces an overall picture of consistency. 
 
For organisation 4 it turns out that the two significant correlations, that for ‘segregation 
of duties EDP’, and that for ‘access to EDP systems’, are the same as two of the five 
highly significant correlations for the pooled organisations.  This is an indication of 
consistency.  This is balanced by 12 of the 19 (non-significant) correlations being 
positive, which is highly inconsistent with the picture for the pooled organisations (and 
with the expected direction).  Evidence and counter evidence make the consistency 
inconclusive. 
 
Furthermore only one significant correlation for organisation 8 is also significant for 
organisation 4 and 15 out of 19 correlations for organisation 4 are smaller than the 
corresponding ones for organisation 8, moreover, 8 of 19 change sign .  So the 
correlation structure for these two organisations is dissimilar.  Obviously dissimilar 
correlation structures on aggregation will not add up to high correlations. 
 
Conclusion research question 11: bivariate relations of occurrence risk and risk 
indicators. 
For the distinct organisations, the bivariate relations neither give strong support, nor 
give counter evidence to consistency of risk assessment by means of the risk indicators 
on the one hand with risk assessment according to the ARM on the other hand. 
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment by way of Risk Indicators 
 117
For the pooled organisations the consistency emerges to a larger extent: almost all 19 
correlations have the expected sign; 10 of them are significant, their magnitude is 
modest.  
 
7.2.2 Multivariate relations of risk indicators and occurrence risk 
 
With the bivariate relations being rather inconclusive as to the consistency of risk 
indicators and ARM, we will have to look at the multivariate relation for a more definitive 
answer to that question: can the occurrence risk be predicted from the risk indicators, or 
possibly a subset of them?  When the indicators account for all the aspects that play a 
role in risk assessment in the classical sense, the indicators as a total, or a subset from 
them, may have a strong relation with the occurrence risk. 
 
We analysed this by way of a stepwise regression analysis (which we started with the 9 
‘normative indicators’ entered).  This analysis omits the indicator that explains the 
smallest part of the variation in OR and starts a new round of analysis, in which similar 
actions are taken.  Thus in every step an indicator is omitted, the least explaining first.  
This omission continues as long as it does not reduce the explained variance (of the 
regression model as a whole) too much.  Actually in all cases in our analyses the R2 
decreased, but the adjusted R2 always increased with the omission of the first 
predictors.  This effect is due to the fact that the adjusted R2 increases with decreasing 
number of predictors; and that this increase is stronger than the decrease due to 
omission of the predictors in the first steps.  This also, because omission of a predictor 
only takes away the individual explaining power that is in the predictor and not the 
explaining power that is caused where it covaries with the other predictors that are left 
in the model.  Obviously there is a point where omission of an extra predictor causes a 
decrease of the adjusted R2.  This effect gave us the opportunity to choose the solution 
with the largest explained variance for OR in terms of the adjusted R2.  
 
Stevens(1996) suggests to keep the number of predictors at less than 1/7th of the 
sample size.  Therefore we started our stepwise analysis with the limited number of 9 
risk indicators.  For the pooled organisations this number could have been larger, 
according to the criterion of Stevens, but for the single organisations it is still too large.  
However, as the stepwise analysis results in models with less predictors, in the end the 
models come close to, or satisfy Stevens’ criterion.  When in some cases the stepwise 
procedure still includes too many predictors, according to Stevens’ criterion, we will do 
a check for overfitting of the model. 
 
In the stepwise analysis the following 9 indicators were used as the predictors: 
complexity of organisation 
attitude management 
segregations maintained? 
errors previous audits 
access to edp systems 
strength system of controls 
access other systems and assets 
segregation of duties EDP 
segregation of duties other 
 
These indicators were chosen because they are deemed to refer to the central aspects 
in the assessment of risk (see for instance Arens and Loebbecke, 1997).  In this thesis 
they will be referred to as ‘normative’ indicators. We took this approach to be preferable 
over a selection of indicators done by choosing the ones that correlate most with the 
dependent variable.  Because, in that procedure, a capitalisation on chance almost 
inevitably will occur and it will lead to varying choice of indicators over the 
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organisations.  This is less preferable, because a comparison of organisations is most 
informative when it can be done based on the same variables. 
But there are also limitations:  
• the information that is contained in the other indicators is not used in the 
analysis. 
• we might have chosen indicators that do not represent the most important 
aspects in risk analysis. 
 
We took these limitations for granted, because the outcomes of the analysis were 
satisfactory: the aim of the analysis, to get information on the consistency of risk 
assessment in the classical sense and by way of the risk indicators, was achieved.  The 
same limitations will apply to our analyses with the error rate as the dependent variable 
(in section 7.3).  But here we will do extra analyses with more predictors and no extra 
explaining power will be found.  So here, the limitations are very mild. 
 
The analysis led to the results given in tables 7.5 and 7.6.  Table 7.5 gives the 
explained variance and its p-value for the distinct organisations (without the triplet, for 
its number of cases (13) was too small).  In the analysis of the pooled organisations, the 
triplet was included. 
 
Table 7.5: Occurrence risk explained by risk indicators; the explained variance 
Organisation Adjusted R2 n p-value 
2  60% 22 .001 
4  34% 21 .033 
5 64% 22 .000 
6  52% 25 .000 
8  65% 17 .004 
All 24% 119 .000 
 
For an adjusted R2 of 52% or higher the conclusion of this analysis can be that in the 
organisation concerned risk indicators can very well predict the occurrence risk. This 
means that the customary approach of risk assessment and the approach with 
indicators are highly consistent for these organisations. Only with organisation 4 the 
consistency is less, albeit that also in this case the regression model is significant. 
 
For the pooled organisations the consistency is weaker.  It is true that the model is 
highly significant (p-value: 0), but the explained variance is smallest of all.  It looks as if 
the consistency per organisation is no guarantee for consistency at the same level for 
the pooled organisations. This might be caused by differences per organisation in the 
indicators that are most important in risk assessment, possibly because of the differing 
cultures in risk assessment.  In this perspective, still, an explained variance of 24% 
means that there is a reasonable level of consistency between the assessments on the 
risk indicators and the assessment of the occurrence risk.  In table 7.6, we show which 
indicators were included in the models for the various organisations. 
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Table 7.6: Occurrence risk explained by risk indicators; the included indicators 
Orga 
nisation 
Explained 
variance 
variables in the model (in order of 
associated T-value; ‘+’-sign when positive 
regression weight) 
significant pre-
dictors (at 5%) 
2 *** 60% 5, 7, 2, 1, 8(+) first 2 
4  34% 1(+), 4, 5, 7 first 2 
5*****  64% 2, 7, 1, 4, 8(+) first 3 
6 51% 4, 5(+), 6, 8 first 2 
8**** 65% 8, 4, 1, 6(+), 2 first 2 
All 24% 4, 6, 8, 9(+), 2, 1 first 4 
1: complexity of organisation  2: attitude management  3: segregations maintained?  4: errors previous 
audits  5: access to edp systems  6: strength system of controls  7: access other systems and assets 
8: segregation of duties EDP  9: segregation of duties other 
*** We checked this model for overfitting; with 3 predictors the explained variance (adjusted R2) was 50%, 
p-value .001  **** idem; 3 predictors gave adjusted R2 63%, p-value .001  ***** idem; 3 predictors gave 
adjusted R2 60%, p-value .009  ;  so if there is any, the overfitting is very limited 
 
The analysis also shows which of the indicators are important in the assessment of the 
occurrence risk (OR).  Table 7.6 shows that there is much variability in the most 
important indicators of the organisations.  None of the indicators appears twice or more 
as the most important indicator.  When we count how many indicators belong to the first 
two important in the models, ‘errors in previous audits’ appears three times, ‘access to 
EDP systems’ and ‘access to other systems and assets’ appear twice.  So the ‘errors in 
previous periods’, scores the best with three, but disappears from the model for 
organization 2.  Still, over organizations, this is the most consistently scoring indicator, 
which corresponds with its Kendall correlation for the pooled organisations (see Table 
7.1).  It is plausible that the variability in “most important risk indicators” is caused by 
the variability in the way risks are assessed in the various organisations, so that 
variability does not necessarily mean inconsistency.  Our guess is, that the low 
explained variance for all organisations should be attributed to these varying 
assessment cultures. 
 
Just as the correlations with the bivariate relations, in valid risk assessment the 
regression weights should be negative; because a higher score on the indicator 
represents more quality and a higher score on the occurrence risk represents more risk.  
Contrary to the expectation implied, some of the predictors showed positive weights; in 
table 7.6 a ‘+’ is added after these indicators.  
 
The ‘+’-signs mostly correspond to positive bivariate correlations.  But it can also 
happen that indicators with a negative correlation with OR show a positive weight in the 
regression equation (e.g. ‘access to EDP systems’).  This can occur in regression 
analysis and is known as suppression effect (see Cohen and Cohen, 1983).  With a 
view on this, no predictor can be left out of the model, once the indicators would really 
be used as predictors.  Suppression is a possible consequence of collinearity.   
 
Definition of collinearity: 
When substantial correlations exist between predictors, these are said to be collinear. 
(Cohen and Cohen (1983) 
 
Collinearity can cause difficulties with the computations of the regression equations and 
difficulties in the interpretation of a regression model.  We will discuss this in more detail 
after table 7.10. 
 
Conclusion research question 12: the multivariate relations of occurrence risk and risk 
indicators. 
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The multivariate relations per organisation are relatively strong, except for one 
organisation. This means that assessment on the risk indicators and classical risk 
assessment are consistent per organisation.  
It appears that the regression models, that explain the assessment of OR from the nine 
‘normative’ risk indicators vary strongly over organisations with respect to the risk 
indicators included in the model.  This will cause the relatively low explained variance in 
the similar regression model for the pooled organisations.  The findings can be 
interpreted as an indication of varying assessment cultures over organisations, given 
that the consistency per organisation is satisfactory. 
 
7.2.3 More on the consistency of the risk indicators 
 
In 5.2.3 we discussed desirable qualities of risk indicators.  We reported what we did in 
order to construct the set of 23 possible risk indicators.  These actions all were based 
on available files of completed audits and on the study of relevant literature.  But an 
important source of evidence with respect to the consistency of the risk indicators can 
be added: the auditors of the organisations in which our research took place.  Their 
opinion on the risk indicators, the extent to which they recognised their way of risk 
assessment in the risk indicators, can be seen as valuable information on the 
consistency of the risk indicators with audit practice.  Making use of these sources of 
information, together with the previous analyses, implies a kind of triangulation (see 
Babbie, 1995) in our investigation of the consistency of the risk indicators.  It results in 
an answer to research question 13 (in 5.2.4), as we now explain. 
 
As we already indicated in 5.2.4, we took the opportunity to involve the auditors of the 
organisations with the introduction of our research in the organisation concerned.  Here 
we discussed the quality of the set of risk indicators with our contact persons, together 
with some of the auditors that were to fill out the questionnaire.  This discussion was on 
the qualities stated in section 5.2.3.  In general our contact persons thought the set of 
indicators had the desired qualities.  In some cases the discussion led to the addition of 
an extra indicator, which meant that the questionnaire for this organisation had a slightly 
different content compared to the others.  The 19 indicators of this chapter form the 
cross-section for all organisations. 
 
An additional check on the consistency of the indicators with the way auditors deal with 
risk analysis, was also introduced by inviting the respondents by way of an open 
question to mention factors that were of importance in their risk assessment.  With 
some organisations almost all respondents took this opportunity.  With others hardly 
any addition to the factors was proposed.  In our analysis of the results of this invitation 
the question was answered if the factors mentioned should lead to the conclusion that a 
relevant risk dimension had been forgotten in the risk indicators. The answer to this 
question was negative.  All factors could be interpreted as a specification or an 
alternative formulation of an indicator which was already in the questionnaire.  Of 
course this is a subjective judgment, but within this almost inevitable constraint, the 
consistency of the indicators with risk assessment as viewed by the auditors 
themselves has been confirmed and the indicators can be seen as recognisable and 
exhaustive. 
 
Conclusion research question 13: Can the risk indicators be seen as an appropriate 
representation of the view auditors have on audit risk assessment?   
This consistency is confirmed by the judgment of the respondents that the indicators 
cover the way the respondent does risk assessment. 
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Our factor analysis in 7.3.3 will still give another approach to discus the quality of the 
risk indicators of this study.  The discussion (in 7.3.3.2) will confirm the above 
conclusion. 
 
7.3  Risk indicators and the error rate 
 
With risk indicators that are consistent with the audit risk model, it makes sense to 
investigate the quality of the risk indicators as predictors for the error rate.  It was the 
ultimate reason to introduce the risk indicators to improve on that prediction compared 
to the performance of the audit risk model, in particular its occurrence risk  As argued in 
5.2.3, this improvement can be measured by the extent to which prediction of the error 
rate is improved by this decomposition.  In this section we will show the results of 
analysis on bivariate relations between risk indicators and the error rate (7.3.1) and of 
and a regression analysis of the error rate on the nine ‘normative’ risk indicators (7.3.2).  
In order to check if we omitted much information by focusing on the ‘normative’ risk 
indicators will also show the results of a regression analyses on factor scores (7.3.3) 
and of a regression analysis on scales constructed from the 17 risk indicators (7.3.4).  
Finally we regressed the error rate on a transformed error rate (7.3.5).  We did the last 
three analyses only for the pooled organisations. 
 
7.3.1 Bivariate relations of risk indicators and the error rate 
 
To give insight into the relation between risk indicators and the error rate we will show 
scatterplots of the relation of a selection of risk indicators and the error rate; we will 
show the plots for the pooled organisations, for some organisations with high 
correlations and some with low correlations.  As there is much more variation in the 
error rate than there is in the occurrence risk, we may expect these scatterplots to be 
informative.  We will base our selection on the bivariate correlations, both the Pearson 
product moment- and the Kendall rank-correlation coefficient (P-correlation and K-
correlation respectively).  
 
Table 7.7 shows the bivariate correlations between the risk indicators and the error rate.  
It shows three series of correlations; the column with the P-correlation with one case 
omitted is discussed after the figures 7.1.   
 
Table 7.7: Pearson- and Kendall-Correlations risk indicators with error rate (n = 119) 
Risk indicators P-correlation with error rate
P-correlation one 
case omitted*** 
K-correlation 
with error rate
errors previous audits -.105 -.123 -.0137 
changes since last audit .125 .172 .023 
quality documentation .049 .085 .073 
segregation of duties EDP -.305** -.275** -.142 
segregation of duties other .091 .04 .042 
    
strength system of controls -.184* -.093 -.184* 
access to edp systems -.313** -.274** -.113 
access other systems and assets -.012 .184* .125 
segregations maintained? .033 -.033 .110 
routine processing? -.236** -.189* -.219** 
    
pressure for high performance? -.226* -.208* -.201** 
structural changes? -.086 -.243** -.129 
auditability of law, regulations -.028 -.018 -.022 
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Risk indicators P-correlation with error rate
P-correlation one 
case omitted*** 
K-correlation 
with error rate
existence audittrail .058 .008 .007 
nature of organisation -.138 -.159 -.194** 
attitude management -.109 -.117 .031 
expertise personnel -.220* -.254** -.065 
attitude personnel -.053 -.042 .044 
complexity of organisation -.038 -.023 .016 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).   **  Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
***  The case with an extremely outlying error rate of .29 was omitted 
 
The Pearson and the Kendall correlations are not inconsistent: most of them have the 
same sign and only the ones close to 0 differ in sign.  But neither the picture given by 
the P-correlations nor the picture given by the K-correlations is satisfactory.  As for the 
19 P-correlations: six of them are significant and 14 of them, the significant ones 
included, have the expected minus sign.  The sign test gives a p-value of .032 for at 
least 14 ‘minusses’ out of 19 trials, so it can be concluded that the direction of the 
relation has a strong tendency in the expected direction.  But the scatterplots in the 
figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that the P-correlations do depend on very irregular patterns, 
outliers included.  So it is worthwhile to look at the K-correlations.  According to these, 
the relation between risk indicators and the error rate is almost absent: only ten of the 
K-correlations have the expected minus sign; this has a p-value of exactly .50.  This 
means that the only indications for a relation in the expected direction, are the 4 
significant K-correlations having the expected minus sign. 
 
Now in the figures 7.1 we show the scatterplots of 2 of the strongest correlations, with 
the P- and the K-correlation being consistent and in figures 7.2 of two of the almost 
zero-correlations.  For the sake of the spread, in the figures 7.1 we left out the case with 
an error rate of 29%.  This hardly biases the picture, because in both cases it coincides 
with a value of –1 for the indicator.  So it deflates the correlation, but this still remains 
significant and negative (see table 7.7). 
 
Figures 7.1: Scatterplots of two of the highest P-correlations: 
      error rate x pressure: - .226                      error rate x routine processing?:- .236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figures 7.2 we did not skip the outlier; the figures show how it affects the 
correlation for ‘segregations maintained’ (skipping changes the sign of the correlation, 
still both values are close to zero, see table 7.7) and to a lesser extent that for 
‘complexity organisation’ (skipping only causes a small decrease in absolute value.) 
 
pressure for high performance?
1.51.0.50.0-.5-1.0-1.5
er
ro
r r
at
e
.16
.14
.12
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
0.00
-.02
routine processing?
1.51.0.50.0-.5-1.0-1.5
er
ro
r r
at
e
.16
.14
.12
.10
.08
.06
.04
.02
0.00
-.02
Chapter 7: Risk Assessment by way of Risk Indicators 
 123
Figures 7.2: Scatterplots of two almost zero P-correlations:  
error rate*segregations maintained:.033           error rate*complexity organisation: - .038 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now with the distribution of the pairs (error rate, risk indicator) as in the scatterplots 
shown and with outliers of the size shown, correlation and regression analyses run a 
high risk of giving an unrealistic picture.  Even rank-correlations run a risk of giving an 
unrealistic picture, because many of the values of the error rate are very close to each 
other.  Given the variability of the error rate, this means that the rank order found in the 
error rates is an order which, to a large extent, is determined by chance.  
 
Because it is a very obvious outlier, we calculated all correlations after skipping the 
case with an error rate of 29%.  This affected all correlations, as is shown in table 7.7 in 
the middle column.  But the number of negative P-correlations did not change. 
 
Conclusion research question 14: the bivariate relations between risk indicators and 
error rate. 
The bivariate relations are only very weak: there are some significant correlations, but 
the ratio of plus-signed correlations to minus-signed correlations is not convincing. 
 
These considerations would lead to efforts to transform the indicators and the error rate 
in order to come to data that better meet the assumptions of statistical models.  For the 
analysis of the multivariate relations we have chosen to do both: try and find the 
relations between the original indicators and the error rate (in 7.3.1 and 7.3.2) and 
relations between the transformed indicators and the error rate (in 7.3.3 and 7.3.4) and 
between the indicators and the transformed error rate (in 7.3.5).  Because by doing both 
we can get an impression of relations that may exist between the raw data and we do 
an investigation into possibilities of finding better relations by transforming the data. 
We continue by investigating the multivariate relation between risk indicators and the 
error rate. 
 
7.3.2 Regression of the error rate on risk indicators 
 
In this section we will try to explain the error rate by way of linear regression analysis.  
Similar to the analyses of the risk indicators as predictors of the occurrence risk, we 
may expect the regression model to explain more variance in the error rate than is done 
by the distinct bivariate relations between risk indicators and the error rate.   
 
We recall the nine ‘normative’ indicators we introduced in section 7.2.2. 
1. complexity of organisation 
2. attitude management 
3. segregations maintained? 
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4. errors previous audits 
5. access to edp systems 
6. strength system of controls 
7. access other systems and assets 
8. segregation of duties EDP 
9. segregation of duties other 
Again we did a stepwise regression analysis for the pooled organisations and for the 
distinct organisations.  The results are given in the tables 7.8 and 7.9  
 
Table 7.8: Error rate explained by risk indicators; the explained variance 
Organisation Adjusted R2 n p-value 
2  85% 22 0 
4  45% 21 .011 
5  23% 22 .084 
6  10% 25 .119 
8  32% 17 .094 
All 22% 119 0 
 
Two models for the distinct organisations have a significant p-value.  The model for 
organisation 2 is even highly significant.  For the remaining three organisations the 
models found are not significant.  The explaining power of the models varies 
substantially over the organisations.  Table 7.9 shows per organisation which indicators 
are included in the regression model.  
 
Table 7.9: Error rate explained by risk indicators; the included indicators 
Orga 
nisation 
Explained 
variance 
Indicators in the model (in order of associated T-
value; ‘+’-sign when positive regression weight) 
significant pre-
dictors (at 5%) 
2***  85% 9(+), 8, 7, 1, 4(+), 3(+), 6(+) all 
4  45% 2(+), 7(+), 6, 4 first 3 
5  23% 2, 7, 1, 6 first 1 
6 10% 6, 7(+) none 
8****  32% 5, 2, 7, 4, 1 first 1 
All 22% 9(+), 8, 5, 6, 2, 7(+) first 3 
1: complexity of organisation  2: attitude management  3: segregations maintained?  4: errors previous 
audits 5: access to edp systems  6: strength system of controls  7: access other systems and assets 
8: segregation of duties EDP  9: segregation of duties other 
*** We checked this model for overfitting; with 3 predictors the explained variance (adjusted R2) was 64%, 
p-value .000,  **** idem: the explained variance (adjusted R2) was 21%, p-value .113; so if there is any, the 
overfitting is very limited 
 
When we look per organisation at the indicators in the two significant models the most 
striking observation is that various of the significant predictors have the unexpected (‘+’) 
sign.  It appears that with 4 out of 6 indicators these unexpected signs also occur in the 
corresponding bivariate correlations, but with organisation 2 two of these corresponding 
correlations are negative, including the only significant one, as is shown in table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Error rate by risk indicators , P- correlations for the organisations 2 and 4 
organisation 2 (n=22) organisation 4 (n=21) 
indicator P-correlation  p-value indicator P-correlation  p-value 
6 -.424* .05 2 .314 .17 
9 .236 .29 7 .352 .12 
3 .229 .31    
4 -.028 .9    
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
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In our discussion of the results of table 7.6 we already introduced ‘suppression effects’ 
as a very likely cause for these illogical signs.  The ‘suppression’ (see Cohen and 
Cohen (1983), Hair, 1998) comes from the introduction of an extra predictor variable 
(say pred 2), ‘suppressing’ variability in another predictor (say pred 1) that does not 
contribute to the variability of the dependent variable.  This enlarges the explaining 
power of pred 1 and of the total regression model, but often leads to illogical signs for 
the regression weight of pred 2.   
 
This means that the model relies on some interrelations between the predictors, that 
make it hard to interpret.  This reliance is made visible when we remove one indicator 
from the model for organisation 2.  When we remove ‘segregation of duties other (9)’, 
the most explaining, but with the ‘wrong’ sign, the explained variance dramatically drops 
from 85% to 38% (adjusted R2); the associated p-value grows, but remains small: 3.3%.  
Now the most explaining indicator is ‘segregations maintained?’, but this predictor also 
has the ‘wrong’ ‘+’-sign.  Apparently the model for organisation 2 is very sensitive to the 
changing of predictors and keeps relying on illogical signs for the regression 
coefficients. To a lesser extent this sensitivity also applies to the models for the other 
organisations, although they all show much less explained variance, which limits the 
effects of omitting predictors.  As an example we modify the model for organisation 4, 
by omitting the indicator ‘attitude management (2)’. Now almost all explained variance 
disappears: only 1.5% is left (adjusted R2).  At the same time the indicator “access 
other systems and assets (7)” keeps the ‘wrong’ sign.   
 
The suppression effects obviously cause interpretation problems: can we say that an 
indicator explains much of the variability, when this explaining power is so dependent 
on other predictors.  Next to these interpretation problems, collinearity may lead to 
unstable estimation.  We will discuss this now. 
 
Collinearity 
In the discussion following table 7.6 of the illogical signs, we already noted that high 
collinearity also may influence the stability of a model in another way: when a 
regression model contains a predictor with a high multiple correlation with the other 
predictors in the model, the corresponding regression coefficient gets a high variance, 
making its estimate unstable.  In order to look whether this collinearity occurs, we 
analysed all models for the error rate on collinearity, by means of the tolerance and the 
condition index.  Tolerances larger than .10 and condition indices smaller than 15 are 
assumed to prevent this instability of the estimates (see Hair, 1998).  Table 7.11 gives 
the (predictor with the) smallest tolerance and the largest condition index per regression 
model (as shown in table 7.9).  The table shows that all diagnostic values are well 
within the range that should not cause (stability) problems. 
 
Table 7.11  Collinearity diagnostics for regression models for the error rate** 
organisation adjusted R2 #(predictors) p-value (model) Tolerance condition ind.
2 85% 7 0 >.31 <5.3 
2 64% 3 0 >.51 <3.4 
4 45% 4 .011 >.55 <4.8 
5 23% 4 .084 >.79 <3.9 
8 32% 5 .094 >.71 <3.2 
8 21% 3 .113 >.95 <1.5 
all 22% 6 0 >.64 <2.8 
**we omitted organisation 6 because the p-value of its model even exceeded 10%. 
 
Conclusion research question 15: error rate predicted from the risk indicators? 
Only for two organisations a model can be formulated that is significant at the 5% level 
and has more than 20% explaining power.  But these two models are very sensitive to 
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the omission of one indicator, which makes them dependent on the interrelations of the 
indicators and not convincing for practical use. 
 
Explaining power occurrence risk vs indicators 
When we forget, for a moment, the interpretation problems with the models, we can 
look at the question whether the risk indicators give more explaining power to the 
assessments of an auditor than an assessment lead by the ARM.  This regards 
research question 16. 
Therefore we have to compare the variance explained by the bivariate relation to that 
by the multivariate relation.  We do this in table 7.12 (ordered after adjusted R2) 
 
Table 7.12 Explained variance (error rate, indicators) x OR by organization 
Organisation P-correlation R2 adjusted R2 n 
6 -.009 0 10% 25 
5 .518 27% 23% 21 
8 .720 52% 32% 17 
4 .121 1.4% 45% 21 
2 .275 7.6% 85% 22 
All .427 18% 22% 119 
 
For the explained variances R2 (of error rate x OR) we refer to table 6.7; R2 is the 
square of the P-correlation. 
It can be seen that the explained variances per organisation increase in 3 cases and 
decrease in two cases.  In two of the increase cases, the increase is dramatic, but 
unfortunately these increases are accounted for by models that we have shown to be 
hard to interpret.  With 3 increases for the (adjusted) R2, 2 decreases and an only very 
slight increase for the pooled organisations, we have to decide that it can not be 
concluded that the indicator approach leads to improved explaining power, compared to 
the classical ARM approach.   
 
Conclusion research question 16:  explaining power of risk indicators larger than that of 
OR?  
No systematic increase of explaining power by the indicator approach could be shown, 
compared to the classical ARM approach. 
  
7.3.3 Regression of the error rate on factorscores 
 
As the suppression effects are caused by interrelations of the predictors, it is worthwhile 
to investigate the predictive power of the indicators, while eliminating interrelations.  
This can be done by applying a principal components analysis on the correlations of the 
indicators and regressing the error rate on the factorscores  Because principal 
components are orthogonal, factorscores have zero correlation.  
 
Another reason for using factorscores as predictors for the error rate is, that this 
circumvents the loss of information that may be caused by only using nine (the 
‘normative’) indicators. A principal components analysis produces a number of principal 
components, each component being a linear combination of the scores on all indicators, 
so all indicators are included.  Only a limited number of principal components is 
selected, such that the number of components is much smaller than the number of 
variables and such that the explained variance is satisfactory.  The explained variance 
is the measure that accounts for the ‘information content’ of the principal components.  
So choice for a limited number of principal components also implies a loss of 
information, but this is not dependent on a choice of indicators. 
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The principal components can be used as new variables, also referred to as 
‘components’. Thus, as a result of the principal components analysis, every individual 
case has its scores on all indicators transformed into ‘componentscores’, more 
commonly referred to as ‘factorscores’.  These factorscores can be treated just like 
normal variables.  We use this property by performing a regression analysis of the error 
rate on these factorscores, just as we did with the nine ‘normative’ indicators.  It may be 
hoped that this analysis explains more variance in the error rate.  This is not only 
because the factorscores contain information from all indicators, but also because the 
components solution maps the data on dimensions that are orthogonal, so any 
collinearity of the indicators that may affect the outcome of a regression analysis is 
excluded by the model itself.  When these interrelations mask a relation between the 
error rate and the indicators, the relation with the factorscores may prove to be 
stronger. 
 
But there may also be a decrease of explained variance, for several reasons.  
1. The first may be the opposite effect of the argument just stated: a more sound data 
structure may also show that a relation between error rate and risk indicators is only 
weak. 
2. The second reason stems from the fact that a principal components analysis is 
aimed at maximizing the explained variance in the indicators.  This may result in a 
structure which not optimally predicts the error rate. 
3. The third is that a components solution will always explain only a part of the total 
variance in the indicators.  
4. This may be more so, because of a practical limitation: we can only analyse the 
data for the pooled organisations.  None of the participating organisation has 
enough cases for a principal components analysis.  An optimal result of the analysis 
asks for similar structures in the relations between the indicators over the 
organisations.  When these structures are dissimilar, the factor solution will have 
limited explained variance and consequently have less predictive power. 
With these considerations in mind we look at the principal components analysis. 
 
7.3.3.1 Factorisation of risk indicators in seven components. 
The analysis produced 7 principal components, which accounted for 67% of the 
variance.  In this solution we included the components according to the common 
criterion: an eigenvalue larger than 1.  Table 7.13 shows the outcome. 
 
Table 7.13: Variance explained by principal components 
Component Initial Eigenvalues % of Variance explained Cumulative % 
1 4,601 24,218 24,218 
2 2,232 11,748 35,966 
3 1,523 8,016 43,982 
4 1,193 6,279 50,261 
5 1,170 6,158 56,419 
6 1,091 5,743 62,162 
7 1,005 5,287 67,449 
 
We rotated the principal components with a varimax rotation, which resulted in the 
matrix of factor loadings given in table 7.14.   
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Table 7.14: Rotated Component Matrix with factorloadings* and interpretation 
risk indicator Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
errors previous audits ,296 ,424 ,201 0 -,144 ,327 0 
changes since last audit 0 0 ,195 0 -,795 0 ,115 
quality documentation ,415 ,215 ,299 0 0 -,593 0 
segregation of duties EDP* 0 ,131 ,421 ,402 ,574 ,200 ,121 
segregation of duties other ,460 -,159 ,586 ,306 ,102 ,101 0 
        
strength system of controls ,182 ,273 ,568 ,131 -,215 ,155 0 
access to edp systems* ,279 0 ,291 -,253 ,476 ,479 0 
access other systems and assets ,137 ,156 ,240 ,248 0 ,659 0 
segregations maintained? ,202 0 ,153 ,833 ,101 ,109 0 
routine processing? ,273 ,197 ,687 0 0 0 ,263 
        
pressure for high performance? 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,894 
structural changes? -,106 ,600 0 ,268 0 0 ,500 
auditability of law, regulations -,233 ,596 ,444 0 0 -,111 -,187 
existence audittrail ,116 ,718 0 0 0 0 0 
nature of organisation 0 ,789 ,166 0 ,253 0 ,163 
        
attitude management ,842 0 ,206 ,128 0 0 0 
expertise personnel ,377 ,463 0 ,449 0 0 0 
attitude personnel ,858 0 ,233 ,149 0 0 0 
complexity of organisation ,515 ,407 -,210 0 -,240 ,321 0 
 
Interpretation in short 
atti 
tude 
nature
organi
sation
natu 
re job
seggr
ega 
tion 
stabili
ty 
ac 
cess 
pressure 
on 
employee
*All loadings smaller than .1 are rounded down to 0. 
 
The distribution of the factor loadings over the indicators allows a relatively clear 
interpretation when a high threshold for the loadings is chosen.  In table 7.14 we 
shaded the loadings larger than .59.  These loadings determine our interpretation of the 
components, which is given in a keyword at the bottom of the column concerned.  It 
must be noticed that with lower thresholds (for instance .40) for the loadings, the 
interpretability strongly reduces.  This is no problem for the outcomes of the regression 
analyses: they are not affected, but it should be seen as a caveat when interpreting it.  
The interpretation of the components is given in table 7.15. 
 
Table 7.15: Interpretation of components 
Component Interpretation 
1   attitude 
factor 
The indicators regarding the attitude with respect to internal control of the 
personnel and the management load highly on the first component; this is 
the ‘attitude factor’ 
2    nature of 
organisation 
factor 
Indicators regarding the ‘state of the world’ load highly on this component: 
the nature of the organisation, the auditability of laws and regulations, have 
there been changes.  The existence of an audit trail not only refers to this 
‘state of the world’ but also to the operation of controls; this is the ‘nature of 
organisation factor’ (with impact on auditability) 
 
3  nature of 
job factor 
The only indicator loading highly is that regarding the nature of the job, 
especially whether it has a routine character; interpretation is not selfevident, 
because indicators regarding controls and segregation of duties just miss the 
.59 criterion; still our interpretation is ‘nature of job factor’ 
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Component Interpretation 
4 segregation 
factor 
The only indicator loading highly on this component is that regarding the 
operation of the segregation controls; the loadings of the two segregation 
indicators are relatively high, so support our interpretation: the ‘segregation 
of duties factor’. 
5   stability 
factor 
Only one indicator loads highly on this component: that regarding possible 
changes in controls since the last audit; our interpretation: the ‘stability 
factor’. 
6   access 
factor 
Two indicators load highly on this component: one regarding access control 
and one regarding the quality of the written documentation; our 
interpretation: the ‘access control factor’ supported by the relatively high 
loading of yet another access indicator. 
7   pressure 
factor 
Only one indicator loads highly on this component: that regarding pressure 
for high performance. So this obviously will be our interpretation of this factor 
 
7.3.3.2 More on the quality of the risk indicators 
We extend our discussion on the quality of the risk indicators (as announced in 7.2.3).  
The interpretation of the components shows that many of the relevant aspects of the 
object of risk analysis are covered.  These relevant aspects can be divided into 
contextual aspects, the ones that cannot directly be influenced by organisational and 
control measures, and into organisational aspects: the things you can do to manage 
and keep control of the business- and administrative processes. 
Contextual aspects are: (a) nature of business, (b) nature of organisation, (c) nature of 
job, (d) quality of personnel (expertise and attitude) and nature and stability of (e) 
environment and of the (f) organisation.  
Organisational aspects are: (g) various types of segregation of duties, (h)  various types 
of access control, (i) various controls to safeguard the quality of the processes. 
The next table shows how they are related to the components. 
 
 Table 7.16: Coverage of aspects of risk assessment by the components 
component→ 
aspect↓ 
Attitude 
(1) 
Nature 
organisa
tion(2) 
Nature 
job (3) 
Segre 
gation 
(4) 
Stability 
(5) 
Access 
(6) 
Pres 
 sure 
 (7) 
(a) nature of 
business, 
 x      
(b) nature of 
organisation 
 x      
(c) nature of job   x    x 
(d) quality of 
personnel 
x       
(e) stability of 
environment 
       
(f) stability of 
organisation 
    x  x 
(g) segregation 
of duties 
   x    
(h) access 
control 
     x  
(i) various 
controls 
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Only two of the aspects are not covered by the factor structure: the nature and stability 
of the environment and the various controls18. This can be seen as an indication that 
the structure and consequently the indicators cover the risk-assessment job of the 
auditor and have a similar structure.  Moreover the indicators are exhaustive with 
regard to the relevant aspects of the assessment task, except for one contextual 
aspect.  For only the stability of the environment is not included (it also is not present in 
the indicators); the aspect regarding the various controls has a fuzzy boundary with the 
other controls and moreover is present in an indicator.  We conclude that the factor 
structure is very satisfactory: it allows a satisfactory interpretation and it covers the risk-
assessment job to a large extent.  Evidently this conclusion can be seen as a 
confirmation of the conclusion at the end of 7.2.3 
 
7.3.3.3 The regression analysis 
With this result of the principal components analysis, it makes sense to perform a 
regression analysis of the error rate on the factorscores.  We did a simple analysis on 
the pooled organisations, in which we entered all seven factors.  This led to a 
regression model with an adjusted R2 of 11,6% and a p-value of .4%.  This is only half 
of the explained variance found with the untransformed nine ‘normative’ indicators 
(22%; see table 7.8).  One or more of the five possibilities mentioned at the start of this 
section will have caused this rather weak result.  Table 7.17 accounts for one of these 
possible reasons: the models at the organisation level varied considerably.  Moreover 
the plus-signs and minus-signs varied on the same factor for varying organizations, only 
with some exceptions: the factor “(segreg. of) duties” consistently had the ‘+’-sign, the 
factor “access” consistently had the ‘-’-sign.  The other factors varied in sign.  It should 
be noted that the expected sign again is the minus-sign.  It also should be noted that 
the varying models over the organisations may account for the illogical signs. 
 
Table 7.17: Error rate explained by factors, per organisation 
Organ
isation 
Adjusted 
R2 
components 
(sign of regression weight, if ‘+’, in parentheses)  
p-
value
df 
2 27% Job nature, segreg. duties(+), stability, access, pressure 7% 21 
4 43% Attitude(+), organisation, stability(+), pressure(+) 1.4% 19 
5 38% Attitude, access .5% 20 
6 19% Attitude, organisation(+), segreg. duties(+), access, pressure(+) 11% 24 
8 63% Attitude, organisation(+), stability(+), access, pressure .5% 16 
All 12% all(1 factor ‘+’-sign, rest ‘-’) .4% 117
 
Table 7.18 gives the t-values of the coefficients of the factors in the regression model 
for the pooled organisations.  Only two of the factors have a significant coefficient.   
 
Table 7.18: Coefficients of the factors in the regression of the error rate 
Component t-value p-value 
attitude factor -.743 .459 
organisation factor -.881 .380 
job factor -1.53 .129 
segregation factor .598 .551 
stability factor -2.552* .012 
access factor -1.42 .158 
pressure factor -3.128** .002 
*  significant at the 5% level  (2-tailed)    ** significant at the 1% level  (2-tailed) 
                                                          
18 When we observe that two segregation indicators and the ‘strength of the system of controls’ 
load highly on factor 3 we could also state that this lack of coverage is due to our strict cut off for 
the interpretation of the factors.  We could also choose to lower the cut off value for the loadings 
(at the cost of loss of interpretability) and thus gain in coverage of the aspects. 
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Conclusion regression on factorscores 
The explaining power of the factorscores is only half of that of the nine ‘normative’ 
indicators.  The models for the distinct organisations strongly vary, indicating a lack of 
uniformity or consistency in risk assessment over organisations.   
 
7.3.4 Regression of the error rate on risk scales 
 
We constructed four scales, which we will call ‘risk scales’.  Each of the risk scales 
represented a major aspect of risk assessment: indicators that apply to properties  
1. of the administrative system (SYSTEM, built with: segregation of duties edp, 
segregation of duties other, access other systems and assets, access to edp 
systems, segregations maintained?, strength system of controls;  
2. related to the personnel (MANAPER built with: attitude management, attitude 
personnel,  expertise personnel); 
3. regarding the context of the audit object (POPULA built with: structural changes?, 
complexity of organisation, nature of organisation) and  
4. regarding auditability of the object (AUDITA built with: auditability of law, regulations 
and existence audittrail). 
 
The risk scales were formed on logical, substantive grounds: in principle the terms in a 
scale belong to the same kind of aspects: system indicators (segregation and access) 
combined with other system indicators, etc. Only indicators which caused the 
Cronbach’s alpha of a scale to drop below .48 were skipped. 
 
Constructing a scale out of various indicators has the effect of ‘smoothing’ the 
measurements.  An extreme measurement on one indicator is likely to be compensated 
by a less extreme measurement on another in the same scale, unless the object itself is 
‘extreme’ on that scale.  This, as a consequence, also applies to the relations of the 
scales, especially with the error rate.  A strong relation, caused by combinations of the 
predictors and the predictand that emerged by chance, is much less probable to occur, 
when the predictor is a scale.  This may cause the relations found to change compared 
to that with the original indicators as predictors: the weak relations may grow (but not 
necessarily), the strong relations may shrimp (but not necessarily). 
  
We performed a regression analysis of the error rate on these risk scales, in which 
analysis we also included the indicator for the expected influence of previous errors, 
because we expected it to have predictive value on its own that can not be missed.  As 
in the previous analyses, we chose the model with the highest adjusted R2.  We show 
the results in tables 7.18 and 7.19. 
 
Table 7.19: Error rate explained by four scales and one indicator; the explained 
variance 
Organisation Adjusted R2 * n p-value 
2  10%(85%) 22 .146 
4  47%(45%) 21 .008 
5  31%(24%) 22 .024 
6 0 (10%) 25  
8  42%(32%) 17 .018 
All 4%(22%) 118 .070 
* variance explained by the nine ‘normative’ indicators in parentheses (see table 7.9) 
 
Table 7.19 shows that for the organisations 4, 5 and 8 the explained variance 
increased. But for organisations 2, 6 and for the pooled organisations, the explained 
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variance (dramatically) dropped.  Especially for the pooled organisations this is hard to 
explain, because the scales represent meaningful aspects of risk assessment and have 
good properties as a scale.  For organisation 2 it may be related to the instability of the 
solution found, as discussed in 7.3.2 after table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.20 shows which risk scales are included in the regression models 
 
Table 7.20: Error rate explained by risk scales 
Orga 
nisation 
Explained 
variance 
Indicators in the model (in order of associated 
T-value; ‘+’-sign when positive regression 
weight) 
significant 
predictors (at 
5%) 
2  10%(85%) system, popula (+) none 
4  47%(45%) manaper(+), audita, erroprev, system first 3 
5  31%(24%) manaper, popula, audita(+) first 1 
6  0 (10%)  none 
8  42%(32%) audita (+), system, erroprev first 2 
All 4%(22%) system, popula, audita first 1 
 
Table 7.20 shows that even with scales significant predictors can have the unexpected 
‘+’-sign in their weight. This strengthens the indication that some of the indicators (or a 
subset of them) are counter-intuitively related to the error rate.  But this implies serious 
problems when the indicators in their present form would be used as predictors for the 
error rate.  We will discuss these recurring illogical signs in greater detail in section 7.4. 
 
7.3.5 Relation of the risk indicators with the transformed error rate 
 
We concluded 7.3.1 with a discussion on necessity of transforming the error rate, 
because of the many outliers in the scatterplots shown in 7.3.1, combined with a great 
density of very small error rates and of zeros. 
One of the ways to circumvent this problem is to categorise the values of the error rate.  
We did this by creating a variable “ERRCATEG” (category for error rate) as follows: 
 
Table 7.21: Error rate categorised 
value of error rate Value of ERRCATEG 
0 0 
>0 and <.003 1 
>=.003 and <.015 2 
>=.15 3 
 
With this transformed error we re-analysed three relations: 
1. we recalculated the Pearson- and the Kendall-correlations, 
2. we produced a cross tabulation of the indicator with highest correlation with the 
categorised error and one with a small correlation; these cross tabulations being an 
equivalent of a scatterplot 
3. and we regressed the categorised error rate on the nine ‘normative’ indicators.   
 
The first operation 
The results of the first re-analysis are shown in table 7.22.  For the sake of  comparison 
we reproduce the P(earson)- and K(endall)-correlation with the untransformed error rate 
(in the 2nd and 4th column).  We also shade the correlations of the nine ‘normative’ 
indicators with the (categories of the) error rate. 
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Table 7.22: P- and K-correlations risk indicators with categories error rate (n = 119) 
P- and K- correlation with→ 
indicator↓ 
error rate 
(P-corr) 
 error 
category 
(P-corr) 
error rate 
(K-corr) 
error 
category 
(K-corr) 
errors previous audits -.105 -.152 -.0137 -.152 
changes since last audit .125 .074 .023 .048 
quality documentation .049 .031 .073 .044 
segregation of duties EDP†‡ -.305** -.195 -.142 -.162* 
segregation of duties other .091 .005 .042 .023 
     
Strength system of controls -.184* -.222* -.184* -.208* 
access to edp systems† -.313** -.151 -.113 -.112 
Access other systems and assets -.012 .128 .125 .114 
segregations maintained? .033 .091 .11 .109 
routine processing? -.236** -.283** -.219** -.242** 
     
pressure for high performance? -.226* -.216* -.201** -.207* 
structural changes? -.086 -.165 -.129 -.139 
auditability of law, regulations -.028 -.019 -.022 -.030 
Existence audittrail .058 -.043 .007 -.015 
nature of organisation† -.138 -.282* -.194** -.228** 
attitude management -.109 .015 .031 .021 
expertise personnel† -.220* -.063 -.065 -.064 
attitude personnel -.053  .008 .044 .017 
complexity of organisation -.038 .005 .016 .011 
*significant at the .05 level ** significant at the .01 level 
†  major change in P-correlation for error category  ‡ major change in K-correlation for error category 
 
We looked for ‘major changes’: changes from significant to insignificant or vice versa. 
As can be seen, according to this criterion the P-correlation shows a major change with 
four indicators (three as a decrease and one as an increase); only one of the K-
correlations shows a major change (from insignificant into significant; the size of the 
change is not very dramatic).  This result is not surprising.  Some major changes may 
be expected in the P-correlation, as the categorisation of the error rate smoothes the 
outliers.  So smaller P-correlations are to be expected.  Only with exceptional 
covariation of error rate and an indicator, an increase of the P-correlation will occur.  
The changes in the K-correlation may be expected to be smaller, as the categorisation 
actually is a crude kind of ranking. 
 
The ‘normative’ indicators covered only 3 of the 6 significant P-correlations with the 
error rate; they appear to cover only one of the four significant P-correlations with the 
categorised error rate.  In bivariate relations for the pooled organisations, the 
‘normative’ indicators appear to be not the best predictors. 
 
The second operation 
The second operation with the categorised error rate, showed some bivariate relation 
by a cross tabulation.  We did this for the strongest and for one of the weakest P-
correlations.  Table 7.23 shows the result for the indicator concerning the complexity of 
the organisation, having a correlation of only 4% with the error rate. 
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Table 7.23 : Error category by complexity of organisation 
error category→ 
complexity of  
organisation↓ 
0 1 2 3 row 
total 
-1 2 
14% 
6 
43% 
3 
21% 
3 
21% 
14 
100% 
0 28 
43% 
10 
15% 
10 
15% 
17 
26% 
65 
100% 
1 11 
28% 
10 
25% 
11 
28% 
8 
20% 
40 
100% 
column total 41 
35% 
26 
22% 
24 
20% 
28 
24% 
119 
100% 
2-sided p-value of Pearson Chi-square: .120;   2-sided p-value of linear by linear association: .953 
 
The tabulation fully confirms the absence of a relation: for all values of the indicator the 
row percentages do not show a systematic increase or decrease compared to the 
marginal percentages.  The two-sided p-value of the Pearson Chi-square statistic is 
consistent with these observations: it is considerably more than .05. 
Table 7.24 shows the result for the highest P-correlation. 
 
Table 7.24: error category by ‘routine processing?’ 
error category→ 
routine 
processing?↓ 
0 1 2 3 row 
total 
-1 4 
16% 
5 
20% 
9 
36% 
7 
28%
25 
100% 
0 16 
33% 
8 
17% 
8 
17% 
16 
33%
48 
100% 
1 21 
47% 
12 
27% 
7 
16% 
5 
11%
45 
100% 
column total 41 
35% 
25 
21% 
24 
20% 
28 
24%
118 
100% 
2-sided p-value of Pearson Chi-square: .025;   2-sided p-value of linear by linear association: .002 
 
Now for the low quality (risk high) score on the indicator, the row percentages show an 
increase for the higher error rates and for the high quality (low risk) score on the 
indicator a systematic decrease for the higher error rates, as may be expected.  The p-
value of the Chi-square statistic makes the observed relation significant at the 5% level.  
The linear by linear association is significant at the 1% level, consistent with the result 
shown in table 7.22. 
 
The bivariate relations between indicators and categorised error rate are consistent with 
the corresponding bivariate relations for the untransformed error rate.  This means that 
the picture of the bivariate relations with the untransformed error rate, should not be 
attributed to ill-behaving data, but should be seen as a fair representation of this (lack 
of) relation. 
 
The third operation 
The third operation consists of regressing the categorised error rate on the nine 
‘normative’ indicators.  The analysis produced a model with 5 predictors (indicators), 
having an explained variance (adjusted R2) = 14,3%, with p-value = 0, n= 119.  Table 
7.25 shows the indicators that were included in the model, with the associated t-values. 
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Table 7.25: ‘Normative’ indicators predicting the categorised error rate 
Indicator t-value p-value 
segregation of duties EDP -2.923 .004 
access other systems and assets 2.795 .006 
strength system of controls -2.396 .018 
segregations maintained? 1.999 .048 
errors previous audits -1.779 .078 
 
Only the last predictor had a p-value larger than .05. Consequently four predictors have 
a significant regression weight. With two of them having the illogical plus-sign. 
 
Regressing on the highest correlating indicators is a very inviting activity, because 
these indicators have both the logical (negative) correlation with the (categorised) error 
rate and also have much higher bivariate correlations.  Moreover, a regression analysis 
on these highest correlating indicators might give an indication of possible improvement 
of the prediction of the error rate from better predictors.  So we will make one exception 
on the policy chosen in which we only regressed on the ‘normative’ indicators, by doing 
one analysis with the indicators correlating highest on the categorised error rate. We 
chose the indicators with a correlation of at least .15 (in absolute value).  From the 
models resulting from the stepwise analysis, we again chose the model with the highest 
explained variance (adjusted R2).  This gave a model with an explained variance 
(adjusted R2) = 12.6%, with p-value  = .001, n=119.  Table 7.26 shows the indicators 
that were included in the model, with the associated t-values.  
 
Table 7.26: Highest correlating indicators predicting the categorised error rate 
Indicator t-value p-value 
pressure for high performance? -1.955 .053 
nature of organisation -1.886 .062 
routine processing? -1.473 .144 
strength system of controls -1.282 .202 
 
None of these predictors was significant at the 5% level.  All weights have the logical 
minus sign.  This corresponds to the high negative correlations of the indicators with the 
categorised error rate.  Except for the more logical model, with only negative weights for 
the predictors, the operation of taking the highest correlating indicators does not lead to 
more explained variance and none of the predictors is significant.  So ruling out the 
illogical weights leads to insignificant predictors and less explained variance. 
 
7.4  Summary, Discussion and Conclusions 
 
7.4.1 Summary 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate if risk assessment decomposed by way of risk 
indicators leads to an improvement of risk assessment.  This investigation was done in 
three steps:  
1. the consistency of risk assessment by way of risk indicators with risk assessment by 
way of the audit risk model was investigated;  
2. the predictive power of risk assessment for the error rate, by way of nine ‘normative’ 
risk indicators, was investigated; 
3. the predictive power for the error rate of linear combinations of these risk indicators 
was investigated. 
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The first step: that of consistency of the assessments by risk indicators and according 
to the audit risk model, led to satisfactory results.  From this it can be concluded that the 
risk indicators cover the way auditors assess risks in their practice.  This coverage was 
also found in interviews with practising auditors, in a pilot study analysing five audits 
(Broeze et al 1997), by comparison with the textbook of Arens and Loebbecke (1997, 
chapters 8 and 9), and in a logical analysis of the principal components.  So we may 
conclude that the substance of the risk indicators was appropriate. 
 
The second step: that of the predictive power of the “normative” indicators, led to 
varying results.  The bivariate correlations between the risk indicators and the error rate 
in general are relatively small; regression analyses led to varying explained variances, 
which means that the predictive power is not stable over organisations.  Moreover some 
regression models are very dependent on just one indicator.  This, combined with many 
positive regression weights, where the logical sign is negative, makes the indicators as 
predictors of the error rate either not reliable or hard to interpret.  Moreover the 
explained variance in the models with the risk indicators, compared with the variance 
explained by the occurrence risk, improved strongly in three cases but decreased in two 
cases.  Although according to the first step, the substance of the indicators may be 
appropriate, the scoring was such that only three of the six highest correlating with the 
error rate and only one out of four of the highest correlating with the categorised error 
rate belonged to the nine ‘normative’ ones we selected.  Our attempt to improve on the 
explained variance by regressing the categorised error rate on the eight highest 
correlating indicators led to a smaller explained variance 
 
The third step: using linear combinations of risk indicators for the prediction of the error 
rate, neither improved their predictive power, nor eliminated the unexpected ‘+’-signs 
from the regression equations. 
 
7.4.2 Discussion 
 
It is hard to give clear causes for these disappointing results. The occurrence of the 
illogical positive regression weights especially is hard to understand, even if we take the 
phenomenon of ‘suppression’ (see 7.3.2, after table 7.10) into consideration.  We 
discuss seven possible reasons for these results. 
 
1. They may be due to the form of the risk indicators: we did not only ask for the 
quality of the aspects of the audit object that are relevant for the assessments 
task but, at the same time, we asked to assess the possible influence of these 
aspects on the risk of the occurrence of errors.  Maybe that assessment 
interacted too much, and in a complicated way, with the assessments asked 
with the other risk indicators.  Only decomposing into the quality of aspects like 
in Bell & Carcello (2000) might have been better (considering the positive result 
of Bell & Carcello).  
2. They may be due to the indicators being formulated in a negative way: high-
quality on the aspect represented by the indicator led to a high score on the 
indicator, but implied low risk, so a high score on a risk indicator would be 
expected to correspond to a low score on the error rate.  Although this was 
explicitly explained in the questionnaire, confusion may have taken place when 
the respondents filled out the questionnaire: whether high-quality on the aspect 
covered by the indicator meant a high score or a low score.  Although this is a 
possible cause, it would lead to systematically positive correlations.  But in fact 
there are both (significant) positive and (significant) negative correlations.  
3. They may be due to pure confusion, caused in some way or another.  But then 
more or less random scores on all risk indicators should occur, which would 
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prevent significant results as we have found.  Combined with a clear instruction 
in the questionnaire, this possibility is improbable. 
4. They will be due to the phenomenon of ‘suppression’ as discussed in 7.3.2, after 
table 7.10.  It will account for many of the illogical ‘+’-signs, thus offering a 
satisfactory explanation for these signs.  But the difficulty in interpretation 
remains.  Moreover, also bivariate correlations show the illogical ‘+’.  So the 
suppression only partly gives a satisfactory explanation. 
5. They may be due to the error rates being distributed in a very inhomogeneous 
way: many zeros, many small error rates a few larger error rates and some very 
large error rates.  This explanation is partially satisfactory: we categorised the 
error rates into four size-classes.  The regression analysis on this categorised 
error rate showed only 2/3rd of the explained variance of that with the 
untransformed error rate.  This 2/3rd may be seen as the explanatory power that 
is robust against the ill-behaving distribution of the error rate.  The 1/3rd that 
disappeared may be seen as distribution having its influence.  Also in this 
analysis, the illogical regression weights do not disappear. 
6. The anomalies appear to be organisation dependent as only some have the 
observed anomalies in the assessments of their auditors.  Then this anomaly 
occurs for different indicators per organisation.  Some (5 and 8) appear to have 
the logical relations in their assessments.  To come to stronger conclusions, one 
could ask for larger samples per organisation, but the perspective is not very 
promising given all the illogical relations, per organisation, for the pooled 
organisations, for linear combinations of indicators and for the transformed error 
rate. 
7. They may be due to susceptibility of auditors for illogical assessments.  This 
possibility raises more problems than it solves, because if we would accept it, 
we would have to explain why this does not cause anomalies in a more 
consistent way.  So we reject this possibility. 
 
7.4.3 Conclusion 
 
It must be concluded that the risk indicators, in the way we use them, do not 
systematically improve risk assessment compared to the assessment of the traditional 
occurrence risk.   
 
7.4.4. What next 
 
With so many problems and unexplainable anomalies, we decided not to continue the 
research on the risk indicators, but to continue the research by investigating the validity 
of the classical risk assessment of the occurrence risk, because the varying strength 
per organisation of the relation between error rate (and other criteria) and the 
occurrence risk raised questions concerning this validity. 
 
We conclude with a summary of our findings, organised as answers to the research 
questions applying to the performance  of the risk indicators. 
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7.5  Summary of findings research questions 11 through 16 
 
The next table gives an overview of the findings reported in this chapter. 
 
Table 7.27: Overview of findings chapter 7 
Research question  Result 
11: Are the bivariate relations 
between risk indicators and the 
occurrence risk in the expected 
direction and of sufficient 
strength? 
For distinct organisations, the bivariate relations 
found neither form counter evidence, nor give strong 
support to the consistency of risk assessment by 
means of the risk indicators on the one hand with risk 
assessment according to the ARM on the other hand. 
For the pooled organisations, the consistency is more 
evident: almost all 19 correlations have the expected 
sign; their magnitude is modest. 
12: Can the occurrence risk be 
predicted from the risk indicators 
by way of a regression model? 
The multivariate relation  for the pooled organisations 
is relatively weak, possibly due to dissimilar 
assessment structure over the organisations. 
The multivariate relations per organisation are 
relatively strong, except for one organisation. This 
means that assessment on the risk indicators and 
classical risk assessment are consistent per 
organisation.  
13: Can the risk indicators be 
seen as an appropriate 
representation of the view 
auditors have on risk 
assessment? 
Assessment of risk by way of the risk indicators and 
assessment of risk by way of the audit risk model are 
consistent.  Moreover this consistency is confirmed by 
the judgment of the respondents that the indicators 
cover the way the respondent does risk assessment.  
Principal components analysis confirmed this 
consistency. 
14:  Are the bivariate relations 
between the risk indicators and 
the error rate in the expected 
direction and of sufficient 
strength? 
The bivariate relations are only very weak: there are 
some significant correlations, but the ratio of (the 
expected) minus-signed correlations to (not-expected) 
plus-signed correlations is not convincing. 
 
15:  Can the error rate be 
predicted from the risk indicators 
by way of a regression model? 
The indicators do not account for a convincing 
prediction of the error rate, neither with the original 
indicators as predictors, nor with predictors 
transformed into principal components or other 
scales, or with the error rate transformed into 
categories. 
 
16:  Is the explaining power for 
the error rate of the risk indicators 
larger than that of the classical 
risk assessment?  
No increase of explaining power by the indicator 
approach could be shown, compared to the classical 
ARM approach. 
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Chapter 8: Validation of Risk Assessment Revisited 
 
 
Four relatively complete actions in three studies were taken in our research into the 
‘real risk’: (1) validation of the classical assessment of OR, (2) an attempt to improve 
classical assessment of OR by decomposition of the assessment over risk indicators 
(1st and 2nd action formed the first study), (3) a replication of the validation of classical 
assessment of OR in the second study and (4) investigation of the predictive power of 
system tests for the error rate in the third study.  Varying validity of classical risk 
assessment per organisation (1st action) and problematic results with risk indicators (2nd 
action) led to the choice for the replication (3rd action).   
In this chapter we report the results of the 3rd action. 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will perform a replication (as far as possible) of the research carried 
out in chapter 6.  There we saw that there was much variability in the degree of validity 
between the organisations.  In this introduction we will give an outline of research 
questions, design and other relevant aspects of this second study in our research.  The 
validity of the assessed risk with respect to the ‘audit position’ (section 8.2), the error 
rate (section 8.3) the sampling risk (section 8.4) and the conditional distribution of the 
error rate (section 8.5) will be reported.  We will do this both at the level of the pooled 
and the distinct organisations (where possible).  In section 8.6 we will try and find some 
moderator variables and in section 8.7 we will look for the predictive qualities of the 
error ‘of the previous year’ for the error ‘of this year’.  In section 8.8 we will discuss our 
findings and come to conclusions.  Section 8.9 gives a summary of the findings in the 
form of a table. 
 
We concluded chapter 7 with the assessment that improvement of risk assessment by 
decomposition into the assessment on risk indicators did not work, at least not in the 
way we tried it, and that it would be wise to get a clear picture of the validity of classical 
risk assessment first.  As a consequence of the conclusions of chapter 6 and chapter 7, 
we chose to continue this research in a second study, by doing another investigation 
into the validity of risk assessment in the classical way: the assessment of the 
occurrence risk in the audit risk approach.  With this continuation, we hoped to find 
validity on the same criteria as used in chapter 6, but in a more stable way. 
 
Participating organisations 
In the second study, our data were collected from the audit files of the audit 
departments of the Dutch ministries, regarding the annual accounts of the year 2001.  
Files regarding the audit of these accounts are available to the Netherlands Court of 
Audit (NCA), as the natural consequence of its task to certify the annual accounts of all 
Ministries.  For our research, we were granted access to these files, both by the NCA 
and the audit departments.  For a start, all audit departments were a candidate for 
collecting the data from their files, but a kind of natural selection took place:  
• firstly on the possibility of matching the assessed risks and the errors found 
without too much effort.  The audit departments have there own logic in 
organising their audit files and as a consequence, it appeared that for many 
departments, the matching of risk assessment and related error would be too 
laborious; 
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• secondly on the necessity that only cases with "real risk assessments" were 
included.  Some departments just set the OR at “high” in order to circumvent the 
necessity of testing the controls when assurance is derived from risk analysis.  
They deemed this to be more laborious than just doing substantive testing, or 
other substantive work.  For our study these ‘assessments’ of OR are not useful, 
so these departments were not included in our research. 
 
It appeared that at four departments (sometimes a part of ) the necessary data, were 
available in the audit files: they regarded a complete audit risk approach, while error 
rate and assessed OR could be matched with reasonable effort.  We will refer to them 
as “Organisation 1, 2, 3, 4”.  None of these organisations also participated in the first 
study of this research.  Also in this study, we agreed on the condition that the 
organisations would be kept anonymous.   
 
8.1.1 The research questions 
 
A selection of the research questions stated in 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 applies to this second 
study.  We skipped research questions 7 and 9, because we did not have the 
necessary data on the complexity of the audit object and on first vs. repeated audits.  
Obviously, the research questions with respect to the risk indicators do not apply in this 
study.  We summarise the research questions for this chapter. 
 
Research question 1: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the position 
of the error in a sample relative to the materiality? 
Research question 2a: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the error 
rate in the audited account? 
Research question 2b: To which degree is this correlation stable over organisations? 
Research question 3: To which degree will risk assessment correlate with the sampling 
risk (SR)? 
Research question 4: To which degree will the distribution of the error rate vary with the 
level of assessed risk? 
Research question 5: To which degree will the correlation between error rate and risk 
assessment increase when calculated for groups of accounts with the same level of 
materiality compared to the correlation for the whole group of accounts?  
Research question 6: To which degree will the occurrence risk (OR) show a relation 
with the sampling risk, which is stronger than that between OR and the ‘audit position’, 
or OR and the error rate? 
Research question 8: To which degree will the level of validation increase with the effort 
put in the assessment of OR? 
Research question 10: To which degree will the level of validity vary over 
organisations?  
 
We added two new research questions: 
 
Research question 18: To which degree does the validity of risk assessment depend on 
the type of transactions involved? 
Our data regarded two types of transactions: obligations and payments.  These are 
closely related, but in practice their accounts are separately analysed as to the 
occurrence risk that applies to them.  It is hard to tell whether the type will influence the 
validity of the assessment of the occurrence risk.  Obligations are at the basis of every 
payment; especially legality is accounted for when the obligation is made.  And in 
governmental transactions legality is a very important feature, so it may be expected 
that risk assessment with respect to obligations will be done very carefully.  On the 
other hand, the real expenditure is done in the payment.  Thus an error in the payment 
has direct financial consequences, so it may be expected that risk assessment with 
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respect to payments will also be done very carefully.  It is hard to say which of the two 
reasons for ‘extra care’ will win, so we chose to formulate question 17 as an open 
question. 
 
Research question 19: To which degree will the error of the previous year predict the 
error for this year? 
By including this research question, we investigated the possibility that the error of the 
previous year may be a valuable extra in risk assessment, or even a replacement for 
risk assessment if it would turn out to be invalid.  When the administrative processes 
are stable from last year into the current year, it hardly needs an explanation that the 
error of the previous year may be expected to have this predictive quality.  Therefore in 
risk assessment the error of the previous year is always an important feature of the 
audit object.  But we also have an opposite possible effect, discussed in 3.2.1 leading to 
expectation E, that the error of this year would regress negatively on the error of last 
year.  So we can also say that by including this research question we investigated a 
part of the basis of risk assessment.  It opens the possibility of a comparison of the 
error of previous year with risk assessment on their performance as a predictor of the 
error rate (of this year).  Unfortunately we do not have data on the possible changes in 
the administrative processes, making it impossible to test for either the stability or the 
negative regression effect. 
 
8.1.2 The data 
 
The data were collected by means of a questionnaire that again was discussed with the 
audit organisation that was willing to provide for the data.  The discussion was less 
complicated than that in the first study, because no risk indicators were involved.  The 
‘questions’ were only meant to guide the data collection from the audit files, which we 
ourselves did in this study.  Two other employees of the NCA were also involved in the 
data collection and in the discussions on the analysis.  The data regarded the annual 
accounts of 2001. 
 
The number of audit cases per selected organisation varied considerably.  With three 
organisations (2,3,4) we used all available audit cases, satisfying our information need;  
with one organisation (1) we used 37 of the available 70 cases.  The degree of detail 
and the information available on a number of background variables also varied.  
Background variables were chosen, which could possibly serve as moderator variables.  
Per audit case we collected the following data (if available): 
• the nature of the transaction (payment or obligation) 
• is it a first engagement (yes or no) 
• the number of days spent for risk analysis  
• the nature of the transaction (routinely or not) 
• the level of materiality 
• the size of the account (in Dutch guilders) 
• the way transactions were selected (by statistical sample, or other) 
• the size of the sample 
• the inherent risk  
• the internal control risk (results of system testing included) 
• the size of the error found (before corrections, if applicable) 
• the audit opinion. 
 
8.1.3 Data processing 
 
In this second study of the research, we had the information on the inherent risk (IR) 
and the internal control risk (ICR).  Our research questions were on the occurrence risk 
Chapter 8: Validation of Risk Assessment Revisited 
 142
(OR).  So we had to transform IR and ICR into OR.  We did that by making use of the 
table of HCDAD (1997) in which for every combination of IR and ICR a level of 
assurance is given that has to be generated by the substantive testing, or other 
substantive procedures (see section 1.1).  The following table shows this 
transformation. 
 
Table 8.1: Transformation of inherent risk and internal control risk into “reliability lack” 
Inherent risk→ 
Internal control risk↓ 
low medium high 
low .67 .78 .83 
medium .83 .89 .92 
high .90 .93 .95 
 
In this thesis we call the assurance to be generated “reliability lack”.  Obviously it 
represents the assessed occurrence risk.  In some analyses we will categorise this 
‘reliability lack’ in 5 categories, by means of a new variable OR2, created from inherent 
risk and internal control risk as shown in table 8.2. 
 
Table 8.2: Transformation of inherent risk and internal control risk into “OR2” 
Inherent risk→ 
Internal control risk↓ 
low medium high 
low 3 4 5 
medium 4 5 6 
high 5 6 7 
 
Because in the data OR2=4 (which corresponds with two possible values of ‘reliability 
lack’) does not occur, for every value of the "reliability lack" there is exactly one value of 
OR2 (but not v.v.).  In this chapter we will use the names "reliability lack (occurrence 
risk )" for the transformation of table 8.1 and "occurrence risk" for the transformation of 
table 8.2. 
 
Organisation 2 did not assess the inherent risk, but only the internal control risk.  For 
the analysis of the pooled data, we set the inherent risk at "high", so that risk 
assessment for this organisation became compatible to a certain extent with that of the 
other organisations.  But by imputing a standard value for the inherent risk, we influence 
the outcomes.  Therefore we will never give a result for the pooled organisations, 
organisation 2 included, without also giving the result for the pooled organisations, 
organisation 2 excluded and in various analyses we only pool organisations 1,3 and 4.  
 
8.1.4 Validity and generalisability 
 
We got data from four audit departments of the Dutch government.  The same 
considerations on generalisability as in the first study apply to this second study: the 
sample of organisations is not random, but a kind of "convenience sample"; the 
conclusions apply to the organisations in the sample, not to the individual auditors.   
 
Also in this study, it is not clear to which extent the conclusions for the participating 
organisations apply to risk assessment in general.  Actually, this also would be true if 
the sample of participating organisations would have been random from some clearly 
defined set of organisations.  This, because a size of 4 hardly allows interesting and 
statistically sound conclusions to whichever larger set.  So again, as in the first study, 
we show the existence of phenomena and can state that they apply to some wider set 
of organisations, but we cannot give clear boundaries for this set. 
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8.2 Risk assessment and ‘audit position’ 
 
8.2.1 Definition of ‘audit position’ 
 
For this analysis we again use the variable "audit position" as we defined it in 2.3.2.  It 
is "OK" when the most likely error is smaller than materiality.  It is "not OK" in the other 
cases.  In case of a valid risk assessment, the "not OK"-positions may be expected to 
coincide with the higher "reliability lack" (occurrence risk), so when "OK" is coded with 1 
and "not OK" with 0, a negative point-biserial correlation may be expected.  Again we 
note that “OK” needs not be the same as ‘acceptable’ for in general, the auditor comes 
to his audit opinion on sharper criteria. 
 
8.2.2 Results for the pooled organisations 
 
Table 8.3 gives the results of a cross tabulation of “reliability lack” (occurrence risk) with 
"audit position".  Unfortunately the analysis is based on only 2 "not OK"-positions.  This 
makes the results very dependent on the position of just two cases, something to be 
kept in mind when interpreting the outcome.  This shows only a weak a relation: the two 
"not OK"-positions are only just above the middle of the range of the assessed risk 
(‘reliability lack’) and not in the highest range, as may be expected in valid risk 
assessment.   
 
We also calculated the point-biserial (PB) correlation; its value was -.075, with a p-value 
of .60.  This confirms the interpretation of the cross tabulation. 
 
Table 8.3: Reliability lack (occurrence risk) by ‘audit position’ (pooled organisations) 
‘audit position’→ 
Reliability lack↓ 
Not OK OK Row totals 
.67 0 6 6 
.83 0 4 4 
.89 0 12 12 
.90 1 2 3 
.92 0 4 4 
.93 1 14 15 
.95 0 8 8 
Column totals 2 50 52 
(PB-correlation: -.075, p-value: .60) 
 
In table 8.3 organisation 2 was not included.  When we do this (with, as known, the 
inherent risk by default set at "high"), the analysis is based on 76 cases, the number of 
"not OK"-positions remains only 2, the point-biserial correlation becomes -.103 with a p-
value of .38.  For the pooled organisations, the conclusions can only be that risk 
assessment shows no validity with respect to "audit position". 
 
8.2.3 Results for the distinct organisations 
 
We applied the same analyses to the distinct organisations.  The two "not OK"-positions 
occurred in organisation 1.  This means that for the other organisations the "audit 
position" will be constant; when there is no variation, ‘co-variation’ is meaningless and 
so is correlation.  So for the "audit position" as a criterion, there is only one organisation 
for which the analysis of validity makes sense.  The following table (8.4) gives the result 
of the K- and the P-correlation. 
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Table 8.4: K- and PB-correlations ‘audit position’ x reliability lack (occurrence risk) for 
organisation 1 
Organisation K-correlation  p-value PB-correlation p-value n 
1 .033 .83 .052 .76 37 
 
Conclusion research question 1: validity with respect to ‘audit position’: 
Assessment of the occurrence risk only shows correlations close to 0 for the pooled and 
the distinct organisations.  Validity cannot be concluded. 
 
Obviously, research question 10, with respect to the variability of validity over 
organisations, cannot be answered. 
 
Discussion 
It should be kept in mind that the conclusion is based on only two cases with "not OK"-
positions.  So the empirical basis of the conclusion for this research question is not very 
strong.  We could consider a change in the definition of ‘audit position’, by only calling it 
OK when the upper tail probability of materiality, given the error rate, is smaller than, 
say, 5%.  But actually we will go in this direction when taking the sampling risk as a 
criterion, in section 8.4.  So we leave it the way it is, noting that apparently the criterion 
‘audit position’ is crude and therefore, with these data, not very informative on validity. 
 
8.3  Risk assessment and error rate 
 
8.3.1 The error rate  
 
For this analysis we used the variable error rate, as we introduced it in 2.3.1.  It was 
directly found from the audit files and represented as a percentage of the account-size. 
 
We started section 6.3 by stating  
• that the error rate itself is an indicator for the level of risk associated with the 
administrative processes,  
• that it should be kept in mind that the occurrence risk is ordinal by character, 
which makes the Pearson correlation less fit as an association measure,  
• that therefore a rank correlation is more appropriate;  
• and that we should be aware that the error rate itself may have a pathological 
distribution: very inhomogeneous, with extreme outliers. 
 
These remarks also apply to this section, with "reliability lack" as a measure for the 
occurrence risk.  Extreme outliers were actually found in chapter 6, which adds to the 
relevance of the scatterplot of the next subsection. 
 
8.3.1 Results for the pooled organisations. 
 
We start with a scatterplot of the error rate by the occurrence risk. Figure 8.1 shows the 
results. 
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Figure 8.1: Error rate* by ‘reliability lack’** for the pooled organisations (n=52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              * error rate on its original scale,  **’reliability lack ón an ordinal scale 
The scatterplot shows a relatively homogeneously distributed set of error rates. No 
explicit outliers can be seen, and no high concentration of error rates near 0 is seen. 
This can be checked in a scatterplot with the error rate also scaled as an ordinal 
variable. 
 
Figure 8.2: Error rate* by ‘reliability lack’* for the pooled organisations (n=52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             * error rate and ‘reliability lack’ on an ordinal scale 
 
Figure 8.2 confirms what he saw in figure 8.1.  Now, the error rate being relatively 
homogeneously distributed, both a Pearson and a Kendall correlation coefficient will 
make sense.  Consistent with this observation, the pooled data showed similar values 
for the Pearson and the Kendall correlation between the error rate and the “reliability 
lack” (occurrence risk), as is shown in table 8.5 in the row "pooled (without: org 2)".  
Both correlations are significant at the 5% level, and have the plus-sign, as may be 
expected in a valid risk assessment.  It is remarkable that the P-correlation is virtually 
zero when organisation 2 is included.  Interpretation of this outcome suffers from the 
“reliability lack” (occurrence risk) for organisation 2 only being based on the internal 
control risk and an imputed value ("high") for the inherent risk. 
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Table 8.5: P- and K-correlations error rate x reliability lack (occurrence risk) 
Organisation K-correlation  p-value P-correlation  p-value n 
1 -.066 .61 -.064 .71 37 
2*** .078 .68 .016 .94 24 
3 .100 .77 -.050 .91 8 
4 -.246 .53 -.211 .65 7 
pooled (without org 2) .253* .015 .326* .018 52 
pooled (with org 2)*** .232 .01 .003 .98 76 
* significant at the .05 level  *** For organisation 2 the correlations are only based on ICR; the 
value for IR has been imputed as "high". 
 
We will analyse the significant correlation for the pooled organisations, by comparing 
the means of the error rate per level of the occurrence risk, scaled according to the 
variable OR2, because in the "primitive" ‘reliability lack’ there are four categories with 
six or less cases.  The results (organisation 2 excluded) are shown in table 8.6 and 
figure 8.3. 
 
Table 8.6: Means of error rate by occurrence risk for 3 pooled organisations 
occurrence risk (OR2) Mean of error rate (%) N Std deviation 
3 .034 6 .065 
5 .28 19 .32 
6 .38 19 .31 
7 .22 8 .32 
All levels .282 52 .31 
F-value: 2.2; p-value: .103, p-value for Levene’s statistic for equal variances: .016:  
Figure 8.3: Means of error rate by occurrence risk for the 3 pooled organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of the means shows that the positive correlation of table 8.5 does not 
imply a monotonous relation between the occurrence risk and the means of the error 
rate, but the positive relation is confirmed.  An analysis of variance shows an F-value of 
2.2 (p-value: .103), so the means do not differ at a significance level of 5%. 
 
8.3.2 Results for the distinct organisations. 
 
The results for the distinct organisations are given in table 8.5 above.  All correlation 
coefficients, either Pearson or Kendall, are close to 0 and far from significant.  This 
implies that there will be no significant differences with regard to the validity between 
the organisations.  This is confirmed in testing the differences with Fishers z-
transformation.  The largest difference of correlations applies to organisations 3 and 4; 
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the p-value of the difference is .3.  Also the difference between the correlations in 
organisation 1 and 4 has a p-value (.16) which makes it insignificant.  So we cannot 
conclude that there is a difference in the correlations for the distinct organisations. 
 
Just as we did for the pooled data, we plotted the “reliability lack” (occurrence risk) 
against the error rate in order to check the statistical validity of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient.  The result for organisation 1 is given in figure 8.4.  The (P or K) correlation 
(-.064 or -.066) of table 8.5 is fully confirmed by relatively homogeneous distributions of 
the error rate for the 4 available levels of the ‘reliability lack’; there are no obvious 
outliers. 
 
Figure 8.4: Scatterplot of error rate by OR for organisation 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The other organisations gave pictures that showed a lack of variability in the “reliability 
lack” (occurrence risk), which also can be seen from table 8.7.  In every organisation, 
except for organisation 1, only two distinct levels for the "reliability lack" (occurrence 
risk) were found. 
 
Table 8.7: Frequencies of the “reliability lack” (occurrence risk) per organisation 
reliability lack organisation 1 organisation 2 organisation 3 organisation 4 
.67    6 
.83  22 6  
.89 11   1 
.90 3    
.92  2 4  
.93 16    
.95 9    
Total 39 24 10 7 
 
This lack of variability implies that the relations found for the distinct organisation are 
not very informative for the full range of ‘reliability lack’, except for the data of 
organisation 1.  Anyhow, per organisation there is no indication of a satisfactory 
correlation between occurrence risk and error rate. 
 
Table 8.5 allows another striking observation: the correlations for the distinct 
organisations all are close to zero, except for those of organisation 4, but the 
correlations for the pooled organisations are significant in the expected direction.  We 
will further analyse how this seemingly contradictory result can be explained, by 
calculating the correlations for the means of "reliability lack" and of the error rate per 
organisation.  We did this for the 3 organisations of which both IR and ICR were known.  
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The resulting correlation is .799 (p-value: .411) , which gives an explanation for the 
resulting positive correlation for the pooled organisations of table 8.5.  We further 
analyse this result, by plotting the means in the next figure 
 
Figure 8.5:: Means of error rate by mean of "reliability lack" for 3 organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We see that the correlation for the means per organisation is built on a monotonous 
relation of the means of the “reliability lack” and of the error rate per organisation.  This 
indicates valid assessment of OR, but it lacks significance. 
 
8.3.3 Controlling for materiality 
 
In 2.3.1 and 6.3.3 we discussed the necessity of controlling for the materiality, when 
analyzing the correlation between error rate and occurrence risk.  Therefore we 
categorized the materiality into 3 classes, with .98% and 1.2% as boundaries.  With that 
categorization the middle class is very narrow, which is favourable for a raise in the 
correlation, assuming that controlling for materiality gives such an effect.  It appears 
that in the highest class 24 cases out of 27 come from organization 2 for which, as 
known, the “reliability lack” could not be computed.  Therefore we will restrict our 
analysis to two classes of materiality.  Table 8.8 shows the results 
 
Table 8.8: P-correlations reliability lack x error rate for classes of materiality 
Level of materiality reliability lack x error rate size sub-sample 
materiality< .98% .427 18 
.98%<=materiality<1.2% .071 32 
the two classes pooled .306* 50 
* significant at the .05 level 
 
It appears that the correlation does not improve from controlling for the level of 
materiality.  Just as in 6.3.3 we conclude that this is an indication that risk assessment 
is done with disregard of the level of materiality.   
 
So in all, we have a significant correlation for the pooled organisations, but for the 
distinct organisations this correlation disappears.  We conclude as follows. 
 
Conclusion research question 2: validity with respect to error rate. 
Validity with respect to the error rate is not strong. 
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Conclusion research question 5: increasing correlations when controlling for materiality 
Contrary to the expectation, the correlation of error rate and reliability lack (occurrence 
risk) does not increase when controlling for materiality. 
 
Conclusion research question 10: varying validity with respect to error rate. 
Validity with respect to error rate does not vary over organisations; within the 
organisations all correlations between error rate and occurrence risk are insignificant. 
 
Discussion 
There is an indication of validity with respect to the error rate, when we look at the 
pooled data.  But this indication is not convincing enough to justify varying audit effort 
with varying assessment of OR on this observation, because the relation found between 
error rate and reliability lack (occurrence risk) is not strong and not monotonous.  Within 
organisations variation in audit effort due to varying assessments of the occurrence risk, 
is not justified by the results found.  For 3 organisations a lack of variation in the 
‘reliability lack’ may have hindered the investigation of validity, where for organisation 1 
this variability was sufficient, but nevertheless only a small correlation was found. 
 
8.4  Risk assessment and sampling risk 
 
8.4.1 Definition of sampling risk 
We define (categories of) the sampling risk as in section 6.4.1; table 8.9 helps recall the 
classification. 
 
Table 8.9: Categories of sampling risk 
category of sampling risk boundaries 
1: very low SR < .05 
2: low .05 <= SR  < .15 
3: medium .15 <= SR  <.45 
4: high SR >=.45 
 
We also recall the dependency of SR of the sample size and therefore of OR.  But it 
appears that the correlation between these 2 variables is even negative (-.048); the 
correlation between SR and OR is positively affected (albeit to a negligeable extent). 
 
8.4.2 Results for the pooled organisations. 
 
We start our analysis by creating scatterplots (see figures 8.6) for the sampling risk and 
the standardised sampling risk against the "reliability lack" (occurrence risk),.  The 
scatterplots shows a distribution of the sampling risks for all levels of ‘reliability lack’ 
(occurrence risk) which is of similar homogeneity as that found in 6.4.2.  This implies 
that both the Pearson and the Kendall correlations make sense.  The 4 correlations are 
given in table 8.10 (all analyses with organisation 2 excluded).  The differences in n for 
the sampling risk (SR) and the standardised sampling risk (SR2) are caused by missing 
values for the size of the audit sample.  So for instance in organisation 3 the size of the 
audit sample was missing for all cases, whereas in 8 cases an estimate of the error rate 
was available.   
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Figures 8.6: Sampling risk by "reliability lack" (occurrence risk), organisation 2 excluded 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.10: Pearson and Kendall correlations of "reliability lack" ( occurrence risk) by 
sampling risk (SR) and standardised sampling risk (SR2), organisation 2 excluded 
Organi 
sation 
P-correlation 
SR 
K-correlation 
SR 
n P-correlation 
SR2 
K-correlation 
SR2 
n 
pooled .047 .12 44 .23 .18 52 
 
The correlations are positive, but none is significant; the smallest p-value is .08 for the 
K-correlation of .18. 
 
We produced a cross tabulation of the categorised sampling risk with the occurrence 
risk (OR2).  Table 8.11 gives the results. 
 
Table 8.11: Sampling risk in categories by occurrence risk (ex organisation 2)  
Sampling risk in 
categories→ 
Occurrence risk (OR2)↓ 
Very low Low Medium High Row total 
3 1 0 0 5 6 
5 1 0 4 10 15 
6 0 0 1 14 15 
7 0 1 2 5 8 
Column total 2 1 7 34 44 
 
The table shows only 7 cases on the diagonal, and relatively many (16) far from the  
same diagonal, so that the relation is weak or absent.  This is also seen in the K-
correlation, which has a value of only .018.  The most striking element of the table is 
that 15 cases are far from the diagonal in the above-diagonal triangle, which means that 
15 out of 44 cases must be seen as ineffective.  Next to that, the categorisation of the 
‘reliability lack’ and of the sampling risk has a slightly deflating effect on the correlation 
(it was .12 in table 8.10).  This will also appear in the same analysis for the 
standardised sampling risk. Table 8.12 gives the results (organisation 2 excluded). 
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Table 8.12: Standardised categorised SR2 by occurrence risk (ex organisation 2)  
Standardised sampling 
risk in categories→ 
Occurrence risk (OR2)↓ 
Very low Low Medium High Row total 
3 0 0 4 2 6 
5 1 0 8 10 19 
6 0 2 5 12 19 
7 0 0 4 4 8 
Column total 1 2 21 28 52 
 
The K-correlation decreases from .18 to .08 (p-value: .51).  Again the number of (16) 
ineffective cases is remarkable.  So with this categorisation of sampling risk and 
reliability lack, the relation between SR2 and OR2 is even weaker than in table 8.10.  
This especially with an eye on the remarkable number of ineffective cases, both for 
sampling risk and standardised sampling risk. 
 
Conclusion research question 3: validity with respect to sampling risk  
For the pooled organisations, assessment of the occurrence risk neither shows validity 
with respect to the sampling risk nor with respect to the standardised sampling risk,.  
 
Conclusion research question 6: OR strongest relation with SR as a criterion? 
A difference in the degree of validity of the assessment of OR with the error rate as a 
criterion or with the sampling risk as a criterion, cannot be shown. 
 
8.4.3 Results for the distinct organisations. 
 
We did the same analyses for the distinct organisations, as we did for their combination.  
So firstly we calculated all P(earson)- and K(endall)-correlations for the 4 organisations 
that were our units of analysis.  Table 8.13 shows the results. 
 
Table 8.13:     Sampling risk (SR) x “reliability lack” and  
standardised sampling risk (SR2) x “reliability lack”  by organisation 
Organisa
tion 
P-correlation 
SR 
K-correlation 
SR 
n P-correlation 
SR2 
K-correlation 
SR2 
n 
1 .12 .14 37 -.10 -.076 37 
2 -.19 -.14 16 -.14 -.030 24 
3 .*** *** . -.433 -.378 8 
4 -.62 -.36 7 -.77* -.54 7 
pooled** .047 .12 44 .23 .18 52 
* significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)   **organisation 2 excluded    *** in this organisation we did not get the 
sample sizes 
 
Only one correlation is significant, that for SR2 and "reliability lack" in organisation 4.  
But it has the unexpected minus-sign.  This ‘-’-sign is to be observed in all cases, 
except for the two SR-correlations for organisation 1.  This means a worsening of the 
degree of validity compared to that with the error rate as a criterion, where the 
correlations vary more around 0 (table 8.5).  This worsening is parallel to that found in 
chapter 6. 
 
In figures 8.7 we show the scatterplots for organisation 1, of the sampling risk and the 
standardised sampling risk against the "reliability lack" (occurrence risk).  It indicates 
that the relation for organisation 1 deviates from linear.  This is also shown by the eta, 
with the ‘sampling risk’ as the dependent variable and the ‘reliability lack’ as the 
independent variable; it is considerably larger than the P- or the K-correlation: eta=.39.  
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But at the same time the K- and the P-correlation are almost equal and both indicate 
that the correlation is negligible.  So the relation is neither linear nor monotonous. 
 
Figures 8.7: Sampling risk and standardised sampling risk against occurrence risk for 
organisation 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The scatterplot for organisation 2 in figure 8.8 shows a far less interesting picture: only 
two distinct values for the ‘reliability lack’ and for the highest value only two cases 
(which both have SR=0).   
 
Figure 8.8: : Sampling risk by occurrence risk for organisation 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisations 3 and 4 show similar relatively uninformative configurations.  Therefore, 
as in 8.3.2, we only continue the analysis for organisation 1.  We do this by producing a 
cross tabulation: table 8.14. 
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Table 8.14: Occurrence risk  by sampling risk in categories  for organisation 1   
sampling risk in 
categories→ 
Occurrence risk 
(OR2)↓ 
Low 
(.05< 
SR 
<=.15) 
Medium
(.15< 
SR 
<=.45) 
High 
(.45< 
SR) 
Row 
total 
5 0 4 10 14 
6 0 1 14 15 
7 1 2 5 8 
Column total 1 7 29 37 
 
Again there are only a few cases on the diagonal and there are relatively many cases in 
the above-diagonal triangle, which indicates an ineffectiveness of the audits.  As in the 
previous analyses, for the pooled organisations, we used the occurrence risk (OR2).   
 
The cross tabulation shows that the highest categories for the sampling risk occur to a 
lesser extent at the higher occurrence risk, so there is a negative correlation.  The K-
correlation appears to be -.018 (p-value:.94); the P-correlation is -.11 (p-value: .68). 
 
Conclusion research question 3: validity with respect to sampling risk  
Neither for the pooled nor for organisation 1 risk assessment with respect to the 
sampling risk SR shows validity.  For the other organisations the validity could not be 
established separately. 
 
Conclusion research question 6: OR strongest relation with SR as a criterion? 
The correlations between error rate and reliability lack virtually do not differ from those 
between sampling risk and reliability lack. 
 
Conclusion research question 10: varying validity with respect to sampling risk. 
Varying validity with respect to sampling risk over organisations can not be shown. 
 
Discussion on validity with respect to sampling risk. 
The correlation between sample size and OR being virtually 0, we expected on logical 
grounds, the validity with respect to sampling risk to be stronger than with respect to the 
error rate.  This, because the sampling risk has the dimension of a risk, contrary to the 
error rate.  This expectation is not satisfied: we again do not find such a difference, 
albeit that in this study the relevant correlations are approximately equal, where in the 
first study they differed (but in the unexpected direction).   
On empirical grounds, as a consequence of the findings in the first study of our 
research, we expected that the correlations with the error rate would be stronger than 
the correlations with sampling risk.  This expectation was not confirmed.  As a 
consequence, no indication is found in this study, that risk assessment might be 
improved if the auditor would explicitly aim at predicting the error. 
 
8.5  Risk assessment and conditional distribution of error rates 
 
In chapter 2 we introduced the logic of using the distribution of the error rates, 
conditional on the assessed risk, as a validation criterion for risk assessment.  Like in 
section 6.5, we show the results of this analysis only for the pooled organisations, 
because for the distinct organisations there are not enough data.  We will give a 
scatterplot of the error rates for the four levels of the occurrence risk OR2 (table 8.2).  
We will also give the parameters of the beta distributions that can be fitted on the 
pooled data and on the data per level of assessed risk. 
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8.5.1 Results for the pooled organisations 
 
We constructed a PP-plot (see footnote 12 in 6.5.1) of the distribution of the error rates, 
for a beta distribution, and calculated the best fitting parameters, both for the total of 
error rates and for the error rates per level of the occurrence risk. We show the PP-plot 
for the 4 pooled organizations and undivided for level of OR in figure 8.9. 
 
Figure 8.9: PP-plot of the error rates for the beta distribution 
 
From figure 8.9 it can be seen that where 
some 20% of the observed error rates is 
smaller than the error rate corresponding 
to the first dot above the X-axis, in the 
fitted beta distribution values smaller 
than this observed value would have a 
much smaller probability.  So here the 
fitted distribution and the actual 
distribution do not fit.  But the fit 
improves and is good for the values that 
are larger than the 40 percent smallest 
observed error rates 
   
As we discussed in 6.5.1, the poor fit for 
the lower cumulative probabilities is due 
 to the 24% of the error rates equal to 0 (see table 8.15), where in a theoretical beta 
distribution none of any possible values has a probability larger than zero (due to its 
continuity).  The parameters of the fitted distribution appear to be: a=.236;  b=54,2.  
This means that the mean of the fitted beta distribution is equal to (a/a+b=).0043=.43%, 
which is exactly equal to the actual mean. 
 
We repeat the analysis for the values of the error rate larger than 0.  This gives figure 
8.10 as a result.  It shows less small errors than expected in the fitted distribution and 
more larger errors than expected 
The parameters are: a=.379;  b=60.3 
 
Figure 8.10: PP-plot of the non-zero errors for the beta distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We applied the same analysis for three levels of the occurrence risk: OR2= 5, 6, 7; OR2 
as defined in 8.3.1 .  As there were only two cases with a non-zero error rate for    
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OR2= 3, we left out this fourth level from analysis (no other levels for OR2 were 
observed).  The analyses again apply to the non-zero error rates.  Because in this 
analysis the relation between distribution of error rate and assessed occurrence risk is 
object of investigation, we leave out the data of organisation 2 (as before, because IR is 
missing)  In table 8.15 we have also left out organisation 2. 
 
Figures 8.11: P-P plots for levels of the occurrence risk 5, 6 and 7, organizations 1,3,4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OR2=5, n=14, a=1.5, b=374   OR2=6, n=18, a=1.8, b=444  OR2=7, n=8, a=.48, b=218 
 
The figures 8.11 again show considerable differences between the distributions of the 
error rates for the three levels of the occurrence risk that were observed.  We make 
these differences more visible in table 8.15, by presenting the means of the non-zero 
errors and by including the zeros in the analysis, so that we can combine the mean of 
the beta-distribution for the non-zeros with that for the zeros.. 
 
Table 8.15: Relative rates of 0 and beta distributions for the non-zero errors by 
occurrence risk (OR2) for organisations 1,3,4. 
Occurrence risk→ 
(Beta-) distribution↓ 
3 5 6 7 All* 
#(greater than 0) 2 14 18 8 42 
a-parameter  1.457 1.79 .484 1.271 
b-parameter  374.5 443.6 217.7 363.5 
mean non zeros  .00389 .00403 .00222 
 
.00350 
#(equal to 0) 4 5 1 0 10 
rate of 0 (%) 67 26 5 0 24 
weighted mean  .00287 .00382 .00222 .00283 
*all cases where OR2, the occurrence risk was known 
 
The outcomes are consistent with table 8.6.  Firstly the weighted means in the last row 
in table 8.15 are equal to those in table 8.6.  Secondly, also for the nonzero errors, the 
means show a peak at an occurrence risk of 6.   
 
Further we can see that the rate of zeros is monotonously decreasing with an 
increasing occurrence risk.  Together with the non-monotony of the relation between 
occurrence risk and error rate, this may be seen as an indication that risk assessment 
has more predictive power for the existence of an error than for its size .  The same 
conclusion has been drawn in 6.5.1 (table 6.18).   
 
The high sum of a and b parameters in all columns of table 8.15, compared to that sum 
for the fitting distribution for all errors is due to the leaving out of organisation 2.  In this 
organisation an error of 6.25% occurred (as the maximum) whereas in the other 
organisations the maxima are 1.04%, .31% and .16% respectively.  With such small 
maxima the b-parameter should be large, to get sufficient weight for the small errors. 
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8.5.2 Results for the distinct organisations 
 
There were not enough cases to perform this analysis on the level of the distinct 
organisations.  It asks for an analysis at the 4 distinct levels of OR2, for 4 units of 
analysis.  So on the average, in the optimistic case that we would include organisation 
2, we would only have 76/16=5 cases to base the distributional analysis on.  In the 
more realistic case of excluding organisation 2, we would have to base our analysis on 
the average on only 52/12=4 cases per level, organisation.  Therefore, it makes no 
sense doing this analysis per organisation. 
 
We come to a conclusion regarding this criterion. 
 
Conclusion research question 4: validity with respect to conditional distribution 
In the second study risk assessment shows a satisfactory validity with respect to the 
prediction of the occurrence of errors, less with respect to their size. 
 
Discussion on validity with respect to the conditional distribution of the errors 
The indication we discussed in 6.5.2, that an auditor’s risk assessment might be better 
in predicting the size of an error than in assessing a risk is not confirmed by the findings 
of this chapter.  Validity with respect to error rate, with respect to the sampling risk and 
with respect to the conditional distribution of the errors all are of similar quality, where in 
chapter 6 the validity with respect to error rate was considerably better than with 
respect to sampling risk. 
 
8.6  Moderator variables?  
 
Only for organisation 1 data on the possible moderator variables were sufficiently 
available the number of days spent for the audit and the type of transaction.  In the 
other organisations these were only available in numbers that were too small to allow 
statistical analysis.  This is also due to the fact that combinations of 3 variables are 
necessary: the moderator and the two correlated variables.  So we will only analyse 
possible moderators for organisation 1. 
 
8.6.1 The influence of the effort for organisation 1 
 
We made a dichotomy with respect to ‘effort’: the effort was “small” when at most 12 
days were spent for the risk analysis, and “large” when more than 12 days were spent.  
With this classification we found the results given in table 8.16. 
 
Table 8.16 P- correlations of “reliability lack” (occurrence risk) with 3 variables for levels 
of “effort”  
“reliability lack” with→ 
for↓ 
error rate sampling risk (real n) sampling risk (n=100) 
“effort” <= 12 days .109  (n=13) -.011  (n=13) .095  (n=13) 
“effort” >12 days .110  (n=9) .196  (n=9) .123  (n=9) 
 
Evidently the correlations differ only marginally, which leads to the conclusion that 
“effort” is not a moderator. 
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Conclusion research question 8: is effort a moderator? 
The variable is not acting as a moderator for the validity of the assessment of OR with 
respect to the criteria error rate and sampling risk. 
 
Discussion: 
“Effort” may be correlated to “size”.  When this is the case, more effort might be 
“compensated” by larger size (complexity), causing a net result of no moderator effect.  
But the actual correlation of “size” and “effort” (in organisation 1) is -.01319..  So this 
possible explanation does not hold.  We must stick to the conclusion that (in 
organisation 1) “effort” is not a moderator. 
 
8.6.2 The influence of type of transaction for organisation 1 
 
As explained in 8.1.1 (research question 18), our data concern two types of 
transactions: obligations and payments.  We subdivided the data after this quality and 
compared the relevant correlations.  The result is given in table 8.17. 
 
Table 8.17  P- correlations of “reliability lack” (occurrence risk) with 3 variables for two 
types of transactions in organisation 1 
“reliability lack” with→ 
for↓ 
error rate sampling risk (real n) 
SR 
sampling risk (n=100) 
SR2 
obligations (n=15) -.213 -.364 -.441 
payments (n=22) .067 .062 .064 
p-value difference .224 .116 .077 
The differences for obligations and payments in the correlations all are considerable, 
but none has a p-value less than 5% (the smallest, that for SR2, is 7.7%).  So we 
cannot conclude that ‘type’ is a moderator variable. 
 
Conclusion research question 18: type of transactions a moderator? 
We cannot conclude that type is a moderator variable for organisation 1. 
 
8.7  Error previous year a predictor for error this year? 
 
In 8.1.1 we introduced research question 19 on the possibility that the error ‘of the 
previous year’ is a predictor for the error ‘of this year’, to investigate a possibility of 
having another predictor than risk assessment for the for the error of the account to be 
audited (the error ‘of this year’).  In our data collection we had access to the error of the 
previous year in the organisations 1 and 2.  So for these two organisations we can 
investigate the relevant relation.  We start with giving the relevant scatterplots: for the 
pooled and for the distinct organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 This actually confirms the logic of our choice not to use ‘size’ as a moderator; see 5.2.3. 
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Figures 8.12: Scatterplot error against error previous year for pooled organisations (1 
and 2) (n=68) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 P-correlation=.026 (p-value= .83, n=68)          outliers omitted: P-correlation=.15,  (p-value=.24, n=62) 
 
The correlation corresponding to the first scatterplot is .026 (n=68).  When we leave out 
the error rates (of this year) larger than 1.6%, the resulting correlation is .15 (n=62).  It 
is interesting to see how the two distinct organisations contribute to this correlation. We 
show the scatterplots in figures 8.13. 
 
Figures 8.13: Scatterplot error against error previous year for organisations 1 and 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        P-correlation=.089 (p-value= .58, n=42)                      P-correlation=.128 (p-value=.53, n=26) 
 
Maybe the most striking of the patterns in the scatterplot of figures 8.13 is given by that 
of organisation 2: where last year the errors could be (almost) any size, this year the 
error is (almost for all cases) close to zero; where this year the error can be any size, 
last year the error was very close to zero.  The scatterplot for organisation 1 shows an 
almost completely random distribution of the pairs of errors over the graph. 
 
Conclusion research question 19: error of the previous year predicts error this year? 
The error of the previous year cannot be used as a predictor for the error of this year. 
 
Discussion 
The findings with respect to the predictive qualities of the error of the previous year are 
very revealing.  They show that in addition to the fact that the validity of risk assessment 
is questionable, the error of last year does not provide refuge from this finding.  This 
observation can easily be interpreted as a consequence of the existence of two effects:  
• the existence of the negative regression effect over years as we discussed in 
8.1.1 research question 19: accounts in some year with high (low) error tend to 
have low (high) error next year, due to improvement (deterioration) of the 
administrative processes; 
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• accounts with a stable quality of the administrative processes also (might) tend 
to be stable in error rate. 
We believe the interpretations are worth to be considered more deeply.  We will do that 
in chapter 9 (the negative regression) and in our final chapter, 10. 
 
8.8  Summary, Discussion and conclusions 
 
8.8.1 Summary and discussion 
 
The aim of this chapter was, to report the findings of a replication of the study of chapter 
6.  The conclusions made per research question are not very encouraging.  
 
The relation with ‘audit position’ gives only very weak correlations.  This could be 
caused by the data being not very strong, because only a few cases with ‘audit position’ 
‘not OK’ occurred. 
 
Only for the pooled organisations a significant correlation is found between the error 
rate and the occurrence risk.  The practical value of this is to be questioned, because all 
correlations within organisations are close to zero.  Again the risk assessment seems to 
be performed with disregard of materiality, and the relation between occurrence risk 
and error rate is not monotonous. 
 
The relation between assessed risk and sampling risk is unsatisfactory, both for the 
pooled and for the distinct organisations.  Based on the sampling risk, 15 out of 44 
cases had to be labelled as ‘ineffective’, based on the standardised sampling risk this 
number was 16 out of 52.  Within the distinct organisations the relation between 
occurrence risk and sampling risk is absent, as is the relation with the error rate.  Here 
again there was an alarming number of ‘ineffective’ cases. 
 
The analysis of the conditional distributions shows a modest validity for the pooled 
organisations.  This analysis was not done for the distinct organisations, due to an 
insufficient number of cases. 
 
The potential refuge of the error of the previous year appears not to work, probably due 
to negative regression effects.  The analyses reveal another trait of the field in which an 
auditor has to work: he has to assess risk in a situation where the error rate only varies 
in a very limited range.  In the past he had to do with many error percentages well 
below 1% and in many cases he will have the experience that they will probably be in 
the same domain again in the year his audits apply to.  Practice of risk assessment 
aims at gaining more information on the error rate, so the auditor is confronted with the 
question whether error rates within such a small range can be predicted more precisely 
than that they probably will be below 1%.  Essentially this is what the auditor aims at.  
And this necessity of precision is also implied by the audit methodology, which takes 
the absence of material errors as a point of departure (see also the 6th consideration in 
section 6.7).  In our chapter 10 we will go further into the rationality of goals implying 
such a precision 
 
8.8.2 Conclusion 
 
The replication gives a weaker conclusion than in chapter 6, as to the validity of risk 
assessment: for the pooled organisations there is an indication of validity, but within the 
organisations validity could not be established.  Remember that this validity was found 
in chapter 6 (albeit with quite some caveats).  The conclusion of chapter 6 is confirmed 
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and inescapable, that an organisation cannot rely on its risk assessment as a 
justification for a decrease in substantive audit, unless it has strong empirical evidence 
on its validity. 
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8.9  Summary of findings 
 
The next table gives an overview of the findings reported in this chapter, organised by 
research question. 
 
Table 8.18 Overview of the findings in chapter 8 
Research question Result 
1: To which degree will risk assessment 
(OR) correlate with the ‘audit position’ of 
the error in a sample? 
Assessment of OR only shows insignificant 
correlations with the variable ‘audit 
position’; it is not valid with respect to this 
variable (section 8.2). 
2: To which degree will risk assessment 
correlate with the error rate in the audited 
account? 
Risk assessment and error rate do not 
correlate very strongly; lack of monotony in 
the relation may cause problems (section 
8.3). 
3: To which degree will risk assessment 
(OR) correlate with the sampling risk (SR)?
Neither for the pooled organisations, nor 
for organisation 1 the assessment of the 
occurrence risk is valid with respect to the 
sampling risk (section 8.4). 
4: To which degree will the distribution of 
the error rate vary with the level of 
assessed risk? 
The distribution of the error rate, 
conditional on the assessed level of risk, 
varies with risk assessment in the 
expected direction (section 8.5). 
5: To which degree will the correlation 
between error rate and risk assessment 
increase when calculated for groups of 
accounts with the same level of materiality 
compared to the correlation for the whole 
group of accounts? 
Contrary to the expectation, the correlation 
of error rate and OR does not increase 
when controlled for levels of materiality.  
(8.3.3) 
 
6: To which degree will the occurrence risk 
(OR) show a relation with the sampling 
risk, which is stronger than that between 
OR and the ‘audit position’, or OR and the 
error rate? 
Both for the pooled organisations and for 
the distinct organisations the answer to 
this question is negative (8.4.3) 
8: To which degree will the level of 
validation increase with the effort put in the 
assessment of OR? 
The validity of risk assessment does not 
improve with increasing effort spent in this 
activity. (8.6.2) 
10: To which degree will the level of 
validation vary over organizations?  
This question could not be answered for 
the ‘audit position’ 
Both with respect to error rate and with 
respect to sampling risk a variation in 
validity over organisations could not be 
established, but only for one organisation 
these validities could be established in a 
satisfactory way(8.3.2, 8.4.3) 
18: Is type of transactions a moderator? 
 
We cannot conclude that type is a 
moderator variable for organisation 1. 
(8.6.3) 
  
19: Is “error of the previous year” a 
predictor for “error this year”? 
 
The error of the previous year cannot be 
used as a predictor for the error of this 
year.  (section 8.7) 
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Chapter 9: The Predictive Power of System Tests. 
 
 
Four relatively complete actions in three studies were taken in our research into the 
‘real risk’: (1) validation of the classical assessment of OR, (2) an attempt to improve 
classical assessment of OR by decomposition of the assessment over risk indicators 
(1st and 2nd action formed the first study), (3) a replication of the validation of classical 
assessment of OR in the second study and (4) investigation of the predictive power of 
system tests for the error rate in the third study.  Varying validity of classical risk 
assessment per organisation (1st action) and problematic results with risk indicators (2nd 
action) led to the choice for the replication (3rd action).   
In this chapter we report the results of the 4th action.  It does not directly aim at 
investigating risk assessment itself, but at investigating a standard method for 
underpinning risk assessment. 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
In 5.2.5 we discussed system tests in relation to risk assessment.  We concluded that 
system tests should be predictive for the error rate, for to be fit as an underpinning of 
risk assessment.  After the chapters 6 and 8, with their positive and negative results 
with respect to the validity, the question is more urgent whether system testing really is 
fit for this underpinning. 
 
Therefore we try to answer the question whether system testing has predictive qualities 
for the error rate.  If the answer is positive, we have found a way to improve on the 
validity of risk assessment.  Because, even if in all cases (where relevant, because of 
an assessment of ‘low’ or ‘medium’) system testing was used as underpinning, it could 
be taken more advantage of by giving it more weight than usual.  And obviously, in 
cases where system testing was not included in risk assessment, the possible 
improvement speaks for itself. 
 
In this chapter we will investigate these predictive qualities.  For that purpose 37121 
records with data of dual purpose tests were available, by the courtesy of a Dutch 
governmental audit organisation.  We analysed these data with respect to the predictive 
value of system errors for substantive errors.  As in the first two studies of this research, 
we agreed on maintaining anonymity. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows.   
In section 9.2: some definitions, an overview of the data, a discussion of generalisability 
and a subdivision of research question 17 are given,  
in section 9.3 the predictive qualities at the level of a transaction are reported,  
in section 9.4 the predictive qualities at the level of the account are given and  
in section 9.5 conclusions are drawn. 
 
9.2  Definitions and data 
 
The logical level to analyse the relation between system errors and substantive errors, 
is a transaction.  But we will also aggregate the system errors and corresponding 
substantive errors to the level of the account to which they belong and analyse these 
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aggregates.  Therefore we will define "system errors" and "substantive errors" both at 
the level of a transaction and at the level of an account. 
 
9.2.1 Definitions 
 
Definition of dual purpose test:  
A test on an individual transaction in which both the operation of the controls (the 
administrative system) is checked and the correctness of the book-value is investigated. 
 
Definition of system error 
A transaction contains a system error when it has not been handled in accordance to 
the rules of the administrative organisation. 
"System error" and "compliance error" are synonyms in this definition.  In 9.2.2 we give 
the categories that were used and given in the data that were available to us.  We did 
not have a more detailed specification. 
 
Definition of fraction of system errors 
The fraction of system errors in an account is the number of transactions with a system 
error divided by the total number of transactions in the account.   
 
Definition of substantive error 
A transaction contains a substantive error when at least one of the following 
deficiencies occurs: 
• (part of) the transaction was not in accordance with the demands of legality 
and/or regularity 
• the transaction was settled for an incorrect amount 
• the transaction is reported with an incorrect amount. 
In 9.2.2 we give the categories that were used and given in the data that were available 
to us.  Again, we did not have a more detailed specification. 
 
Definition of taint 
A taint is the size of a substantive error divided by the size for which the transaction has 
been booked; in other words: the fraction of the book-value for which the transaction is 
in error. 
 
Definition of fraction of substantive errors 
The fraction of substantive errors in an account is the number of transactions with a 
substantive error divided by the total number of transactions in the account. 
 
Definition of mean taint 
The mean taint is the mean of all taints in the sample: the sum of these taints divided 
by the number of records in the sample20.  
 
Remark 
 
In a dual purpose test the operation of the administrative processes and their outcome 
are tested more or less simultaneously.  This leaves unimpeded that in the process the 
system part precedes the outcome and that it can be treated independently from the 
outcome (as is done in system testing), just as the outcome can be treated 
independently from the system part (as is done in substantive testing).  This 
‘independence’ is used when we try to explain the substantive error of year t from the 
system error of year t and the substantive error of year t-1 (see 9.4.3). 
                                                          
20 With this definition the mean taint found in a sample is an unbiased estimator of the error rate 
in the population, provided the sample has been drawn as a monetary unit sample. 
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The next tables give an overview of the definitions 
 
system errors 
level occurrence  size 
transaction yes/no 
account fraction of records with system errors 
not 
applicable 
 
substantive errors 
level occurrence  size 
transaction yes/no taint 
account fraction of records with substantive error mean taint  
 
9.2.2 The data 
 
From one of the participating governmental organisations, mentioned in chapter 1, we 
got data of dual purpose tests performed on a monetary unit sample from the accounts 
of five years: 1995 up to 2000.  A record in these dual purpose tests contains data with 
respect to compliance to the regulations and, if a substantive error occurs, its size.   
 
The compliance errors were given in the following categories, (translated from the 
Dutch; no extra information on the errors was available): 
• authorisation not sufficient 
• not complied to accounting regulations 
• incomplete accounting files 
• essential data are missing 
• insufficient quality of offering procedures 
• miscellaneous procedural errors 
• appropriation/payment too late 
• certificate not filled out 
• errors in administration of obligations 
 
One of the problems with these categories was that they are not exclusive.  Therefore 
answering a question like: "Can system errors be ordered as to their risk of causing a 
substantive error?" was impossible.  In spite of this shortcoming, we used the data as 
we got them, simply because these categories were the ones in use in the audit 
department.  And we took the limitations on our analyses for granted, limitations like 
that we had to confine ourselves to the existence of a system error and that we could 
only get some ordering of the seriousness of this error by using the number of system 
errors reported for a transaction.  Also, seriousness because of the nature of a system 
error could not be established, because of the overlap of definitions.  As to the 
substantive errors, data on the size of the transaction and the size of the substantive 
error (if there) were available. 
 
The substantive errors were given in the following categories, (translated from the 
Dutch; no extra information on the errors was available): 
• undue charge of budget 
• appropriation or payment too large due to false application of regulation 
• appropriation or payment too large due to double obligation or payment 
• appropriation or payment too large due to untimely processing of new data 
• wrong size of appropriation or payment due to other causes 
• other financial errors 
• appropriation or payment too small.  
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Table 9.1 gives an impression of the frequencies and fractions of system errors and 
substantive errors in the transactions for the years 1995 up to 2000. 
 
Table 9.1: Frequencies of substantive errors and system errors per year 
Year Number of 
substantive 
errors 
Percentage of 
substantive 
errors 
Number of 
system errors 
Percentage of 
system errors 
Number of 
records 
1995 253 1.8 2949 21.5 13743 
1996 64 1.2 1069 19.3 5531 
1997 31 0.5 559 9.6 5818 
1998 97 2.0 562 11.5 4882 
1999 36 0.5 530 7.4 7147 
Total 481 1.3 5669 15.3 37121 
 
It appears that in every year many system errors occur, where at the same time 
considerably less substantive errors are found.  The audit opinion is not dependent on 
the number of errors, but on the size of the error.  We give an overview of these sizes 
(expressed as mean taints) at the level of the accounts in table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2: Mean taints per account, per year 
Year -0.5% <mean 
taint<=0 
0 0<mean 
taint<=0.5% 
0.5%<mean 
taint<=1% 
mean 
taint>1% 
Number of 
accounts 
1995 5 23 15 2 4 49 
1996 1 26 9 1 6 43 
1997 3 33 4 2 5 47 
1998 1 37 3 1 8 50 
1999 1 31 6 1 5 44 
Total 11 157 32 7 26 233 
 
Table 9.2 shows that the 37121 records were grouped in 233 accounts.  Relatively 
many had a mean taint larger than 1%.  Not all of these accounts were object for audit 
opinion, but still the 1% level for a mean taint is interesting, because as a rule for larger 
accounts 1% is the level of materiality in governmental audits.  So for this study the 
question is interesting whether the quality of the operation of the system is a predictor 
for exceeding this 1%-level. 
 
9.2.3 Generalisability 
 
In this study the definitions as used by the governmental audit organisation are our 
point of departure.  Even if there were some problems with these definitions, like the 
overlap in categories of system errors, we took them for granted because of the content 
validity (see Babbie, 1995).  If we had tried to solve the ambiguities by changing 
definitions, we would have taken a greater distance from the actual audit practice of the 
audit organisation. 
 
Again, like the previous ones, this study is based on a "convenience sample": we took 
the opportunity of being provided with a host of data in which an answer to an 
interesting question was hidden.  This question: “Do system tests have predictive power 
for substantive errors?” in principle applies to organisations and accounts/transactions 
produced by the organisation.  Our data only apply to one audit organisation, only 
selected by the ‘convenience of the availability of data’.  The data form a MUS-sample 
from the relevant accounts.  So there are strong limitations on generalisability to 
organisations, which we took, as an inevitable consequence, for granted.  We could and 
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did not aim at external validity (see Cook and Campbell 1979).  But the generalisability 
from sample (from an account) to the total account is guaranteed by considerable 
sample sizes and appropriate sampling. 
 
Again, like in the first two rounds, this way of "selection" of data does not mean that the 
findings of this study will not be applicable to a wider population of audit organisations 
and the way they perform system testing.  This population is characterised in principle 
by the same way of acting in auditing as is prevalent in the audit organisation of this 
study; but again it is clear that the range of this generalisation cannot be determined. 
 
9.2.4 Research questions 
 
In chapter 5 we formulated research question 17:  "To what extent are system tests 
predictive for the error rate and valid in that sense?"  In this part of the study we can 
give a specification of this question and extend it in the following two (sub) questions: 
17.1  Is the absence of a system error in a transaction a guarantee for the absence of a 
substantive error in the same transaction? 
17.2  Is the quality of the operation of the administrative system at the account level 
predictive for the fraction of substantive errors and/or mean taint? 
 
We include two extra research questions: the first of these was already introduced in 
the previous chapter as r.q. 19.  Because we can extend this question to the fraction of 
errors, we give it the number 20.  The second of these represents candidates for the 
most logical predictors of the substantive error.  A positive answer to both questions 
would falsify the negative regression we discussed in section 8.7(a.o.). 
Research question 20  Are the substantive errors (fraction, mean taint) of the year t-1 a 
predictor for the substantive errors (fraction, mean taint) of the year t? 
Research question 21  Does the prediction of the mean taint (t) improve by using both 
mean taint (t-1) and fraction of system errors (t) 
 
9.3  Predictability at the transaction level 
 
We analysed the predictability of a substantive error from a system error by looking at 
the rate of correct predictions and at odds ratios at the transaction level.  Due to the 
definitions, it cannot be excluded that one error can both be seen as a system error and 
a substantive error.  When this occurs, we call it a ‘self evident combination’.  Self 
evident combinations inflate the predictability we are after.  We will discuss this in 9.3.3.  
 
9.3.1 Correct predictions 
 
We say that a "prediction" is “correct” when one (or more) system errors in a transaction 
coincide with the occurrence of a substantive error, or when the absence of a system 
error coincides with the absence of a substantive error.  Table 9.3 shows how well 
system tests predict in the year 1999. 
 
Table 9.3: Substantive error predicted by system error 
1999 no system error system error Total  
no substantive error 6600 (99.7%) 511 (96.4%) 7111 (99.3%) 
substantive error 17 (0.3%) 19 (3.6%) 36 (0.5%) 
Total  6617 (100 %) 530 (100%) 7147 (100%) 
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In 3.6% of the 530 cases where a system error was found, also a substantive error 
occurred; so in these cases "the error was predicted" (by the system error).  Also for 
0.3% of the 6617 cases where no system error was found, still a substantive error was 
found.  In these cases "the error was missed" (due to the absence of a system error).  
The percentages of "errors missed" and "errors predicted", defined in this sense, are 
given in table 9.4 for the five years covered by our data.  So table 9.4 gives the 
percentages in the row “substantive error”, from all the tables that are similar to table 
9.3.  All relations are highly significant: p-value=0 for the corresponding Fisher’s exact 
test.  Evidently this high significance is also caused by the large sample sizes. 
 
Table 9.4 Substantive error predicted by system error for five years 
Year error predicted 
% 
error missed 
% 
all errors 
% 
1995 4.0 1.3 1.8 
1996 3.4 0.6 1.2 
1997 2.0 0.4 0.5 
1998 7.3 1.3 2.0 
1999 3.6 0.3 0.5 
mean 4.0 0.8 1.3 
 
It appears that the rate of correct predictions of a substantive error is equal to 4%, 
averaged over the five years.  So in 96% of the cases where a system error was found, 
no substantive error occurred.  On the other hand, only in 0.8% of the cases where no 
system error occurred, a substantive error was found,  
 
Looking at table 9.4 another way shows that, given that a system error is observed, the 
probability that a substantive error will be found is 5 times larger (on the average) than 
when no system error is found.  The column ‘all errors’ gives the probability of the 
occurrence of a substantive error if the information of system tests would not be used. 
This probability is more than 3 times smaller (on the average) than that of the cases 
with ‘error predicted’.  But the probability of missing an error is still about 60% (on the 
average) of the same probability when no system test is used. 
 
9.3.2 Odds ratios 
 
In the analysis of 9.3.1 we concentrated on the predictive power in terms of the 
improvement of the rate of correct predictions, when the information on the outcome of 
the system test would be used.  Another way of analysing is by means of the so-called 
"odds ratios".  When a person says: "10 against 1 that it will rain in the coming hour" he 
is also stating something about the probability of rain to come, not as a probability, but 
as a ratio of probabilities also called the "odds".  So odds ratio is a ratio of ratios. 
 
In our research we will analyse these odds ratios by looking at the odds of a substantive 
error, when a system error was observed compared to the odds of a substantive error, 
when no system error was observed.  In table 9.3 the odds for a substantive error are: 
19/511 when a system error is found and 17/6600 when no system error is found.  The 
odds ratio is: 19/511:17/6600 = 6600*19/17*511=14.435.  
The ratio of these odds of course is informative for the effect of the system error: the 
odds may be expected to increase when a system error is observed.  In our analyses 
the odds for a substantive error when a system error was observed are in the 
numerator of the ratio.  So then the effect of a system error on the existence of a 
substantive error is mirrored in an odds ratio larger than 1.  Table 9.5 gives the odds 
ratios for the five years and for the pooled data. 
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Table 9.5 odds ratios for substantive errors for five years 
year Odds ratio 
1995 3.291 
1996 5.519 
1997 5.258 
1998 5.992 
1999 14.435 
All years 4.361 
 
When a system error is present, the odds for the existence of a substantive error is 
more than four times larger than when no system error is present.  This result, for the 
pooled years, can be seen as the relatively strong relationship.  The p-value of this 
odds ratio is 0, so the outcome is highly significant.  Especially the odds ratio for 1999 is 
very high; it is a kind of climax in an improving tendency for the odds ratios over the five 
years.   
 
It is possible to test the difference for the five years for the odds ratios, by means of the 
Mantel-Haenszel statistic (MHS, see Bishop et al p.147).  This MHS appears to be 298, 
its corresponding p-value is 0.  So we can reject the null-hypothesis that the odds ratios 
are homogeneous over the years: it confirms our observation of the improvement in 
predictive power for the occurrence of substantive errors over the years. 
 
9.3.3 Self-evident combinations 
 
A "self-evident combination" occurs when an error can both be seen as a system error 
and as a substantive error.  For instance: the error "disposal/ payment too late" can 
occur in one transaction both as a system error (with the same label) and as a 
substantive error: "inappropriate application of regulations" (this occurred 20 times). 
Seen from the viewpoint of predictability, this may imply an increase in predictability, 
because when this system error is found, it is 100% sure that the corresponding 
substantive error occurs in the same transaction.  But with other system errors, for 
instance a shift of a booking from the appropriate sub-account to an inappropriate one, 
it depends on the level at which the account is audited: when the two sub-accounts are 
part of the account under audit, there will be a system error, but no substantive error.  
So we cannot say that the predictability for self evident combinations is 100%.  We 
could not establish to which extent the predictability is affected, so we only can note 
that it will be affected, but to an unknown extent..  As self-evident combinations do not 
mean that the relations found in the previous two sub-sections are not fit for validation 
of risk assessment by system tests, we take this inflation of the predictability for 
granted. 
 
9.3.4 Predictability of the error size 
 
There is a major difference between the occurrence of an error and its size.  The audit 
opinion is not based on the occurrence of errors but on the size of the total error.  So far 
our analyses concerned the occurrence of errors; in this subsection we will pay 
attention to the size of the substantive error and its dependence on the occurrence of a 
system error.  We will do this by comparing the mean taint in those cases (records) with 
a substantive error where also a system error occurred, with the mean taint in those 
cases (with substantive error) without a system error.  It may be expected that correct 
operation of the system will mitigate a substantive error, even if it could not prevent it. 
(Note that it does not make much sense to compare the mean taint in all cases where 
no system error occurred with the same mean in all cases with a system error, because 
there are so many cases without a system error that the mean taint of these cases will 
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always be much smaller than the mean taint in the cases where a system error 
occurred.)   
 
By restricting ourselves to the cases where a substantive error occurred, we actually 
look at whether correct handling of the administrative procedures mitigates the 
substantive error, compared to those cases where the administrative procedures were 
violated.  (Note also that this "search for mitigation" is not conclusive for the error in the 
total account, because then the occurrence of substantive errors also plays a role: 
many records with small substantive errors can aggregate into a material error.  Only 
when we do the analysis at the account level, we can and will incorporate this (see 
section 9.4).) 
 
Table 9.6 gives the mean taints for cases with a (or more than one) system error 
against the mean taint for cases without a system error.  We took the error in its 
absolute (irrespective of the sign) and in its original (the sign included, so also possibly 
negative) value, because both can be in use in auditing. 
 
Table 9.6: Mean taints against occurrence of system errors 
Year system 
error 
mean abs 
taint (%) 
n F p-
value 
mean 
taint (%)
F p-
value 
1995 No 32.4 135 5.2 0.024 26.3 1.3 .256 
 Yes 43.8 118   32.9   
1996 No 16.1 28 1.7 0.20 14.9 1.9 .175 
 Yes 26.9 36   26.5   
1997 No 47.6 20 .95 .338 29.7 .98 .331 
 Yes 62.7 11   50.6   
 
1998 No 36.3 56 2.9 .093 33.2 3.2 .074 
 Yes 50.5 41   49.2   
1999 No 40,9 17 .57 .455 40.0 .65 .426 
 Yes 53.1 19   53.1   
 
In all years there is a tendency for the mean taint in the presence of a system error to 
be larger, but only one difference is large enough to reach the 5% significance level: 
that for the absolute taints in 1995.  The sign test gives a p-value of 3.13 percent for 5 
favourable outcomes out of 5.  So the number of differences in expected direction is 
significant.  Except for the year 1995, it hardly makes difference whether the absolute or 
the original value of the taints is used. 
 
9.3.5 Conclusions on predictability at transaction level 
 
The rates of correct predictions in table 9.4 and the odds ratios in table 9.5 show a clear 
relation between the occurrence of a system error and the occurrence of a substantive 
error.  Moreover the odds ratio shows a clear "learning effect" over the years.  Of 
course this effect was also present in table 9.4. 
 
Some mitigating influence on the size of the substantive error from correct application of 
administrative procedures, could be shown.  With an eye on the sometimes high 
percentages with which substantive errors occur, in all years (see table 9.4), such a 
mitigating influence is of importance.  Table 9.6 shows that there is no "learning effect" 
over years for the size of an error, at the level of a transaction. 
 
Conclusion research question 17.1: absence system error guarantee absence 
substantive error? 
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The answer to this question can be moderately positive:  
• On one hand we did not find a guarantee for the prevention of a substantive 
error, but we found a strongly mitigated probability of such an error occurring 
when no system error is found.  Moreover there is a tendency that the size of 
the substantive error is mitigated by correct application of administrative 
procedures. 
• On the other hand in 96% of the cases with a system error, no substantive error 
was found.  This means that the systems assessment by the audit department is 
much more severe than necessary for the prediction of substantive errors.  It is 
a consequence of the fact that the audit department includes many aspects in its 
systems assessment that are not directly relevant for a substantive error. 
 
9.4  Predictability at the account level 
 
For the predictability of the error at the account level, we had to aggregate the data of 
the individual transactions to the level of the account.  At the account level the fraction 
of transactions containing a system error is a measure for the (lack of) quality of the 
operation of the administrative processes for this account.   Therefore we use the rate 
of transactions showing a system error as the system error for that account.  We refer 
to it as "fraction of system errors".  We also compute the fraction of transactions in 
which a substantive error occurs: "the fraction of substantive errors", next to the "mean 
taint" for the account: the sum of all taints divided by the number of transactions in the 
sample from the account.  With these fractions and means we can investigate 
predictability of the substantive error from the system error.  We will do this for the 
relations as given in table 9.7.  In this table the first column gives the predictor, the 
second (at the same row) the predictand, so sometimes the same predictor is used for 
different predictands (rows 1and 2). 
 
Table 9.7: Relevant predictions 
predictor predictand subsection 
fraction of system errors (t) fraction of substantive errors (t) 9.4.1 
fraction of system errors (t) mean taint (t) 9.4.1 
fraction of subst. errors (t-1) fraction of subst. errors (t) 9.4.2 
mean taint (t-1) mean taint (t) 9.4.2 
fraction of system errors (t-1) fraction of system errors (t) 9.4.2 
fraction of system errors (t), 
plus mean taint (t-1) mean taint (t) 9.4.3 
 
The first 4 predictions of table 9.7 directly relate to the research questions 17.2 and 20 
in 9.2.4; the letter "t" refers to a year and "t-1" to the year preceding the year "t".  We 
added the last prediction, because that might be optimal: the information of the error 
size of last year combined with the information of the quality of the operation of the 
system of this year.  It refers to research question 21. 
 
9.4.1 Predictability substantive error from system error 
 
When there is a high fraction of transactions containing one or more system errors, the 
account concerned may be expected to run a higher risk of showing substantive errors, 
in two ways: 
by containing more transactions with a substantive error (the occurrence of substantive 
errors) or by showing a higher mean taint (the size of the error in the account).   
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Occurrence of substantive errors from occurrence of system errors 
We start this subsection by looking at the relation between the occurrence of system 
errors and the occurrence of substantive errors, both in the year t, represented by their  
fraction.  Table 9.8 gives the relevant Pearson-correlations. 
 
Table 9.8: Fraction of system errors x fraction of substantive errors 
year P-correlation R2 n p-value 
1995 .207 .043 49 .15 
1996 .366* .134 43 .016 
1997 .296* .088 47 .044 
1998 .316* .10 50 .025 
1999 .518** .268 44 0 
* significant at the .05 level  **significant at the .01 level 
 
Table 9.8 shows that the predictability of the occurrence of substantive errors, from the 
occurrence of system errors is satisfactory: two explained variances (column R2) are 
larger than 10% (27% and 13%) and 4 out of 5 correlations are significant at the 5% 
level (at least).  So the occurrence of system errors has predictive value for the 
occurrence of substantive errors.   
 
Size of substantive errors from occurrence of system errors 
The next question is whether the occurrence of system errors is also predictive for the 
size of the substantive error in an account.  Therefore we compute the correlations 
between the fraction of system errors and mean taint per account.  Because the size of 
the error is the decisive property in the audit opinion, we will both compute the 
P(earson)-correlation and the K(endall)-correlation, in order to get a robust analysis 
(see remarks in chapters 6, 7 and 8). The results are given in table 9.9. 
 
Table 9.9  Fraction of system errors x mean taint 
year P-correlation R2 p-value K-correlation p-value n 
1995 .080 .006 .583 .242* .024 49 
1996 .167 .028 .285 .375** .002 43 
1997 .136 .018 .36 .148 .206 47 
1998 .322* .10 .023 .387** .001 50 
1999 .531** .28 .0 .389** 0 44 
* significant at the .05 level  **significant at the .01 level 
 
Table 9.9 shows two years (1998 and 1999), in which both the P-and the K-correlation 
are significant.  These years also show the highest explained variances; only that for 
1999 is greater than 10%.  Scatterplots showed that the relatively substantial 
differences between the P-correlation and K-correlation for the years 1995 and1996 are 
not due to outliers.  For the two strongest P-correlations found, we will show a 
scatterplot. in figures 9.1 
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Figures 9.1: Fraction of system errors against mean taint in 1998 and 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Both the scatterplots for 1998 and 1999 show one evident outlier.  But they indicate 
that, on omitting this, a positive correlation will remain, which appears to be so.  The P-
correlations become:  
for 1998: .153 (p-value .295, n=49) and  
for 1999: .358, (p-value: .018, n=43).   
So for 1999 the relation between system error and size of the substantive error is 
convincing and fully consistent with the high odds ratio found in 9.3.2.  For 1998 the 
relation is less strong. 
 
In summary, the most essential relation, that between the occurrence of system errors 
and size of substantive errors, is weaker than that between the occurrence of system 
errors and the occurrence of substantive errors.  But for 1999 it is significant and for 
1998 there is a fair indication of the relation to be expected with system testing having 
predictive power for the error rate. 
 
Following table 9.2, we asked the question whether the quality of the operation of the 
system is a predictor for the trespassing of the 1% level for the mean taint.  In order to 
come to an answer we again categorised the mean taints into the classes of table 9.2 
and computed the mean fraction of system errors for each of these categories.  
Evidently the highest category of mean taints may be expected to coincide with the 
highest average of fraction of system errors; or rather when this coincidence occurs it is 
an indication that system tests predict the highest mean taints.  We give the results in 
table 9.10. 
 
Table 9.10: Mean fraction of system errors by taint category (M) 
mean taint 
     M (%) 
1995 
mean 
fraction 
 
n 
1996 
mean 
fraction
 
n 
1997 
mean 
fraction
 
n 
1998 
mean 
fraction
 
n 
1999 
mean 
fraction 
 
n 
M<0 .19 5 .18 1 .14 3 .2 1 .12 1 
M=0 .19 23 .12 26 .12 33 .76 37 .071 31 
0<M<=.5 .24 15 .37 9 .20 4 .18 3 .23 6 
.5<M<=1 .36 2 .10 1 .051 2 .28 1 .062 1 
1<M .32 4 .25 6 .26 5 .22 8 .33 5 
Total  49  43  47  50  44 
 
In 1997 and 1999, the highest category of taints coincides with the highest fraction of 
system errors.  In 1995 and 1996 it coincides with the second highest and in 1998 with 
the third highest.  Most striking is that by far the highest mean fraction of system errors 
is found for taints = 0 in the year 1998, for 37 cases!   
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The question was whether the fraction of system errors predicts the trespassing of the 
1%-level of materiality.  From this viewpoint we see that for all years the mean fraction 
of system errors is the highest (for 2 years), or relatively high, so to a certain extent the 
answer is positive.  But a high fraction of system errors is not necessarily followed by a 
high taint. 
 
Conclusion research question 17.2: quality of the operation system at the account level 
predictive for the fraction of substantive errors and/or mean taint? 
In 4 out of 5 years the occurrence of system errors predicts the occurrence of 
substantive errors, in 2 out of 5 years the occurrence of system errors predicts also the 
size of the substantive error.  So the most essential relation, that between the 
occurrence of system errors and size of substantive errors, is weaker than that between 
the occurrence of system errors and the occurrence of substantive errors.   
 
Remark 
The better prediction of the occurrence of substantive error than of the size, is 
consistent with our findings in 6.5.1 and 8.5.1 (tables 6.18 and 8.15). 
 
9.4.2 Predictability error from the same type of error previous year 
 
So far we have investigated the predictability of the substantive error by means of the 
system error.  In this subsection we will investigate the predictability of the substantive 
error ‘of this year’ from the substantive error ‘of the previous year’ and next to that also 
the similar predictability of the system error.  Finally we will investigate the predictability 
of the substantive error in year t from the substantive error in year t-1 and the system 
error in year t.  The last predictability could perform best: it uses two sources of 
information which both are the best we can think of (except for the negative regression 
–effect).  Analysis of our data will learn us whether we have to think of even better 
sources. 
 
9.4.2.1 Predictability substantive error (t) from substantive error (t-1) 
Because we had data of five years at our disposal, we could correlate the error with the 
error of the previous year, to look whether the latter could be used as predictor for the 
former.  We investigated the predictability both for the fraction of substantive errors and 
for the mean taints.  Table 9.11 gives the results for the fraction, i.e. the occurrence of 
substantive errors. 
 
Table 9.11: P-correlations for the occurrence of substantive errors over years 
years fraction (t) x fraction (t-1) R2 n p-value 
1995-1996 .17 .029 39 .30 
1996-1997 .52** .27 41 .001 
1997-1998 .31* .094 44 .043 
1998-1999 .49** .24 37 .002 
* significant at the .05 level  **significant at the .01 level 
 
We see that only the correlation for 1995-1996 is insignificant at the 5% level and we 
also see that the explained variance for two pairs of years is some 25%.  This is a very 
satisfactory correlation.   
 
Will this satisfactory level also apply to the correlations regarding the size of the errors 
in subsequent years?  The answer is given in table 9.12. 
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Table 9.12: P-correlations for the error size over years 
years Mean taint (t) x 
mean taint (t-1) 
R2 n p-
value
1995-1996 .084 .007 39 .61 
1996-1997 .21 .045 41 .18 
1997-1998 .047 .002 44 .76 
1998-1999 .861** .74 37 0 
**significant at the .01 level 
 
We investigated the high correlation for 98-99 by producing a scatterplot.  It appeared 
that there is one obvious outlier; on omitting this, the second plot in figures 9.2 results.  
The skipping of the outlier clearly deflates the P-correlation, but it is still high(.54) and 
highly significant (p-value: .001).  So the relation is convincing. 
 
Figures 9.2:  size 98 x size 99                              size 98 x size 99 (outlier omitted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     P-correlation:.86, p-value: 0  n=37                                   P-correlation: .54, p-value.001, n=36  
 
Looking at all correlations in table 9.12, we see that for the size of the error the relation 
between the subsequent years virtually disappears, with an obvious exception for 98-
99.  So 3 of the 4 correlations are insignificant and small, but one is extremely large.  
An outcome that is hard to explain, albeit that the correlations in table 9.9 are also high 
for the year 1999.  It looks as if (only) the errors of 1999 behave in a way we expect 
with regular system tests (table 9.9) and with a logical relation with the errors of the 
previous year (table 9.12).  This regularity is also shown by the high odds ratio in table 
9.5.   
 
We could not find an explanation for this ‘proper but deviating behaviour’21.   
 
Intermediate conclusion 
We can conclude that predictive quality of the substantive error of the previous year for 
the same error of this year can be strong, both for occurrence and size, but like the 
validity we found in our first study, it is unpredictable if it really is.  So it can not be relied 
upon. 
 
                                                          
21 An explanation could have been that the negative regression (see section 8.7) does not occur 
because the maintenance for 1999 was more evenly spread.  But we could not trace signs of 
such an even spread.  And next to that, this would only be an explanation if a strong relation 
between system errors and mean taint would exist.  But table 9.9 shows that this is not self 
evident, albeit reasonable for 1998 and 1999. 
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9.4.2.2 Predictability system error (t) from system error (t-1) 
It is not the first objective of this research to investigate the predictability of system 
errors.  But it makes sense to do that because, in risk analysis, both the error of the 
previous year and the quality of the administrative procedures of the previous are 
important.  We compute the same P-correlations as we did in table 9.12, now for the 
fractions of system errors.  The results are given in table 9.13 
 
Table 9.13: P-correlations for the "occurrence" of system errors over years 
years fraction system errors (t) x 
fraction system errors (t-1) 
n p-
value
1995-1996 .51** 39 .001 
1996-1997 .23 41 .15 
1997-1998 .22 44 .15 
1998-1999 .855** 37 0 
**  significant at the .01 level 
 
Two correlations turn out to be high and significant; all correlations are positive, which 
means that there is a certain predictability of the quality of the operation of the 
administrative procedures.  The fact that only two correlations are significant indicates 
that the predictability is not very stable over years.  All correlations are a counter-
indication for the negative regression effect, because this would cause negative 
correlations. 
 
To check the highest correlation, we show a scatterplot for the fractions of system 
errors for 1998 and 1999 in figure 9.3. 
 
Figure 9.3: fractions of system errors 1998 x 1999 
 
 
Figure 9.3 shows that the high 
correlation is not dependent on 
one or two outliers.  So for this 
pair of years the correlation is 
very satisfactory.   
 
From the viewpoint of control 
over the administrative 
processes, the picture is less 
satisfactory: high fractions of 
system errors should not tend to 
stay at a high level and high 
fractions should not occur 
where last year they were low. 
 
Conclusion research question 20: errors (fraction, mean taint) year t-1  predictor errors 
(fraction, mean taint) year t? 
The substantive errors of the previous year appeared to be predictive for the 
substantive errors of this year, but this predictability is not stable over the years; its 
stability is larger for the occurrence than for the size.  The same lack of stability applies 
to the predictability of system errors from those in the previous year: in two years the 
relevant correlation is highly significant in the other two they are far from the 5% 
significance. 
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9.4.3 Predictability substantive error (t) from system error (t) and 
substantive error (t-1) 
Probably the most logical dependence is the one in which the substantive error in year t 
is seen as predictable from the quality of the administrative system in year t and the 
substantive error in year t-1.  We have investigated this relation by way of multiple 
regression.  The dependent variable was the mean taint in an account, the independent 
variables were the fraction of system errors in year t and the mean taint in year t-1.  We 
show the correlations between the two predictors in table 9.14 and give the results of 
the regression analysis in table 9.15. 
 
Table 9.14: P-correlations fraction of system errors (t) x mean taint (t-1) 
years P-correlation p-value 
1995-1996 .21 .20 
1996-1997 .12 .44 
1997-1998 .16 .31 
1998-1999 .40 .013 
 
Table 9.15: mean taint (t) from fraction of system errors (t) and mean taint (t-1) 
years R Adjusted R2 F p-value 
1995-1996 .22 0 .995 .39 
1996-1997 .31 .05 1.99 .15 
1997-1998 .31 .05 2.14 .13 
1998-1999 .89 .78 30.5 .000 
 
With one exception, the relations found all are very weak, although the multiple 
correlation coefficient (R) is relatively high.  But the adjusted R2 is a better measure for 
the strength of the relation and this is very close to zero in three cases, corresponding 
to the high p-values found.  Only the prediction for the error of 1999 is very satisfactory, 
which is consistent with the corresponding correlations in table 9.9 and 9.12.  Table 
9.14 shows that there is no collinearity to influence the regression results 
 
Conclusion research question 21: errors (mean taint year t-1 and fraction system errors 
year t)  predictor errors (mean taint) year t? 
Only for the year 1999 the predictability of mean taint (t) is (more than) satisfactory. 
Prediction based on two predictors does not improve the prediction based on only the 
mean taint (t-1). 
 
9.4.4 Conclusions on predictability on the account level 
 
When we come to conclusions on predictability of substantive errors on the account 
level, obviously we have to make a distinction between their occurrence and their size. 
 
The predictability of the occurrence of substantive errors turns out to be relatively good: 
the correlations found are of a satisfactory magnitude and significant at the 5% level or 
stronger in many cases.  When we look at the size of the substantive error, we also find 
satisfactory correlations with the occurrence of system errors or with substantive errors 
of the previous year, but less consistently than for the prediction of the occurrence of 
substantive error.  System tests are a not a stable predictor of the size of the 
substantive error.   
 
This leads to the same warning as we gave for the use of risk analysis: only use system 
testing as a justification for the reduction of substantive testing when its validity in that 
respect has been established.  Actually this warning is more serious than that regarding 
the use of risk analysis, because there we implicitly assumed that for organisations the 
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quality of risk assessment is stable over years.  This 3rd study shows that for systems 
testing this stability can not be established.  This raises new problems as to the 
certainty there is with regard to the possibility to rely on systems testing.  Problems that 
might very well extend to the possibility to rely on risk assessment.  We will discuss this 
further in chapter 10. 
 
9.5  Discussion and conclusion 
 
9.5.1 Discussion 
 
We will discuss three possible causes for the sometimes absent, and sometimes 
relatively strong predictive power of system tests: (1) a logic that will cause this 
absence, (2) the way errors are distributed, (3)  shortcomings in the definition of system 
errors.   
 
9.5.1.1 An explaining logic? 
When we look for explaining logic, we look for reasons why violations of administrative 
procedures do not necessarily affect the size of the error in an account.  Especially 
when the procedures are meant to further the quality of the account, it will be hard to 
find such a logic, because logic was used to design the controls in such a way that they 
should mitigate the substantive error.  An extra problem is, that we do not specifically 
know about the logic that led to the (violations of) controls, given in 9.2.2.  Yet another 
problem is that the logic we have to find should not exclude satisfactory (1998) or even 
high (1999) correlations as we have also found.  We found the general logic as can be 
found in Blokdijk (2004) to be a good starting point.  And we will speculate on reasons 
why this logic still allows the higher correlations we found. 
 
In his article Blokdijk discusses the effectiveness and efficiency of the various types of 
controls as part of risk analysis.  To that end he distinguishes three stages of the 
preparation of financial statements.  (1) the occurrence of events and their first 
recording in the accounting system (2) data processing, resulting in a routine product, 
"the trial balance" (3) adjusting the trial balance in order to arrive at the final balance 
sheet and income statement.  In his opinion, in the third stage, only substantive 
procedures are fit for auditing.  So the question of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
tests of control, system tests, only applies to the first and second stage.   
 
In the first stage many so-called "non-reproducible controls" are relevant (controls that 
cannot be reperformed by the auditor, like the first recording of an event).  His first 
conclusion is that non-reproducible controls should not be included in risk analysis, or in 
determining the control risk, because lack of compliance in the actual operation of non-
reproducible internal controls cannot be remedied by the auditor's substantive 
procedures.  But Blokdijk does not question the effectiveness of non-reproducible 
controls for the quality of the account, so here we do not find a starting point for the 
logic we are looking for.  Moreover, the categorisation of system errors in 9.2.2 does not 
give information on which possible non-reproducible controls were considered in the 
dual purpose tests of this study. 
 
For the second stage, that of data processing, Blokdijk discusses four types of general 
ICT controls: (a) controls of change management; (b) access controls; and application 
controls, being (c) programmed controls and (d) user controls.  He also discusses the 
tests of control mentioned in ISA 400 par. 30.  For all these controls he concludes that 
they have relevance for the quality of the accounts; he also concludes ‘that separate 
tests of control do not make much sense; if useful, their use lies in focusing substantive 
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tests rather than in assessing the internal control risk’.  With that conclusion, together 
with his observation that in some situations the most effective tests of control are 
actually analytical procedures, he implies that tests of control do not contain much 
information on the substantive error.  So, according to Blokdijk’s logic, system tests can 
not be expected to have much predictive value for the error and maybe we should 
sooner be surprised by the presence of such predictive value than by its absence. 
 
In evaluating the Blokdijk logic, we are heavily hindered by the fact that the specific 
definitions of the possible system errors, as given in 9.2.2, are not very clear about the 
precise nature of these possible errors.  What, for instance, are "essential data", where 
are the "user controls", how influential for the error are the accounting rules, etc.  It was 
practically impossible to find answers to these questions.  We must conclude that this 
weakens the possibilities to conclude on the extent to which Blokdijk’s logic applies to 
our data.  But even if we are handicapped in that respect, we can conclude that our 
results do not falsify Blokdijk’s logic, because relations between system errors and 
substantive errors are too frequently absent. 
 
Implicit in the above discussion is that Blokdijk’s logic does not exclude that better 
operation of the controls may coincide with less substantive error.  It only implies that 
this coincidence might be caused by other factors than the quality of the operation of 
the system of controls.  Plausible candidates for these other factors are psychological: 
attitude, motivation and the like.  When an organisation’s employees score highly at 
these properties, this will probably cause good performance on the operation of the 
controls and cause high quality accounting.  When the employees score less highly, it 
still may be possible that the operation of the controls is satisfactory, but that this does 
not extend to the accounting.  In this research we will not go deeper into these 
speculations, because we do not have the data to substantiate them. 
 
9.5.1.2 The way errors are distributed 
Figures 9.1 show error distributions on the Y-axis, implying very many zeros, many 
small errors and some larger errors.  In fact in 1998 (1999) of 50 (44) mean taints 37 
(31) were 0, 5 (5) smaller than 1% and the rest larger than 1%.  The scatterplot of the 
errors in accounts for 1998 against 1999 also shows this (figures 9.2),  The last figures 
also show that even with a relatively high correlation, the size of the error in 1999 can 
vary considerably for known error in 1998.   
 
The error shows a pattern of noise at a very low level, with an occasional, but so far 
only weakly predictable outlier.  Maybe we must conclude that the control measures in 
accounting work very well to keep the error almost always at an acceptably low level, 
but that in an individual case they do not predict how low exactly, albeit that their quality 
can be made high.  Maybe it is like measuring a length: it is 99.7 cm, plus or minus 0.2 
cm.  Such a level of precision can only be outperformed by professionals.  In auditing, 
the professionals are satisfied when the length is at least 99 cm, were 100 is aimed at, 
but where reaching that aim is very costly.  Therefore we are satisfied with a production 
of the accounts of somewhat less precision.  But then we should not be surprised if 
sometimes the outcome is even worse than the desired precision.   
 
Accepting this rather fatalistic (realistic?) point of view of course has consequences 
both for the application of risk analysis and for the use of system tests.  We go deeper 
into that in chapter 10. 
 
9.5.1.3 Shortcomings in the definition of system errors in this study 
We already mentioned the rather vague character of the descriptions of possible 
violations of compliance.  They are not exclusive, it is very hard to weigh them for their 
seriousness.  So the analyses we did, necessarily were of a crude nature.  This may 
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have hidden a stronger relationship than we could find in some years, while in other 
years with the same labels, but maybe different content, the relations were stronger. 
 
A remarkable property of the list in 9.2.2 is that it mostly regards aspects that have to 
do with legality and regularity, and only contains controls having to do with the 
accounting system itself at a rather high level of abstraction, like "compliance to 
accounting regulations".  More concrete is "authorisation" and ‘errors in administration 
of obligations and maybe some aspects are hidden in "miscellaneous errors" that refer 
to the accounting system itself.   
 
This observation leads to a further reflection on the generalisability of our findings.  It is 
obvious that this generalisability is highly dependent on the way system properties and 
system tests are defined.  If it were the case that in other audit departments the aspects 
of the accounting system itself prevail over other aspects, our findings probably would 
not generalise to these types of audit departments, which latter types will be found in 
the audit practice in private firms. 
 
9.5.2 Conclusion 
 
Three claims with respect to system tests are relevant for the audit practice: 
1. They are supposed to give evidence on the truth and fairness of the financial 
accounts.  Even if this would not be an explicit claim, it is implied by the fact that 
together with risk analysis that assesses low risk, less substantive testing may 
be done than without system tests (see ISA 400). 
2. They are supposed to be fit for underpinning of a risk assessment "low", when 
this assessment serves as a justification for a decrease in substantive effort, 
compared to the effort needed in a situation without such a risk assessment.   
3. They are supposed to give evidence in themselves on the quality, especially the 
operation, of the administrative procedures; they take the design as a given. 
This part of our research was especially designed to give evidence on the first claim, 
operationalised as the predictive power for the substantive error of system tests.  We 
give a closer look to the three claims mentioned. 
 
As to the first claim, we saw the extent to which system tests give evidence on the truth 
and fairness from two viewpoints.   
1 The predictive power for the occurrence of substantive errors at the level of a 
transaction was reasonable, although the relations found were not 
homogeneous over the years.  There was also a predictive power for the 
occurrence of substantive errors at the level of the account.   
2 The predictive power appears to be less, when at the level of the account the 
size of the substantive error is to be predicted from the quality of the operation 
of the system; for two years (98, 99) this predictive power could be shown.  As 
the audit opinion is based on the size of the substantive error, it must be 
concluded that it is not self evident that system testing adds to the assurance 
regarding the audit opinion. 
 
As to the second claim, the same lack of stability of predictive value for the size of the 
substantive error, leads to the conclusion that it is not self evident that system testing 
has the underpinning qualities it is claimed to have, as far as risk assessment is used 
as a justification for a decrease of substantive testing.  This quality should be assessed, 
before an organisation relies upon the underpinning. 
 
As to the third claim, the quality of system testing as direct evidence of the quality of the 
administrative procedures is only shown, insofar it proves to be a predictor of the 
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occurrence and size of substantive errors.  The administrative procedures appear to 
have this quality, but unfortunately not stable over years, so it can not be relied upon.  
 
Next to these three claims, it speaks for itself that a system test by nature gives 
evidence on the operation of the administrative procedures and the attitude and 
discipline of the employees involved.  In that respect much more is relevant than just 
the question whether a substantive error occurs in a transaction.  We mention for 
instance the possibility of omissions in the procedures regarding contracts to be 
acquired, and indications on how keen an organisation is in maintaining the quality of its 
processes.  For an auditor these are very interesting aspects, basic for getting an 
overall picture of the organisation under audit. 
This wider relevance is shown in our data by the fact that system errors occurred some 
10 times as much as substantive errors.  So naturally, the system test gives information 
on the quality of the administrative procedures and the extent to which they are 
maintained.  The fact that they do not predict the size of the substantive error in an 
account leaves that unaffected. 
An improvement might result from a division in the system errors into errors that have 
predictive power for a substantive error and errors that miss this power.  For such an 
operation, the definitions would have to be sharp enough. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions, Discussion and Perspectives 
 
 
When auditors would consistently manage to give risk assessments close to the ‘real 
risk’, our validation results would have been better; nevertheless for some of the 
participating organisations the validation results are satisfactory.  The trouble is that an 
organisation should be sure of the quality of its risk assessment before using it to 
warrant an unqualified opinion and our research shows that it cannot be, unless it has 
validated its own risk assessments.  Apart from this conclusion, this chapter gives new 
possibilities to improve the practice of risk assessment, by giving it a firmer statistical 
basis, which even may result in coming very close to the ‘real risk’. 
10.1  Conclusions 
 
10.1.1 Validity of the assessment of occurrence risk 
 
In the first study, risk assessment showed a satisfactory validity with respect to two of 
the validation criteria: the error rate and the empirical distribution of the error rates.  
This validity was almost absent in the second study.  The relatively favourable results of 
the first study have to be placed in perspective, because neither error rate nor empirical 
distribution incorporate the dependence of risk upon the level of materiality.  Next to 
that, plausible moderator variables had no effect on the strength of the relation between 
assessed occurrence risk and error rate while the correlations found were not stable 
across organisations.   
 
The other two validation criteria, ‘audit position’ and sampling risk, do incorporate the 
dependence of risk upon materiality.  Validity with respect to these criteria was virtually 
absent, with an exception for two organisations. 
 
Combining these varying indications for validity, we conclude that the assessment of 
occurrence risk can be valid, but that an audit organisation surely can not take this 
validity for granted.  As the validity we investigated is necessary for the replacement of 
substantive testing by risk analysis, we formulate our first conclusion in the form of a 
warning. 
 
The first conclusion:  
Unless an audit organisation has sufficient evidence on the validity of its risk 
assessment, it should assume that this risk assessment is not valid in the sense that it 
may replace substantive audit. 
 
10.1.2 Improvement by decomposition 
 
We tried to accomplish improvement of the validity of risk assessment by its 
decomposition into the assessment on risk indicators.  We used the error rate as a 
validation criterion, because it was the most promising where validity of the classical 
assessment of the occurrence risk was concerned.  With this criterion we tried to find 
regression models in various ways, that would better predict the error rate.  None of 
these approaches led to a systematic improvement of the prediction of the error rate, 
compared to prediction by the occurrence risk. 
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The second conclusion: 
Improvement of risk assessment by decomposition of the occurrence risk with the help 
of the indicators in this study, could not be shown. 
 
10.1.3 System tests as predictor of the error rate 
 
We analysed the predictive power of system tests (tests of control) both for the 
occurrence and for the size of substantive error, as it showed itself in the data of more 
than 37000 dual purpose tests in the course of five years.. 
 
The third conclusion: 
Fairly stable over years, the occurrence of a system error has a predictive power for the 
occurrence of a substantive error, both at the level of a transaction and at the level of 
an account. 
 
The fourth conclusion:  
The occurrence of system errors in an account has predictive power for the size of the 
substantive error in that account, but it varies considerably over years. 
 
10.1.4 The “error of last year” as predictor of the “error of this year” 
 
Both in our second and in our third study, we could analyse the predictive power of the 
size of the error ‘of last year’ for the size of the error ‘of this year’.  For the six instances 
we could analyse this predictive power was absent, except for one in the third study.  In 
three of the four instances of the third study the occurrence of errors ‘of last year’ 
appeared to have predictive value for the occurrence errors ‘of this year’. 
 
The fifth conclusion:  
The size of the substantive error ‘of this year’ is not predicted by the size of the 
substantive error ‘of last year’.  The occurrence of substantive errors of this year is 
relatively stably predicted by the occurrence of substantive errors in last year  
 
10.2  Discussion 
 
We concluded chapters 6 up to 10 with discussions on the results presented there.  We 
will not repeat these, but will add some aspects resulting from the whole of the 3 
studies.  We will discuss (1) possible causes for the relatively unfavourable results, (2) 
compare the results to findings in literature, which are not consistently positive either, 
but still show stronger results, (3) the generalisability over the 3 studies, (4) the 
question whether we did accomplish what we intended. 
 
10.2.1 Causes and solutions  
 
We discuss four possible causes for the relatively unfavourable results. 
 
(1)  The first possible cause could be the difficulties in general that man has with 
assessing risks.  In chapter 3 we discussed many possible biases from which this 
assessment may suffer.  We also saw that many of the biases can be reduced by 
proper training and that in many cases practice furnishes this proper training.  But we 
are not sure of the question whether this training was also received in the cases we 
studied.  So here lies a possible cause. 
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The solution to this possible cause might be to provide for the desired training.  But we 
wonder whether any training can be given in such a way that it really meets the 
practical conditions an auditor is engaged in.  It would probably only work if designed 
for the specific way of assessment of an individual auditor: is he inclined to overstate 
risk, is he inclined to understate risk, does he need training in the branch of the 
business, or in the audit risk model, etc.  However, as a consequence of Waller (1993) 
and Srinindi & Vasarhelyi (1986), there is one approach which might be successful for a 
great variety of contexts.  Auditors could be trained to analyse more explicitly on the 
level of assertions and to aggregate the assessments per assertion to the level of the 
account in a proper way.  We will further discuss this in section 10.3. 
 
(2)  A second possible cause could be the level of difficulty which is inherent in 
predicting the error rate in an account, due to its distributional properties.  In almost all 
cases, the error rate is smaller than 1% (and then often 0, or much smaller than 1%).  
Most of the exceptions are only slightly larger than 1% and only occasionally really 
large.  So we might be looking at administrative processes of which the outcome in 
terms of errors can be described as "noise".  Predicting noise is very hard.  This 
suspicion of noise and the difficulties in predicting it, is confirmed by the correlations of 
the error "of previous year" and the error "of this year", which are all close to 0 and 
insignificant (except one).  And, as we could see from the scatterplots, an error of 0 in 
the previous year appears to be no guarantee for a zero or a small error this year; a 
large error in the previous year very often is followed by a small error this year.  So, 
what might be expected to be one of the best predictors of the error rate, also turns out 
to be without predictive power.  So we could wonder whether it is possible at all to 
predict the error rate from the qualities of the administrative processes and/ or the error 
of last year in an individual case. 
 
The solution to this possible cause maybe can be found when we only reckon on the 
distributional properties of the error rate over a set of audit cases.  When we know that 
error rates behave as noise around a low average level (which indeed they do in many 
cases); obviously we could use this as prior knowledge when starting a new audit.  In 
section 10.3 we will discuss how we can take advantage of the distributional properties. 
 
(3)  A third possible cause might be that we had "bad luck" with the organisations that 
participated in the research.  Or in other words, that these results are not representative 
of the way risk assessment is done in practice.  We discussed this possibility earlier 
under the question of generalisability.  
 
Obviously there is no solution to this possible cause, but we can put it into perspective:  
• a perspective on the qualities of the selected organisations: we did not select 
them for their good or bad quality in risk assessment; 
• a perspective on the reputation of the participating organisations: none was 
selected for either a good or a bad reputation with respect to the quality of their 
risk assessment.  In fact this reputation did not play a role at all.   
So we stick to our guess that the participating organisations perform neither better nor 
worse than the average audit organisation.   
 
(4)  A fourth possible cause might be the regression effect in the assessment of risk we 
introduced in 3.2.1 expectation E.  This regression could be on the findings of last year: 
when these were (1) favourable, the assessment of the occurrence risk is more likely to 
be favourable too; when these findings were (2) alarming, an assessment ‘high’ for the 
occurrence risk is more likely, even if the administrative processes were improved.   
 
When the first regression effect is combined with the unpredictability of the error rate, 
as we found it in chapters 8 and 9, this explains ineffective audit designs (‘under-
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auditing’): the extent of substantive testing or other substantive audit is chosen too low, 
given the actual risk.  Because the actual error and therefore the actual risk, given a low 
error rate in last year, can be ‘high’ just as well as ‘low’ this year.  This regression in risk 
assessment would be unintended and would lead to ‘under-auditing’. 
 
When the second regression effect is combined with the unpredictability of the error 
rate, as we found it in chapters 8 and 9, this explains inefficient audit designs (‘over-
auditing’): the extent of substantive testing or other substantive audit is chosen too high, 
given the actual risk.  The second regression effect also combines with a natural course 
of action in auditing and accounting.  In this course, the auditor urges the ones 
responsible for the accounting to improve their procedures and/ or operation.  Most 
probably the accounting department follows the relevant advice and thus improves the 
administrative processes.  By way of system testing and other means of systems 
assessment, the auditor sees that the processes are of higher quality than last year.  So 
the auditor is fully justified to assess the occurrence risk at low(er), but in many audit 
practices it is still customary to choose for OR=‘high’’, as a consequence of a ‘safety 
first’ principle.  In this case, the regression is intended and the auditor actually did the 
right assessment.  He just did not act according to this assessment, for he also gave 
much weight to his assessments of the previous year.   
 
From the viewpoint of the quality of an audit this course of action is fully justified, but it 
disturbs our view on the capabilities of an auditor with regard to risk assessment; 
actually he is better at it than can be read from his audit files.  Many auditors with whom 
we discussed our findings, confirm this practice of ‘safety first’.  In future research this 
regression effect is worth to be investigated.  We will include it in our discussion on the 
perspectives in section 10.3. 
 
So of the four possible causes the last one may be applicable, the third one is not 
expected to be effective, the second one cannot be remedied, but circumvented as we 
will show in section10.3 and the first one may be true and a proper training may be 
available (see also section 10.3). 
 
10.2.2 Comparison with results from literature 
 
Much of the research discussed in chapter 3 does not directly regard the relation 
between risk assessment and error rate.  In principle only the literature that refers to 
consistency of risk assessment with the error rate, is comparable to our study.  We 
discussed  
1. Roberts & Wedemeyer (1988); they found consistent relations between six general 
attributes, comparable to control environment, and the size to be expected of the error. 
2. Asare & Davidson (1995); they found three studies in which risk factors predict the 
error rate and two in which they do not.  
3. Waller (1993) investigated risk assessment at the assertion level; he found a positive 
correlation between the assessment of inherent risk and the rate of qualified opinions in 
a set of 215 real-life audits.  
4. Kreutzfeldt & Wallace (1990), found positive correlations between the error rate and 
many from 75 operational variables describing the control structure 
5. Wallace & Kreutzfeldt (1993), found positive correlations between the error rate and 
five factors regarding the control structure. 
6. Wright (1994) found increasing incidence and impact of errors with decreasing 
strength of controls. 
7. Bell & Carcello (2000), found that logistic regression on six risk factors improves 
prediction of fraud 
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The first, fourth, fifth and sixth study do not regard the risk assessment as such, but 
relevant aspects for the assessment.  In the studies these aspects, called "factors" or 
"operational variables" have a rating on their quality and with this only implicitly on the 
risk associated with them (high quality => low risk).  Under this condition all studies 
show consistently positive relations between factors and error rate, where in the fourth 
study these positive relations regarded ca. 80% or more of the investigated variables. 
This outcome is not fully comparable to the risk assessment studied in this thesis, 
because the link to an assessed risk is not made and therefore a crucial aspect of risk 
assessment is missing.   
 
The findings in our first study on the relation between risk assessment and error rate 
are also relatively favourable, although they varied considerably over organisations.  
When we include the findings of our second study, the results deteriorate and the 
overall picture becomes that of an unreliable relation between risk assessment and 
error rate. 
 
The studies referred to, and our studies, have in common that they investigate real-life 
situations, so are fully comparable on that aspect.  Maybe the most important difference 
between the studies is that in our study the occurrence risk is quantified, whereas it is 
not in the referred ones; there the assessment only regards aspects of the occurrence 
risk.  And this may account for the difference in the results. 
 
This supposition is confirmed by some of the findings of the second study, that of Asare 
and Davidson, where 5 studies are reviewed.  In 2 of them no relation is found between 
risk assessment and error rate.  But in 3 studies they do find this relation.  We actually 
did two studies into the validity of the assessment of the occurrence risk.  In the first the 
validity on the error rate was satisfactory for a couple of organisations, but for the 
remaining organisations and for those participating in the second study, validity with 
respect to error rate was absent.  With these findings we can conclude that our results 
are similar to those of Asare & Davidson, but with more weight on the absence of 
validity. 
  
Waller’s study investigates only the relation between inherent risk and error rate, which 
makes the results not comparable.  Still it does show that risk assessment at the 
assertion level does relatively well. 
 
So our studies may show less strong relations between risk assessment and error rate 
but these differences can be explained by the difference in handling risk assessment.  
This conclusion leads to a perspective: maybe risk assessment should only be done at 
the assertion level.  This perspective is further discussed in section 10.3. 
 
The sixth study, that of Wright, is comparable to our study into system tests.  Wright 
also went into the strength of the controls, where we only looked at the operation of 
them given their strength.  Maybe that difference accounts for the difference in outcome 
between his and our study.  Both studies find a relation between controls and incidence 
of errors, but Wright also finds a relation with impact of the error, where we find a 
varying relation between the occurrence of system errors and the size of substantive 
error.  Maybe these differences can also be accounted for by our observation that the 
definitions of the system errors in our study could have been sharper, thus excluding 
the possibility of rating them for their impact. 
 
In the study of Bell & Carcello the effectiveness of decomposition is investigated.  They 
found predictability of fraud and improvement from decomposition.  But this result is 
only partially comparable to ours, because their assessment regards the occurrence of 
fraud, not its size and moreover, fraud has a fundamentally different relation with the 
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administrative procedures than most of the other misstatements that can occur in an 
account. 
 
10.2.3 Generalisability over the three studies 
 
We mentioned it earlier: the availability of our data may have influenced what we found.  
This influence in our first study, may have been caused by the willingness of the 
organisations to participate in our research.  It may also have played a role in the 
choice of the cases that were reported via the questionnaires, but we may expect that 
for the respondents the retrieval of the data from their audit files will have been 
relatively easy  In our second study we ended with less departments than we started, 
because with some departments the necessary data were only available at too large an 
effort.  This may have influenced what we found.   
 
In both studies it is more likely that it will have influenced the relation in a positive rather 
than in a negative direction.  For available transparent data are likely to coincide with 
audit of a high quality.  On the other hand, the availability was in the relation to our 
questions; with other questions the availability might have been fully different.  So the 
possible influence can only be speculated at, but we expect it to be negligible. 
 
The availability was evident in our third study: we just were given the opportunity to 
analyse a host of interesting data.  It hardly makes sense to speculate on the extent to 
which the audit department we got the data from, is representative of other audit 
departments.  A sample of size one (organisation) can never be strong as a basis for 
generalisation.  Still more than in the other studies of this thesis, the generalisation will 
be that of "existence" (or “to a theory”, (Yin, 2003), see also section 5.6).  The strength 
of the data in the third study lies in their big numbers.   
 
For the three studies as a whole these considerations mean that a rigorous 
generalisation is not possible.  The results should be seen as strong indications for the 
(lack of) validity of risk assessment.  They give a strong warning not to assume that risk 
assessment is valid by itself.  They must be seen as a less strong indication that tests 
of control, or system tests might not work as well as they are expected to work.   
 
We can also put it another way: if both risk assessment and system testing would 
properly work, we most probably would have found stronger relations than we actually 
did. 
 
10.2.4 Did we accomplish what we intended? 
 
In chapter 3 we concluded that the heuristics and biases paradigm is interesting, but 
research based on it does not give conclusive information on the validity of risk 
assessment in practice.  Similar conclusions could be drawn from the consistency 
studies.  Our review showed very interesting things on the conditions under which 
consistency in the assessments will be seen and/or will indicate more quality of risk 
assessment.  However no validation was performed on the error rate or on an 
estimated audit risk, except for a couple of studies. 
 
So we concluded that there was a gap to be filled and that in this thesis the filling of this 
gap would be started. 
 
With the conclusions of 10.1, we may claim that we indeed started this work, or, with a 
view on the six studies we mentioned in the start of this section, continued it.  But we do 
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not claim that we have filled the gap: there are still many questions unanswered.  Some 
of them will be treated in 10.3. 
 
10.3  Perspectives 
 
We discuss 4 perspectives for further research we believe to be promising for 
improvement of risk assessment, given the results of this thesis:  
(1) risk assessment on assertions rather than at the account level 
(2) predicting the error size instead of assessing the occurrence risk 
(3) in combination with (2): another way of eliciting and representing risk 
(4) taking the empirical distribution of the error rates as a point of departure. 
 
We will discuss them in the same order 
 
10.3.1 Risk assessment on assertions rather than at the account level. 
 
For the convenience of the reader we refresh our discussion of the term ‘assertion’.  In 
3.3.3 we explained that the truth and fairness of the annual accounts is made up of 
aspects like existence, accuracy and completeness.  These aspects are labelled 
‘assertions’ (also ‘audit objectives’, or ‘controle criteria’ in Dutch); so assertions regard 
the aspects of truth and fairness, as they are subject of an audit.  The term ‘assertion’ 
derives from the form in which they appear:  “The account of debtors is complete” has 
the form of an assertion.  Truth and fairness of the account implicitly or explicitly 
consists of such assertions.  Actually you can not talk of truth and fairness without 
defining the aspects, assertions, that make up this property.  Not all assertions are 
applicable to all sub-accounts. 
 
Waller (1993), Srinindi & Vasarhelyi (1986) and Buckless (1989) indicate that risk 
assessment at the assertion level may lead to better results than risk assessment at the 
account level, provided a suitable aggregation rule is available.  This possibility is 
consistent with the general idea of improving assessment by reducing complexity by 
decomposition and the idea in particular of our study that risk assessment might be 
improved by decomposition of the assessment task into assessment on assertions (see 
3.3.3).  This consistency is not taken away by the lack of improvement we had to face 
with our indicator approach, because the indicators imply a decomposition into risk 
factors, whereas the assertions imply a decomposition into aspects of truth and fairness 
(see also figure 3.1 in 3.3.3). 
 
When we suppose that risk assessment on the assertion level leads to better 
assessments per assertion, the problem of a proper aggregation rule is still left.  Srinindi 
(1984) gives such aggregation rules, Vrijling & Van Gelder (2002) also give a way to 
deal with the aggregation of separate risks in the context of hydraulic engineering and 
controlling the various risks concerning budget execution in projects. 
 
This possible improvement for risk assessment implies research in which two randomly 
selected groups of auditors do their risk assessment, one group by means of classical 
risk assessment at the account level (so only with implicit assessment on the 
assertions), the other by means of explicit assessment of risks at the assertion level; 
assessments on the assertions are aggregated to the level of the account in the two 
ways referred to above.  The outcomes of these risk assessments are validated on the 
error rate, on the sampling risk and on the conditional distribution of the error rates, 
provided enough cases can be generated. 
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10.3.2 Aim at prediction of the error rate and not at assessing risk 
 
In this thesis we have identified two ways of prediction of the error rate to be expected 
as outcome of the audit: 
(1) in our first study we got a strong indication that risk assessment in the classical 
way as such is better in predicting the (size of the) error, than in assessing the 
risk (of missing a material error); in the first and second study there were 
indications that risk assessment is fairly good at predicting the existence of 
errors. 
(2) various studies we referred to in our review of the literature succeeded in 
locating factors, more or less representing aspects of the control structure, that 
are good predictors of the error found in the corresponding account. 
We think that especially the second approach, in which the quality of aspects of the 
control structure is assessed, without explicitly attributing an associated risk to them, 
could lead to improvement of risk assessment, because the judgmental part of this 
procedure has less weight than in risk assessment.  So we may circumvent the 
problems that assessment of risks in the audit field meets.  Some of our references, 
summarised in 10.2.2, indicate that we may expect improvement. 
 
Both in accordance with the first approach (risk assessment predicting error), and in 
accordance with the second approach (factors control structure predicting errors) ‘risk 
assessment’ could be aimed at assessing which size of the error is to be expected, 
given the quality of the administrative processes (and inherent risk factors).  An audit 
will produce an estimate of the error.  This study would be aimed at the predictive 
qualities of the assessments according to the first or to the second approach.  A 
convenient property of a study that would aim at investigating this quality, may be that it 
can combine both approaches. 
 
Assessing a most likely error (for the account) is not the same as assessing a risk, and 
it is not self-evident how this can be integrated in the calculations of the reliability of the 
audit.  We have to extend this procedure in order to come to an outcome of this "risk 
assessment" that really has the properties of a risk.  This extension is given in 10.3.3. 
 
10.3.3 Another way of modelling prior knowledge. 
 
Once the auditor has assessed the most likely error that will be in the account, he may 
wonder how sure he is that the actual error will not be "far" from this expected error.  He 
can do this by stating (assessing) probabilities on the expected and on error rates 
nearby and more distant.  These probabilities will be dependent on the outcome of the 
procedure (linear regression, logistic regression, etc.) in which he predicted the error.  
This procedure will have some statistical measure that indicates a bandwidth around 
the expected error.  And this bandwidth relates to the probability that can be given to 
this expected error.  On the other hand he also may use his assessments from the 
classical risk analysis and guess how probable that expected error will be, compared to 
other possible error rates.  He may also combine the statistical and judgmental 
approach. 
 
This attribution of probability to the expected error will also be dependent on the level of 
refinement with which the other possible errors are viewed.  To complete his attribution 
of probabilities, the auditor will define a suitable grid of possible error rates with values 
0 up to 1 (included).  In most situations he will give the error rates less than 1 percent 
(or another small percentage, associated with the level of materiality) almost all 
probability to be distributed, and the error rates larger than 1% only a small part of it.  
But of course, this will depend on the error(s) he expects as a consequence of his risk 
analysis or of the procedure meant in the second approach in 10.3.2.   
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Acting in this way, the auditor attributes the probabilities by way of what mathematicians 
call a “discrete distribution”: probabilities are assigned to a discrete set of (possible) 
error rates p (and not to a continuously changing set of p’s, which would lead to 
infinitely many possible error rates).  
 
The auditor could attribute the probabilities in many other ways, for instance by 
assigning to each possible error rate (of the grid he has chosen) an equal probability 
(1/N if a grid of N points is chosen).  This gives a uniform distribution on [0,1], the 
interval for the error rates p and thus expresses that he has no prior knowledge on the 
error rate (or does not want to make use of it).  Or by giving a greater weight to small 
error rates (and less to the larger ones), thus expressing great confidence in the quality 
of the account, or by giving a greater weight to larger error rates, thus expressing more 
reservations about the quality of the accounts; virtually every prior picture of the 
possible p’s and their probability can be modelled with this simple tool.  This way of 
modelling prior knowledge has many advantages: 
(1) it may combine quantified methods to estimate the most likely error to be 
found in the audit with more judgmental part of risk assessment; 
(2) it meets the findings in our study where the validation criterion at which the 
risk assessments showed most quality, was the error rate, which, as 
mentioned before, points at an assessment which reflects ideas about the 
error rate; 
(3) it offers more flexibility in modelling than continuous models of known 
distribution families. As a matter of fact in auditing these models often 
appear to be too strict, thus causing for instance the necessity of assigning 
a separate discrete probability to an error rate of zero (or one, or both); in 
fact the proposed way offers the possibility to model any mode, also 
multiple modes; 
(4) it is much more informative than the present practice: not only the prior risk 
of a material error is given, or directly computable, also the extent to which 
the auditor is certain of his/her assessments is reflected: the more certain 
that the error rate will be some p0 or within narrow boundaries from p0, the 
higher the probabilities assigned to p0  and the other p-values within the 
boundaries; 
(5) it offers quite natural possibilities for validation: the error rate in the sample 
validates the mode of the prior; also the likelihood of the error rate, based 
on the sample results directly validates the prior (except for one serious 
complication: the dependence of the sample size and provided the prior 
probabilities do not deviate too much from the beta distribution, if that is the 
distribution with which the sampling risk is calculated); 
(6) it circumvents the necessity of justifying a mathematical model for the 
distribution of the error rate; 
(7) the occurrence risk in this method is very easy to be assessed: it is the sum 
of the probabilities attributed to the error rates equal to materiality or larger; 
(8) when the auditor chooses for the ‘All or Nothing’ approach for the evaluation 
of the audit sample, implying that a monetary unit either is in error (for 
100%), or is correct (for 100%) and he uses monetary unit sampling, the 
binomial law applies to the distribution of the number of errors in the 
sample; this offers simple ways to combine the occurrence risk and the 
sampling risk by means of what is known as the Extended Bayes Rule22 
                                                          
22 This rule reads as follows: Let {Hi}i=1,..,n be a set of hypotheses about a parameter p; let 
P(Hi)i=1,..,n be a prior distribution on Hi; let P(x|Hi) be the probability of x, given Hi; then 
P(Hi|x)=P(x|Hi)P(Hi)/Σ P(x|Hi)P(Hi) 
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(9) this way of modelling the prior information can also fully or partly be based 
on the empirical distribution as is discussed in the next subsection. 
(10) this way of modelling the prior information and jointly analysing sample 
results with the Extended Bayes Rule circumvents the statistical invalidity of 
the Audit Risk Model. 
Next to these convenient properties, the approach has the limitation that no simple  
statistical evaluation method is available when the more common taints approach is 
chosen for the evaluation of the sample results. 
 
Performing risk assessment in a combination of the ideas of 10.3.2 and 10.3.3 can very 
well be supported by research: the method of assessing the error to be expected can 
directly be validated.  The method of eliciting the occurrence risk, as given in 10.3.3, 
can be validated with the sampling risk as a criterion or with the distribution of the error 
rates conditional on the assessed occurrence risk in a number of audit cases. 
 
10.3.4 Taking the empirical distribution of error rates as a point of 
departure. 
 
In chapter 2 we gave a justification for the use of the empirical distribution of the error 
rates of a set of audit cases, conditional on the level of occurrence risk, as a validation 
criterion for the occurrence risk.  The ideas developed there can easily be extended into 
a way of dealing with prior information, both from statistical analysis of known error 
rates in a set of "suitable" cases and from the assessment of occurrence risk in the 
audit being performed. 
 
We take S to be a set of "suitable" audit cases. In a number of these cases an error rate 
has been observed, meant to lead to an audit opinion on p, the error rate in the account 
of the case under audit.  We have the empirical distribution of these error rates, say E.  
If we may assume that a new audit case A is a member of S, randomly drawn from it, 
we can see E as the prior distribution of the error rate in A.   
 
For the validity of this approach, it is crucial how we define ‘suitable’.  A tautological 
definition would be “‘Suitable’ is what makes the set fit as the basis for the prior 
distribution”.  But this ‘definition’ still gives an idea how to construct a suitable set. 
 
The most practical approach in constructing a suitable set is just to start with all cases 
an audit department/ organisation audited last year.  In principle, their empirical 
distribution is fit for being used as prior distribution of the error rate in the account of a 
new audit case, provided it may be seen as a randomly selected member of the set.  
This set may be refined by taking subsets on some of the criteria just mentioned.  The 
stability requirement will prevent audit cases from being ‘suitable’ when they are too old.  
 
If the empirical distribution E appears to vary with the level of the assessed occurrence 
risk, say that distributions Evl, El, Em, Eh are found for the assessed occurrence risks, 
respectively ‘very low’ (VL), ‘low’ (L), ‘medium’ (M), and ‘high’ (H), and we have 
assessed an occurrence risk for A, we can refine the prior distribution for A into say El, 
if the assessed occurrence risk was ‘low’ and likewise for a possible other occurrence 
risk. 
 
If we do this, a practical programme for continuing research on the validity and possible 
improvement of risk assessment unfolds, in which from the start, advantage with 
respect to the efficiency of the audit can be taken from information on the error rates in 
the near past and in which risk assessment can be validated: 
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(1) A start up situation can be created, by establishing the "suitable" set from the 
near past of completed audit cases.  These cases all showed some estimated 
error rate.  The empirical distribution of these error rates is modelled.  This can 
be done either by adopting the strategy of 10.3.3 (where probabilities were 
assigned to a discrete set of possible error rates), or by adopting some known 
family of distributions, for instance the beta distribution (as we did in 6.5.1 and 
8.5.1).  
(2) Dependent on the number of suitable cases that can be found and on the 
assessed risks in these suitable cases, it is worthwhile to model the empirical 
distribution separately per level of assessed occurrence risk for the same 
suitable cases.   
(3) With a couple of adaptations the empirical distribution (either per level of OR, or 
irrespective of OR) of the "suitable cases" can be used as the prior distribution 
for the audit of this year, and may serve as a basis for the calculation of the 
number of necessary substantive tests.  We will discuss these adaptations also 
as a separate research topic. 
(4) The audit is performed, assessment of the occurrence risk included, an 
estimated error rate is established.  Evidently materiality, occurrence risk and 
the estimated error and other key features of the audit are kept record of. 
(5) For all audits that can be seen as a member of the suitable set of audit cases, 
the procedure of the previous point is executed; this results in a data set 
consisting of pairs "occurrence risk, estimated error rate". 
(6) If wanted, more variables can be kept record of and measurements added to the 
data set of the previous point; variables like size of the account, attributes of the 
auditor, attributes of the audit object, etc..  Evidently the choice of these 
variables depends on the planned research topics. 
(7) The generic research question: "Do the distributions of the error rates differ for 
varying assessed levels of occurrence risk?"  now can be answered by 
analysing these distributions for the various levels of occurrence risk as 
assessed in the set of audit cases of this year.  This approach allows a non-
monotonous relation between OR and error rate, which makes the outcomes 
more realistic and informative. 
(8) Other questions should be answered too: 
 is the "error of last year" predictive for the "error of this year"?   
 is the distribution of the "errors of this year" stable compared to the distribution 
of the "errors of last year"?  Both questions are relevant because of the 
"suitability" of the starting set. 
 
The idea of this approach is that the information contained in the prior distribution of the 
error rates in the "suitable set", is in itself relevant for the reliability of the audit opinion 
aimed at.  Therefore it may serve as a basis for reduction in the extent of substantive 
testing, even without making use of risk assessment.   
 
It may even contain more information than risk assessment.  This is indicated by the 
results of the first study in this thesis.  Here we found the distributions that fit to the 
distribution of the error rates for the total of the 120 cases and for the cases for varying 
occurrence risk. For this we calculate  
(1) the size for a sample of substantive tests, if we would use this "suitable set" 
regardless of the information given by the risk assessment, so by using the set 
of 120 cases and 
(2) the size for a sample of substantive tests while taking into account that the 
empirical distributions differ after the level of assessed risk. 
 
We calculate the size of the sample by designing an audit for a materiality level of 1% in 
which the substantive tests lead to an unqualified opinion as long as no more than 1 
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error is found in the sample (we choose a "k=1 sample").  If we would not use prior 
information, a sample size of 475 would be needed. 
 
When we use the property of the beta-binomial distribution as given in property 4.1 in 
chapter 4 and use the results of 6.5.1, we get the sample sizes as given in the next 
table. 
 
Table 10.1: Sample sizes in needed for various prior distributions 
suitable set # of cases* (a,b) prior beta 
distribution 
Sample size 
 needed 
less audit 
 effort 
all 120 cases 120 (.164,  9.77) 321 154 
cases with OR=VL 9 (.186,  25.34) 309 166 
cases with OR=L 35 (.127,  38.71) 285 190 
cases with OR=M 58 (.388,  38.18) 332 143 
cases with OR=H 17 (.729,  9.40) 419 56 
* 120 error rates were recorded; in one case the assessment of OR was missing 
 
Indeed table 10.1 shows that the largest gain in terms of less audit effort is got from the 
fact that prior information from the empirical distribution of the "suitable set" is used; a 
reduction in the audit effort of 154 individual transactions is justified.  For three of the 
levels of the occurrence risk the audit effort differs less than 37 individual transactions; 
only when OR=H, 98 extra transactions have to be audited.  But note that in the 
classical approach the auditor would audit 475 individual transactions in this case.  
 
Note that table 10.1 is just used as a hypothetical example.  In practice adaptations as 
discussed below in 10.3.4.2 should first be made. 
 
The outcomes of table 10.1 make clear how improvement of risk assessment may 
affect the necessary audit effort: the better the risks are assessed, the larger the 
differences will turn out to be for the sample sizes still needed.  The approach of this 
subsection turns out to offer the organisation that will engage in it the opportunity to 
"earn" a greater differentiation in the sample sizes needed, corresponding to the 
improvement in risk assessment.  The research part of this approach simply is to 
assess the conditional distributions for the various levels of assessed risk.  It can be 
extended into various other directions, discussed now. 
 
10.3.4.1 "Suitable sets" 
A crucial research topic in this approach will regard the question: "What makes sets 
suitable?".  The generic answer to this question is relatively simple: A set is suitable if 
its members have sufficient in common with the new audit cases for which a prior 
distribution is needed.   
 
This may mean that all audit cases of one audit department of the previous year can be 
considered to be ‘suitable’.  But if the audit cases of this year contain large deviations 
from those of last year, there will be a problem.  It is hard to decide when this deviation 
will be too large.  Decisive criterion for this question is that the distribution of possible 
error rates for the new audit case may be expected to be the same as that of the error 
rates in the suitable cases.  This criterion gives a way to investigate the suitability of the 
set of cases that furnishes the prior distribution.   
 
The question would be which properties of an audit case make that it complies to the 
decisive criterion.   
• The properties could regard type of transactions: expenses regarding personnel, 
activities regarding the creation of infrastructure like the construction of roads, 
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bridges, railways, etc., they may apply to the transfer of money in the form of 
subsidies, loans, etc..   
• The properties could also regard the stability of the audit object, its size, its 
context, etc..  When major changes in the business and/ or accounting 
processes have taken place since an error rate was observed, such an audit 
case will be less fit for inclusion in the suitable set.   
• The properties could regard the type of business: retail, wholesale, hotel and 
catering, etc., stability, size and many other properties may be important.   
It is obvious that relevant properties for audit objects from the public sector will differ 
from those in the private sector. 
 
10.3.4.2 Adaptations of the prior distribution based on the suitable set 
A second research topic, related to the previous one, regards the question which 
adaptations of the empirical distribution, based on the suitable set, are necessary to let 
it be fit as the prior distribution for a new audit.  This topic arises from the observation 
that a new audit case only can be seen as a random selection from the suitable set, if 
this represents the potential audit cases for the new year.  So audit cases of this year 
and audit cases of last year have to be interchangeable.  In order to assess this 
interchangeability it is necessary to assess factors determining this interchangeability.  
Many of them will be a form of stability, on the properties mentioned in the previous 
paragraph.  The extent to which this stability can be made plausible determines the 
extent to which the suitable set can be thought representative for the potential audit 
cases of this year.  Depending on the extent of representativeness, still adaptations of 
the empirical distribution of the error rates of the suitable set, or of conclusions based 
on this, will be necessary. 
 
We can think of the following adaptations: 
inflate the necessary size of substantive testing as results from the plain suitable set, by 
some factor, dependent on a minimum for substantive testing that is deemed to be 
necessary, the similarity of the audit cases with the suitable set, the time lag between 
the audit cases and the suitable set, etc.  These adaptations can be tested for their 
necessity when a database is built over years, in which adaptations and their causes 
are recorded. 
 
10.3.4.3 Regression effects 
When in the classical approach of risk assessment the auditor willingly introduces 
regression effects as discussed in 10.2.1(4), he might consider not to do this when 
making use of this empirical distribution as a prior, because the empirical basis 
enhances the reliability of this prior information, compared to judgmental risk 
assessment.  If the auditor keeps opting for a ‘safety first’ approach, it is wise to keep 
record in which cases OR=’high’ was chosen in spite of the awareness of a quality of 
the administrative processes that would allow to assess a lower level for OR.  Such a 
record allows to treat deliberate risk avoiding risk assessment separately when risk 
assessment is validated. 
 
Of course the approach of this subsection gives no clues as to how to improve risk 
assessment.  But it can be combined with the possibilities given in the first three 
approaches. It may be tempting to observe that this improvement is not really 
necessary for the goal of decrease in the audit effort.  This goal can already be attained 
by making use of the statistical properties of the distribution of the error rates in the 
suitable set. 
 
Our choice from the four possibilities mentioned in section 10.3 for the continuation of 
research and improvement of risk assessment, would be the last one: the one based on 
the empirical distributions, because  
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1. to a considerable extent, it circumvents the difficulties we find in predictability of 
the error rate, either by risk assessment or by the error of the previous year; 
2. it starts with the probable bonus that, regardless of the quality of risk 
assessment, decrease of the audit effort can be justified and that on a sound 
statistical basis;   
3. this choice does not keep us from introducing elements from the other three 
approaches. 
 
10.3.5 Best Practice Research 
 
Improvement of risk assessment could also be found by way of best practice research.  
Organisations’ risk assessments are validated, organisations showing assessments 
with highest validity are compared for possible determinants for their best practice.  We 
will not further discuss this possibility. 
 
10.4  Business process analysis 
 
Since about a decade, the audit risk approach is gradually being replaced by the 
business risk approach, or business process analysis/ approach (BPA).  We discussed 
this in 1.2.7.  As we mentioned there, our research exclusively deals with the audit risk 
approach, simply because our data apply to this approach.  But this exclusive 
orientation leaves us with two related questions: 
1. Do the results of this study also apply to risk analysis in BPA? 
2. Would the results with respect to the validity of risk assessment have been 
better, when BPA had been used, instead of the ARM?  
 
As to the first question, we firstly have to add “as far as it also aims at assessing the 
occurrence risk”.  We mentioned that the Joint Working Group (JWG 2000, p.10) has 
the same expectation as to the effectiveness and efficiency of BPA as have Van 
Leeuwen and Wallage (see Van Leeuwen & Wallage 2002), especially for issues 
concerning accounting estimates, going concern and management fraud.  But the Joint 
Working Group also notes that the auditor will have to transform outcomes of the 
business process analysis as to their relevance for the quality of the accounting 
processes and for the inherent risk.  There might be a possibility that ICR and IR are 
assessed with more quality, because of the wider scope of BPA.  But it is not very likely 
that this possible improvement will be significant, because that would imply that the 
methodology of the ARM would insufficiently consider the relevance of the business 
processes for the audit risk.  But the opposite is true: the ARM explicitly aims at 
incorporating all aspects of the business relevant for the quality of the administrative 
processes, both the uncontrollable (in the inherent risk) and the controllable in the 
control risk).  So the improvement that may be expected from BPA with respect to the 
assessment of OR results from its wider scope.  Our conclusion with respect to the first 
question is, that we expect our findings to apply to BPA, as far as it is aimed at 
assessing OR. 
 
As to the second question, we observe that our analysis of and answer to the first 
question implies our answer to the second question: we do not expect a significant 
improvement from the application of BPA for the assessment of the occurrence risk. 
 
Obviously these two expectations ask for substantiation by empirical research. 
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Glossary 
 
In this glossary definitions of key concepts and some of their semantics are given.  
Concepts in a definition that refer to a defined concept in this glossary are in italics. 
 
1. Allocation: 
primary allocation: the choice on which balances or classes of transactions the 
auditor will deploy his audit resources. 
secondary allocation: the determination of the extent of the audit activities per 
chosen audit object  
2. Analytical procedures: analyses meant to detect signals in or produce signals 
from the data that underlie or constitute the account under audit; signals that 
point at the possibility of errors in the account. 
3. Assessment: finding out what could be the value of a relevant attribute, by 
making use of a mix of more or less precise methods, which may vary from 
judgmental methods, intuition included, analysis of processes of key features, 
comparison with similar situations, transformation of qualitative findings into 
quantities, to strictly quantitative measurements.  The mix chosen is also a 
matter of judgment. 
4.  Annual accounts: a set of accounts, issued every year, reporting the state of the 
finances of a business. The annual accounts often are made up by sub-
accounts.  In the case of a business the sub-accounts mostly are debtors 
(receivables), creditors (payables), stock, assets, loss and profit.  
In this thesis the audited account often will be a sub-account. In case of a 
governmental organisation, the sub-accounts may be obligations, payments, 
receipts, balance.  
          sub-account: a group of homogeneous individual items, of which the 
          aggregate is included as a separate item in the annual accounts, or in  
          management information that is summarised in the annual accounts  
5. Assertion: ‘truth and fairness’ of the annual accounts are made up of aspects 
like existence (of debtor, stock), accuracy (correctness of a booking), legality (of 
a transaction).  These aspects are called ‘assertions’.  Audit establishes truth 
and fairness with respect to these assertions, also called ‘audit objectives’ (or, in 
Dutch: ‘controle criteria’)  
6. Audit assurance (AA): the assurance or level of reliability that is associated with 
an unqualified opinion; it is the complement of the audit risk (AA=100%-AR) 
7. Audit object: the entity of which the audited annual accounts have to give a true 
and fair view. The audit opinion essentially regards the accounts, but the audit 
implies examination of all the relevant persons, procedures, authorizations, 
administrative organization and internal controls, next to contextual factors like 
type of business and quality of the personnel. “Audit object” can refer to a 
business or organisation as a whole, but also to parts of the business or 
organisation, with its own processes and sub-accounts.  
This means that the audit object is much broader than the audited accounts.  
8. Audit objective: See assertion. 
9. Audit risk (AR): the risk that the auditor gives an unqualified opinion, when in 
fact the audited accounts contain a material error. 
10. Audit risk approach: the approach to auditing in which the analysis of risks as to 
the existence and detection of a material error plays a central role in the design 
and execution of an audit and in which the audit risk is modelled by way of the 
audit risk model. 
11. Audit risk model: the model in which the audit risk is seen as a function of the 
inherent risk, the control risk, the risk of analytical review and the sampling risk.   
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12. Audit value: the value which, according to the audit, a transaction should have. 
This value results from the audit of the book-value and underlying transactions.  
13. Bayesian statistics: a statistical methodology in which information on the 
parameter of some probability distribution, for instance of errors in an account, is 
modelled as a probability distribution on this parameter and inferences are on 
the probability distribution of this parameter.   
       In this methodology, a natural sequence of events is: 
a) an investigator has information on this parameter, for instance: “The mean 
error rate per monetary unit in this account may be expected to be very low”; 
b) this information is modelled in a “prior distribution” on this parameter; 
c) the investigator draws a sample from the distribution, for instance from the 
errors in the account (by selecting a sample of line items and assessing the 
error per line item) and assesses the probability of the sample result; 
d) the investigator combines the prior probability and the probability of the 
sample result into a “posterior distribution” for the parameter, the mean error 
rate in our example. 
Conclusions about the parameter (again: the mean error rate, in our example) 
are based on the posterior distribution, in which, for instance, the probability that 
the mean error exceeds materiality can be calculated. (see Lee,1997 pp 33,34)  
In this methodology the prior information may be based on previous statistical 
investigations, but it is also allowed that the prior information is an expectation, a 
state of belief or a conviction.  In this way it is distinct from what is called 
“classical statistics”.  In the same way it is similar to what is done in the audit 
risk approach. 
14.  Book-value: the monetary value at which a transaction is recorded; in the 
account, such a record is also called ‘line item’. 
15. Business process analysis: the approach in which the whole of the context of 
the business and all of its processes, the administrative processes included, are 
analysed as to the risk that the business will fail to reach its goals. 
16. Compliance error: failure to comply to the accounting and internal control 
system. 
17. Compliance testing: see tests of control.  
18. Confidence level: the probability that the estimation procedure results in an 
interval that contains the parameter that is estimated. 
19. Confidence upper limit, also confidence upper bound: see interval estimation 
20. Conjunctive event: an event that happens if (and only if) all of a set of 
composing sub-events happen simultaneously (are in conjunction); it is 
analogous to a series connection.  
21. Control risk (CR): Control risk is the risk that a misstatement, that could occur in 
an account balance or class of transactions and that could be material 
individually or when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or 
classes, will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis by the 
accounting and internal control systems (ISA 400 par.5). 
22. Detection risk (DR): Detection risk is the risk that substantive procedures will not 
detect a misstatement that exists in an account balance or class of transactions 
and that could be material, individually or when aggregated with misstatements 
in other balances or classes. (ISA 400 par 6).   
            The detection risk can be broken down into: 
risk of analytical review (RAR): The risk of analytical review is the risk 
that analytical procedures will not result in the detection of a 
misstatement that exists in an account balance or class of transactions 
that could be material, individually or when aggregated with 
misstatements in other balances or classes (ISA 520 par 10-15), 
sampling risk (SR): Sampling risk arises from the possibility that the 
auditor’s conclusion, based on a sample, may be different from the 
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conclusion reached if the entire population were subjected to the same 
audit procedure.” (ISA 530 par. 7).  
23. Disjunctive event: an event that happens if at least one of a set of composing 
sub-events happens; it is analogous to a parallel connection. 
24. Dual purpose test: a test on an individual transaction in which both the operation 
of the controls (the administrative system) is checked and the correctness of the 
book-value is investigated. 
25. Error: at the level of a line item: the difference between book-value and audit 
value (see also misstatement.); at the level of an account: the difference 
between the total of book-values and the total of audit values 
26. Error rate: the total error amount divided by the total of book-values (= the size 
of the account). 
27. Inherent risk (IR): Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an account balance or 
class of transactions to misstatement that could be material, individually or when 
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, assuming that 
there are no related internal controls. (ISA 400, par. 4)  
28. Internal control risk: see control risk 
29. Internal controls: the set of measures aimed at proper functioning of the 
administrative processes.  
30. Interval estimation: an estimation procedure in which the estimate takes the 
form of an interval, a range of possible values for the entity that is estimated.  In 
auditing the Stringer bound is an example of an interval estimation: it gives the 
upper bound for possible error rates in the account.  Because this upper bound 
is associated with a level of confidence, it is called ‘confidence upper bound’; in 
auditing also the term ‘Upper Error Limit’ (UEL) is in use. 
31. Likelihood: There are two ways of interpreting a value of the formula for a 
probability distribution with some parameter p, for some outcome X: 
1.  p is seen as the variable, and X as given; in this interpretation, the value of 
the formula is the likelihood of p (given X) 
2.  X is seen as the variable and p as given; in this interpretation the value of the 
formula is the probability density of X (given p), 
32. Line item:  see book-value. 
33. Material error: an error or misstatement in the account of a size that may 
influence decisions that have the annual accounts as a basis. 
34. Misstatement: the difference between book-value and audit value (see also 
error). 
35.  Monetary unit (MU): the unit or currency in which the book-value is recorded; 
also (used as) unit of sampling (See also Monetary Unit Sampling)  
36. Monetary Unit Sampling (MUS): A sampling method in which the distinct 
monetary units (MU’s) are the unit of sampling, each drawn with equal 
probability.  So with N monetary units, each has probability 1/N to be drawn This 
causes a book-value to be selected with a probability proportional to its size. 
37. Most likely error (MLE): see point estimation. 
38. MU-sample: sample of monetary units, a sample in which every single monetary 
unit is drawn with equal probability (see also Monetary Unit Sampling). 
39. Nominal level is the level of reliability (or assurance, or risk) that was aimed at 
by the audit design; it is the level of reliability at which the size of substantive 
testing is calculated (by using a model, such as the ARM).  In a valid model, this 
nominal level will be equal to the actual reliability.  
40.  Occurrence risk: the risk that the account an auditor has to audit, contains a 
material error. The occurrence risk can be broken down into inherent risk and 
internal control risk. Because of the problems to separate the IR and CR in an 
unequivocal way, many auditors do not separately assess IR and CR, but 
assess the occurrence risk OR as the combination of both. This means that OR 
= f(IR, CR). 
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41. Point estimation: an estimation procedure in which one single value is attributed 
to the entity that is estimated.  This estimation in principle is ‘best’ with respect 
to a statistical criterion, for instance that the estimate has maximum likelihood, 
given the data in the sample.  In auditing the sample mean of the taints is often 
used as an estimator. This meets the maximum likelihood criterion and therefore 
is also called ‘most likely error (MLE)’.  
42. PPS-sampling: sampling of the units with a probability proportional to their size; 
MU-sampling effectuates PPS sampling of (the book-values of) transactions. 
43. Risk of analytical review (RAR): see detection risk. 
44.  Sampling risk (SR): see detection risk. 
45. Simple event: an event that is not structured as a combination of sub-events. 
46. Sub-account: see annual accounts. 
47. Substantive tests of details: substantive tests of details are part of substantive 
procedures: procedures concerned with amounts aimed at obtaining audit 
evidence to detect material misstatements in financial statements.  Substantive 
tests verify one or more assertions about a financial statement (for example, the 
existence of accounts receivable), or make an independent estimate of some 
amount (for example, the value of obsolete inventories on the individual 
bookings in the audited account). (ISA 530 par 17).  
48. Taint (tainting): The amount of MU’s in error divided by the book-value in a 
transaction. 
49. Tests of control: based on the auditor’s understanding of the accounting and 
internal control systems, the auditor identifies the characteristics or attributes 
that indicate performance of a control, as well as possible deviation conditions 
which indicate departures from adequate performance.  The tests concern the 
absence or presence of these attributes (ISA 530 par. 15)  
50. Unqualified opinion: An unqualified opinion should be expressed when the 
auditor concludes that the financial statements give a true and fair view (or are 
presented fairly, in all material respects) in accordance with the identified 
financial reporting framework .  (ISA 700 par. 27) 
51. Upper error limit (UEL): see interval estimation. 
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Appendix 1: The Questionnaire 
 
The next pages show a prototype of the questionnaire we used in our first study.  It is almost 
uniform for the various participating organisations, but some questions were adapted to the 
actual practice of this organisation.  This adaptation regarded, for instance, the categories for 
the questions 1.1 and 1.7; for some organisations some risk indicators were added, others 
deleted.  As explained in our thesis, the actual results were on indicators that were applicable to 
all organisations. 
 
Contact persons, currency and other elements that could increase the recognisability of a 
participating organisation have been removed or masked. 
 
The questionnaire had more questions than used in this thesis.  All questions have played a role 
in the research report that was written for every participating organisation giving all results for 
this organisation.  In our thesis we left out some of the aspects covered by the questionnaire. 
 
Obviously for the Dutch organisations and firms the questionnaire was in Dutch. 
 
The following explains how we came to risk indicators. 
 
Desirable qualities of risk indicators. 
Use of risk indicators in the assessment task will possibly improve risk assessment when 
• A risk indicator represents a clear, recognizable aspect of the audit object. 
• A risk indicator represents an optimal part of the total of relevant aspects: not too small, 
because then the interaction between indicators becomes too complicated, not too large 
because then complexity is not reduced enough.  
• The set of risk indicators covers all relevant aspects. 
• A risk indicator may be expected to be predictive for the error rate. 
• A risk indicator is as independent as possible of the other indicators defined. “Independence” 
in this context is to mean: one can vary without the others necessarily covarying, for 
instance: educational level can vary independently of separation of duties, which only to a 
minimal extent can (or should) vary independently of authorisations. 
 
These qualities were thought to be desirable, partly because of logical reasoning, partly because 
of the analysis of audit files in a pilot study (Broeze et al, 1997) and partly because of standard 
audit theory (see among others Arens & Loebbecke, 1997).  They gave guidance when we 
constructed the set of indicators used in this thesis.  The qualities were used as giving some 
direction in the construction of the set of indicators to be used in our research.  This research will 
give some answer to the necessity or sufficiency or desirability of these properties for the 
indicators that were developed. 
 
Construction of the set of indicators 
In our study we used 20 risk indicators. An initial set was constructed in a pilot study (see 
Broeze et al, 1997).  In this study five real audit cases on stocks and debtors were scrutinised on 
the risk cues used by the investigating auditor.  Stocks and debtors were chosen because in 
these sub-accounts a relatively high error rate may be expected.  And obviously in order to be 
able to validate risk assessment on (some quantity related to) the error rate, there has to be 
some variability in the error rate.  Also the audit manual of the same firm which allowed us to 
use the (strictly anonymised) cases was used as a source of risk indicators.  A third source of 
indicators was found in the audit manual of the audit departments of the Dutch ministries 
(HCDAD, 1997).  The pilot resulted in a set of 13 risk indicators: 
1. changes in the internal controls since last audit; 
2. quality with which the administrative procedures are documented; 
3. quality with which the authorisations are documented; 
4. quality of separation of duties with respect to automation; 
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5. quality of the other separations of duties; 
6. test and acceptance procedures of software; 
7. security regarding access to EDP system; 
8. operation of the other separations of duties; 
9. violations of procedures and regulations; 
10. violations of authorisations; 
11. attitude of management towards internal control ; 
12. expertise of personnel; 
13. number and size of errors in previous audit. 
 
The indicators from this pilot study were further developed by studying auditing literature with a 
view on key features for the internal control and for contextual factors (see for instance Arens & 
Loebbecke (Ch. 8,9, 1997)).  This added 10 indicators: 
1. strength of the system of controls; 
2. access to other systems and assets; 
3. are the processes a routine?; 
4. the degree of pressure for high performance; 
5. the occurrence of structural changes in the organisation; 
6. the auditability of applicable law, regulations; 
7. existence of audit trail; 
8. the nature of the organisation; 
9. the attitude of personnel; 
10. the complexity of the organisation 
So in this study 23 indicators were in use.  Not every indicator was used with every organisation 
that was in the study; on the average 20 indicators per organisation were used.  Indicator 11 (on 
manual intervention) in the questionnaire of this appendix was not present for all organisations; 
therefore it is missing in the analyses made for this thesis. 
 
 
 
On the next pages the Questionnaire is given, its layout included. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Risk assessment is an essential part of auditing. Also with your organisation in many 
audits some form of risk analysis and assessment takes place. The consequences of 
risk analysis can be far reaching: they can affect both scope and depth of the audit 
activities that follow in the next phase. In spite of this key role, the quantitave aspects of 
risk assessment are still subject to serious discussions and even doubts. Trigger of this 
discussion is the transformation of qualitative (professional) judgements into 
quantitative assessments of chances that some event will occur and the inevitably 
subjective character of this transformation. 
 
The questionnaire in front of you is meant to collect data in a research project that aims 
at forcing back this subjectivity. The key idea behind this is that by breaking down the 
risk assessment from two dimensions (inherent and control risk) into some 20 
dimensions, the subjectivity in the judgement of how these dimensions interact, is 
reduced. In the questionnaire dimensions take the form of risk indicators, that you are 
asked to score, and questions about the organisation to which the financial statement 
applies that you have been auditing. In addition it asks for the size of the financial error 
you found in the audit. The aggregation of the separate risk assessments into some 
prior distribution on the error will be done on a statistical, empirical basis, as is 
explained in the next paragraph. 
 
By gathering this type of data from a number of audits, say 30 as a minimum number, a 
data base is formed that gives the opportunity to analyse the relation between risk 
assessment and error found, on a purely statistical basis (given the data). This will lead 
to a calibration of the risk assessment of the respondents, and of the organisation they 
work for, to the extent that the respondents can be considered to be a random sample 
from the organisation. In a pilot study, conducted under the auspices of the Limperg 
Instituut, some results in this direction have already been gained. The ‘Limperg Instituut’ 
is an inter university institute in Amsterdam, for research into accounting and auditing. 
In the next phase the (regression like) relation between risk assessments and error will 
be used to predict the error rate that will be found in an new audit. This prediction may 
be given the form of a prior distribution of the error rate. An opening to a Bayesian 
approach with an empirically based prior distribution comes within reach in the near 
future. 
 
In this questionnaire we ask for two types of answers: 
• The general aspects you take into consideration when you assess the risk of a 
material error. 
• Detailed data from a case from your own audit practice: risk assessment, size of the 
accounts, the error found 
 
Filling out the questionnaire will take about one hour. The results of this research will be 
communicated to you (and possibly other people who are interested) in a presentation 
for you organisation.  You will be invited in due time. 
Whenever you have questions you can contact the contact person or Ed Broeze  
We thank you in advance for your cooperation 
 
 
Drs. Ed Broeze,        Contact person 
 
(adresses and telephone numbers) 
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I GENERAL FACTORS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT FOR THE RISK 
OF A MATERIAL ERROR IN THE STATEMENT (THE RISK ASSESSMENT) 
 
Please indicate by giving them a rank in the next table, which of the general factors 
mentioned you consider to be important, when assessing the risk of a material error (1 
for the most important factor, etc). 
If there are other factors that you think important, please add and rank them (cells 7, 8, 
9, 10). 
 
 Factor Ranking 
 
1. The audit findings from audits of the same accounts of previous 
periods 
 
 
2. Changes in the sector in which the organisation operates (new laws, 
concentration, heavy workload, etc.) 
 
 
3. Design of the administrative system and controls  
 
 
 
4. The extent to which data processing is automated 
 
 
 
5. Attitude of management with respect to internal control 
 
 
 
6. Major changes in  the way the business operates 
 
 
 
7. 
 
 
  
8. 
 
 
  
9. 
 
 
  
10. 
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II. YOUR AUDIT CASE 
 
 
1. Characteristics of the audit object 
   (All amounts in thousands) 
1.1  
Which type of account or account area is the audit  article   
about? Agency account  
(multiple answers are possible) directorate account   
 resource account  
 any other  
 
1.2 
What is the size in MU (currency) of the financial statement under 
audit?  
KMU 
 
1.3  
What are the number of line items that make up this account?  
 
1.4  
Could you estimate the percentage of largest items that make up 
80% of the account? 
             % 
 
1.5  
Does the account area regard a flow of income or of expenditure? In out 
 
1.7  
Is the expenditure  subsidies  
(multiple answers are possible) construction   
 cost of administration  
 contracts  
 others  
 
1.8 
Has the administrative process been automated to a high extent? Yes no 
 
1.9     
Size of the (estimated) error last time KMU not available 
 
2. Materiality 
(Amounts in thousands of MU) 
At what  materiality limit did you assess the risks in the audit object  KMU                        
=                      % 
 
 
3. Probability of an error in the financial statement 
 
3.1 General indicators 
 
The table next page contains a number of risk indicators: (findings on) aspects that 
possibly have played a role in your assessment of the the occurrence risk (OR): the 
probability that (material) errors exist in the statement under audit.  
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In the column ‘Your conclusion’ you are asked to score every risk indicator according to 
your findings; either ‘-1’ when you consider the findings to be risk enhancing (e.g. many 
errors in the previous period), or ‘0’ when risk neutral , or ‘1’ when risk decreasing. If 
there are indicators that did not play a role in your risk assessment, you can show that 
in the rightmost column.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator Your 
conclusion 
Used in 
assessment? 
 (-1, 0 or 1)       (yes/ no) 
Relations with previous periods XXXXX XXXXXX 
1 Number and size of errors in previous audits 
 
  
2 Changes in controls since last audit  
 
  
Design and existence of admin controls XXXXX XXXXXX 
3 Strength of system of controls 
 
  
4 Quality of documentation 
 
  
5 Strength of segration of duties with respect to EDP 
 
  
6 Strength of segration of duties with respect to other 
procedures 
  
Working of admin procedures XXXXX XXXXXX 
7 Acces to EDP systems (logical, physical) 
 
  
8 Access to other systems and assets (logical, physical) 
 
  
9 Extent to which authorisations and segregations are 
maintained 
  
10 Extent to which transactions can routinely be processed
 
  
11 Extent to which there is manual intervention in data     
processing                                  
  
The context of the organisation  XXXXX XXXXXX 
12 Pressure for high performance 
 
  
13 Structural changes (mergers, privatisation, etc.) 
 
  
Auditability XXXXX XXXXXX 
14 Auditability of law, regulations 
 
  
15 Existence of audit trail 
 
  
16 Nature of the organisation 
 
  
17Complexity of organisation structure 
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Indicator Your 
conclusion 
Used in 
assessment? 
 -1, 0 or1   (yes / no) 
General attitude towards internal control measures XXXXX XXXXXX 
18 Attitude of management towards internal control 
 
  
19 Attitude of personnel towards internal control 
 
  
20 Professionalism/ expertise personnel 
 
  
 
 
3.2 Specific factors 
 
Please mention (ranked in order of importance) specific factors concerning the relevant 
data processing that in your opinion decrease the probability that the financial 
statement will appear to be in material error (at most  3).  
 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
Please mention (ranked in order of importance) specific factors concerning the relevant 
data processing that in your opinion increase the probability that the financial statement 
will appear to be in material error (at most  3).  
 
1. 
 
 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Costs of the risk assessment 
 
Is it a new or a repeat audit? new repeat 
How much audit effort did you need for your risk assessment? ..............days 
How many tests of the working of the system were part of that effort? ..............systems 
tests 
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Please give your global risk assessment (of the occurrence risk)  
in the following table (as you made it up before the substantive testing). 
 
I deemed the occurrence risk to be 
 
Very low 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
High 
 
 
Any other qualification (please describe) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Audit design and -result 
 
4.1 
Do you distinguish large and small items? Yes no 
4.2 
If so, what is the boundary between ‘small’ and ‘large’’? (in thousands) KMU 
4.3 
Design/ result large 
items 
small items 
All items audited   
Judgmental sample   
Statistical line item sample   
Statistical monetary unit sample   
Something else, namely 
 
 
  
Sample size (also with judgmental sample   
Size of the error(s) found (in MU)   
Sum of the taintings   
Number of items in error in the sample   
Other relevant characteristics of the audit  (please describe) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in a ‘multiple sample situation’ please give the data asked for 
on a separate account. 
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Summary 
 
 
In chapter 1 we relate how common practice in auditing allows a significant reduction of 
substantive audit when one of the outcomes of risk analysis, the occurrence risk, is 
assessed at the level ‘low’.  The occurrence risk is the risk (or probability) that the 
annual accounts, as they are presented to the auditor for his audit, contain a material 
error (an error of a size to be in the way of approval of the accounts).  It is the result of 
the assessment of 
• the inherent risk: the risk due to risk factors in the environment of the audit 
object and  
• the control risk, the risk the accounting processes imply when dealing with the 
environmental risks and when safeguarding the proper operation of the business 
processes where they lead to recordings in the various accounts.  
This practice of reduction of substantive work, guided by tables, raised questions. 
Can tables be justified, in use in the audit practice, that relate assessed occurrence risk 
to that decrease in substantive audit?  Does this implicit quantification have an 
empirically sound basis?  To find an answer to these questions, we engaged in a 
research into the validity of the assessment of occurrence risk.  We hoped to find out 
how assessed occurrence risk relates to the ‘real risk’.  For this we had to get a better 
view on the ‘real risk’ and we needed validation criteria. 
 
In chapter 2 we develop a justification for four validation criteria:  
1. the error rate and 3 measures constructed with the error rate as a basis.:  
2. the ‘audit position’ of the error rate (is it larger than materiality?),  
3. the ‘sampling risk’ (the risk a material error is not detected, due to sampling),  
4. the empirical distribution of the error rates in the set of all cases (for a low 
occurrence risk the lower error rates should be prominent in this distribution, for 
a higher occurrence risk the higher error rates should be prominent).   
The assessment of the occurrence risk aims at evaluating the quality of the 
administrative processes.  For this quality the error rate is a direct indicator, but due to a 
random effect in the outcome, processes of the same quality will generate accounts 
with varying error rates.  In combination with materiality (the limit for approval) the error 
rate gives a more conclusive indication of the risk that the administrative processes as 
they are analysed may produce a material error.  This combination is made in the 
criteria “audit position” and “sampling risk”.  Because of this, we expect them to be 
better validation criteria.  We were helped to justify the use of these criteria via the 
exploration of the Ensemble Prediction System (EPS) - the basis of weather forecasts - 
and by exploring the risk of water (the error) flooding dikes (the materiality); as 
metaphors.   The exploration made clear that the empirical distribution of errors 
validates risk assessment. 
 
In chapter 3 we explore the logic of the Audit Risk Model (ARM) and give an overview 
of research.  We explore the ‘heuristics and biases’ paradigm of Tversky and 
Kahneman (T&K).  This paradigm is basic for dealing with risk assessment and for a 
majority of the available research.  We explore the ARM, as to the event structure, the 
statistical validity and the level at which risk is assessed.  We conclude that improper 
outcomes lie in wait, due to shortcomings with respect to the three aspects mentioned.  
Next to an ordering of the available research at the T&K paradigm, we use 
‘consistency’, ‘complexity’ and ‘operation of controls’ as orientations in organising the 
available literature.   
Our overview shows that  
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• the biases in the T&K paradigm do exist in risk assessment, but that with proper 
training they can be controlled 
• consistency of risk assessment with relevant criteria exists; especially with 
respect to error rate.  But unfortunately this is not stable over studies 
• assessment at the level of assertions may improve risk assessment 
• complexity of the audit object negatively affects assessments, but that 
experience improves handling of complexity 
• the few studies on the effectiveness of tests of controls and on the influence of 
attributes of the administrative system indicate predictive power for the error 
rate, but in spite of that insufficient prevention of human errors 
So there is much research on risk assessment, with positive outcomes.  But the vast 
majority of this research applies only to aspects of this judgmental task.  For a 
conclusive answer to the question, whether the current practice of quantification of risk 
is allowed, the assessed occurrence risk and (the four) validation criteria (our indicators 
for the ‘real risk’) have to be related.  This will be the aim of our research.  
Studies that indicate predictive power for distinct aspects also indicate that 
decomposition of risk assessment will improve its validity.  This finding is the cause for 
our choice, in the first study, not only to validate classical risk assessment, but also to 
investigate possibilities for improvement by decomposing risk assessment into the 
assessment of risk indicators. 
 
In chapter 4, as a preliminary, we solve the problem how to calculate the sampling risk, 
based on the data we have, by performing a simulation study to show that the use of a 
Beta distribution, based the estimate of the error rate and the corresponding sample 
size, is fit for the calculation of the sampling risk.  We also found strong indications that 
this way of evaluating sample results may give valid and sharper confidence bounds for 
the error in the account under audit than the customary Stringer bound. 
 
In chapter 5 we explain the design of our research.  It consisted of 3 studies. 
Eight organisations participated in the first.  They filled out questionnaires with which 
data were given for about 20 audit cases concerning 1996 or 1997, each as to their 
assessed occurrence risk and error found.  The answers were based on the actual audit 
files, as much as possible.  Next to that, scores were asked for the same audit cases on 
roughly 20 risk indicators.   
The first study was followed by a second one: a replication of the validation of classical 
risk assessment, as it was done in one part of the first study.  Here the audit cases 
concerned 2001. 
Finally in a third study ‘system testing’ was investigated as part of the underpinning of 
risk assessment.  The second and third study were partly guided by the availability of 
data. 
In this chapter we explain our choice for a field study from the desire to validate risk 
assessment in the ultimate realistic and comprehensive setting.  And that we rejected 
an experimental study, because we could not find ways to approximate risk as it 
emerges (or hides) in ‘reality’ closely enough.   
 
In chapter 6 we report the results of the first study with respect to the validity of 
classical risk assessment.  They varied with respect to validation criterion. 
1. With respect to the “audit position” for one organisation only, a significant 
negative correlation was found.  Exactly only half of the relevant correlations 
had a ‘+’- sign, meaning that (the assessment of) occurrence risk tends to be 
higher when ‘audit position’ changes from 0 (not OK) to 1 (OK), where with valid 
assessment a negative sign is to be expected. 
2. With respect to the error rate validity turned out to be satisfactory for the pooled 
organisations: the correlation at this level was .43 (p-value <.01).  Still there was 
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a problem: the correlation coefficient varied considerably over organisations: 
from roughly 0 up to .72.  So although on the average risk assessment appears 
to be valid with respect to error rate, for an organisation this gives no guarantee 
for the validity of its own risk assessment. 
3. With respect to the sampling risk, validity could not be shown: for the pooled 
organisations a negative correlation was found (where a positive one indicates 
validity).  Twenty cases turned out to suffer a serious threat from ineffectiveness 
(insufficient audit effort, if sample size would be exclusively based on the 
assessed risk) and 19 cases a threat from serious inefficiency (more audit effort 
than needed).  For two of the distinct organisations it appeared that risk 
assessment is valid with respect to this criterion; but for two others the 
correlations were negative to a considerable extent. 
4. With respect to the distribution of the error rates, we again found a satisfactory 
validity, for the pooled organisations.  We had insufficient data for the distinct 
organisations to perform this analysis. 
The evaluation of this outcome cannot be unambiguous: two validation criteria showed 
relatively positive validity, albeit not stable over organisations; two criteria did not show 
validity.  Analyses for more or less constant levels of materiality did not improve this 
picture; neither did analyses with potential moderator variables. 
This instability over the organisations and the failure of the validity to improve for logical 
moderator variables led to the conclusion that validity of risk assessment is not self-
evident for an organisation.  So unless it has established this validity, the organisation 
should assume that validity of risk assessment with respect to the error rate is absent. 
The strongest conclusion can be that in risk assessment the auditor actually predicts 
the error and not the risk that this error will exceed materiality.  We planned to test this 
conclusion in a replication, the second study reported in this thesis. 
 
In chapter 7 we investigated whether risk indicators would improve validity of risk 
assessment with respect to the error rate, and preliminary questions. For this part of the 
first study we developed a set of about 20 risk indicators, from a pilot study, scrutiny of 
audit files, audit handbooks, textbooks and interviews with auditors. We analysed the 
indicators in this set by means of (multiple) correlations and regression. 
The indicators turned out to be consistent with the assessed occurrence risk: both the 
bivariate correlations with all and the multiple correlation with a standard subset of the 
indicators were satisfactory. 
The indicators were less consistent with the error rate.  The bivariate correlations 
showed relatively many with the ‘wrong’ (+) sign (6 out of 19), although the sign test 
showed that the number of the right (-) signs for the correlations was still significant.  
Many of the scatterplots we produced confirmed that the bivariate relations of error rate 
and risk indicators were weak. 
Only for two organisations a regression model that predicted the error rate could be 
formulated that was significant at the 5% level and had more than 20% explaining 
power. But these two models were very sensitive to the omission of one predictor: the 
explaining power vanished.  In addition many of the predictors (indicators) got the 
‘wrong’ sign, which implies that for that indicator you have to assume that the expected 
error decreases when (assessed) risk on that indicator increases.  This illogical finding 
can be explained by the phenomenon of ‘suppression’.  It does not invalidate the 
regression model, but makes it hard to interpret.  In conclusion, the indicators do not 
account for a convincing prediction of the error rate. 
We tried to improve prediction by regression analysis on factorscores and on scales, 
both constructed from the indicator scores.  But none led to a consistent improvement. 
Our conclusion was that we could not show improvement of the prediction of the error 
rate by the use of risk indicators 
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Because of many unanswered questions regarding the use of indicators, for a 
continuation of our study we expected more from an approach in which the promising 
relation of occurrence risk and error rate was further investigated. 
 
In chapter 8 we report the results of the replication of the first study into validity of the 
occurrence risk.  We were allowed to use data from four governmental audit 
organisations concerning 2001.  Unfortunately the relatively strong correlations of 
occurrence risk and error rate of the first study in our research, were not found in this 
replication.  At the level of an organisation, both error rate, ‘audit position’ and sampling 
risk correlated at a near zero, or insignificant level with the occurrence risk.  We had 
insufficient data for analysis of the conditional distributions.   
In this replication we extended our research questions into the question whether the 
“error of last year" would have predictive power for the “error of this year".  For two 
organisations we could calculate the relevant correlation.  The predictive power was 
virtually absent in both. 
Our conclusion for the organisation level had to be that in our replication we only found 
counter indications for the validity of risk assessment. 
For the pooled organisations we could establish a moderate, positive correlation 
between error rate and occurrence risk and also the empirical distribution of the error 
rates showed validity, more with respect to the occurrence than with the size of errors.   
 
In chapter 9 we try to find out whether system testing can be used as an underpinning 
of risk assessment, as this is done in practice.  This mostly regards the cases where the 
occurrence risk is assessed as ‘low’.  In such a case it is allowed to decrease the extent 
of substantive testing, on the condition that the risk assessment is underpinned by 
system tests.   In our view this implies that system tests have to be predictive for the 
substantive error. 
We analysed the relation between system tests and the error both at the transaction 
level and at the account level, in a very large set of dual purpose tests, divided over 5 
years (1995-1999). 
In all years at the transaction level the occurrence of a system error was predictive for 
the occurrence of a substantive error.  But still only in some 4% of the cases where a 
system error occurred, also a substantive error was found.   
In 4 out of 5 years (1996-1999), we found that at the account level, the occurrence of a 
system error is predictive for the occurrence of a substantive error.  In 2 out of 5 years 
(1998, 1999) we found, also at the account level, that the occurrence of a system error 
predicts the size of the substantive error.   
In this third study we also analysed the predictive power at the account level of the error 
“of last year" for the error “of this year".  This power was only found for the error size of 
1999.  As regards the occurrence of substantive error: here we found three significant 
correlations.  Only the relation between the years 1995 and 1996 was absent. 
Our conclusions were that system testing is not self evident as underpinning, but that 
there are conditions under which it has this power. 
 
 
In chapter 10 we summarise our conclusions; they regard the validity of the 
assessment of occurrence risk in the classical sense and the possibilities to improve 
this assessment by means of decomposition with risk indicators.  Next to that they 
regard the quality of system tests as predictor of the error rate and the “error of last 
year" as predictor for the “error of this year".  We gave them already at the end of the 
summary of the corresponding chapter. 
Most important conclusion is, that, unless an audit organisation has sufficient evidence 
on the validity of its risk assessment, it should assume that this risk assessment is not 
valid in the sense that it may replace substantive audit. 
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We also gave suggestions for continuation of this research.  In these suggestions we 
give preference to the possibility to engage in a development project in which the 
empirical distribution of the error rates of a ‘suitable set’ is taken as a point of departure.  
This distribution may serve as a prior distribution for the error rate in a new audit.  Risk 
analysis comes into the picture when this prior distribution is made dependent on the 
assessed risk (both for the distribution in the ‘suitable set’ and for the prior for the new 
audit).  When risk assessment has a high predictive power, the conditional distributions 
will differ substantially; when the discriminating power is absent, the conditional 
distributions will be the same.  But still the empirical distribution may lead to a reduction 
in the extent of substantive testing, if the empirical distribution gives much weight to low 
error rates.  In a rare case it may lead to an increase in substantive testing, if the 
empirical distribution gives much weight to the higher error rates. 
 
Provided the prior is derived from the empirical distribution with caution for changes and 
new risks and taking into account the preventive influence of auditing, this approach is 
ready for use as soon as the ‘suitable set’ is defined and the empirical distribution of its 
errors established.  Research may lead to the assessment of the predictive power of 
risk assessment for the empirical distribution and in that sense to validation of risk 
assessment and even to its calibration. 
 
Next to this approach with priors from suitable sets, we recommend to adopt another 
way of modelling the prior information.  This circumvents the problems with the Audit 
Risk Model and can be integrated in a natural way in the approach with the empirical 
distribution from suitable sets. 
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Samenvatting 
 
“Valideren van risico-inschattingen in 
accountantscontrole” 
 
In hoofdstuk 1 geven we aan hoe in de gebruikelijke praktijk van auditing het 
toegestaan is de gegevensgerichte controle aanzienlijk te verminderen, als een van de 
uitkomsten van risico analyse, het bestaansrisico, op 'laag' wordt ingeschat. Het 
bestaansrisico is het risico (of de kans) dat in de jaarrekening, zoals deze wordt 
voorgelegd aan de auditor, zich een materiële fout bevindt (een fout die zo groot is, dat 
hij goedkeuren in de weg staat).  Dit risico is het resultaat van het inschatten van: 
• het inherente risico: het risico op een materiële fout tengevolge van 
omgevingsfactoren; 
• het interne controle risico (control risk): het risico dat de administratieve 
processen onvoldoende mogelijke fouten tengevolge van omgevingsfactoren en 
als gevolg van eigen onvolkomenheden voorkomen, opmerken en / of 
corrigeren, zodat een materiële fout kan resulteren. 
In deze praktijk worden standaard tabellen gebruikt, die een ingeschat bestaansrisico 
omzetten in een toegestane vermindering van de gegevensgerichte controle. Dit 
gebruik riep vragen bij ons op: hoe kunnen deze tabellen worden gerechtvaardigd, is er 
een gezonde empirische basis voor het omzetten van een ingeschat bestaansrisico in 
een vermindering van de gegevens gerichte controle?  Om een antwoord te vinden op 
deze vragen besloten we een onderzoek op te zetten naar de validiteit van het 
inschatten van het bestaansrisico.  In dit onderzoek hoopten we helderheid te krijgen 
over het verband tussen een ingeschat bestaansrisico en het "werkelijke risico".  
Hiertoe hebben we meer inzicht in het ‘werkelijke risico’ en valideringscriteria nodig. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelen we een rechtvaardiging voor vier valideringscriteria: 
1. het foutpercentage (omvang van de fout als deel van de omvang van de 
rekening) en drie grootheden die op basis hiervan geconstrueerd kunnen 
worden: 
2. de "audit positie" van het foutpercentage (is deze groter dan de materialiteit?), 
3. het steekproefrisico (de kans dat een materiële fout niet wordt ontdekt, omdat 
slechts een steekproef is getrokken), 
4. de empirische verdeling van de foutpercentages in de verzameling van alle 
gevallen die in ons onderzoek geanalyseerd zijn (voor valide inschattingen 
verwacht je hierin voor een laag bestaansrisico dominantie van de lagere 
foutpercentages en voor een hoger bestaansrisico van de hogere 
foutpercentages). 
De inschatting van het bestaansrisico richt zich op het vaststellen van de kwaliteit van 
de administratieve processen.  Voor deze kwaliteit is het foutpercentage een directe 
indicator.  In steekproeven zullen processen van dezelfde kwaliteit een variatie in de 
foutpercentages laten zien.  In combinatie met de materialiteit (de goedkeurgrens) kan 
het foutpercentage een betere indicatie van het risico geven dat de administratieve 
processen een materiële fout zouden kunnen voortbrengen.  "Audit positie" en 
steekproefrisico zijn mede op de materialiteit gebaseerd.  Daarom zullen zij in principe 
betere valideringscriteria zijn.  We werden geholpen in het vinden van rechtvaardiging 
voor onze valideringscriteria door het "Ensemble Prediction System" - de basis voor 
weervoorspellingen - te exploreren en dit, naast het risico dat water (de fout) een dijk 
(de materialiteit) overstroomt, als metafoor te gebruiken.  Deze exploratie gaf ook grond 
aan het gebruik van de empirische verdeling van foutpercentages ter validering van het 
inschatten van risico's. 
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In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken we de logische eigenschappen van het Audit Risk Model 
(ARM) en geven een overzicht van relevant onderzoek.  We behandelen het "heuristics 
and biases"-paradigma van Tversky en Kahneman (T&K).  Dit paradigma vormt een 
basis voor het beschouwen van de risico inschattingen en voor een meerderheid van 
de beschikbare onderzoeken.  We exploreren het ARM op zijn gebeurtenissen-
structuur, zijn statistische validiteit en op het niveau waarop het risico wordt ingeschat.  
We concluderen dat oneigenlijke uitkomsten op de loer liggen, als gevolg van 
tekortkomingen m.b.t. de drie genoemde aspecten. 
Voor het ordenen van de beschikbare onderzoeken gebruiken we naast het T&K 
paradigma ook "consistency", "complexiteit" en "werking van het systeem" als 
ordenende begrippen.  Onze overzicht laat zien dat 
• de "biases" van het T&K paradigma zich inderdaad voordoen bij het inschatten 
van risico's, maar dat zij met een geschikte training beperkt blijven 
• het inschatten van risico's consistent is met relevante criteria; speciaal m.b.t. het 
foutpercentage.  Maar ongelukkigerwijs is deze consistentie niet stabiel over de 
onderzoeken 
• het inschatten van risico's op het niveau van "controle beweringen" (ook wel 
"controle criteria") tot verbeteren van de inschatting kan leiden 
• complexiteit van het controle object een negatieve invloed heeft op de kwaliteit 
van de inschatting, maar dat ervaring het omgaan met complexiteit verbetert 
• de paar onderzoeken naar de effectiviteit van systeemtests en naar de invloed 
van kenmerken van het administratieve systeem op het foutpercentage, wijzen 
op een voorspellende kracht voor het foutpercentage, maar ook de hoogste 
kwaliteit is niet sterk genoeg om fouten te voorkomen. 
Er is dus veel onderzoek op het terrein van risico inschattingen, met positieve 
uitkomsten.  Maar het grootste deel van dit onderzoek heeft slechts betrekking op 
aspecten van deze beoordeling.  Voor een sluitend antwoord op de vraag of de huidige 
praktijk van kwantificering van de risico is geoorloofd, zullen we het verband tussen het 
ingeschatte bestaansrisico en (de 4) valideringscriteria (onze indicatoren voor "het 
werkelijke risico") moeten onderzoeken.  Dat zal het doel van ons onderzoek zijn. 
Uit onderzoek dat wijst op een voorspellende kracht van specifieke aspecten van het 
administratieve processen kan worden geconcludeerd dat het decomponeren van 
risico-inschattingen de validiteit ervan kan verbeteren. Deze conclusie heeft ons ertoe 
gebracht om in de eerste studie niet alleen de klassieke risico-inschattingen te 
valideren, maar ook mogelijkheden te onderzoeken voor verbetering hiervan door de 
risico-inschatting op te delen over het inschatten van risico-indicatoren. 
 
Vooraf aan het behandelen van ons eigenlijke onderzoek lossen we in hoofdstuk 4 het 
probleem op, hoe het steekproefrisico te berekenen met behulp van de data die wij tot 
onze beschikking hadden: het geschatte foutpercentage en de bijbehorende steekproef 
omvang. In een simulatie studie laten zien dat het gebruik van de Betaverdeling, waarin 
deze twee grootheden worden gebruikt, geschikt is voor het berekenen van het 
steekproefrisico.  Als een extra vonden we sterke indicaties dat deze manier van het 
evalueren van steekproef resultaten een betrouwbaarheidsgrens geeft voor de fout in 
de jaarrekening, die valide is en scherper dan de gebruikelijke Stringer bound. 
 
In hoofdstuk 5 verantwoorden wij onze onderzoeksopzet.  Acht organisaties deden 
mee in de eerste studie.  Hen werd een vragenlijst voorgelegd naar gegevens over 
ongeveer 20 controle gevallen (uit de jaren 1996, 1997): het foutpercentage het 
ingeschatte bestaansrisico en scores op de risico indicatoren.  De antwoorden waren 
zoveel mogelijk gebaseerd op de controledossiers. 
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De eerste studie werd gevolgd door een tweede: deze hield de replicatie in van het 
valideren van het klassieke ingeschatte bestaansrisico, zoals dat al in de eerste studie 
was gedaan. 
Tenslotte werd in een derde studie de voorspellende kracht van "systeemtests" 
onderzocht.  De tweede en derde studie werden gedeeltelijk bepaald door de 
beschikbaarheid van de noodzakelijke data. 
In hoofdstuk 5 lichten we ook onze keus voor een veldstudie toe.  Hij is gebaseerd op 
de wens om risico inschattingen te valideren in realistische zettingen.  We kozen niet 
voor een experimentele aanpak, omdat het ons onmogelijk lijkt risico's dicht genoeg te 
benaderen, zoals die blijken of verstopt zijn in de werkelijkheid. 
 
In hoofdstuk 6 rapporteren wij de resultaten van de eerste studie naar de validiteit van 
de klassieke risico inschatting.  Zij varieerden per valideringscriterium, zoals de 
volgende samenvatting laat zien. 
1. Met betrekking tot de "audit positie" werd slechts voor één organisatie een 
significante negatieve correlatie gevonden.  Precies de helft van de relevante 
correlaties had een '+'- teken; in die gevallen bestond dus een tendentie dat een 
hoog ingeschat risico samenging met een 'audit positie' die goedkeuren niet in 
de weg stond.  Bij een valide risico inschatting zou je juist het omgekeerde (en 
dus een negatieve correlatie) verwachten. 
2. De validiteit met het foutpercentage als criterium was bevredigend voor de 
gepoolde organisaties: de relevante correlatie was hier .43 (p-waarde < .01).  
Toch was er een probleem: dezelfde correlatiecoëfficiënt per organisatie 
varieerde sterk: van 0 tot .72.  Hoewel dus gemiddeld de risico inschatting valide 
is m.b.t. het foutpercentage, geeft dit aan een organisatie geen garantie m.b.t. 
zijn eigen risico-inschattingen. 
3. De validiteit m.b.t. het steekproefrisico kan niet worden aangetoond: voor de 
gepoolde organisaties werd een negatieve correlatie gevonden (terwijl validiteit 
om een positieve vraagt). In twintig van de geanalyseerde audit gevallen bleek 
er een serieus gevaar voor te weinig controle inspanning te bestaan en in 
negentien gevallen bleek er een gevaar van een te hoge controle inspanning 
(meer dan nodig) te bestaan.  In het eerste geval dus ineffectiviteit, in het 
tweede inefficiëntie.  Geanalyseerd per organisatie bleek dat bij twee 
organisaties de risico-inschatting valide was op dit criterium (een sterke 
positieve correlatie); bij twee andere was de relevante correlatie juist sterk 
negatief. 
4. We vonden een bevredigende mate van validiteit met betrekking tot de 
empirische verdeling van foutpercentages op het niveau van de gepoolde 
organisaties. We hadden niet genoeg data om deze analyse op het niveau van 
de afzonderlijke organisaties uit te voeren. 
Deze uitkomsten zijn niet eenduidig: op 2 valideringscriteria vonden wij validiteit, ook al 
was deze niet stabiel over de organisaties; op 2 criteria vonden we geen validiteit.  
Analyses op een min of meer constant niveau van de materialiteit leidde niet tot 
verbetering van dit beeld, evenmin als analyses met potentiële moderator variabelen. 
Deze instabiliteit en het niet verbeteren voor potentiële moderator variabelen leidde tot 
de conclusie dat risico-inschatting door een organisatie niet vanzelfsprekend valide is. 
Tenzij hij deze validiteit heeft vastgesteld, moeten een organisatie er dus van uitgaan 
dat zijn risico-inschattingen niet valide zijn in de zin van ons onderzoek. 
Onze bevindingen maken de conclusie aannemelijk dat een auditor eerder het 
foutpercentage dan het risico inschat. Met de bedoeling deze conclusie te testen zetten 
wij onze tweede studie op (zie hfdstk 8). 
 
In hoofdstuk 7 onderzoeken wij of het gebruik van risico-indicatoren de validiteit van 
risico-inschattingen met betrekking tot het foutpercentage verbetert.  Voor dit deel van 
onze eerste studie ontwikkelden wij een verzameling van rond de 20 risico-indicatoren, 
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met behulp van een voorstudie, door het analyseren van controledossiers, controle-
handboeken, tekstboeken en interviews met auditors.  Wij analyseerden het verband 
tussen de indicatoren en het foutpercentage met behulp van (multipele) correlaties en 
regressie. 
De indicatoren bleken consistent te zijn met het ingeschatte bestaansrisico: zowel de 
bivariate correlaties als de multiple correlaties, met een door de hele analyse 
gehanteerde standaard deelverzameling van indicatoren, waren bevredigend. 
De indicatoren waren minder consistent met het foutpercentage.  Van de bivariate 
correlaties hadden er veel het 'verkeerde' (+) teken (6 van de 19) ook al liet de 
tekentoets zien dat het aantal "juiste" (-) tekens significant was (op het 5% niveau).  
Vele spreidingsdiagrammen bevestigden dat de bivariate relatie van foutpercentage en 
indicatoren zwak is. 
Slechts voor twee organisaties werd een regressiemodel gevonden dat het 
foutpercentage voorspelde en dat significant was op het 5% niveau en dat meer dan 20 
procent verklaarde variantie (lees: "verklarende kracht") had.  Maar deze twee modellen 
bleken erg gevoelig voor het wegnemen van een indicator: dan verdween de 
verklarende kracht vrijwel geheel.  Bovendien hadden vele indicatoren het "verkeerde" 
teken, wat zou betekenen dat je voor zo'n indicator moet aannemen dat de verwachte 
fout afneemt als het op die indicator ingeschatte risico toeneemt.  Die onlogische 
bevinding kan worden verklaard door het verschijnsel van "suppressie".  Het regressie 
model is daarmee wel valide, maar het kan nauwelijks nog geïnterpreteerd worden.  Al 
met al hebben wij met de indicatoren geen overtuigende predictoren voor het 
foutpercentage weten te vinden. 
We hebben geprobeerd de voorspellende kracht te vergroten door regressie op 
factorscores en op door onszelf geconstrueerde schalen, beide gebaseerd op de 
indicatoren, te analyseren.  Dit leidde niet tot een consistente verbetering.  Onze 
conclusie kan alleen zijn dat wij geen verbetering van de voorspelling van het 
foutpercentage door het gebruik van risico-indicatoren konden aantonen. 
Omdat er rondom de risico-indicatoren veel onbeantwoorde vragen waren, kozen wij 
voor een voortzetting van ons onderzoek waarin de meer belovende relatie tussen 
bestaansrisico en foutpercentage verder zou worden geëxploreerd. 
 
In hoofdstuk 8 rapporteren we de resultaten van deze gedeeltelijke replicatie van de 
eerste studie betreffende de validiteit van het bestaansrisico.  Hierbij kregen wij 
toegang tot data in de controle dossiers over rekeningen uit 2001 van 4 departementale 
audit diensten.  Helaas werden de relatief sterke correlaties van bestaansrisico en 
foutpercentage van de eerste studie, niet teruggevonden in deze replicatie.  
Op organisatieniveau waren de correlaties van bestaansrisico met foutpercentage of 
steekproefrisico vrijwel gelijk aan 0.  Ook de correlaties met "audit positie" waren niet 
significant.  Voor analyses met de conditionele verdeling hadden we te weinig gevallen 
per organisatie. 
In deze replicatie breidden we onze onderzoeksvragen uit tot de vraag of de "fout van 
het vorige jaar" de voorspellende kracht heeft voor de "fout van dit jaar".  Voor twee 
organisaties konden we de benodigde correlaties uitrekenen.  In beide gevallen waren 
deze vrijwel gelijk aan 0, dus de voorspellende kracht niet aantoonbaar. 
Op organisatieniveau leidde dit tot de conclusie dat onze replicatie alleen aanwijzingen 
gaf voor het afwezig zijn van validiteit. 
Op het niveau van de gepoolde organisaties vonden we een positieve correlatie tussen 
foutpercentage en bestaansrisico.  Dit werd ook teruggevonden met de conditionele 
verdeling; deze liet zien dat het bestaansrisico eerder het voorkomen dan de omvang 
van een fout voorspelt. 
 
In hoofdstuk 9 onderzoeken we of systeemtests gebruikt kunnen worden als 
onderbouwing van de inschatting van het bestaansrisico, zoals dit in de praktijk 
gebruikelijk is.  Deze onderbouwing betreft meestal de gevallen waarin het 
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bestaansrisico als "de laag" is ingeschat.  In zo'n geval staat, zoals al gezegd, de audit 
methodologie toe de omvang van de gegevens gerichte controle te verminderen, mits 
de risico-inschatting wordt onderbouwd door systeemtests.  Dit betekent, naar ons 
inzicht, dat systeemtests voorspellend moeten zijn voor de omvang van de fout. 
Om dit te onderzoeken analyseerden wij de relatie tussen systeemtests en de fout 
zowel op het niveau van een transactie als op het niveau van een rekening, in een zeer 
grote verzameling van "dual purpose tests", verdeeld over vijf jaar (1995 tot en met 
1999).  Op het niveau van een transactie was in alle jaren het vóórkomen van een 
systeemfout voorspellend voor het vóórkomen van een gegevensfout.  Dat nam niet 
weg dat slechts in ca. 4% van de transacties waarin systeemfouten voorkwam er ook 
een gegevensfout werd gevonden.  Op het niveau van een rekening vonden wij in vier 
van de vijf jaren (1996 tot en met 1999) dat het voorkomen van een systeemfout 
voorspellend is voor het voorkomen van een gegevensfout.  Voor de jaren '98 en '99 
vonden we bovendien dat het voorkomen van een systeemfout voorspellend is voor de 
omvang van de gegevensfout. 
In deze derde studie analyseerden wij ook de voorspellende kracht op het rekening 
niveau van de "fout van vorig jaar" voor de "fout van dit jaar".  Voor de foutomvang 
werd deze alleen gevonden voor het jaar 1999, voor het voorkomen van een 
gegevensfout vonden we drie significante correlaties; alleen de relatie tussen de jaren 
'95 en '96 was afwezig. 
Onze conclusie was dat systeemtests niet vanzelfsprekend zijn als onderbouwing, maar 
wel deze werking kunnen hebben. 
 
In hoofdstuk 10 vatten we onze conclusie samen; zij betreffen de validiteit van het 
inschatten van het bestaansrisico op de klassieke manier en de mogelijkheden dit te 
verbeteren via decompositie met behulp van risico indicatoren.  Daarnaast betreffen zij 
de kwaliteit van systeemtests als voorspeller van het foutpercentage en van de "fout 
van vorig jaar" voor de "fout van dit jaar". 
Belangrijkste conclusie is dat een organisatie alleen mag aannemen dat zijn risico-
inschattingen valide zijn, als hij dit ook empirisch heeft vastgesteld.  Voorlopig mogen 
we niet aannemen dat deze inschattingen het “werkelijke risico” geven. 
 
In dit hoofdstuk geven wij ook suggesties voor voortzetting van dit onderzoek.  Hierbij 
gaat onze voorkeur uit naar de mogelijkheid een ontwikkelingsproject op te zetten 
waarin de empirische verdeling van het foutpercentage, zoals gevonden in een 
"geschikte verzameling" (van audit gevallen), als uitgangspunt wordt genomen. Deze 
verdeling kan als voorverdeling voor het foutpercentage dienen in een nieuw audit 
geval. Ook het inschatten van het bestaansrisico komt in beeld, omdat deze 
voorverdeling afhankelijk gemaakt kan worden van het ingeschatte risico.  Dit kan 
zowel voor de verdeling in de "geschikte verzameling", als in de voorverdeling voor de 
nieuw audit.  Als risico-inschatting een voorspellende kracht heeft, zullen de 
conditionele verdelingen verschillen; als de voorspellende kracht er niet is, zullen de 
conditionele verdeling samenvallen. In beide gevallen kan de empirische verdeling, 
gebruikt als voorverdeling, echter toch leiden tot een vermindering van de omvang van 
de gegevensgerichte controle.  Dat zal met name gebeuren als deze verdeling veel 
gewicht geeft aan de lage foutpercentages.  In enkele gevallen zal hij ook tot een 
vermeerdering van de controle inspanningen kunnen leiden: als veel gewicht aan 
hogere foutpercentages wordt gegeven. 
Op voorwaarde dat bij de afleiding van de voorverdeling uit de empirische verdeling 
marges worden ingebouwd voor veranderingen en nieuwe risico's en ook het 
preventieve karakter van een controle niet uit het oog wordt verloren, is deze 
benadering bruikbaar als een "geschikte verzameling" is gedefinieerd en daarin de 
empirische verdeling van de foutpercentages is vastgesteld.  Het voortgaande 
onderzoek kan dan leiden tot het vaststellen van de voorspellende kracht van risico-
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inschattingen voor de empirische verdeling.  Zo wordt deze risico-inschatting 
gevalideerd en zelfs gecalibreerd, waarmee het het “werkelijke risico” aangeeft.   
Naast deze aanpak met voorverdelingen uit "geschikte verzamelingen", bevelen wij aan 
om een andere manier van modelleren van á priori informatie te gebruiken. Daarmee 
worden de problemen met statistische validiteit van het Audit Risk Model vermeden en 
de door ons voorgestelde modellering kan op een vanzelfsprekende manier 
geïntegreerd worden in de aanpak met de empirische verdeling van "geschikte 
verzamelingen". 
 
